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Abstract
This thesis examines the political economy of Mexican trade policy in the 
administration of Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988). The central question focuses 
on the reasons for and the conditions under which Mexico decided to liberalize its 
trade regime in the early 1980s. The study contends that Mexico implemented 
trade policy reforms because of a combination of five international and domestic 
factors. The first variable - the 1982 economic crisis - proves to be the catalyst for 
policy reform. Without this external shock, the Mexican policymakers might not 
have taken the decision to change so fundamentally the post-Second World War 
development strategy. The second determinant examines the international, 
especially US, pressures for economic policy change. It is argued that these 
pressures reinforced and helped speed up a liberalization process that the Mexican 
government itself had already initiated. The third factor explores the global 
resurgence of neoliberalism and the transmission of ideas. It is maintained that 
neoliberal ideas were carried from the international to the domestic arena through 
international education and institutions via an epistemic community. This paradigm 
shift globally proved to be a legitimizing factor for Mexican policymakers. The 
fourth variable is the institutional arrangements of the Mexican state. This factor 
conferred the Mexican decision makers with a certain degree of autonomy in the 
policymaking process, making the individual policymakers themselves important. 
Finally, the fifth factor examines the key policymakers and their perceptions, 
values and experiences. These policymakers were predisposed toward economic 
liberalization through a change in their professional and educational socialization 
experiences. All of the five variables are mutually dependent and reinforcing 
factors that best explain why Mexico liberalized its trade regime in the 1980s.
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Chapter One: Introduction: Trade Policy Reform in Mexico
Introduction
This thesis examines the reasons why Mexico liberalized its trade regime during 
the administration of Miguel de la Madrid (1982 to 1988). The focus is on the first 
four years of the de la Madrid government when Mexico substantially reduced 
commercial restrictions and made the commitment to long-term structural change 
by joining the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).1 Trade policy 
reform was so fundamental that, by the end of the decade, Mexico went from 
being one of the most protected to one of the more open economies in the 
international system.
The liberalization of trade restrictions is important because not only did it 
signal a policy shift, but it marked a watershed in the underlying philosophy of 
Mexico’s post-Second World War development strategy (1940 to 1982). The 
postwar policy had been loosely based on the theory of economic nationalism, 
emphasizing the primacy of the state in economic policymaking and 
industrialization as its foremost objective. With the de la Madrid administration, 
Mexico now turned toward the theory of economic liberalization. Rather than 
supporting state intervention, the new philosophy stressed the commitment to the 
market and the price mechanism and managing the market economy in order to 
achieve economic growth, maximize efficiency and ensure the progress of the 
modernization of Mexican society.
Why did Mexico reverse forty years of development policy and shift 
toward economic liberalization in the 1980s? The principle hypothesis examined 
argues that Mexico’s trade liberalization was introduced as a result of 
complementary international and domestic pressures, which bolstered a process of 
reform initiated, on its own accord, by the de la Madrid economic team.
'The GATT entered into force in January 1948 - the only multilateral instrument that lays down 
agreed rules for international trade. The GATT’s principal objective is to liberalize international 
trade and place it on a secure basis, thereby contributing to economic growth and development. It 
acts both as a code of rules and as a forum in which countries can discuss solutions to their trade 
problems and negotiate the reduction of various trade restrictive and distortive measures.
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Although the Mexican policymakers2 are responsible for making the decision to 
liberalize the economy, it was the international and domestic pressures which 
facilitated the pace and intensity of the reforms and ensured their continuance. 
Without these pressures, it is unlikely that the de la Madrid government would 
have liberalized as quickly and to the extent that it did in the 1980s.
The international relations field has long sought to determine a framework 
for analysis that would integrate both the international and domestic determinants 
for policy change.3 It is not the purpose of this thesis to evaluate the relative 
merits of these approaches, but rather to state that both international and domestic 
variables are essential to explaining trade policy reform in Mexico. The economic 
policy of Mexico is affected by the qualities of its policymakers, its domestic 
socio-political and economic conditions and by the external environment and the 
stimuli the state receives abroad. Neither an emphasis on the international nor the 
domestic alone can determine the reasons for policy reform. As Keohane quite 
aptly argues,
An international analysis ... is ... neither an alternative to studying 
domestic politics, nor a mere supplement to it... On the contrary, it 
is a precondition for effective comparative analysis. Without a
2The terms policymaker and decision maker are used interchangeably to mean the top political 
leaders in the executive branch.
3For a discussion of the tri-level analysis, see, for example, Kenneth Waltz in Man, State and 
War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1954); on ‘linkage 
politics’, see James Rosenau, ‘Toward the Study of National-International Linkages’, Linkage 
Politics: Essays on the Convergence o f National and International Systems (New York, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1969); for an examination on two-level game approach, see Robert D. 
Putnam, ‘Diplomacy Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization (Vol. 
42, Summer 1988); for a critique of the two-level construct, see Jeffrey W. Knopf, ‘Beyond Two- 
level Games: Domestic-International Interaction in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
Negotiations’, International Organization (Vol. 47, Autumn, 1993); For a discussion on the 
domestic determinants of foreign policy, see Peter Katzenstein (ed.), Between Power and Plenty: 
Foreign Economic Policies o f Advanced Industrial States (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1978) and Stephen Krasner, Defending the National Interest (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1978); and finally, for an examination of the impact of the international economy 
on domestic politics and domestic economic policy, see Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: 
Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1986).
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conception of the common external problems, pressures, and 
challenges ... we lack analytic basis for identifying the role played 
by domestic interests and pressures ... Understanding the constraints 
imposed by the world political economy allows us to distinguish the 
effects of common international forces from those of distinctive 
national ones.4
Thus, this thesis offers five international and domestic determinants that have had, 
to varying degrees, significant effects on trade policy direction in Mexico: the 
impact of the 1982 economic crisis; leverage by international actors; the 
transmission of ideas; the institutional arrangements of the state; and the 
perceptions, values and experiences of the individual policymakers. These factors 
were derived through an examination of the empirical evidence provided by a 
wide-array of governmental and nongovernmental documents and interviewing 
Mexican and US politicians, civil servants and academics. (Archival work and 
interviews were held in London, UK; Madrid, Spain; Washington DC, USA; and 
Mexico City, Mexico. A list of interviews is included in the bibliography.)
The chapter is divided into three parts. The first section discusses the 
international relations theories that best explain why Mexico implemented trade 
liberalization policies. In addition, the section examines the existing studies on 
Mexican trade policy reform in the 1980s and highlights the problems with these 
analyses. The second part of the chapter discusses the five variables and how they 
answer why Mexico liberalized its trade regime in the 1980s. The final part 
outlines the structure of the thesis.
4Robert Keohane, ‘The World Political Economy and the Crisis of Embedded Liberalism’, in 
John H. Goldthorpe (ed.), Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1984), p. 16.
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1.1 Theoretical Approaches to Policy Change
There is no one theory that adequately explains why Mexico liberalized its trade 
regime. This thesis offers three: international regime theory, the epistemic 
community approach and a domestic political analysis. Before these theories are 
examined it is important to point out why the thesis does not use asymmetrical 
interdependence. When analyzing Mexico’s foreign policy - usually vis-il-vis the 
United States - complex interdependence5 is often employed.6 According to this 
approach, it is the asymmetries in dependence that are the sources of power and 
influence of one actor toward another in the international system. Hence, because 
of the asymmetrical interdependence between the United States and Mexico, the 
former has more power in influencing economic policy in the latter - forcing 
Mexico to implement economic policies it might not have otherwise chosen.
Understanding and defining power resources and the bargaining process are 
problems of the concept.7 The power to influence policy is not always as obvious 
as the relative strengths would make it appear. As Keohane and Nye point out, 
political bargaining is usually the ‘means of translating potential into effects, and a 
lot is often lost in the translation’.8 The reasons for Mexico opening its trade 
regime is more subtle than pure power relations would suggest. Rather than the 
use of asymmetrical power relations, an analysis of the interplay between 
international interdependence and domestic politics is essential.
This thesis utilizes international regimes, transnational networks and the 
Mexican state to analyze why Mexico liberalized its trade regime. The agreed 
upon rules in the international arena can greatly influence domestic behaviour.
5The concept of complex interdependence was introduced by Keohane and Nye. See Robert 
Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence, 2nd ed. (London: Scott, Fores man and 
Company, 1989).
6See, for example, George Grayson, Oil and Mexican Foreign Policy (Pittsburgh, PA: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988).
7R. Keohane and J. Nye, op. cit. , in footnote 5, p. 225.
%lbid, p. 11.
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International regimes, embodying the rules and regulations, are important 
influences on domestic policymaking. In addition, the role played by transnational 
alliances of parallel members in different societies and states also pressure 
domestic policy choices. Finally, the domestic policymaker in the executive branch 
and the institutions responsible for decisional outcomes are key to explaining 
Mexican trade policy reform.
1.1.1 International Regime Theory
The discussions of interdependence and what factors propel co-operation at the 
international level has focused attention on international regimes.9 Although the 
international system appears to be an ‘anarchical society*,10 international co­
operation, not conflict, is often the outcome of relations among states. The interest 
in international regimes is influenced by the wish to comprehend the mutually 
accepted limitations that affect the behaviour of nation-states. International regimes 
are defined simply as the ‘principles, norms, rules and, decision making 
procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area*.11 By 
creating or accepting the international regime, state governments regulate and 
control transnational and interstate relations. An example of an international 
regime is the global trading system created after the Second World War. The trade 
regime, as represented by the GATT, encompasses a combination of rules and
’For further discussion on the regime literature, see, for example, the special issue in 
International Organization (Vol. 36, No. 2, 1982). Also see, Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: 
Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1984). For a critique of the concept, see Susan Strange, 'Cave! hie dragones: A Critique of 
Regime Analysis’, in Stephen Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (London: Cornell University 
Press, 1983). Strange argues that the concept is a fad, ambiguous and imprecise. She maintains that 
the concept is value-based, essentially static and rooted in a state-centric paradigm.
10Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study o f Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan 
Press, 1977).
“Stephen Krasner, ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences’, International Organization 
(Vol. 36, No. 2, Spring 1982), p. 185.
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norms that limit government intervention in the international political economy and 
facilitate the free flow of goods across national boundaries.
Some regime analysts point to the role of a hegemon in assuming the 
leadership and guaranteeing the order in the international political economy, and 
thus perpetuating the international trade regime.12 The analysis for this study 
emphasizes the international transactions among nation-states rather than the 
hegemon. This position argues that increasing transactions in the international 
system triggers a learning process which produces and ensures the perpetuation of 
international regimes. This would explain the lag times between changes in power 
structures and transformations in international regimes.13 The approach maintains 
that even if the hegemonic actor becomes too weak to enforce the basic rules upon 
which the system depends, the international regimes put in place by the hegemon 
tend to persist and can even be strengthened.14 The analysis, therefore, should 
not concentrate on the existence of a hegemon as a stabilizing influence in the 
international system, but on the ideas, values and norms of the regime left in its 
place. It is the international regime, not the hegemon, that influences domestic 
policymakers.
International regime explanations for policy change are important in order 
to set the broad margins of and to describe the environment in which certain
12The hegemonic power has a strong preference for liberal economic regimes and possesses the 
power to maintain such regimes either by providing collective goods - such as an open and liberal 
trading system - or by coercing reluctant states to participate. The hegemonic economy uses its 
influence to create the norms and values that make up the international regimes. The regime 
dictates what is and is not legitimate behaviour in order to limit conflict, ensure equity or expedite 
agreement. The HST holds that domestic policy change is shaped by a state’s position in the 
international economy. The HST has been subjected to much inquiry and debate. See Duncan 
Snidal, ‘The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory*, International Organization (Vol. 39, No. 4, 
Autumn 1985) and R. Keohane, op. cit., in footnote 9. The demise of the HST school of thought is 
not so clear cut. The debate about the decline of American hegemony is addressed in Susan 
Strange, ‘The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony’, International Organization (Vol. 41, No. 4, 
Autumn 1987).
13Keohane argues that the HST theory could not explain these lag times. Robert O. Keohane, 
‘The Demand for International Regimes’, International Organization (Vol. 36, No. 2, Spring 
1982), p. 326.
MD. Snidal, op. cit., in footnote 12.
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policy decisions were made, however, they cannot explain the reasons for specific 
policy choices by domestic policymakers. With the increasing interdependence of 
national economies, there results a clash between domestic policy autonomy and 
the influence of international regimes. A central focus of this thesis is how the set 
of ideas or beliefs were transferred from the international system into the domestic 
decision making process (in Chapter 5). In the case of Mexican trade reform, the 
acceptance of international regimes could be explained by: 1) coercion; 2) by some 
inherent logic of economic liberalism or 3) an acceptance of an ideology, a belief 
or set of ideas. This thesis argues that Mexican trade liberalization was neither the 
product of coercion nor the product of the power of the market. Rather, this study 
asserts that Mexican policymakers voluntarily, consciously and deliberately 
embraced the ideas of the international regime, and formulated policies 
accordingly. An explanation for how these ideas and beliefs are transferred from 
the international to the domestic is needed. The epistemic community approach 
attempts to provide the link.
1.1.2 The Epistemic Community Approach15
An epistemic community is a network of knowledge-based experts with recognized 
specialization and ability in a particular field and an authoritative claim to policy­
relevant knowledge within this sphere or issue-area. The epistemic community 
approach explores the role of these communities in helping the state identify its 
interests and determining the reasons for and possible solutions to complex 
problems facing the nation. The state, in response to new knowledge articulated by 
an epistemic community, may elect to pursue entirely new objectives - such as
13The term ‘epistemic community’ comes from B. Holzner and J. Marx, see Burkhart Holzner
and John H. Marx, Knowledge Application: The Knowledge System in Society (Boston, MA: Allyn 
& Bacon, 1979), pp. 107-11. They defined the term as a shared faith in the scientific method as a 
way of generating truth. My use of epistemic community will draw from Peter M. Haas. See, for 
example, Peter M. Haas, ‘Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy 
Coordination', International Organization (Vol. 46, No. 1, Winter 1992), pp. 1-35 and Peter Haas,
‘Obtaining International Environmental Protection through Epistemic Consensus', in Ian H. 
Rowlands and Malory Greene (eds), Global Environmental Change and International Relations 
(London: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 38-59.
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economic policy reform. The group of scholars who put forth this view argue that 
control over knowledge and information is an important dimension of power and 
that the diffusion of new ideas and information can lead to new patterns of 
behaviour.16
This approach uses the epistemic community as the basic unit of analysis. 
They have:
1) a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a 
value-based rationale for the social action of community members;
2) shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of 
practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their 
domain and which then serve as the basis for elucidating the 
multiple linkages between possible policy actions and desired 
outcomes;
3) shared notions of validity - that is, intersubjective, internally 
defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the 
domain of their expertise; and
4) a common policy enterprise - that is, a set of common practices 
associated with a set of problems to which their professional 
competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human 
welfare will be enhanced as a consequence.17
Epistemic communities consist of individuals from any discipline or 
profession, such as economics, who have a strong claim to a body of knowledge 
valued by society. These individuals acquire their knowledge through educational 
and professional experiences. All economists, for example, do not belong to an 
epistemic community. They share a set of causal approaches and a consensual 
knowledge, but they do not necessarily share normative commitments. Each sub­
group of economists, such as Keynesians, structuralists and monetarists, constitute
16See the contributions to International Organization (Vol. 46, No.l, Winter 1992).
17P. Haas, ‘Introduction’, op. cit., in footnote 15.
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epistemic communities on their own. Each systematically contributes to a concrete 
set of projects informed by its preferred views, beliefs and ideas.
Although an epistemic community emerges in the national arena, they often 
forge links with like-minded communities internationally. These transnational links 
are strengthened as a result of the diffusion of community ideas through 
conferences, journals, research collaboration and an array of informal dialogues 
and connections. These transnational ideas take root in international organizations 
and/or in individual state institutions. Then they are circulated to other states via 
the decision makers who have been influenced by the community’s ideas.
According to this approach, there are three major elements for epistemic 
co-ordination: uncertainty, interpretation and institutionalization. The complex and 
technical nature of the wide-range of issues (e.g., monetary, macroeconomic and 
environmental) confronting domestic policymakers today causes a certain amount 
of uncertainty with regard to policy formulation, especially in times o f crisis. With 
the increasing economic interdependence of nation-states and the globalization of 
the economy, the domestic and international agendas have become increasingly 
linked. Understanding these complex linkages is vital for domestic policy 
formulation. In times of uncertainty, policy elites may not be sure what strategies 
will most likely keep them in power. Also, poorly understood conditions create 
enough disorder that standard operating procedures may break down, making 
institutions unworkable. When confronting conditions of uncertainty, therefore, 
policymakers have reasons to look to specialists for help.
Because of the epistemic community’s acknowledged expertise, its members 
are accorded access to the political system by policy elites who legitimize their 
activities. Whether the ideas of these communities influence policy choice depends 
upon the group’s access to the decision making process. One way this is done is 
through the political infiltration of an epistemic community into governing 
institutions. This access enables the community to lay the groundwork for a 
broader acceptance of their ideas and beliefs. An important point that this 
approach makes is that once inside the bureaucratic process, these communities do
9
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not operate to preserve their mission and budgets, as the bureaucratic politics 
paradigm would indicate. Rather, the epistemic community applies its knowledge 
and beliefs to the policymaking process. Once part of the bureaucracy, the 
community may vie for key positions, thus increasing their influence over policy 
decisions. The epistemic community approach to policy change attempts to answer 
questions such as, how ideas emerge and change, why some ideas prevail over 
others, how these ideas are disseminated and who the carriers are. The 
communities, who acquire their knowledge through both professional and 
educational experiences, are the channels or carriers of the new ideas into the 
domestic policymaking process. The epistemic community can influence the 
content and direction of policy through access to state institutions.
Haas argues that by shifting the focus to these ‘goal-seeking’ actors, the 
study of international relations is influenced in two ways: by the substantive role 
of ideas as a motivating source of national interest and by the question of 
institutional learning as different governments respond to the provision of 
consensual knowledge.18 International relations scholars have introduced many 
variables and concepts to help understand policy outcomes and co-ordination. The 
epistemic community approach explains how these transnational networks convey 
ideas to decision makers that influence their perceptions of policy dilemmas and 
the possible solutions to the problems. Thus, the epistemic community approach is 
useful for understanding how the ideas and perceptions of the domestic 
policymakers are formed.
Both international regime theory and the epistemic community approach 
help explain why Mexico liberalized its trade regime. The first approach describes 
the international policymaking environment and the rules and norms of the 
international system. The epistemic community approach illustrates how the 
international regimes are transferred from the international to the domestic 
policymaking arena. It provides an answer to how decision makers acquire
18P. Haas, ‘Obtaining...*, op. cit., in footnote 15, p. 41.
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particular policy preferences and what international factors determine the 
perceptions of specific policy problems. What is needed now is an analysis of the 
domestic political process.
1.1.3 The Domestic Political Process
This state-centred approach19 attributes policy outcome to the individual 
policymakers and the institutional arrangements of the state. Both elite theories of 
politics and the institutional theories of the state represent these positions.20 The 
state is credited with specific interests and policy preferences of its own as well as 
the capacity to impose those preferences against domestic resistance. The capacity 
to implement policy depends on the institutional setting and the organizational 
resources they have at their command and the autonomy of the state.21 Without a 
certain degree of state autonomy, policy elites would find it difficult to pursue
19See, for example, Theda Skocpol, ‘Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in 
Current Research*, in P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol, Bringing the State Bade In 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
20For information on elite theory, see Patrick Dunleavy and Brendan O’Leary, Theories o f the 
State: The Politics o f Liberal Democracy (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1987), Chapter 4. For a 
discussion of the ‘new institutionalism’, see James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, ‘The New 
Institutionalism’, American Political Science Review (Vol. 78, No. 3, September 1984).
2lThere exists a vast literature on the autonomy of the state (or lack of). The definition of 
‘autonomy’ poses some problems as it is not clearly defined. The Marxist definition holds that 
autonomy exists when the state overcomes the opposition of the capitalist class that is taken to be 
dominant within civil society. Hamilton defines autonomy as ‘the ability of those who control the 
state apparatus to use it for ends other than, and particularly contrary to, those of the dominant 
class, since it is this class which benefits from the reproduction of the existing mode of production 
by the state’. Others explain the term as the extent to which the state translates its own preferences 
into authoritative actions. Nordlinger offers four subjective properties of the state: malleability, 
insulation, resilience and vulnerability. See, for example, Nora Hamilton, The Limits o f State 
Autonomy: Post-Revolutionary Mexico (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 23; 
Eric A. Nordlinger, On the Autonomy o f the Democratic State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1981). Joel Migdal focuses on the dichotomy of a strong state-weak state, rather 
than on the autonomy of the state. According to Migdal, whether a state acts autonomously is not 
the central question. Rather, the focus should be on whether the state is able to implement what its 
policymakers set out to do. Joel Migdal, ‘Strong States, Weak States: Power and Accommodation’, 
in Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington, Understanding Political Development (Boston, MA: 
Little, Brown and Co., 1987) and also see Stephen Krasner, Defending the National Interest 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978).
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politically delicate policies associated with dramatic shifts in policy, such as trade 
liberalization. The state-centric explanations are important for indicating the major 
role played by decision makers and state institutions in determining policy 
outcomes. In a country like Mexico, where the state defines the goals and 
objectives of society, the perception of these policymakers and the organizational 
context of the government is vital to policy reform.
The state-centric analyses rely exclusively on the state as the most 
important actor in the international system. They consider all states as somewhat 
the same, ignoring the structural power relations among states. In addition, this 
approach does not acknowledge the importance that transnational actors and 
coalitions can play in international relations, thus it understates the role of non­
state actors within and outside of the state.22 However, the emphasis on the 
individual policymakers and the institutional arrangements of the state coupled 
with international regimes and transnational networks does provide a satisfactory 
theoretical framework for analysis. The following section discusses the existing 
studies on trade policy reform in Mexico and how they are lacking in their 
explanations.
^For critiques of the state-centric, realist paradigm, see, for example, Robert Keohane (ed.), 
Neorealism and its Critics (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1986).
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1.2 Existing Studies
Although there is ample material written on Mexican economic policymaking in 
general - especially the management of the debt crisis,23 there exists no study that 
adequately answers why Mexico liberalized its trade regime. Three works do 
attempt to address this question. The first two explore the reasons for economic 
policy change by focusing on the international determinants, while the third 
examines the domestic variables. In the first work, Teichman argues that state 
managers were weak vis-d-vis international actors and therefore, Mexico 
liberalized its economy primarily because of pressure from the United States and 
international financial institutions.24 This explanation disregards the importance of 
domestic factors, wrongly argues that state managers were in a weak position vis- 
d-vis international actors, and cannot explain Mexico’s decision to liberalize trade 
before these external forces were exerted.
The second study by Stallings does not address Mexico specifically but 
offers a general framework for developing countries.25 She maintains that 
although domestic influences can be important, international factors - such as the 
leverage by international actors - are crucial to explaining broad policy shifts. Her 
argument, while useful for an international analysis, fails to explain why Latin 
American countries facing similar external pressures took very different policy 
directions.
a See, for example, John Bailey, Governing Mexico: The Statecraft o f Crisis Management 
(London: Macmillan Press, 1988); Wayne A. Cornelius, The Political Economy o f Mexico Under 
de la Madrid: The Crisis Deepens, 1985 - 1986 (San Diego, CA: University of California, San 
Diego, Center for US - Mexican Studies, 1986); Robert E. Looney, Economic Policymaking in 
Mexico: Factors Underlying the 1982 Crisis (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1985); Miguel 
D. Ramirez, Mexico’s Economic Crisis (New York, NY: Praeger, 1989) and Donald L. Wyman, 
Mexico’s Economic Crisis: Challenges and Opportunities, Monograph Series 12, Center for US- 
Mexican Studies (San Diego, CA: University of California, San Diego, 1983).
^Judith A. Teichman, ‘Mexico and Economic Change*, Latin American Perspectives (Vol. 19, 
No. 2, Spring 1992).
“Barbara Stallings, ‘International Influence on Economic Policy: Debt, Stabilization, and 
Structural Reform’, in Stephen Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman (eds), The Politics o f Economic 
Adjustment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).
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Both these studies identify the leverage by international actors, but fail to 
acknowledge the importance of domestic factors for Mexican trade policy reform. 
Although this thesis does acknowledge its importance, the leverage argument 
leaves important questions unanswered. If international actors were so influential, 
then why did some Latin American countries liberalize in the 1980s and others did 
not? Are domestic factors totally irrelevant? Do not domestic policymakers have 
some say in policymaking or are they at the mercy of international pressures?
Stallings does highlight a very important international variable - the 
transmission of ideas - but she does not take the argument far enough. She argues 
that the transmission of ideas is indeed an important factor in the broad policy 
shift toward economic liberalization in the developing world. She does not, 
however, identify how these ideas influence decision makers or how they were 
transferred from the international to the domestic policymaking arena. The 
transmission mechanisms and the carriers of ideas are important factors for 
Mexico’s decision to liberalize its trade regime. The thesis analyzes the reasons 
for the resurgence of neoliberalism globally and the means by which the ideas 
were transferred to Mexican policymakers.
The third study examined primarily the domestic reasons for policy change 
- the role of the private sector during the de la Madrid administration.26 Of all 
the interest groups in Mexico, the business community would most likely have had 
the most influence on policy direction. Yet, Hobbs found that business groups, 
although more influential than in the past, were marginalized in -the policymaking 
process before 1985 because of the corporatist structure of the Mexican state.
After this time, the private sector was restricted to a reactive rather than proactive 
role in policymaking decisions. By identifying the corporatist structure of the 
Mexican state, Hobbs does identify an important variable for policymaking in 
Mexico - the institutional arrangements of the Mexican state. However, he does
“See, Jeremy Hobbs, The Role o f Business Organisations in the Transition from an Import 
Substituting to an Export-oriented Model o f Growth in Mexico After 1982, PhD thesis (Colchester: 
University of Essex, 1991).
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not emphasize the institution of the presidency or the importance of the individual 
policymakers within the executive branch. These two factors are key to explaining 
the domestic variables for trade policy reform during the de la Madrid 
administration.
As argued above, there are many important questions still unanswered in 
these three studies. In response, this thesis attempts to provide a fuller 
understanding for why Mexico liberalized its trade regime by introducing five 
factors. It is argued that the domestic and international determinants are mutually 
dependent and reinforcing variables. Without any one of the five variables,
Mexico would have had a much more difficult time implementing such radical 
policy reforms. The variables are discussed in the following section.
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1.3 International and Domestic Determinants
This thesis proposes five international and domestic determinants for Mexican 
trade reform in the 1980s. The international factors are the impact of the 1982 
economic crisis, leverage by international actors and the transmission of ideas 
from the international system to the domestic political arena. It is argued that the 
economic crisis is the catalyst for policy change, the leverage by the international 
actors proves to be a reinforcing factor, while the shift in the global development 
paradigm provides the outer margins for policy choice. The domestic variables are 
the institutional arrangements of the state and the perceptions, values and 
experiences of the individual policymakers. The study maintains that the 
institutional arrangements bestow the Mexican decision makers with a certain 
degree of autonomy in the policymaking process, while the perceptions, values and 
experiences determine the specific policy choices. These five mutually reinforcing 
variables best explain why Mexico liberalized its trade regime during the de la 
Madrid sexenioP  The international and domestic variables are introduced below.
1.3.1 The Economic Crisis
The early 1980s was a time of crisis in Mexico. Not only was the country unable 
to service its huge external debt and manage its considerable budget deficit, but 
there were socio-political problems that had been brewing for over a decade.28 
The new de la Madrid government was confronted with the task of attempting to 
manage the economic, political and ideological crises.
In this study of why Mexico decided to liberalize its trade regime, the 
economic crisis confronting the country is one of the foremost external variables. 
Hence, the nexus between crisis and policy change is central to the thesis.
27The sexenio is the 6-year presidential term. The 1917 Constitution stipulates that a Mexican 
president can only serve one term; he cannot stand for re-election.
“For more information on the concept of crisis and the socio-political problems, see Miguel 
Basanez, 20 Years o f Crisis in Mexico, 1968-1988, PhD Thesis (London: The London School of 
Economics and Political Science, 1991).
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However, determining the link between the crisis and policy change can be 
difficult. Unless a clear measure of crisis is adopted, explanations can involve a 
sort of circular reasoning: fundamental policy changes are initiated because there 
is a crisis and therefore a crisis exists when major policy reforms are adopted. 
Hampson offers three criteria to define a crisis situation: policymakers perceive 
that a crisis exists; there is a general consensus among the policymakers that the 
crisis situation is real and of a threatening nature; and decision makers believe that 
failure to act on the crisis could jeopardize the legitimacy and survival of the 
regime.29
Crisis decision making provides the opportunity for policy reform. Not 
only is there a perceived threat, but policy decisions must be made in a short time 
period. The primary actors responsible are the president and his advisors excluding 
the Congress, bureaucracy and interest groups.30 It is argued that during such 
crises, there is not only strong pressure for reform, but decision makers are more 
likely to institute radical or innovative policies than when a crisis does not exist. 
Although institutions are prone to inertia, they become more flexible in times of 
crisis. The environment becomes less of a policymaking constraint and new ideas 
and solutions are introduced.
Although the crisis situation of the early 1980s provided the opportunity to 
implement reforms, it did not necessarily stipulate what those reforms would 
entail. As the cases of many countries in Latin America clearly illustrate, similar 
crises generated dramatically different policy responses. In the largest and third 
largest debtor countries in the region, Brazil and Argentina, domestic 
policymakers were resistant to neoliberal stabilization policies and these countries
^Ten Hampson, Forming Economic Policy: The Case o f Energy in Canada and Mexico 
(London: Pinter Publishers, 1986), pp. 16-17.
^For more information on crisis policy, see Randall B. Ripley and Grace A. Franklin, 
Congress, The Bureaucracy and Public Policy (Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, 1980); John Spanier 
and Eric M. Uslander, American Foreign Policy Making and the Democratic Dilemmas, fourth ed. 
(London: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1985); and Graham Allison, Essence o f Decision: Explaining 
the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co., 1971).
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applied a variation of heterodox policies to deal with the economic crisis. In 
Mexico, on the other hand, orthodox stabilization policies were implemented and 
long-term structural reform, including trade liberalization, were policy objectives 
from the beginning of the de la Madrid administration. The difference in policy 
response was due to domestic factors. Although the economic crisis acted as an 
external pressure for some kind of policy reform and was a necessary precondition 
for policy initiatives, the exact content was determined by domestic policymakers.
1.3.2 International Leverage
The second international force for policy change in Mexico concerns the leverage 
placed on the Mexican decision makers by the creditor nations - primarily the 
United States, international financial institutions and commercial banks. The 
leverage by international actors proves to be a reinforcing factor for policy reform. 
It is necessary to examine the dimensions of the action, but is not particularly 
useful in explaining why specific changes occurred in Mexico. In 1982 Mexico 
could no longer service its external debt obligations and required International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) assistance in the form of stand-by loans, renegotiations of 
the debt and increased levels of financial support. The leverage argument 
maintains that the magnitude of the crisis and the need to rely to some extent on 
external assistance, provided an opportunity for those external players to offer 
assistance and set the conditions for its disbursement. In exchange for increased 
financial assistance, the IMF, the major donor institutions and the United States 
prescribed economic management based on neoliberal economics and focused on 
stabilization and structural adjustment.
The ‘leverage* explanation argues that the external economic crisis changed 
the basic policy agenda during the 1980s, forced some policy changes directly and 
enhanced the political power of creditors. Because of the economic constraints on 
domestic policymakers and the asymmetry in the power relations between Mexico 
and its creditors, the country was strongly pressured to adopt the orthodox policy
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reforms.31 But can national responses be explained solely by the power of 
international actors? Because of the leverage they had, did international creditors 
force Mexico to reform policy? Most Latin American countries experienced the 
debt crisis, and subsequently faced pressure of varying degrees to reform policy in 
the direction of neoliberalism. Yet, the differences in their policy responses are 
more striking than their resemblances. How then can a difference in policy 
responses in the various countries be accounted for?
There are two problems with the ‘leverage* argument: the problems of 
implementation and the lack of commitment by the debtor countries. First, 
international actors had difficulty imposing their preferences despite apparent 
power asymmetries between them and the Latin American countries. Kahler found 
three obstacles that reduced the leverage of these international actors: the problems 
of cross-conditionality among donors and international financial institutions, the 
multiple and conflicting goals vis-d-vis the debtors and the difficulties that arose in 
the attempt to impose external conditions.32 These problems of policy direction, 
co-ordination and implementation greatly reduced the leverage by the international 
actors over the Mexican decision making process. In addition, whether certain 
policy reforms would be implemented depended upon the commitment of the 
specific domestic government. Kahler found in a cross-national study that those 
committed to policy reform would most likely undertake them and those that were 
opposed would resist their implementation.33 Thus, the central focal point returns 
to the domestic policymakers.
It is acknowledged that the international actors, especially the United 
States, had a considerable degree of leverage on Mexican policymaking, but this 
pressure did not force Mexico to implement policies it had not already wanted.
31B. Stallings, op. cit. , in footnote 25.
32Miles Kahler, ‘External Influence, Conditionality and the Politics of Adjustment’, in Stephen 
Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman (eds), The Politics o f Economic Adjustment (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1992).
™Ibid.
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Rather, the reinforcement from these international actors facilitated the speeding 
up of policy implementation and ensured their continuity. Moreover, the thesis 
will demonstrate that this leverage came after important long-term structural 
changes had already been initiated. The policy prescriptions advocated by these 
international governments and agencies coincided with a preferred policy path of 
the de la Madrid economic team.
1.3.3 The Transmission o f Ideas
Keynes argues that:
the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they 
are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is 
commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else.
Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any 
intellectual influences, are usually slaves of some defunct 
economist.34
This indeed proved to be true for this case. The third international factor is the 
transmission of ideas from the international system to the domestic political arena. 
The crisis enabled new ideas and solutions to enter the policymaking process.
These new ideas were brought in through information available from technical 
experts both inside and outside of the government. This technical information, 
carried by an epistemic community, was important in convincing decision makers 
in Mexico that a crisis existed, reform was needed and only certain options could 
solve the economic problems.
The thesis examines the fundamental shift in economic policy in the 
industrialized nations and the corresponding change in policy in the developing 
world. A shift occurred in the global development paradigm ushered in by new 
ideas concerning the best way for states and markets to interact. With the 
ascendance of neoclassical economics in Britain and the United States in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, there occurred a shift toward orthodoxy in most developing
^J. M. Keynes, The General Theory o f Employment, Interest and Money (London: Macmillan, 
1936), p. 383.
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nations. In addition to the rise of such ideas in government circles, there was a 
long-term intellectual change within the economics profession and the development 
field. The perception that the East Asian newly industrializing countries had 
broken into international markets by shifting from an inward- to an outward- 
looking development strategy played an important role. The stark lessons of the 
successful export-oriented East Asian countries and the heavily-indebted and 
inward-looking Latin American nations were quite apparent to Mexico. The ISI 
strategy and the heterodox policies implemented in Latin America as a whole 
seemed to demonstrate the failure of the region’s post-Second World War 
development model.
The channels for transferring these orthodox ideas from the developed to 
the developing world include academic and institutional links. Through the study 
of these new ideas in the academic literature and through foreign education, senior 
economic policymakers and academic economists were important carriers of 
neoliberal economic ideas into Mexico. In addition, many of the Mexican 
policymakers had worked for international institutions such as the World Bank, the 
IMF or the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). These technocratic 
policymakers had a greater understanding of the new ideas and a comparative 
knowledge of similar countries’ experience through these transnational links with 
an epistemic community. This international linkage had a tremendous impact on 
the perceptions and values of Mexican policymakers.
The international conditions discussed above: the economic crisis, the 
leverage by international actors and the transference of ideas from the developed 
to the developing world all serve to explain the environment in which 
policymaking was made in Mexico in the early 1980s. International events may 
well have determined the margins and conditions for policy choice, but 
policymakers were still left with a significant range of options and substantial
21
Introduction Chapter One
room for manoeuvre in the extent, timing and order of reform initiatives.35 These 
individuals have made the critical difference in the introduction, the scope and the 
pursuit of economic policy reform. The discussion now turns to the two domestic 
factors: the institutional arrangements of the state and the perceptions, values and 
experiences of the individual policymakers.
1.3.4 The Institutional Arrangements o f the State36
This first domestic factor - the institutional arrangements37 of the Mexican state - 
is important for explaining economic policymaking because it endows the state 
with considerable powers vis-a-vis social classes and interest groups and places the 
executive branch at the forefront of making policy choices. The Mexican political 
system is characterized by limited political pluralism, low subject mobilization of 
the population and the predominance of patrimonial rulership on the part of a 
single leader or small group.38 By briefly examining statism and presidentialism, 
it will be possible then to focus the analysis on the few individuals in the executive 
branch responsible for economic policymaking in Mexico.
The roots of the modem Mexican state can be found in the Mexican 
Revolution and particularly the 1917 Constitution. According to Article 25:
“Reform is defined here as deliberate attempts by policymakers to ‘redress perceived errors in 
prior and existing policy and institutional arrangements’. See Merilee S. Grindle and John W. 
Thomas, Public Choices and Policy Change: The Political Economy o f Reform in Developing 
Countries (London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1991), p. 8.
“ There are many definitions of the state. The interpretation used here identifies both the 
individuals who occupy decision making positions within the executive and bureaucracy and the 
state institutions. The state is defined as an enduring set of executive and administrative 
organizations whose role is to control a given territory and to make authoritative decisions for 
society. See Max Weber, ‘Politics as a Vocation’, in H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, Max Weber: 
Essays in Sociology, 7th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 77-8.
37For an institutional analysis in the case of Mexico, see J. Bailey, op. cit., in footnote 23 and 
Sylvia Maxfield, ‘Bankers’ Alliances and Economic Policy Patterns: Evidence from Mexico and 
Brazil’, Comparative Political Studies (Vol. 23, No. 4, January 1991).
“ See Susan Kaufman Purcell, ‘Decision-Making in an Authoritarian Regime: Theoretical 
Implications from a Mexican Case Study’, World Politics (Vol 26, October 1973), p. 30.
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The rectorship of national development corresponds to the State in order to 
guarantee that this [development] is integral, that it fortifies the sovereignty 
of the nation, and that through the promotion of economic growth, 
employment, and a more just distribution of income and wealth, it permits 
the full exercise of the liberty and dignity of individuals, groups and social 
classes, whose security this constitution protects.39
Most importantly, the constitution provided the legal basis for an interventionist 
and autonomous state vis-a-vis social classes or interests and established Mexican 
sovereignty over its natural resources. Hamilton dates the consolidation of the 
Mexican state from the Cdrdenas period (1934 to 1940) when it took its 
nationalist-populist form.40 Statism as an institutional feature of the Mexican 
regime endows the state with considerable powers. As the rector of the economy, 
the Mexican state greatly influences the national unity and cohesion of society by 
the perceived pursuit and achievement of economic growth and development. In 
turn, the Mexican regime derives a large degree of legitimacy from this economic 
advancement, empowering the state and reducing the influence of the strongest 
interest group - the private sector.41
Traditionally, interest groups and competing political parties have had very 
little input into the policymaking process. Since the 1940s, the state has co-opted 
and controlled all major interest groups - the peasant, labour and some business
39John Bailey, Reform o f the Mexican Political System: Prospects for Change in 1987-88 
(Washington, DC: Office of External Research, US Department of State, 17 July 1987), p. 14.
40N. Hamilton, op. cit., in footnote 21, p. 271.
41For more information on the private sector, see John Bailey, ‘The Impact of Major Groups on 
Policy-Making Trends in Govemment-Business Relations in Mexico*, in R. Camp (ed.), Mexico's 
Political Stability: The Next Five Years (London: Westview Press, 1986); Roderic A. Camp, 
Entrepreneurs And Politics in Twentieth-Century Mexico (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); 
Sylvia Maxfield, ‘International Economic Opening and Govemment-Business Relations*, in W. 
Cornelius, J. Gentleman, and P. Smith (eds), Mexico's Alternative Political Futures, Monograph 
Series 30 (San Diego, CA: Centre for US-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 
1989); S. Maxfield and R. Anzaldtia M. (eds), Government and Private Sector in Contemporary 
Mexico, Monograph Series 20 (San Diego, CA: University of California, San Diego, Center for US 
- Mexican Studies, 1987); and L. Rubio F., ‘The Changing Role of the Private Sector’, in S. K. 
Purcell (ed.), Mexico in Transition, Implications for US Policy: Essays from Both Sides o f the 
Border (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988).
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organizations by incorporating them into the ruling party, the PRI. This 
arrangement is characterized by compulsory membership, lack of competition, 
hierarchical relationships and little or no autonomy from the state.42 The Mexican 
state has performed the critical function of regulating sociopolitical and economic 
interactions among various social forces through pacts and coalitions - a 
‘revolutionary coalition’.43 Because of this coalition, the political system has 
enjoyed relative stability for over sixty years.
Since policy emanates from the executive branch, it is then important to 
discuss the institution of the presidency. Theoretically, the constitution provided 
for legislative and judicial branches to provide checks-and-balances powers, but in 
practice, power has rested with the presidency. During the six-year term, the 
Mexican president is virtually omnipotent. He is generally immune from media 
criticism and opposition within the PRI. Until recently, the congress and the 
bureaucracy all obeyed him unconditionally. The president made all laws while the 
congress and the court functioned as rubber stamps.
The presidency has evolved so that it is the key to economic policy 
formulation and implementation. The institution of the presidency provides a small 
group of policymakers, led by the president, a substantial amount of autonomy in 
the policymaking process. The values, perceptions and experiences of these few 
individuals are key to the reasons for trade policy reform in the early 1980s. The 
next section outlines these individual policymakers.
1.3.5 The Individual Policymakers
In times of crisis and within the institutional framework of the Mexican state, 
individual policymakers have considerable autonomy in the policymaking process.
42Rose J. Spalding, ‘State Power and its Limits: Corporatism in Mexico’, Comparative Political 
Studies (Vol. 14, No. 2, July 1981), p. 141.
^Brandenburg called this group the ‘revolutionary family’ while Padgett named it the 
‘revolutionary coalition’. Frank Brandenburg, The Making o f Modem Mexico (Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964) and L. Vincent Padgett, The Mexican Political System (Boston, MA: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1966).
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The structure of the political institutions in Mexico influence both the capacity of 
the individual policymakers to act and the extent of social interests that are 
represented. Domestic policymakers are in the unique position to identify, 
articulate and propose policy reforms that coincide with the aims of the state and 
society. Policymakers are aware of the international and domestic interests and 
constraints in both historical context and bureaucratic capacity. They seek to 
manoeuvre within these constraints and to design solutions that will be politically 
acceptable and seriously address public problems.44
The choices available to the domestic policymakers are not derived from 
interest groups or classes, international actors and conditions or by the hold of 
history or culture on policy choices. Such influences form the outer boundaries of 
policy choice, but still leave the policymakers substantial room for manoeuvre. 
This room for manoeuvre and influence defines what Grindle and Thomas call a 
‘policy space’. For any given problem,
a space that is determined by the ability of a regime and its political 
leadership to introduce and pursue a reform measure without 
precipitating a regime or leadership change or major upheaval and 
violence in society, or without being forced to abandon the 
initiative. Within issue areas, a policy space consists of the range of 
options that could be introduced without major adverse 
consequences for policy makers, the regime, or reform itself.45
Why a specific policy decision is taken can best be understood by 
examining the origins of the perceptions, values and experiences of the individual 
decision makers. When determining the reasons for policy choices it makes a 
difference what values, experiences, training and commitments policymakers have 
when they are involved in discussions and debates about particular policy and 
organizational reform initiatives. The thesis argues that because of the generational 
distance from the 1910 Revolution and a shift toward private and foreign
^M. Grindle and J. Thomas, op. cit., in footnote 35, p. 5.
*sIbid, pp. 7-8.
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postgraduate education, the Mexican governing elite has changed.46 With the 
transformation in the ruling elite, policymakers have developed fundamentally 
different policy perceptions and prescriptions.
Because of the different personal values and predispositions of individuals, 
it makes a difference who the policymakers are. Especially in a country like 
Mexico where only a few individuals are involved in the policymaking process, 
the individual characteristics of the decision makers loom large and can greatly 
affect the outcome of issues being discussed. The perceptions of policy problems 
and the perceived viable solutions are important determinants in reform initiatives. 
These perceptions are undoubtably influenced by ideological biases. The thesis 
argues that through a domestic socialization in technocratic ministries - the central 
bank and the treasury - and private and foreign education - primarily in the United 
States - those policymakers predisposed to neoliberalism came to power and put 
forth their policy preferences.
The perceptions and ideological beliefs of the individual policymakers are 
greatly influenced by professional expertise and training. Increasingly, individuals 
with technical training and experience in specific subjects are found among 
decision makers in Mexico.47 Their specialization - in economics and public 
administration, for example - influences how they perceive problems and what 
solutions they believe ought to be applied. These domestic policymakers form
46The governing elite is defined as those leaders who directly or indirectly play a part in ruling 
society. These leaders include the Mexican executive branch, primarily the president, his cabinet 
and bureaucracy. It does not include the military or commercial elite.
47The Mexican ‘old-guard’ replaced by the new technocratic elite is discussed at length in 
Chapter 6. For more information, see Roderic Camp, The Making o f a Government: Political 
Leaders in Modem Mexico (Tucson, AZ: The University of Arizona Press, 1984); R. Camp, ‘The 
Political Technocrat in Mexico and the Survival of the Political System’, Latin American Research 
Review (Vol. 20, No. 1, 1985); Peter H. Smith, ‘Does Mexico Have A Power Elite?’, in Josd 
Reyna and Richard S. Weinert (eds), Authoritarianism in Mexico (Philadelphia, PA: Institute for 
the Study of Human Issues, 1977); and P. Smith, ‘Leadership and Change, Intellectuals and 
Technocrats in Mexico’, in R. Camp (ed.), Mexico's Political Stability: The Next Five Years 
(London: Westview Press, 1986).
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epistemic communities with transnational like-minded communities and influence 
the direction of policy reforms.
The international and domestic determinants outlined above are identified as 
the factors contributing to Mexico’s trade liberalization in the 1980s. It is argued 
that without one of these key variables, the others would have been less likely to 
have caused Mexico to liberalize its trade regime. The economic crisis is 
particularly important as it acts as the catalyst for policy reform. Without such an 
event, it is unlikely that Mexican policymakers would have made such a radical 
shift in trade policy as quickly and as fundamentally as they did. In addition, 
without the crisis, the ideological vacuum would not have been exposed to the 
degree that it was enabling the transmission of new ideas. These ideas greatly 
affected individual policymakers’ perceptions of policy options. The individual 
policymakers are key to the policy shift. They are the ones who chose a particular 
policy path before the crisis struck and implemented such policies afterward. They 
also were educated abroad incorporating new ideas to their beliefs and forming 
transnational links called epistemic communities. The institutional arrangements of 
the Mexican state enabled a select few to guide policy in Mexico with considerable 
autonomy in the policymaking process. Finally, the international actors are indeed 
important, but I argue not solely responsible for a policy shift as has been argued 
in previous studies. They act as a reinforcer to the domestic policymakers to stay 
the course and implement trade liberalization faster and further than might have 
been the case. Together, these five variables answer why Mexico liberalized its 
trade regime during the administration of Miguel de la Madrid.
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1.4 Thesis Structure
This thesis is comprised of seven chapters, of which, this introduction is the first. 
Chapter Two provides a brief historical overview of the post-Second World War 
development strategy from 1940 to 1986. The first part of the chapter examines 
the nationalist development strategy and the events leading up to the financial 
crisis in the summer of 1982. The second part explores the short-term economic 
stabilization policies of the de la Madrid administration. The economic conditions 
and the policies employed in the aftermath of the financial crisis explain the pace 
and intensity of the trade liberalizing reforms in the early 1980s.
Chapter Three discusses the first international variable: the economic crisis. 
It is argued that this systemic crisis acted as a catalyst for trade policy reform. The 
chapter tracks the implementation of trade liberalizing measures culminating in the 
accession to the GATT in August 1986. It is demonstrated that gradual trade 
policy reforms were a stated objective of the de la Madrid government from the 
beginning of the sexenio and before the crisis intensified. Although the reforms 
were initiated by domestic policymakers, the worsening economic crisis 
contributed to their rapid implementation.
Chapter Four considers the second international determinant: the leverage 
exerted by international actors on Mexican policymakers. The analysis looks 
primarily at the bilateral trade relationship between Mexico and the United States. 
In addition, the chapter explores the relationship between Mexico and international 
financial institutions. It argues that, although the United States and international 
financial institutions reinforced Mexico’s neoliberal economic policies, they did 
not force Mexican policymakers to implement such reforms.
Chapter Five looks at the third international factor: the transmission of 
ideas from the international system to the domestic arena. In particular, it focuses 
on the shift in global development paradigm from a state-led, inward-looking 
development policy to the more market-led, export-oriented strategy for growth. 
The chapter identifies the carriers or channels by which these ideas are conveyed 
from the international system to the domestic political arena (i.e., an epistemic
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community). The chapter links the transnational epistemic community with 
Mexican domestic policymakers.
Chapter Six examines the two domestic determinants: the state institutions 
and the perceptions, beliefs and experiences of the domestic policymakers. The 
chapter makes two points. First, the institutional arrangements of the Mexican 
state invested policymakers with a certain degree of autonomy from social interest 
groups, thereby enabling them to implement their policy preferences. Second, by 
determining the origins of the values and beliefs of the decision makers and their 
links to a like-minded transnational network, the reasons for particular policy 
reforms are identified.
Finally, Chapter Seven concludes the thesis by briefly summarizing the five 
international and domestic variables that explain trade policy reform in Mexico in 
the 1980s. It discusses the variables and their relevance in the post-1986 
economic, political and ideological developments in Mexico. The chapter ends by 
addressing the broader implications of these variables in the study of international 
political economy.
29
Chapter Two: The Historical Roots of Trade Liberalization in Mexico
Introduction
This chapter provides a brief historical overview of Mexico’s post-Second World 
War political economy (1940 to 1986). The first part examines the state’s import 
substitution industrialization (ISI) development model (1940 to 1970) and the 
economic troubles of the 1970s and early 1980s. This brief synopsis offers a fuller 
understanding not only of the nationalist development strategy, but also of the 
events leading up to the financial crisis in the summer of 1982. The second part of 
the chapter explores the short-term economic stabilization policies of the de la 
Madrid administration. The economic conditions and the policies employed in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis explain the pace and intensity of the trade 
liberalizing reforms in the early 1980s. Understanding the post-Second World War 
development strategy - its successes and failures - helps to determine the origins of 
Mexico’s shift toward economic liberalization in general, and trade policy reforms 
in particular.
2.1 The Post-Second World War Development Strategy
For most of this century, Mexico has experienced both political stability and 
economic growth unsurpassed in the Latin American region.1 This is due 
primarily to the authoritarian-corporatist regime established in post-revolutionary 
Mexico (1917).2 The social peace and political collaboration necessary for the 
rapid modernization of the economy was assured by instituting corporatist 
structures to co-opt and mollify the broad sectors of society included in the 
peasant, labour and popular organizations. The constitution of 1917 and the 
subsequent evolution of the state apparatus ensured the instruments necessary not
‘Unlike many of its counterparts that have experienced military coups and revolutions, Mexico 
has been governed by a succession of civilian presidents who each have served out his single six- 
year term followed by orderly elections managed by the ruling party, the PRI.
*For more information on this period in Mexican history, see Robert Ryal Miller, Mexico: A 
History (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985).
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only for the dominant role of the state vis-a-vis society, but also for an activist 
role in the economy.
2.1.1 State-led Industrialization (1940 to 1970)
Mexico’s foremost objective in the post-Second World War period was 
industrialization. Policymakers believed that industry would have spillover effects 
which in turn would lead to overall development. From 1940 to 1970, Mexico’s 
economic policy - known as desarrollo estabilizador or ‘stabilizing development’ - 
used the import substitution model. This strategy was based on the theory 
advanced by Raul Prebisch, the Director of the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Latin America (ECLA), and others who critiqued the neoclassical 
theory of international trade. The theory held that world demand for primary 
goods, traditionally exported by developing countries would decline relative to the 
demand for manufactured goods, traditionally imported by developing countries. In 
order to prevent impoverishment from declining terms of trade, Prebisch argued, 
developing countries should restrict imports and encourage domestic production of 
manufactured goods.3
The ISI strategy aimed at aiding industrial development with selective 
economic policies while protecting domestic production from external competition. 
This would entail an integrated domestic economy, one that could create goods for 
all the stages of the production chain: consumer, intermediates and capital. 
Economically, the main objective was to replace imported products with goods 
produced locally. The strategy encouraged the development of manufacturing, 
freeing the country from spending scarce foreign exchange funds on imports.
3Raul Prebisch, ‘Commercial Policies in the Underdeveloped Countries’, American Economic 
Review (May 1959), pp. 251-73. The role of ECLA and the ISI strategy is examined in Chapter 5, 
section 5.2.2.
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In addition to the economic reasons for the ISI strategy, there were also 
political goals.4 Successive Mexican governments believed that industrialization 
would lead not only to economic self-sufficiency, but also to political autonomy. 
The plan aimed at enabling Mexico to break away from external ties and gain self- 
sufficiency and independence, mostly from the United States.
Initially the strategy, which began Mexico’s industrial revolution, produced 
impressive results.5 Throughout the ISI period, Mexico had one of the fastest 
growing economies of the world with an average annual rate of growth of over 6 
per cent coupled with low inflation below 5 per cent annually.6 Sectoral shifts in 
both output and employment over the period illustrated the fundamental nature of 
the changes which the Mexican economy had experienced. From 1950 to 1968, 
industrial output increased on an average rate of growth of 6.7 per cent per year.
“The political motive was based on the dependencia approach. The most commonly sighted 
definition of dependency is given by Dos Santos as:
a conditioning situation in which economies of one group of countries are 
conditioned by the development and expansion of others. A relationship of 
interdependence between two or more countries or between such countries and the 
world trading1 system becomes a dependent relationship when some countries can 
expand through self-impulsion while others, being in a dependent position, can 
only expand as a reflection of the expansion of dominant countries, which may 
have positive or negative effects on their immediate development.
T. Dos Santos, ‘The Crisis of Development Theory and the Problem of Dependence in Latin 
America’, in H. Bernstein (ed.), Underdevelopment and Development: The Third World Today 
(Hammondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973), p. 76. For more information on the dependencia 
approach, see Cristobal Kay, Latin American Theories o f Development and Underdevelopment 
(London: Routledge, 1989); P. O’Brien, ‘A Critique of Latin American Theories of Dependency’, 
in I. Oxaal, et al. (eds), Beyond The Sociology o f Development (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1975); and Ian Roxborough, Theories o f Underdevelopment (London: Macmillan, 1979).
5Mexico’s industrialization began in the period before the rapid expansion of exports in the 
second half of the nineteenth century. In fact, industrial development in Mexico can be traced as far 
back as 1840, when small factories devoted to fabrics, paper and ironworks initiated the transition 
from artisan to modem industry. But the earliest major advances in industrial development were 
made in the late 1800s, particularly with the construction of railroads and the establishment of 
metallurgical factories. The industrialization process made significant progress in the decades prior 
to the Second World War and more importantly, prior to the beginning of the ISI strategy.
6Economic Commission for Latin America, Economic Survey o f Latin America (Santiago,
Chile: ECLA), various years.
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Manufacturing output grew from 1940 to 1968 at 7.8 per cent annually.7 In the 
process, Mexico restructured its economy from an export-enclave economy to a 
semi-industrial country. People migrated from the rural areas; agriculture’s 
contribution to total production diminished from 21 to 11 per cent.8 Whereas two- 
thirds of the labour force had been employed in agriculture in 1940, the figure 
dwindled to little more than a third by 1970.9 As the population moved to the 
urban areas, they found employment in industry and the service sector. By 1970 
Mexico was largely self-sufficient in the production of foodstuffs, basic petroleum 
products, steel and most consumer goods.
When the international environment began to change in the early 1970s 
with the OPEC petroleum price rises and the international recession which 
followed, Mexico’s economy also started to experience difficulties. This is when 
the flaws of the ISI strategy were exposed. The years of protection had made 
Mexican industry inefficient and highly uncompetitive internationally. The state’s 
large role in the economy had produced a swollen, inefficient and costly 
bureaucracy.
The difficulties inherent in the ISI programme were many. The most 
fundamental problems were that it prescribed development policies that did not 
take into account the market size, the product being produced or the nature of the 
technology used. The most obvious result of the strategy was the bias against 
exports and agriculture. Mexico neglected exports both by failing to diversify the 
export structure in accordance with the changing internal economic structure which 
ISI brought about. By the late 1960s, 75 per cent of Mexico’s exports still
7Roger D. Hansen, The Politics o f Mexican Development (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1971), p. 42.
8Carlos Tello, La Politico Economica en Mexico, 4th edition (Mexico City: Siglo Ventiuno, 
1980), p. 15.
Economic Commission for Latin America, Economic Survey of Latin America (Santiago, 
Chile: ECLA, 1949) and Inter-American Development Bank, Economic and Social Progress in 
Latin America, Annual Report (Washington, DC: IDB, 1971).
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consisted of traditional primary and food products.10 With the rapidly growing 
population, especially in the urban centres, the domestic demand for foodstuffs 
outstripped the supply which the agricultural sector was capable of offering. This 
led to shortages and imports of food. ISI also contributed to a worsening of the 
income distribution because governments failed to redistribute income through 
fiscal policies and ISI failed to increase employment. Foreign companies used 
capital intensive technologies with no incentive to adopt labour-intensive 
techniques of production.11
Increasing political centralization and the contradictions embedded in the 
economic development model pursued after the 1940s (which generally favoured 
private sector capital accumulation and rapid growth rather than income 
redistribution and social reform) led dissident labour unions, peasant groups and 
university students to challenge the system at different times. Politically, the 
Mexican government started to experience the breakdown of the social pact 
(between labour, business and the government) in the late 1960s and 1970s. In the 
summer of 1968, social unrest spread from what started out as a clash among rival 
groups of students to include hundreds of thousands of professionals, members of 
labour unions and some government officials. The concern was with greater 
political democracy and the call for the end to the authoritarian rule of the 
Mexican government. The impact of the 1968 movement was a watershed because 
it introduced the perception that the political system was not immune to social 
uprising.12 The events of 1968 sent a clear message to the politicians: economic 
policies could no longer be confined to promoting economic growth at the expense
10Wemer Baer, ‘Import Substitution and Industrialization in Latin America: Experiences and 
Interpretations’, Latin American Research Review (Vol. 8, No. 1, 1972), p. 106.
nFor more information on the problems of the ISI model see, L. Antonio Aspra, ‘Import 
Substitution in Mexico: Past and Present’, World Development (Vol. 5 Nos. 1/2, 1977); W. Baer, 
ibid', and Herbert Schmitz, ‘Industrial Strategies in Less Developed Countries’, Journal o f 
Development Studies (Vol. 21, No. 1, October 1984).
l2Rosario Enriquez,‘The Rise and Collapse of Stabilizing Development’, in G. Philip (ed.), The 
Mexican Economy (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 30.
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of economic justice. Indeed, regime support declined in the late 1960s and early 
1970s as the rate of growth slowed and a broad range of socioeconomic problems 
seriously worsened.13
2.1.2 Shared Development (1970 to 1976)
As Mexico entered the 1970s, it confronted serious social, economic and political 
problems. In this period of crisis, the administration of Luis Echeverrfa (1970 to 
1976) retreated into an inward-looking, populist direction with the concept of 
‘revolutionary nationalism’. Essentially this concept followed the social democratic 
ideology, positing a mixed-economy under state tutelage, central planning and 
increased welfare. The objective of revitalizing the economy as well as confronting 
the salient issues of unemployment, poverty and exploitation of the poor were 
tackled by President Echeverrfa in his programme called desarrollo compartido or 
‘shared development’. Its aim was to open up the political system and place 
emphasis on redistributive and social welfare measures while maintaining rapid 
economic growth.
Although the policy of import substitution was continued throughout the 
Echeverrfa administration, significantly, a concerted effort was made to stimulate 
manufacturing exports. Import duties were reduced to improve the competitiveness 
of Mexican manufactured goods, and direct subsidies were made available for 
exports as were credits at low rates of interest from the newly formed IMCE 
(Mexican Institute of Foreign Trade). An attempt was also made to restructure 
import protection so as to provide greater stimulus to the domestic manufacture of
13These problems included severe inequalities in national income distribution and regional 
development; widespread unemployment and underemployment; inflationary pressures that eroded 
real wages; growing foreign indebtedness; stagnating agricultural production and a growing need to 
import basic foodstuffs; and the declining ability of the national educational system to meet the 
needs of an expanding urban middle class. See Pablo Gonzales Casanova and Enrique Florescano 
(eds), Mexico Hoy (Mexico, DF: Siglo Ventiuno Editores, 1979) and John F. H. Purcell, ‘Mexican 
Social Issues’, in Susan Kaufman Purcell (ed.), Mexico-TJnited States Relations (New York, NY: 
Academy of Political Science, Vol. 34, No. 1, 1981), pp. 43-54.
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capital goods.14 In addition, the administration pursued vigorous policies to 
stimulate the establishment of maquiladoras or export processing zone assembly 
plants.15 Mexico introduced the maquilas in 1965 to encourage foreign firms to 
build factories along the US-Mexico border.16 With the Echeverrfa 
administration, these export zones were broadened to other parts of the country.
Proponents of ‘shared development’ argued that it was only through 
increased state spending and major tax reform that the presidential objectives of 
improved income distribution and the removal of investment bottlenecks blocking 
economic growth could be achieved. Rather than deciding between promoting 
industrialization or redistributing the country’s wealth, the Echeverrfa 
administration attempted to do both. It embarked upon a populist programme 
designed to raise the state’s provision of collective consumption goods, such as 
subsidized health, housing and education. The social security system was expanded 
and there was an increase in public investment into agriculture, energy and heavy- 
industrial and capital goods.17 The first action was obviously designed to diminish 
social tensions while the second was counted upon to foster rapid economic growth 
and profits to generate jobs and appease the concerns of the private sector.
To accomplish the objectives of ‘shared development’, President Echeverrfa 
expanded the role of the state in the economy. The size of the public sector in 
terms of expenditure as well as of direct ownership rose. Total government 
spending increased from 23.6 per cent of GDP in 1970 to 36.6 per cent of GDP in
14C. Gribomont and M. Rimez, ‘La poh'tica economica del gobiemo de Luis Echeverrfa (1971- 
1976): Un primer ensayo de interpretacion’, in El Trimestre Economico (Vol. 44, No. 176, 
octubre-diciembre 1977), p. 821.
15The maquila programme is discussed in Chapter 4.
I6Leslie Sklair, Assembling for Development: The Maquila Industry in Mexico and the United 
States (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), p. 10.
17Judith Teichman, Policymaking in Mexico: From Boom to Crisis (Boston, MA: Allen & 
Unwin, 1988), p. 47.
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1975.18 The parastatal sector grew rapidly. The number of enterprises in which 
there was public participation, with shares ranging from very small to large, 
increased from 84 in 1970 to 845 in 1976, while the number of government 
employees doubled to more than 1 million.19
Yet the public sector role in the economy was being increasingly undercut 
by its financial problems. The Mexican regime seemed unable to exercise certain 
fundamental options to gain the revenue necessary to meet its public sector 
responsibilities. Its inability to tax business and wealth sufficiently was crucial. It 
also seemed unable to cut back on subsidies not just to industry, but also to needy 
consumers. Because of the significance that a strong public sector had had in 
Mexican politics, selling public enterprises in order to balance the budget was not 
a possible solution. In order to finance such spending. President Echeverrfa relied 
on deficit financing. This meant that in order to finance its various programmes, 
the public sector had no recourse but to increase its external indebtedness. Because 
of the lack of sufficient sources of credit, the government borrowed abroad. 
Consequently, the level of foreign public debt skyrocketed from US$4.2 billion in 
1970 to US$19.6 billion in 1976.20
It was not coincidental that Mexico’s economic achievements were 
occurring at the same time as the international economy was also expanding 
rapidly. Before the world recession in 1974 to 1975, the international economy 
had experienced a long business cycle boom which began after the Second World 
War. In the 1970s, however, instability rocked the international economy with the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods System. This System had consisted of fixed 
exchange rates and had provided financing for temporary balance of payment 
disequilibria. Although the system was supposed to be self-regulating, it had
18C. Gribomont and M. Rimez, op. cit., in footnote 14, p. 784.
19Daniel Levy and Gabriel Szekely, Mexico: Paradoxes of Stability and Change (Boulder, CO: 
Westview, 1983), p. 148.
™Ibid, p. 149.
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proved to be inherently unstable and required a hegemonic or stabilising power. 
This role had been played by the United States until the late 1960s. Because 
Europe and Japan were emerging as economic powers in their own right, the 
United States was increasingly confronting competition from them. US export 
shares dropped and its imports rose resulting in a large US trade deficit. This 
deficit along with high inflationary rates, caused by increased military spending, 
led first in 1971 to the devaluation of the dollar and subsequently to the 
replacement of the fixed exchange rate regime with a new system of free currency 
floats. This set the stage for the growing financial and monetary instability of the 
1970s and 1980s.
The collapse was extremely important in that it marked the end of 25 years 
of stability for the international economy. The end of the Bretton Woods System 
would have been enough to disrupt seriously the international economic 
community. When coupled with the simultaneous occurrences of the OPEC price 
rises, the increase in most commodity prices and the 1972 crop failures, instability 
and turbulence plagued the world economy. What resulted was wide-spread 
inflation and world recession.
Global inflation and the subsequent world recession were transferred to 
Mexico via various channels. One such means was trade. In light of the 
international economic environment, a large majority of the industrial countries 
resorted to protectionist measures. As Mexico was highly dependent on US 
markets for both imports and exports, the country experienced reduced access to 
i these markets and a sharper decline in its export volumes.
During the last year of the Echeverrfa administration - 1976 - the economic 
situation further deteriorated. Inflation had stood at 4.4 per cent in 1971 but began 
to rise. Originally policymakers had viewed the higher rates of inflation as the 
necessary social price that had to be paid to achieve the twin goals of income 
redistribution and rapid economic growth. Beginning in 1974, however, inflation 
became a serious problem rising to 24.4 per cent. Although inflation dipped down 
to 16.6 per cent in 1975, it re-emerged the following year. With the rise in
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inflation in 1976, the growth rate of real GDP fell to 4.2 per cent. Capital flight 
increased to the level of US$4 billion during 1976 as growing uncertainty among 
private investors led to increasing speculation against the Mexican peso.21 In 
1976 the government ran out of reserves and the peso was devalued for the first 
time in 22 years. The Echeverrfa administration devalued the currency from 12.5 
pesos to the dollar to 19.7 in August 1976 to 25.49 two months later.22
Throughout the post-Second World War period, Mexican economic elites 
rarely participated openly in politics. The private sector was, however, consulted 
on economic policy and even had the use of an informal veto, but their role was 
primarily reactive rather than proactive. Business was willing to refrain from 
interfering in policymaking so long as the government carried out two tasks: 
manipulating and controlling societal agents, such as labour, and subsidizing 
business activity.23 This informal agreement began to disintegrate during the 
presidency of Echeverrfa when the business community became alienated from the 
regime in the early 1970s. Rising inflation and a series of populist policy reforms 
began to erode the decades-old business-govemment pact. These events prompted 
private investors to withdraw their capital from the country not only to protect 
their wealth against possible currency devaluations, but also as a political weapon. 
After the assassination of a leading industrialist, Eugenio Garza Sada (head of the 
Monterrey group), political organization by business groups rapidly occurred. For 
the first time in Mexico’s post-revolutionary history, the private sector publicly 
criticized the government’s running of the economy. This discontent translated into 
political action. The political ‘right’ and entrepreneurs established the Co­
ordinating Business Council (CCE) in 1975 which became the major forum for
21Miguel D. Ramirez, Mexico’s Economic Crisis (New York, NY: Praeger, 1989), pp. 84-5.
^Inter-American Development Bank, Economic and Social Progress in Latin America 
(Washington, DC: IDB Annual Report, 1976). The peso was devalued by 40 per cent in 1948 and 
by 31 per cent in April 1954.
^Sylvia Maxfield and Ricardo Anzaldiia Montoya (eds), Government and Private Sector in 
Contemporary Mexico, Monograph Series 20 (San Diego, CA: Center for US - Mexican Studies, 
University of California, San Diego, 1987), p. 2.
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private sector interests. This led to greater political organization and participation 
against the PRI.
President Echeverrfa finished his term in the midst of violent and 
widespread criticism. Not only was there open conflict with the economic elites, 
but the rewards of higher living standards for the middle-classes (the sector most 
favoured by general policies adopted from the late 1950s onward) had to be 
postponed. The workforce that had benefited from the substantial expansion in 
social services provided by the state had seen its income eroded by rising inflation. 
The peasantry had experienced a bettering of its situation only in very localized 
and specific geographical areas which were subject to special development 
programmes. At an international level, unfortunate foreign policy statements, 
restrictions on foreign investment24 and rising indebtedness had damaged 
Mexico’s relationship with important foreign powers. In retrospect, the 1970 to 
1976 period shows a government that tried to do too much, too fast and without 
the necessary resources to succeed.25
When President Echeverrfa came to power in 1970, Mexico was 
experiencing one of the worst crisis situations since the revolution. His response 
was to turn inward and put forth a populist platform. Although the measures 
employed attempted to quash socio-political unrest, the ‘shared development’ 
model only exacerbated the economic problems. Thus, when President Ldpez 
Portillo took office in 1976, Mexico was once again experiencing economic 
difficulties. The next section analyzes the Ldpez Portillo administration and its
^President Echeverrfa instituted laws regulating foreign capital and technology. The most 
important of which was the 1973 Law to Promote Mexican Investment and Regulate Foreign 
Investment, which made 51 per cent Mexican ownership the general rule for new ventures.
“ On President Echevem'a’s economic programme, see E. V. K. Fitzgerald, ‘Stabilization 
Policy in Mexico: The Fiscal Deficit and Macroeconomic Equilibrium, 1960-1977’, in Rosemary 
Thorpe and Laurence Whitehead (eds), Inflation and Stabilization in Latin America (London: 
Macmillan, 1979); Merilee S. Grindle, Bureaucrats, Politicians and Peasants in Mexico (Berkeley, 
CA; University of California Press, 1977); and Leopoldo Solis, Economic Policy Reform in Mexico 
(New York, NY: Pergamon, 1981).
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attempt to open the trade regime through import liberalization and joining the 
GAIT.
2.1.3 The Lopez Portillo Administration (1976 to 1982)
The first task at hand for the new administration was to confront the problems of 
the 1976 devaluation and the ensuing economic crisis. The new president, Jose 
Lopez Portillo, proposed two actions: political reform and an ‘alliance for 
production’. The latter’s aim was to mend the business-private sector rift. The 
alliance for production sought to re-negotiate the pact among labour, business and 
government in order to stimulate investment and growth. In return for the 
government’s promise to straighten out its management of the economy, recognize 
the essential role of the private sector in a mixed economy and provide economic 
incentives, businessmen vowed to operate more efficiently and expand investment.
With the economic difficulties inherited from the Echeverrfa administration, 
Lopez Portillo agreed to implement a package of austerity measures prescribed by 
the IMF in exchange for a stabilization loan of US$1.2 billion. The three-year 
austerity programme called for: 1) a sharp decrease in the public sector deficit 
from 9.9 per cent of GDP to 6 per cent; 2) an overall ceiling on annual wage 
increases to no more than 10 per cent; 3) systematic devaluation of the peso to 
maintain domestic prices in line with external ones; and 4) a reduction of the 
overall tariffs so that goods produced by Mexican firms would reflect their real 
costs of production.
Such austerity measures might have led Mexico down the path of 
development policy reform in 1976 if not for the discovery of oil. Because of the 
‘oil bonanza’, the austerity programme was effectively abandoned. The oil boom 
brought new development possibilities and seemed a painless solution to Mexico’s 
economic and social problems. By increasing the government coffers through oil 
revenues, the government could increase its spending and thus assure the 
restoration of economic growth and strengthen its political support.
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The Oil Boom26
Central to President Lopez Portillo’s alliance for production strategy was 
petroleum development. Although Mexico’s oil industry had been successful, it 
had run into difficulties in the early 1970s. The country recorded its first 
petroleum trade deficit in 1970; four years later the deficit reached over US$250 
million. With the discovery of new oil deposits in 1978, however, the Mexican 
petroleum industry experienced a dramatic turnaround. Proven oil reserves 
increased more than six-fold: in 1976, the reserves stood at 6.3 billion barrels 
compared to 40.2 billion barrels in 1978.27 In 1982 the country’s proven reserves 
were estimated at more than 60 billion barrels; Mexico ranked fourth in proven 
reserves and production among the world oil producers.28 As Table 2.1 shows 
Mexico’s influence as a global oil producer grew between 1973 and 1983. 
Compared with the United States, Mexico produced one-twentieth of the US 
production in 1973, but this figure grew to one-fourth in 1983.
Mexico’s fortunes changed with the 1978 oil discovery. Rather than 
adjusting to scarcity, Mexico had to deal with administering the abundance. The 
oil option would be the ‘axis of national development’ and would provide the 
much needed remedy for the fundamental problems of the Mexican economy. 
President Lopez Portillo’s oil-based development policy sought to accelerate 
economic development while reducing the country’s external dependency. ‘Oil is 
our chance for self determination because it will improve our international 
economic relations.’29
“For more information on the oil boom in Mexico, see George W. Grayson, The Politics of 
Mexican Oil (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1980); Pamela S. Falk (ed.), 
Petroleum and Mexico's Future (London: Westview Press, 1987); and J. Teichman, op. cit., in 
footnote 23.
27M. Ramirez, op. cit., in footnote 21, p. 87.
“ George Grayson, Oil and Mexican Foreign Policy (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 1988), p. 26.
“ Cited in Judith Gentleman, Mexican Oil and Dependent Development (New York, NY: Peter 
Lang, 1984), p. 83.
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Table 2.1
Mexico’s Growth as an Oil Producer: 
Global Oil Production, 1973 to 1983 
(in billions of barrels)
Year
World
Total OPEC US USSR Mexico
1973 21.2 11.3 4.0 3.1 0.2
1975 20.2 9.9 3.6 3.6 0.3
1977 22.6 11.4 3.6 4.0 0.4
1979 24.0 11.3 3.7 4.3 0.5
1981 21.6 8.2 3.7 4.5 0.8
1983 20.6 6.3 3.7 4.5 1.0
Source: La econorma mexicana en cifras (Mexico: NAFINSA, 1986), cuadro 15.4, p. 356. Cited in 
Van Whiting, Jr., The Political Economy of Foreign Investment in Mexico: Nationalism, Liberalism, 
and Constraints on Choice (London: Johns Hopkins Press, 1992), p. 27.
Oil led to a new self-confidence in Mexico that was evident in both 
domestic and foreign policy. Jose Andres de Oteyza, the Minister of Public Sector 
Industries, when speaking about domestic economic policy, remarked
The capacity for financial self-sufficiency which the oil profits offer, 
allied to the right plans for their use, can allow our economy to 
grow at annual rates of 10% for a relatively long period without 
pressure on the balance of payments or extreme inflationary effects.
With this growth rate the new work force can be absorbed and 
hidden unemployment slowly eradicated by the 1990s.30
In addition, the Lopez Portillo administration pursued an activist foreign policy 
which brought the country into conflict with its most important neighbour, the 
United States. Mexico refused to boycott the Moscow Olympics, back economic 
sanctions against Iran and openly criticised the United States on its policy in El 
Salvador.31 Grayson maintains that Mexico’s oil wealth (high petroleum prices
^ u g h  O’Shaughnessy, Financial Times (London), 3 January 1979.
31For an indepth analysis of President L6pez Portillo’s strong foreign policy stand, see G. 
Grayson, op. cit., in footnote 28, Chapter 2.
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and the expectations that those prices would continue to rise) created the 
possibility to develop a new, prosperous Mexico. This improved outlook 
transformed Mexico’s ‘role conception’ - that is, the enduring self image of the 
appropriate relationship of Mexico vis-a-vis the external environment.32 With 
every increase in oil prices and reserves, the Lopez Portillo administration more 
forcefully advanced Mexico’s bid for leadership.
Table 2.2 
Real GDP Growth, 1977 to 1981 
(percentages)
Year GDP Growth
1977 3.4
1978 8.1
1979 9.0
1980 8.3
1981 8.1
Source: Banco de Mexico, 1982.
Mexico’s vast oil reserves were used to foster growth and development. 
Both the public and private sectors went on an investment binge and increased this 
spending as the price of oil rose in 1979. This public expenditure-led growth 
strategy, during the four years of the oil boom (1978 to 1981), recorded 
impressive growth rates. As Table 2.2 shows, whereas real GDP growth stood at
3.4 per cent in 1977, it reached 8.1 per cent in 1978, 9.0 per cent in 1979, 8.3 
per cent in 1980 and 8.1 per cent in 1981. In addition, total investment increased 
more than 15 per cent a year and real minimum wages rose slightly.33
The Mexican self-confidence, borne from the development possibilities of 
the oil-led growth strategy, adversely affected the limited trade liberalizing
32Ibid, pp. 6-8.
33Nora Lustig, ‘The Mexican Economy in the Eighties: An Overview’, in F. Desmond Me 
Carthy, Problems of Developing Countries in the 1990s, Vol. II (Washington, DC: IBRD, World 
Bank Papers, No. 98, 1990), p. 80.
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measures initiated in 1977. Like the IMF austerity programme, the trade 
liberalizing measures were abandoned in 1980 when the country decided not to 
join the GATT. The following section discusses the 1980 GATT debate.
The GATT Debate
For many years Mexico chose to keep the GATT at arms length. First, the 
underlying philosophy of the GATT - that of free trade - clashed with the post- 
Second World War Mexican trade policy - that of protectionism. Like many 
developing countries at the time, there existed much hope in the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),34 whose doctrine had been, 
to a great extent, the work of the first secretary-general, Raul Prebisch, reflecting 
the structuralist analysis of North-South relations. However, disillusionment with 
the UNCTAD, the failure of the new international economic order, and by the late 
1970s, a more sympathetic stance toward developing countries’ demands by the 
GATT, led Mexico to look in other directions.35
Mexico actively participated in the Tokyo Round (1973 to 1979). Although 
Mexico had not signed the final document, it did reach several bilateral 
agreements - all beneficial without making significant concessions. It could be 
argued that the United States, for example, may have signed these agreements in 
order to lure Mexico to enter the GAIT. By the mid-1970s, Mexico had increased 
its trade links with its northern neighbour. The United States extended most 
favoured nation (MFN) status to Mexico as well as trade privileges under the
34The UNCTAD met in Geneva in 1964 and attacked the rules of the GATT for excluding the 
developing countries from the post-Second World War expansion and perpetuating their existence 
as primary commodities exporters. The calling for a conference to deal with world trade problems 
meant a challenge to the GATT. The proposals of the UNCTAD I were incorporated in Part IV of 
the General Agreement. Diane Tussie, The Less Developed Countries and the World Trading 
System: A Challenge to the GATT (London: Frances Pinter, 1987), p. 3.
35In the 1960s, the Kennedy Round added Part IV ‘Trade and Development’ to the General 
Agreement and in the 1970s, a number of provisions in the Tokyo Round were formulated 
specifically for the developing countries.
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Generalized System of Preferences to help Mexico promote its manufactured 
exports.36
In January 1979, Mexico sought GATT membership. The initial 
negotiations were completed in October producing the Protocol of Accession. The 
protocol’s terms for Mexican entry were:
1) a time period of twelve years in which to eliminate the remaining 
import permits;
2) incorporation of the bilateral tariff concessions negotiated in the 
Tokyo Round;
3) acceptance of the new Mexican system of tariff valuation;
4) allowance for the continued use of export subsidies and controls 
in Mexico;
5) the right to implement the National Industrial Development Plan 
of March 1979 and to continue granting certain tax incentives to 
industry;
6) full rights to manage internal development policies and to protect 
industry and agriculture;
7) recognition of Mexican protectionist policy toward rural products 
and of the priority given to the agricultural sector, especially the 
basic foodstuffs;
8) the rights to ignore any provisions of Part II of the GATT (which 
covers non-tariff barriers) that are incompatible with existing 
Mexican legislation.37
These terms of entry were ‘unusually flexible’ and ‘extremely liberal’. Under such 
conditions, the international community was making it virtually impossible for 
Mexico to refuse accession.
36This is discussed at length in Chapter 4.
37Dale Story, Industry, The State, And Public Policy in Mexico (Austin, TX: University of 
Texas Press, Austin, 1986), p. 136.
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President Lopez Portillo was fully aware of the contentiousness of joining 
the multilateral trade organization. Within his own cabinet, his ministers were 
deeply divided over pursuing a nationalist versus internationalist development 
policy.38 In an unusual move for a Mexican president, Lopez Portillo called upon 
various sectors in society to debate the issue.39 The national debate took place at 
the elite level involving the economic, intellectual and governmental elites. The 
proponents of the GATT argued on two fronts: the economic benefits and the 
advantages of multilateral participation.40 The former included greater access to 
foreign markets and improved efficiency, productivity and quality through 
competitive incentives; the latter that with the members of the GATT representing 
80 to 90 per cent of international trade, Mexico should not isolate itself from this 
international forum.
The opponents to GATT entry focused on the loss of sovereignty and the 
economic disadvantages. The first argument concerned the age-old problem of 
economic dependency on the United States. To many, Mexico’s policy autonomy 
was of far greater importance than the benefits that could be accrued from a 
multilateral framework for trade. Mexico’s sovereignty in economic decision 
making was considered the most important aspect of its bilateral relations with the 
United States. In addition, some feared that Mexico, as an advanced developing 
country, would not enjoy GATT privileges and would be targeted for ‘graduation’ 
from preferential treatment.41 The second argument focused on the viability of 
the small and medium industrialists who would not be able to stand up to foreign 
competition.
38This division is discussed in Chapter 6.
39For an in-depth analysis, see D. Story, op. cit., in footnote 37, Chapter 6; and Saul Escobar 
Toledo, ‘Rifts in the Mexican Power Elite, 1976 - 1986’, in S. Maxfield and R. Anzaldua M., 
Government and Private Sector in Contemporary Mexico (San Diego, CA: Monograph Series 20, 
Center for US - Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1987).
40D. Story, ibid, p. 138.
Allbid, p. 139.
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In addition to internal pressures to join the GATT, external pressures came 
from the United States. Relations with its northern neighbour were not very good 
at this time.42 With the new-found oil wealth and the idea that its economic 
dependence on the United States was decreasing, the Mexican government felt 
increasingly more powerful and therefore, in a better position to assert its 
independence vis-a-vis its neighbour. One such action was to refuse the request of 
the United States and other international actors to join the GATT. The debate was 
allowed to boil for four months until reaching its peak on 18 March 1980, when 
President Lopez Portillo ended the national debate and announced that Mexico 
would ‘postpone’ accession.
The economic reasons given for not joining the GATT in 1980 were for the 
most part straightforward. The President argued that there were four principal 
trade policy motivations for the decision. First, with the then-overvalued Mexican 
peso, the GATT entry could have deleterious effects on the competitiveness of 
Mexico’s production, particularly its non-traditional exports. Second, Mexico’s 
problems in agriculture production could have required government intervention 
that might have clashed with GATT rules. Third, there was concern that as an oil- 
exporter, Mexico would not have been eligible to utilize the GATT balance of 
payments provisions for temporary protection. And finally, the fear pervaded that 
Mexico would lose flexibility in allocating its petroleum production.43
President Lopez Portillo decided against the GATT based on the philosophy 
of the GATT instrument and the current development opportunity that the oil 
boom had provided. He stated at the time:
42The poor relations concerned primarily Mexico’s independent foreign policy, (for example, 
President Lopez Portillo’s diplomatic and economic support for the Sandinista revolution in 
Nicaragua from 1979 through 1982) but also concerned diplomatic gaffs (President Carter’s 
Monteczuma’s Revenge comment on a trip to Mexico) and the general unfriendly relationship 
between the two presidents.
43‘The GATT’, Business Mexico (November 1985), p. 78.
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more liberalized norms for world trade are not enough to promote a 
more equitable (international) economic order. We prefer to work 
for the concept of a more equitable economic order, even though 
that means we have to continue with bilateral trade negotiations, 
outside of GATT, as we have been doing up to now.44
Silva Herzog, de la Madrid’s Finance Minister, argues that Mexico did not 
join the GATT quite simply because of o il45 Mexico was in a powerful position 
for the first time in its history. The international community acknowledged this by 
knocking at Mexico’s door for access to oil and to provide large amounts of 
international funds.
Dale Story notes additional domestic factors for this decision. President 
Lopez Portillo was actually pro-GATT,46 but reversed his decision after the 
debate. Story points out that under President Echevema, Lopez Portillo had led 
the delegation to the Tokyo Round. As president, he put forth plans to reduce the 
level of protectionism and after Mexico began negotiating GATT accession, he 
implied his support several times.47 As President, Lopez Portillo decided not to 
enter the GATT. Story maintains that domestic detractors of the GATT were the 
principal forces preventing accession.
The domestic actors were Canacintra (National Chamber of the 
Transformation Industry) and the CNE (the National College of Economists). The 
former, created in 1941, was a strong supporter of Mexico’s right to control its 
own economy. Canacintra defended economic nationalism and opposed the free- 
trade provisions of the GATT as contradictory to Mexico’s development model. 
The CNE was comprised of nationalists within the intellectual community and
^ ‘Mexico declines GATT’, Mexican-American Review (April 1980), p. 1.
45Interview, Sr. Jesus Silva Herzog, 21 May 1992, Madrid, Spain.
^According to President L6pez Portillo’s memoirs, rather than being in strong favour of the 
GATT, he, in fact, had severe doubts about the GATT and organized the debate in order to resolve 
the question of membership. Jose Lopez Portillo, Mis Tiempos: Biografia y Testimonio Politico, 
Parte Segundo (Mexico, DF: Fernandez Editores, 1988), pp. 801-2.
47D. Story, op. cit., in footnote 37, p. 139.
49
The Historical Roots Chapter Two
government planners. Story argues that whereas the opponents were quite forceful 
in their opposition, the supporters (Ministry of Commerce, the Central Bank and 
the Banco de Comercio Exterior - Bank of External Trade) were relatively 
unassertive.
Both Silva Herzog and Story point to important determinants in the GATT 
decision. Other variables, however, need to be emphasized as they are vital links 
to policy outcome. First, oil gave Mexico the feeling of strength vis-a-vis external 
actors. The high price of oil enabled the government to follow an economic policy 
that did not force Mexico to confront long-term structural problems or radically 
alter its post-Second World War development model. In addition, oil gave Mexico 
the perception that it could now be a regional power. The soaring oil revenues 
fuelled the pursuit of an independent stand vis-a-vis the United States. Yet, oil was 
not the only deciding factor in the decision.
Although domestic pressures were strong, it does not fully explain the 
decision not to enter the organization. The fact that President Lopez Portillo called 
upon the elites to debate the issue indicated several things. First, it showed 
indecisiveness on the part of the president48 - the president’s policy process of 
‘nondecision’ enabled established groups such as Canacintra and the CNE to take 
the offensive and block the GATT entry. But although Canacintra may have 
seemed important in influencing the policy outcome, interest groups in Mexico 
have traditionally been controlled and permitted to wield influence only when 
allowed to by the government. The anti-GATT stance was ‘allowed’ to be 
influential because it concurred with the opinions of important policymakers 
(members of the CNE) within the Ldpez Portillo cabinet.49
Second, the national debate exposed a chasm in the group of politicians 
responsible for economic policymaking. They were polarized into two camps: the
^One can only guess if this uncertainty derived from: 1) expected public pressure; 2) the 
inappropriateness of the GATT for a country like Mexico; 3) the increased prestige of his country - 
and himself - because of oil; and/or 4) just the lack of a sound knowledge of economic matters.
49The individuals of the Lopez Portillo administration are discussed in Chapter 6.
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populist structuralists and the neo-liberal monetarists. The decision not to join the 
GATT was a ‘populist’ victory for the structuralists in the Cabinet. These 
structuralists were the same government planners at the CNE who were so vocal 
against GATT entry.50
Rather than liberalizing the trade regime, the oil boom enabled the Lopez 
Portillo administration to pursue expansionist and populist economic policies 
without making the much needed economic adjustments. The oil boom fed 
unrelenting expectations of government planners. The 1980 Global Development 
Plan proposed utilizing petroleum revenues to promote industrial growth and called 
for the achievement of sustained increases in employment and income for 
Mexico’s rapidly expanding working-age population, along with improvements in 
the distribution of the benefits of growth. Importantly, the Plan had renewed an 
inward-looking development strategy. It reinforced the public sector’s involvement 
in the economy, did not plan any fiscal reforms and still relied on oil revenues to 
finance the deepening of import substitution.
The Economic Crisis
The impressive performance of the oil boom years did not reflect the full 
economic reality of the period. Rather than severely adjusting its domestic 
expenditures, Mexico pursued sustained economic expansion in the mid-1970s and 
early 1980s which resulted in an overheated and increasingly inflationary 
economy. The country’s economic development policy consisted of growth based 
on the expansive effects of domestic demand. A schism was developing, however, 
between domestic demand and economic growth. The policy held real growth at an 
average rate of 8.2 per cent from 1978 to 1981 despite long-term capacity growth
^Carlos Tello (Secretary of Programming and Budget) and Jos6 Andres de Oteyza (Minister of 
Energy) - responsible for oil policy with the state oil company, PEMEX. The structuralists are 
discussed in Chapter 6.
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of 6 per cent.51 This expansion weakened due to exchange overvaluation and the 
deterioration of external markets caused by the deepening of the world recession. 
Mexico’s GDP from 1978 to 1981 grew on average 8.2 per cent, but dropped to - 
0.5 percent in 1982.52 The intensification of economic contraction produced a 
severe loss in terms of production and income with serious effects on employment 
and social well-being.
The Lopez Portillo government assigned a leading role to the public sector. 
With the steep rise in oil prices in 1979, Mexico increased its public sector 
spending. Real government expenditures on economic projects rose at an average 
annual rate of 27.9 per cent during 1980 to 1981 as compared to a rate of 14.3 per 
cent during 1978 to 1979.53 As a result of the higher rates of real government 
spending and lack of tax reform, the public deficit as a proportion of GDP grew 
appreciably from 7.4 per cent in 1978 to an all-time high of 17.9 per cent by the 
end of 1982.54 Deficits were financed by monetization of the government debt 
and by borrowing heavily from both private and public foreign sources.
Inflation averaged 16.5 per cent during most of the 1970s, but it 
accelerated from 20.3 per cent in 1979 to 98.2 per cent by the end of President 
Lopez Portillo’s sexenio.55 As the inflation differential between Mexico and the 
United States increased, the peso became overvalued which caused a stagnation in 
non-oil exports. With excess demand and import liberalization, the exchange rate
51W. R. Cline, International Debt (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1986), 
p. 258.
52Inter-American Development Bank, External Debt and Economic Development in Latin America 
(Washington, DC: IDB, 1984), p. 24.
53D. Story, op. cit., in footnote 37, p. 4.
^Inter-American Development Bank, op. cit., in footnote 52, pp. 29-30.
55ECLAC, ‘Statistics on Mexico’, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(Santiago, Chile: ECLAC, 1988), pp. 94-5.
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prompted imports to rise from US$6 billion in 1977 to US$23 billion in 1981, 
outstripping even the once ‘seemingly limitless bonanza of new oil exports’.56
Another key economic variable overlooked was the increasing dependence 
of Mexico on foreign exchange earnings derived from oil, particularly from 1979 
onwards. Between 1979 and 1981 the value of oil exports rose from US$3.9 to 
US$14.5 billion dollars.57 In addition, the oil share in total exports increased 
from 43.9 per cent in 1979 to approximately 75 per cent in 1981.58 The external 
account became even more dependent on oil exports as the performance results for 
non-oil trade deteriorated.
The private sector grew increasingly disillusioned. The overvalued 
exchange rate prompted capital flight of over US$8 billion in 1981. As inflation 
continued to soar, the public frantically converted pesos into dollars. In the first 
part of 1982, capital flight intensified to a transfer of more than US$20 billion in 
only an 18-month period.59 Six months later in an attempt (rather late in the day) 
to try to eliminate continued massive transfers of foreign currency, the government 
declared all dollar deposits in banks redeemable only in pesos. As confidence 
dwindled, however, external credit diminished. Capital flight and payments for 
short-term debts caused foreign exchange reserves to decrease to such an extent 
that by August 1982, Mexico declared that it could no longer meet its external 
debt repayments. Total external debt rose from US$33 billion in 1978 to US$87 
billion in 1982.60
56W. Cline, op. cit., in footnote 51, p. 259.
51Ibid.
58M. Ramirez, op. cit., in footnote 21, p. 88.
59J. Ros, ‘Mexico from the Oil Boom to the Debt Crisis’, in R. Thorpe and L. Whitehead (eds), 
Latin American Debt and the Adjustment Crisis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 77.
“ECLAC, op. cit., in footnote 55, pp. 500-1.
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Although domestic mismanagement of the economy was an important cause 
of the financial crisis, three international factors were particularly crucial.61 First, 
there was the sharp rise in oil prices in 1973 to 1975 and 1979 to 1980. In late 
1973, OPEC announced a quadrupling of the price of oil, only to increase oil 
prices again by 50 per cent in 1979.62 Until 1975 Mexico was a net importer of 
petroleum. As a consequence, Mexico borrowed heavily to develop oil production; 
the promise of oil exports was the main basis for its ability to borrow large 
amounts. Mexico’s build up of debt was almost certainly accelerated rather than 
deterred by higher oil prices in the 1970s. The expectation that this trend would 
continue into the 1980s was not realized. In 1981 oil exports were only US$14 
billion rather than the US$20 billion expected.63 The weakening of the world oil 
market after 1981 precipitated a crisis in Mexico, as oil constituted three-fourths 
of its exports.
Second, the large increases in nominal and real interest rates contributed 
greatly to Mexican balance of payments deficit. The increase both in interest rates 
and the value of the US dollar adversely affected the balance of payments since a 
high proportion of the external debt had been contracted at variable interest rates 
(introduced after 1974) and denominated in US dollars. The sharp rise in interest 
rates in the early 1980s stunned borrowers as they had become accustomed to low 
real interest rates. Between 1961 and 1970, the London Interbank Offer Rate 
(LIBOR) produced an average real interest rate of 4.1 per cent and between 1971 
and 1980, this average dropped to an incredible -0.8 per cent.64 After twenty 
years of relatively low real interest rates, it is no wonder that debtor countries
61A fourth factor was the world economic recessions of 1974 to 1975 and 1980 - discussed earlier 
in this chapter.
62Inter-American Development Bank, op. cit., in footnote 52, p. 37.
63W. Cline, op. cit., in footnote 51, p. 259.
MIbid, p. 11.
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were shocked by the 1981 rate of 7.4 percent and the 1982 rate of 10.95 
percent.65 The remarkable upsurge of interest rates that started in 1978 sharply 
exacerbated the expanding balance of payments deficit and thereby became one of 
the major precipitating factors of Mexico’s financial crisis in 1982.
Finally, there was the pronounced decline in the net inflow of capital to 
Mexico in 1982 and again in 1983. The net inflow had been steadily increasing 
over most of the 1970s reaching a record figure of nearly US$38 billion in 1981. 
However, this amount fell to US$20 billion in 1982 and to a mere US$8 billion in 
1983.66 This radical drop in external financing was further aggravated by the fact 
that net payments for interest increased considerably at the same time. Beginning 
in 1982, the drastic reduction in the net inflows of capital meant that with the 
increase for interest, the Latin American region had to transfer to the exterior a 
considerable amount of real resources estimated at between US$10 billion and 
US$20 billion in 1982 and 1983 respectively.67
When the oil-led debt boom turned bust, financial speculation and capital 
flight brought Mexico to the brink of bankruptcy. The country declared in late 
August 1982 that it could no longer meet its external debt repayments. The 
country was now facing the worst economic crisis since the inter-war years half a 
century before. President Lbpez Portillo had become convinced that responsibility 
for the crisis had to be accepted by someone.68 According to the president, the 
1982 crisis differed from the one in 1976. Whereas the 1976 crisis was a response 
to the failed post-Second World War ISI development model, the Lopez Portillo 
growth strategy had been a success. Rather than placing the blame on his own 
mismanagement of the economy, President Lopez Portillo placed the blame on
65Ibid, p. 12.
“ECLAC, External Debt in Latin America, (Colorado: Lynne Reinner, 1985), pp. 12-13.
61 Ibid, p. 13.
^Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski, Latin American Debt, A Twentieth Century Fund Book (London: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1988), p. 83.
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external and domestic ‘evils’.69 President Ldpez Portillo justified his actions on 
the grounds that the banking community had betrayed Mexico by speculating 
against the peso.
I can affirm that ... a group of Mexicans, led, counselled and 
supported by private banks, have taken more money out of the 
country than all the empires that have exploited us since the 
beginning of our history.70
On 1 September, President Jose Ldpez Portillo took a dramatic step: in his last 
state-of-the-union address, he announced the state takeover of all Mexican 
commercial banks as well as the imposition of exchange controls.71 Mexico was 
retreating into populism. The origin of the bank nationalization can be found six 
months earlier. The president requested information analyzing all of the economic 
policy options to deal with speculation and capital flight. The most important 
motivation, however, was political. The nationalization reinforced the legitimacy 
and increased the popularity of the administration in the midst of acute economic 
crisis. Although the bank nationalization was extremely popular with most of 
society, the move only served to accelerate further capital flight. The bank 
nationalization served to radicalize a certain faction in the business community.
The mixed-economy model had guided the development direction of 
Mexico for over thirty years. The political and economic turmoil of the late 1960s 
and 1970s, however, spurred a search for other development options. President 
Echeverrfa’s ‘shared development’ strategy increased the role of the state in order
69For more information on the bank nationalization in Mexico, see Jorge Basave, et al., ‘La 
Nacionalizacion de la Banca’, Teoria y Politico (Nos. 7-8, diciembre 1982), pp. 47-63; Carlos Tello, 
La Nacionalizacion de la Banca en Mexico (Mexico, DF: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1984); and Russell
N. White, State, Class, and the Nationalization o f the Mexican Banks, (New York, NY: Taylor and
Francis, 1992).
70Excelsior (Mexico City), 2 September 1982, p.l-A .
71The bank nationalization is discussed further in Chapter 6, section 6.4.2.
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to attempt to redress the imbalances in the distribution of the spoils of the 
‘Mexican Miracle’. When this strategy failed, his successor, President L<5pez 
Portillo, after discovering vast reserves of oil, briefly experimented with a more 
open economy. The alliance for production, Lopez Portillo’s oil-led growth 
strategy, also was abandoned. Both attempts ignored deep-rooted structural 
problems in the Mexican economy. The 1982 economic crisis provided the catalyst 
that finally forced Mexico to confront the long-standing problems with its 
development model.
Although a new strategy was needed, there was little indication that one 
had been formulated. The outgoing president, Lopez Portillo, had just made a 
radical shift back toward populism with the controversial nationalization of the 
banks. The president-elect, Miguel de la Madrid, was not scheduled to take office 
until December. Although de la Madrid’s economic policy preferences were 
known, (working within the confines of the agreed upon IMF programme), the 
long-term development strategy to be chosen was not clear. It was not a foregone 
conclusion that the country would opt for economic liberalization. It was still 
possible to choose a policy that would provide Mexico with an outward-oriented 
economy with selective export promotion, rather than an open import regime.
The more likely scenario of the 1982 crisis was a policy reverting back to 
economic nationalism. Both Presidents Echevema and Lopez Portillo had 
retreated into populism and an inward-looking direction when confronted with 
acute crisis. Why would de la Madrid be different? Although de la Madrid was 
known to be a monetarist when in the Secretariat of Programming and Budget (he 
supported GATT membership in 1980), he was responsible for masterminding a 
long-term development strategy in 1980 that called for a renewed inward-looking 
economic model. During his campaign, de la Madrid published an outline of his 
views on the future of Mexico. He guaranteed the continuation of the 
constitutional ideals of nationalism, a plural democracy and a mixed economy. De 
la Madrid emphasized that the state would continue to direct the process of
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development and that the market would be subject to the public interest.72 When 
de la Madrid finally assumed the presidency, however, he oversaw the beginning 
of the most radical change in Mexico’s post-Second World War economic policy. 
It was during his sexenio that the Mexican economy underwent a fundamental 
restructuring as the doctrine of economic liberalization gained the upper hand over 
the post-Second World War belief in economic nationalism.73
^Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, Cien Tesis Sobre Mexico (Mexico, DF: Editorial Grijalbo, S.A., 
1982), p. 99.
^This new policy direction would finally settle the great debate over national development strategy 
that had been fought in the Ldpez Portillo administration. This struggle between the two models is 
discussed further in Chapter 6.
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2.2 Economic Stabilization
2.2.1 The Austerity Programme (1982 to 1985)
The immediate task at hand for the new administration was to confront the 
principal economic problems revealed by the crisis. The de la Madrid 
administration tried to reverse the damage to govemment-business relations caused 
by the bank nationalization through an orthodox economic stabilization 
programme. When Mexico had difficulties in servicing its foreign debt, the IMF 
was used as the intermediary between the country and its creditors. In late August 
1982, access to US$1 billion of a US$1.85 billion emergency credit was granted 
by the Bank for International Settlements conditional upon Mexico reaching an 
agreement with the IMF.74 On 10 November 1982, the Mexican government 
announced it had reached a long-awaited agreement with the IMF on an austerity 
programme aimed at easing the crisis caused by the nation’s huge foreign debt. 
Under the agreement Mexico would receive US$3.84 billion worth of credit from 
the IMF over the next three years.75
This three-year stabilization programme aimed to stem inflation and to cut 
public expenditure by lowering real wages, reducing subsidies and freezing 
investment. Further, short-term policy had to deal with the restructuring of 
external public debt, rescuing private enterprises with heavy foreign debt burdens, 
reversing a massive deficit on the current account in the balance of payments and 
managing a rapidly depreciating peso. On the external front, exports were to be 
encouraged and this was to be accompanied by a dynamic exchange rate policy 
and real positive interest rates.
The austerity measures put in place during 1983 initially produced some 
encouraging results. Mexico’s 1983 adjustment programme focused on its fiscal
74Jesus Silva Herzog, The Finance Secretary, insists that the programme - and subsequent IMF- 
styled programmes - were designed by Mexican officials, and not imposed by the IMF. Interview, 
Silva Herzog, op. cit. , in footnote 45.
75Robert E. Looney, Economic Policymaking in Mexico: Factors Underlying the 1982 Crisis 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1985), pp. 261-2.
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policy. Fiscal adjustment was considered the main policy instrument to eliminate 
excess demand caused by high inflation and external imbalance. In order to reduce 
its nominal deficit (PSBR), the government decreased expenditures and increased 
revenues. The reduction in total expenditures as a proportion of GDP fell from
28.2 per cent in 1983 to 26.9 per cent in 1984 and 25.0 per cent in 1985.76 
Public sector revenues were increased by indirect taxes with an upward adjustment 
of public sector relative prices including gasoline, food and transport. This caused 
revenues to increase as a proportion of GDP, from 29.9 per cent in 1982 to 32.9 
per cent in 1983 and 33.2 per cent the following year.77 These gains, however, 
were not accompanied by appreciable increases in income. Meanwhile, as Mexico 
began to experience renewed economic difficulties, even the ratio of returns to 
GDP tailed off to 31.7 per cent in 1985.
This decrease in spending and the increase in revenues resulted in a 
substantial reduction in the public sector deficit, which fell from 17.6 per cent of 
GDP in 1982 to 8.9 per cent in 1983 and 8.7 per cent in 1984. Public sector 
finances would, however, once again deteriorate as the public sector deficit 
climbed to 10 per cent of GDP in 1985 and 16.3 per cent the following year.78 
(See Table 2.3.)
Initially, the de la Madrid administration also adopted a plan called the 
Immediate Economic Rearrangement Program (PIRE) whose primary objectives 
were to reduce inflation, protect employment and resume economic growth.79
76Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, UN Survey o f Latin America and 
the Caribbean (Santiago, Chile: ECLAC, 1986, 1988, 1989), pp. 437, 479, 457, respectively.
77M. Ramirez, op. cit., in footnote21, p. 100.
^The decrease in public sector spending was intended as a short-term measure to be followed by 
renewed economic growth. As section 2.2.2 will discuss, 1985 witnessed the renewal of economic 
crisis.
79Gobiemo de Mexico, El Programa Inmediato de Reordenacion Economica y La Accion 
Economica Internacional de Mexico (Mexico, DF: Presidencia de la Republica, enero 1983).
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Table 2.3 
Economic Indicators, 1982 to 1986 
(annual growth rates, in percentage)
Item 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Real GDP -0.5 -5.3 3.7 2.8 -3.8
Public Sector 
Deficit 
(% of GDP)
17.6 8.9 8.7 10.0 16.3
Inflation1 98.8 80.8 59.2 63.7 105.7
 ^ Percentage variation from December to December.
Sources: IDB, Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, 1987 Report (Washington, DC: IDB, 
1987), p. 342 and CEPAL, Notas Sobre la Economia y el Desarrollo, No. 438/439 (Santiago, Chile: 
CEPAL, December 1986), p. 15.
Table 2.4 
External Indicators, 1982 to 1986 
(billions of dollars)
Item 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Merchandise
Exports
20.0 22.3 24.2 21.7 16.0
Merchandise 13.5 8.5 11.3 13.2 11.4
Imports
Trade Balance 6.5 13.8 12.9 8.5 4.6
Current Account 
Balance
-5.7 5.3 4.2 1.2 -1.3
Source: IDB, Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, 1987 Report (Washington, DC: IDB, 
1987), p. 342.
61
The Historical Roots Chapter Two
The rate of inflation was reduced from 98.8 per cent in 1982 to 80.8 per cent in 
1983 and 59.2 per cent in 1984. The PIRE was at first successful in reducing the 
financial deficit and inflation. Within the next two years, however, this trend was 
reversed by the relaxation of the restrictive policy, a new ‘overheating’ of the 
economy and the uncontrolled acceleration of growth occurred in 1984. As Table 
2.3 shows, the rate of inflation first climbed to 63.7 per cent in 1985 and then 
jumped to 105.7 per cent in 1986. This caused the gradual abandonment of the 
PIRE and the reappearance of the traditional economic imbalances.
Another short-term success of the stabilization programme was the 
performance of the current account during 1983. Due in part to the systematic 
devaluation of the peso and the global recovery that began in 1983, exports edged 
up to US$22.3 billion, but imports plunged to US$8.5 billion. This resulted in a 
trade surplus of US$13.8 billion and a current account surplus of US$5.3 billion. 
This was the first surplus since 1955. The improvement in the current account 
was, to a considerable degree, the result of a sizable drop in imports due to 
economic depression that hit the country that year. In 1983 alone, Mexico’s gross 
domestic investment - the country’s future source of growth and employment - fell 
by an unprecedented 24.7 per cent.80 The external accounts - the main area of 
achievement of the stabilization programme during the preceding two years - 
suddenly reversed itself when the current account surplus fell from over US$4.2 
billion in 1984 to US$1.2 billion in 1985. (See Table 2.4.)
Initially Mexico had been quite successful in meeting the IMF economic 
targets. In 1984, the government received high praise from the international 
financial community. By meeting its economic targets, Mexico was seen as 
representing the perfect example of a successful orthodox adjustment to the debt 
crisis in contrast to the other major debtor countries of Latin America. The 
administration shared this optimism, hoping that the 1983 to 1985 austerity
80M. Ramirez, op. cit., in footnote 21, p. 100; and Armen Kouyoumdjian, ‘The Miguel De La 
Madrid Sexenio: Major Reforms or foundation for disaster?’, in George Philip (ed.), The Mexican 
Economy (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 81.
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measures would stabilize the economy and facilitate the conditions necessary for 
an orderly rescheduling of the debt, a rapid resumption of access to new external 
credit and a resolution of the crisis. Yet the extent of outstanding public external 
debt stood at US$98.9 billion in 1986 - some US$12 billion higher than it had 
been in August 1982.81
When the crisis first hit the headlines, it could have been viewed either as a 
liquidity crisis or a solvency problem. The former maintains that the debt was a 
short-term interruption of cash flow, sound but merely illiquid with the solution 
lying in additional lending with rescheduling packages and temporary adjustments. 
The latter views debt as a long-term inability to repay debt with some attempt 
made to salvage some portion of the debt while accepting some loss on face value. 
At the time of the crisis, the majority of bankers, government officials and 
independent observers were inclined to view Mexico’s situation as a liquidity 
problem.
Two basic assumptions were made regarding the liquidity crisis: 1) that the 
developing countries’s balance of payments problem was short-term and could be 
resolved in a relatively short time period; and 2) that their economies were 
resilient and flexible and orthodox treatment such as deflationary policies could be 
achieved without undue strain on the developing countries’s economies. From 
these basic assumptions, the international financial community believed that the 
developing countries would expand their exports and generate trade surpluses in 
order to service their debt. In the meantime, they would receive new loans to help 
carry out short-run adjustment policies. It was hoped that after this hurdle of 
temporary illiquidity was overcome, credit worthiness would be restored and 
lending would resume. As the following section illustrates, however, both internal 
mismanagement of the economy and unforseen external factors prevented Mexico 
from solving its ‘liquidity’ crisis.
81Mike Faber, ‘Dissent on Debt: The Implications of Mexico’s 1986 Rescheduling’, Development 
Policy Review (Vol. 5, No. 3, September 1987), p. 231.
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2.2.2 The Watershed (1985 to 1986)
Although the difficulties experienced by Mexico have their roots in the domestic 
mismanagement of the economy, the deepening of the problems during this time 
period was primarily attributable to circumstances in the international economy. 
The ability of Mexican policymakers to anticipate and adjust to adverse external 
developments was minimal. In addition, the scope for coping was squandered by a 
time-consuming bureaucratic squabble.
During the second quarter of 1984, the government began to loosen its 
economic policy and briefly implemented populist policies. The increase in public 
sector deficit was in part the result of the expansionary fiscal and credit policies 
which were in response to growing political pressure resulting from the 
deterioration of living standards of broad sectors of society. More importantly, the 
increase was in anticipation by the government of an electoral challenge from the 
PAN (The National Action Party - the leading opposition party) in the 
gubernatorial and chamber elections to be held in 1985.
Because of the inherently conflictual relationship between the Finance 
Ministry (responsible for income) and the Budget and Planning Ministry 
(responsible for expenditure), a bureaucratic squabble ensued. Jesus Silva Herzog 
(the Finance Minister) knew that Mexico would never reach its targets for 1985. 
The figures drawn up by Carlos Salinas de Gortari (the Budget Minister) were 
misleading. When the 1985 budget was proposed by Salinas in December 1984, 
Silva Herzog refused to sign it until expenditures were cut. This disagreement 
between the two men would be the first of many.
In 1985 Mexico was falling short of its economic policy targets. The 
overvalued peso led to a resurgence of capital flight,82 reflecting society’s and the
82The renewed capital flight was very important as a substantial amount had left the country in the 
past decade, damaging the government’s effort to stabilize the economy. According to the World Bank, 
between 1970 and 1982, US$26.5 billion left the country. Morgan Guaranty Trust reported US$53 
billion in flight capital between 1976 and 1986, with US$36 billion leaving between 1976 and 1982. 
Pamela S. Falk, ‘Prdlogo’, in Blanca Torres y Pamela S. Falk (coordinadoras), La Adhesion de Mexico 
al GATT (Mexico, DF: El Colegio de Mexico, 1989), p. 15.
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international community’s perceptions that the adjustment programme was no 
longer working as it should. The de la Madrid administration had not been 
successful in mending its relationship with business. The diverse private sector 
interests, the ideological divisions over the preferred role of the state and the 
mobility of Mexican capital made renewed business confidence difficult.
In addition to domestic mismanagement of the economy, external factors 
were also affecting the Mexican economic recovery. As events changed in the 
international economy, it was realized that external factors seriously limit the 
extent to which domestic economies were able to adjust without changes in the 
international economic system. Mexico’s adjustment programme, although initially 
successful, soon ran into difficulties. The rescue packages did not account for the 
problems in the international economic system, the effects of austerity programmes 
on domestic populations and the unwillingness of banks to provide new loans while 
increasing the costs to the debtor nations with rescheduling fees and higher interest 
rate spreads.
Much of what was happening in the international economic system was 
obviously out of Mexico’s control. The industrialized countries were not 
performing as anticipated. During the 1983 to 1985 period, expected growth in 
international trade had not occurred. Industrialized nations were assumed to grow 
between 3 and 4 per cent a year, but in reality only grew around 2 per cent.83 
Concurrently, non-oil commodity prices continued to fall while real interest rates 
remained high. At the same time, Mexico’s exports confronted mounting 
protectionism. As protectionism increased in the industrialized world (primarily 
because the comparative advantage in many standardized products had shifted 
toward the newly industrializing countries), competition between developing
83World Bank, World Development Report (Washington, DC: IBRD, 1983, 1987), pp. 27, 205.
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countries like Mexico and the industrialized countries, especially the United States, 
increased.84
As Mexico was not a member of the GATT and there existed no bilateral 
trade agreement with the United States, the United States was in a position to 
retaliate against several Mexican subsidies by means of a countervailing duty. 
Particularly after 1982, the United States, feeling the effects of the world 
recession, initiated eighteen investigations into Mexican subsidies.85 This, in 
effect restricted market access for many of Mexico’s products. Hence, the country 
was having a harder time generating a trade surplus to service its debt. Instead 
Mexico had to resort to using domestic savings which were augmented by curbing 
imports.
The apparent loss of control of the economy on the part of the government 
was reflected in the tougher stance then adopted by Mexico’s creditors. The 
country had fallen out of compliance with the IMF, which signalled its disapproval 
by withholding the final tranche of official finance in September 1985. Two 
additional events occurred - both of them beyond the control of policymakers - 
which compounded Mexico’s problems. First, within days of the suspension of 
IMF lending, Mexico City was devastated by two earthquakes.86 Approximately 
US$1 billion was added to Mexico’s immediate external borrowing 
requirements.87
84The increase in protectionism in the United States is of vital importance to Mexico. Its trade with 
the United States accounted for approximately 60-70 per cent of its total trade. Mexican-United States 
trade relations is examined in Chapter 4.
o r
The issue of Mexican-United States trade relations and countervailing duties are discussed in 
Chapter 4.
86Sr. Silva Herzog says that Mexico was ‘fortunate’ to have had the earthquakes. Attention was 
drawn away from the mismanagement of the economy as the government was able to blame the 
economic deviations on this external occurrence. Interview, Silva Herzog, op. tit., in footnote 45.
87Wayne A. Cornelius, The Political Economy of Mexico Under de la Madrid: The Crisis Deepens, 
1985 - 1986 (San Diego, CA: University of California, San Diego, Center for US - Mexican Studies, 
1986), p. 35.
66
The Historical Roots Chapter Two
Second, before Mexico could identify where it would locate the extra 
foreign exchange needed for reconstruction, an even worse economic shock struck 
Mexico: the international price of oil collapsed.88 Because oil had constituted 
about 70 per cent of Mexico’s export revenues, the dramatic drop in prices was 
debilitating. It is estimated that US$8 billion was lost in export revenues - almost 
half Mexico’s total foreign revenues.89
Many within the government thought that there were limits to what 
restrictions could be imposed. With the collapse of oil prices in January 1986, 
there was tremendous conflict within the cabinet on short-term policy. This 
indecision lasted for six months and involved the two ministries responsible for 
economic policy: the Finance Ministry and the Budget and Programming Ministry. 
Silva Herzog considered the collapse in oil price terrible, but acknowledged that 
the Mexican government had to continue to cut public expenditures by furthering 
the austerity measures. Silva Herzog, the Finance Minister, proposed (approximate 
figures) trimming US$2 billion from public expenditure, US$2 billion from foreign 
borrowing and US$2 billion in deficit.90 The second group, led by the 
Programming Minister, Salinas, believed that the adjustment programme had been 
unreasonably strict. Public expenditures could not be cut any further as they had 
been ‘cut to the bone’. Salinas called for adjustment to come from external 
sources.
It was the second group that eventually won the policy debate. Silva 
Herzog resigned in June 1986 and one month later, Mexico signed an agreement 
with the IMF. Silva Herzog’s exit from the cabinet had political overtones (his exit
88The price of oil plummeted from US$30.80 on 21 November 1985, to US$11.50 on 2 April 
1986. Robert A. Pastor (ed.), Latin America’s Debt Crisis: Adjusting to the Past or Planning for the 
Future? (London: Lynne Rienner, 1987), p. 13.
89Esperanza Duran, ‘Mexico’s 1986 Financial Rescue: Palliative or Cure?’, in George Philip (ed.), 
The Mexican Economy (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 99.
^Interview, Silva Herzog, op. cit., in footnote 45.
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made Salinas the front-runner for the 1988 Presidential race), but it also created a 
more harmonious cabinet united on short-term economic policy.91
The IMF agreement incorporated the terms of the Baker Plan, emphasized 
the need for growth over further austerity measures and linked debt service 
capability to the price of oil. The Baker Plan called for three essential and 
mutually reinforcing elements: 1) the adoption by debtor nations of comprehensive 
macroeconomic and structural policies, supported by the international financial 
institutions, to promote growth and balance of payments adjustment and to reduce 
inflation; 2) a continued role for the IMF, in conjunction with increased and more 
effective structural adjustment lending, both in support of and the adoption by 
debtor countries of market-oriented policies for growth; and 3) increased lending 
by private banks in support of comprehensive economic adjustment 
programmes.92
Mexico started its road to economic recovery as the international financial 
community began to acknowledge that the debt crisis was not just a liquidity crisis, 
but a problem of solvency. Mexico and the other major debtor countries, however, 
proved incapable of servicing their full obligations or restoring credit worthiness 
before the Brady Plan officially sanctioned debt forgiveness in 1989. Today, it is 
argued by the current Finance Minister, Pedro Aspe, that the Mexican experience 
has shown that macroeconomic stabilization can be successful only if it goes hand 
in hand with structural change and some measure of debt relief.93
91Paradoxically, Sr. Silva Herzog, who considers himself a ‘leftist’, was advocating reduced public 
spending, while Sr. Salinas, seen as an orthodox economist, was attempting to build political support 
by relaxing austerity measures.
^James A. Baker III, ‘Statement before the Joint Annual Meeting of the IMF and World Bank, 
October 8, Seoul, Korea’, Treasury News (Washington, DC, 1985). A more in-depth analysis of IMF 
and US pressure on Mexican policymakers is addressed in Chapter 4.
^Lectures by Pedro Aspe, Finance Minister of Mexico, entitled ‘Stabilization and Structural 
Change: The Mexican Experience’, The Lionel Robbins Memorial Lecture, The London School of 
Economics, 20-22 January 1992.
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Conclusions
This chapter traced Mexico’s post-Second World War development strategy from 
1940 to the mid-1980s. The ISI model emphasized a protected economy with 
strong state intervention and produced the so-called ‘Mexican Miracle’: high rates 
of growth, low annual inflation rates and the transformation into an industrializing 
nation. The strategy was inherently flawed, however, and led to gross distortions 
in the Mexican economy by the late 1960s. The following decade witnessed a 
period of socio-political as well as economic troubles. The administrations of 
Echevema and Ldpez Portillo also reacted to the crises in distinctive ways. 
President Echevema responded by radicalizing the nationalist development model, 
strengthening the role of the state and renewing an inward-looking economic 
policy. President Lopez Portillo implemented an orthodox stabilization programme 
and started some trade liberalization. The discovery of oil in 1978 led to the 
abandonment of these policies. The oil-led strategy was terribly mismanaged and a 
true opportunity for Mexican development was effectively squandered. As the 
domestic economy overheated and the international economy continued to 
deteriorate, President Lopez Portillo retreated into populism. Both Presidents 
Echevema and Ldpez Portillo shifted inward when confronted with economic 
crisis.
With the administration of de la Madrid, the much needed structural 
changes and economic austerity measures were finally implemented. Although de 
la Madrid did resort to brief populist measures in 1985, they were short-term 
policies. It is important to stress that rather than retreating toward an inward- 
looking direction when the crisis intensified in 1985 to 1986, de la Madrid did the 
opposite. His administration cast aside the nationalist development strategy and 
implemented a radical opening of the economy.
The international and domestic economic conditions and the short-term 
policies employed by the new Mexican administration explained the setting for the 
trade liberalizing reforms of the early 1980s. The next chapter examines the first 
international variable - the 1982 economic crisis - and its role as a catalyst for
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policy change. The focus is on de la Madrid’s long-term strategy of economic 
reordering and structural change, specifically on the implementation of trade 
liberalization measures. In light of the continuing financial crisis and the 
difficulties Mexico had in maintaining the orthodox programme, the decision to 
liberalize substantially the trade regime and join the GATT in 1985 is significant.
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Introduction
This chapter explores the 1982 economic crisis and its effect on the liberalization 
of the trade regime in the de la Madrid administration. The central premise is that 
the economic crisis acted as a catalyst for fundamental policy change, but the exact 
content and direction of the reforms were determined by the Mexican individual 
policymakers. This chapter is divided into three parts. The first section discusses 
the international variable explaining policy change in Mexico: the 1982 economic 
crisis. It examines the Mexican policymakers’ grasp of the crisis situation and 
addresses what role the crisis played in prompting economic policy reform. The 
second part explores the trade liberalizing measures pursued from the beginning of 
the de la Madrid sexenio to the 1985 watershed year when Mexico decided to join 
the GATT. The third section argues that despite the immense social welfare costs 
of the ongoing crisis, the de la Madrid administration did not retreat into 
populism, but rapidly speeded up trade liberalizing measures.
3.1 The Crisis Situation
When Miguel de la Madrid came to power in late 1982, he was confronted with 
the worst economic plight to beset his country for over half a century.1 In this 
study of why Mexico decided to liberalize its trade regime, the economic crisis 
confronting the country is the first and foremost external variable - it is the key to 
the dramatic shift in Mexican economic policy in the early 1980s. Although the 
candidate, de la Madrid, had made the commitment to shift gradually toward an 
outward-oriented growth strategy before August 1982, the crisis situation propelled 
the new administration to speed up the liberalization process.
Tor more information on the debt crisis, see, for example, William Cline, International Debt 
(Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1986); Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski, Latin 
American Debt (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988); and Robert Pastor (ed.), 
Latin America’s Debt Crisis: Adjusting to the Past or Planning for the Future? (London: Lynne 
Rienner, 1987).
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The nexus between crisis and policy change is central to the thesis. Yet 
determining the link between crisis and policy change can be difficult. Unless a 
clear measure of crisis is adopted, explanations can involve a sort of circular 
reasoning: fundamental policy changes are initiated because there is a crisis and 
therefore a crisis exists when major policy reforms are adopted. In order to avoid 
this, three criteria are put forward to define a crisis situation: 1) decision makers 
perceive that a crisis exists; 2) there is a general consensus among the 
policymakers that the crisis situation is real and of a threatening nature; and 3) 
decision makers believe that failure to act would lead to an even more ominous 
economic and political reality.2
Because of the international and domestic difficulties, Mexican 
policymakers were convinced that their country was facing an acute economic 
crisis. Not only did the decision makers perceive a real and threatening crisis, but 
they foresaw dire consequences occurring to the political and economic situation of 
the country if appropriate action was not taken. The importance and the greater 
implications of this juncture in Mexican history is evident from the words of 
Miguel de la Madrid. As president-elect, he emphasized that the crisis was of 
dimensions not seen since the great depression of the 1930s, extending to every 
facet of Mexican society: social, political, economic and ideological.3 While he 
was president-elect (4 July to 1 December 1992), de la Madrid chose a select 
group of people to meet twice a week in order to decide what to do about the 
current economic crisis.4 These meetings considered the various policy options 
that would be available to the new administration. These meetings discussed how
2Fen Hampson, Forming Economic Policy: The Case o f Energy in Canada and Mexico (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986), pp. 16-17.
3Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, Cien Dias Contra La Crisis (Mexico, DF: Direcci6n General de 
Comunicacion Social de la Presidencia de la Republica, marzo, 1983), p. 17.
“The inner circle included, among others, Carlos Salinas de Gortari (soon-to-be the Minister of 
Programming and Budget); Jesus Silva Herzog (Minister of Finance); and Miguel Mancera 
(Director of the central bank). This group is discussed in Chapter 6.
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fast and how far to open the Mexican economy and the general philosophy behind 
the Mexico’s past development model.5
Six months after coming to office, when outlining the National 
Development Plan, the president commented on the magnitude of the crisis:
...We are facing a changing and challenging situation. There is 
widespread uncertainty...Mexico faces a decisive moment in its 
history. The Nation’s destiny is at stake. Our future and that of the 
generations to come depend on what we do or stop doing today. We 
are not merely living a circumstantial crisis; if it were so, the 
solution would be relatively easy... Those of us who have the 
capacity to transform the crisis into an opportunity for change and 
improvement will continue advancing as a Nation, as a society and 
as individuals.6
The Finance Minister, Jesus Silva Herzog, further reiterated the perception of 
crisis felt by the policymakers: ‘We were reacting to a very real crisis in Mexico, 
we felt like heroes coming to save our country from ruin.’7 This feeling of crisis 
and the need to act propelled the economic cabinet to institute policies much faster 
and deeper than originally planned.
Crisis decision making provides the window of opportunity for policy 
reform. Not only is there a perceived threat, but policy decisions must be made in 
a short time period. The primary actors responsible are the president and his 
advisors excluding the Congress, bureaucracy and interest groups. It is argued that 
during such crises, there is not only strong pressure for reform, but decision 
makers are more likely to institute radical or innovative policies than when a crisis 
does not exist. Although institutions are prone to inertia, they become more
5Interview, Sr. Jesus Silva Herzog, Finance Minister (1982 to 1986), Madrid, Spain, 21 May 
1992.
6Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, National Development Plan 1983-88: Federal Executive Branch 
Summary (Mexico, DF: Ministry of Planning and Budget, May 1983), p. 9.
’Interview, Silva Herzog, op. cit., in footnote 5.
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flexible in times of crisis. The environment becomes less of a policymaking 
constraint and new ideas and solutions are introduced.
The crisis situation introduced momentous changes in Mexico’s economic 
policy. Although the crisis provided the opportunity to implement reforms, it did 
not necessarily stipulate what those reforms would entail. The exact content was 
determined by the domestic policymakers. In his inaugural speech, President de la 
Madrid stated that he would pursue a policy of ‘reordering the economy’. This 
reordering process would include the reform of both Mexico’s short-term macro­
management of the economy and more importantly, its long-term development 
strategy.8 The economic policies pursued during the sexenio of President de la 
Madrid had two objectives. The first objective was to manage the economic crisis 
by implementing a strict austerity programme through a tough IMF-backed 
package aimed at stabilizing the economy. The second objective was to restructure 
the economy in the long-term by shifting the development strategy from the 
traditional mixed-economy model toward neoliberalism.
When President de la Madrid outlined the National Development Plan 
(PND) after six months in office, he emphasized the feeling of crisis. The 
president knew that this was an important juncture in Mexican economic history 
and that bold decisions had to be taken. Rather than a temporary crisis calling for 
short-term solutions, Mexico had to find long-term, fundamentally different 
strategies to cope with its financial difficulties. President de la Madrid in effect 
declared his intention to break not only with the specific economic programme of 
his predecessor, but also from the development strategy which such a programme 
had essentially been built upon. Lopez Portillo’s Global Development Plan had 
renewed an inward-looking development strategy. It reinforced the public sector’s 
involvement in the economy, did not plan any fiscal reforms and still relied on oil 
revenues to finance the deepening of import substitution industrialization (ISI).
8Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, ‘Mensaje de Toma de Posesidn del Presidente Miguel de la 
Madrid’, op. cit., in footnote 3.
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President de la Madrid’s PND was based on the criticisms of these ‘lessons 
of the past’. The Plan was the first of its kind. Whereas previous programmes 
planned for the sexenio, the president broke this unwritten rule of not 
compromising policy past one’s own administration. The PND outlined what 
President de la Madrid and his economic team believed was necessary for the 
long-term development path of the country: the requirement of fundamentally 
restructuring the Mexican economy.9 The Plan’s objectives were to conserve and 
strengthen the democratic institutions, to conquer the crisis, to recover the capacity 
of growth and to initiate the qualitative changes that the country needed in its 
economic, political and social structures.10
De la Madrid’s national development plan demonstrated a clear shift away 
from the Global Development Plan of the previous administration. Moreover, it 
would be the first of many policies to move away from the previous development 
strategy. The following section of the chapter examines the trade liberalizing 
measures implemented by the de la Madrid administration. It argues that opening 
up the economy was a policy objective from the beginning of the sexenio.
Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, op. cit., in footnote 6. It should be noted that it is quite usual 
for a new administration at the beginning of a sexenio to claim that they are making a new 
departure. It is less usual, however, for them to make one.
10Gobiemo de Mexico, Las Razones y Las Obras, Gobierno de Miguel de la Madrid: Cronica 
del Sexenio, 1982-88, Primer Ano, Direccidn: Alejandra Lajous (Mexico, DF: Fondo de Cultura 
Economica, 1985), p. 160. My emphasis.
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3.2 The Mexican Trade Regime
Since the 1950s when the ISI policies were firmly in place, Mexico had relied on 
three main elements for its import protection: 1) an ad valorem import tariff 
scheme, 2) official minimum prices for customs valuation and 3) a system of 
quantity restrictions either in the form of quotas or of licensing.11 Import tariff 
rates have been on a scale of 0 to 100 per cent ad valorem. Official prices have 
changed over time neglecting to reflect transaction prices, thus, increasing the 
effective levels of the tariffs significantly above nominal rates. The most restrictive 
element of the Mexican import regime has been the system of quantity restrictions.
In the 1970s, however, the Mexican government recognized that this 
system of import protection needed to change for several reasons. First, as was 
shown in the previous chapter, the ISI model was exhausted, inefficient and caused 
long-term structural problems in the economy. Second, having followed an 
inward-looking strategy for over thirty years, Mexico had lost some of its 
competitiveness on the world market. When Mexico was hit by the financial crisis 
in 1982, the situation necessitated the earning of foreign exchange in a sustainable 
fashion. Mexico needed not only to increase its exports, but more importantly it 
had to reduce dependence on a single commodity - oil. In order to recover its 
economic health, import protection needed to be lowered in Mexico to reduce the 
existing bias against exports and to raise the levels of efficiency by exposing 
Mexican industry to foreign competition.
Although there existed compelling economic reasons to move away from 
the model of ISI and move toward a more outward-oriented policy, there was great 
domestic resistance to such a move. Moreover, the policy choice was not clear- 
cut. Such a policy could have taken two paths. The first is selective export 
promotion and the second is trade liberalization. The former utilizes export 
incentives to offset bias against exports without dismantling all of the country’s 
barriers and without devaluing the currency. As Mexico came to find out in the
“Adriaan Ten Kate, ‘Trade Liberalization and Economic Stabilization in Mexico: Lessons of 
Experience’, World Development (Vol. 20, No. 5, May 1992), pp. 662-3.
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1970s and early 1980s, however, subsidizing exports generates problems. Where 
the overvaluation of exchange rate caused by high import protection was large, the 
export subsidies required to offset the antiexport bias were simply too great. In 
addition, subsidies by Mexico became increasingly subject to countervailing duties 
from its principal trading partner, the United States. The latter, and riskier option 
(trade liberalization), recommends removal of existing trade barriers, devaluation 
and reliance on the price mechanism to allocate productive resources. The de la 
Madrid economic team eventually chose trade liberalization.
It is important to point out that the recognition of the need to export did not 
begin with the de la Madrid administration. It was in fact the Lopez Portillo 
administration (1976 to 1982) that first introduced trade liberalizing measures. 
Weiss argues that only when foreign exchange was in abundance - as was the case 
during Lopez Portillo’s sexenio - could Mexico begin its trade liberalizing 
measures.12 The discovery of substantial oil reserves and the great increase in 
petroleum exports after 1977, along with IMF funds and heavy private borrowing, 
eased the foreign exchange situation substantially. Because of this, Weiss argues, 
there occurred the partial relaxation of trade controls.
The Lopez Portillo administration initiated trade liberalization measures 
between 1977 and 1980 when foreign exchange was more plentiful. By 1980, 76 
per cent of the 7,776 items in the tariff code were exempted from an import 
license requirement.13 In 1981, however, the fixed exchange rate was 
appreciating steadily in real terms coupled with higher international interest rates 
and declining oil prices creating new foreign exchange difficulties. Because of 
these financial problems, import licences were reinstated for 80 per cent of the 
total value of imports, thus signalling a return to protectionism.
12Lecture by John Weiss, ‘Trade Liberalization in Mexico in the 1980s’, Institute of Latin 
American Studies, Mexico Seminar, 8 December 1992.
13Luis Bravo Aguilera, ‘Mexico’s Foreign Trade Policies and Commercial Relations with the 
United States’, in William Glade and Cassio Luiselli (eds), The Economics o f Interdependence: 
Mexico and the United States, Volume 2 (San Diego, CA: University o f California, San Diego, 
Center for US - Mexican Studies, 1989), p. 83.
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The next administration of Miguel de la Madrid would also initiate trade 
liberalizing measures but under very different economic conditions. Rather than 
liberalizing when there was an abundance of foreign exchange, the opposite 
occurred. When faced with mounting socio-political and economic troubles in 
1985, Mexico did not retreat into protectionism. Rather, the lack of foreign 
exchange would be one of the factors leading the Mexican government to push for 
reform in the existing trade regime.
The next section examines the development policy changes proposed by the 
de la Madrid team during the election campaign. These proposed changes included 
plans to shift Mexico’s growth model from an inward- to an export-oriented 
strategy. These proposed changes and the rhetoric advocating the liberalization of 
the economy was significant in a country that had experienced a nationalist 
development policy for over thirty years. It also demonstrates that the initiative for 
the change in trade policy emanated from domestic actors led by Miguel de la 
Madrid and his economic team.
3.2.1 The Basic Plan and Electoral Programme
Prior to the debt crisis in August 1982, the candidate for the presidency, Miguel 
de la Madrid, and his economic team realized the need for an outward-oriented 
growth strategy. This realization was partly due to the failed ISI policies of the 
post-Second World War era, but more importantly, it was tied to the realization 
(after the oil glut appeared in 1981) that oil-led growth could not be relied upon. 
Policy formulation of the outward strategy took place within the context of the 
electoral campaign of 1981 to 1982. By examining the PRI national campaign 
meetings (through publications by the ruling party - the PRI - and its think tank, 
the Institute for Political, Economic and Social Studies -IEPES), the de la Madrid 
economic team’s commitment to change trade policy is evident.
‘The Basic Plan and Electoral Programme’, introduced in late 1981, called 
for the Mexican market to integrate into the world economy and the need to adopt 
an export-oriented growth strategy. The Basic Plan was outlined in more detail in
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March 1982 at the Foreign Trade National Meeting. At the meeting, de la Madrid
said that he did not believe in an autarkic or inward-oriented development policy,
but rather that Mexico needed to integrate into the world economy. The
presidential candidate called for the country to diversify its exports and
emphasized the need to make foreign trade a priority in the national development
strategy. This new position on trade included the rationalization of protectionism.
De la Madrid pointed out the economic problems associated with Mexico’s
prolonged protectionism, especially the distortions in the allocation of resources
and in income distribution.14 In addition, at the meeting, Mexican industry was
given notice that it would have to learn to compete on a global level. The
Subdirector from the Treasury, Mauricio de Maria y Campos, emphasized that the
‘fundamental problem’ facing Mexican industry was the growing trade deficit in
the manufacturing sector and the lack of diversified export capacity. Only through
the injection of a strong dose of international competition could these problems be
solved.15 Only a few months later, the future president presented a detailed
programme for a change in the course of the nation’s economic development,
which was much more ambitious and specific than is normal at this stage of the
campaign. He declared that policy would not take the traditional form of subsidies,
but rather it would
create the conditions for modernisation. The principle of economic 
realism must be the starting point of any strategy. We reject the 
rhetoric of populism... [We will continue the] traditional mixed 
economy, but [with the] rationalisation of the existing trade policy 
and a gradual weaning away of industry from protectionism.16
14Miguel de la Madrid, ‘El Compromise)’, Consulta Popular (Mexico, DF: PRI/IEPES, marzo 
1982), pp. 5-10.
15PRI/IEPES, Instrumentos de la Political Commercial (Mexico, DF: PRI/IEPES, marzo 1982), 
pp. 29-30.
,<5‘Mexico’s Next President Spells out his policies’, Latin American Regional Reports: Mexico 
(4 June 1982), pp. 1-2.
79
Trade Liberalization Chapter Three
It could be argued that this election manifesto was only rhetoric; words are 
not necessarily evidence of proposed actions or intentions. After all, during a 
campaign, candidates and parties propose policies that they believe will get them 
elected to office. If the de la Madrid economic team had presented an inward- 
looking, populist programme for development, then this argument just might be 
convincing. But there are several problems with this line of reasoning. First, the 
ruling party has won every presidential race since the 1920s and it is hard to 
believe that they thought they might actually lose this one. The PRI has 
considerable policy autonomy from interest groups and classes in Mexican society 
(perhaps, because of this, they had the leeway to advocate a different policy path).
Second, the shift to an outward-oriented policy was not the obvious 
direction to take, rather the opposite was more likely. The campaign’s proposal to 
integrate into the world economy was advanced only eighteen months after the 
hotly contested debate over GATT entry in 1980. This highly contentious issue 
demonstrated that the government (the dominant faction in the Lopez Portillo 
administration), labour and business groups were against reducing protectionism 
and opening the economy to the outside world.
The significance of the outward-oriented policy proposals from the de la 
Madrid team cannot be understated. These proposals went against the more 
popular, nationalist development model supported by the 1982 Lopez Portillo 
government. In addition, they came five months before the breaking of the debt 
crisis in August. Domestic and international factors, although responsible for the 
pace and intensity of reforms are not sufficient explanations for their genesis. The 
origins of the outward-oriented development policy can be traced to the individuals 
that made up the de la Madrid economic team.
Among those in favour of an outward-oriented development strategy, there 
emerged two groups that differed in their views on the speed and intensity of trade 
liberalizing measures. The first group advocated a slow and gradual approach, 
citing the failed attempts of Chile and Argentina in the 1970s to support their 
position of caution. The other group looked to Japan and South Korea to support
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their view that liberalization should be a quick process in order to renew economic 
growth. Miguel de la Madrid advocated the gradual approach for two reasons. 
First, he believed Mexico had to deal first with the short-term stabilization crisis 
and only then ease into trade liberalization. Second, the shift toward economic 
liberalization would go against thirty years of policy and the Mexican government 
had to proceed with caution.
3.2.2 Trade Liberalization (1983 to 1984)
Because of the anticipated resistance by important sectors of Mexican society to 
the idea of fundamentally altering the development strategy and the economic 
doctrine underlying it, de la Madrid’s government was careful to disguise 
changes.17 The first area to be re-structured was the trade regime. In the first six 
weeks after coming to power, the de la Madrid government started to introduce a 
different rhetoric alluding to the fundamental changes to come in the trade 
structure. The Diario Oficial announced reforms that would include ‘studying, 
protecting and determining tariffs...to study the restrictions on imports and exports 
and to establish criteria to stimulate foreign trade as well as re-evaluate subsidies 
on import taxes’.18 The government not only looked to promote exports in order 
to earn foreign exchange to service its foreign debt, but it also questioned the 
existing import regime and the level of protection that remained in the Mexican 
economy.
The new economic cabinet ministers emphasized the need for long-term 
changes. Silva Herzog, the Finance Minister, announced that the government was
17For example, when in 1983, the Finance Minister sold the first two parastatals he sold them 
to the CTM (the labor union associated with the PRI). According to Sr. Silva Herzog, he did this 
in order to test the waters for future privatizations. Interview, Sr. Silva Herzog, op. cit. , in 
footnote 5.
18Diario Oficial, Organo del Gobiemo Constitutional de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 
Director: Lie. Rafael Murillo Vidal, el 29 diciembre de 1982, Tomo CCCLXXV, No. 23, pp. 323- 
4.
81
Trade Liberalization Chapter Three
looking for a ‘realistic’ economic policy.19 The ‘realistic’ policy called for long­
term structural change. The Trade Minister, Hector Hemdndez Cervantez, 
announced that although the government had no plans to enter GATT, that in or 
out of GATT, Mexico had to open gradually to external competition.20 To say 
that Mexico would not enter GATT at this time had more to do with assuaging the 
fears of those who believed that the renewal of national debate (like the one in 
1980) would hinder the state already trying to cope with an acute crisis. The Trade 
Minister, therefore, was careful with his rhetoric. Nevertheless, he pointed to the 
necessity of a more efficient and competitive Mexican economy that could stand 
up to competition in the international economy.21
The rhetoric from the very beginning of the de la Madrid administration 
foreshadowed the fundamental changes to come. In addition to the changing 
discourse, actual policy changes were occurring to test the political waters. 
Liberalizing measures, albeit quite limited, were carried out only weeks after de la 
Madrid became president. In January 1983, Mexico reduced tariff barriers on 
nearly 2,000 imported goods by 5-10 per cent to maintain supplies of raw 
materials and semi-manufactured goods to industry.22 At this time, tariffs ranged 
from 0 for some basic foodstuffs and agricultural inputs to 100 per cent for luxury 
items. Throughout the year the Secretariat of Trade and Industrial Development
19Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, ‘Cronologia, 11/12/82’, op. cit., in footnote 3, p. 93.
^M. de la Madrid Hurtado, ‘Cronologfa, 16/1/83’, ibid, p. 100.
21Hemandez Cervantez, as Deputy Secretary of Trade (1976 to 1982) had already gone on 
record regarding the need to rationalize protection. In an article published in 1981, Hernandez 
Cervantez argued for the rationalization of protection - liberalizing imports and reducing the overall 
level of tariffs - on the grounds that it would contribute to the reversal of the conditions that 
discourage exports and would create structural conditions that favour them. Hector Hernandez 
Cervantez, ‘La Politica de Comercio Exterior de Mexico’, El Economista Mexicano (julio-agosto, 
1981), p. 40.
22Ron Buchanan, The Financial Times (London), 19 January, 1983.
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(SECOFI) announced it would liberalize import permits to varying degrees.23 For 
the year, 1983, Banamex reports import permit requisites were removed from 
3,777 categories on the import tariff schedules, bringing the total value of 
exempted imports to 47 per cent.24 Although the first year of the new 
administration proceeded slowly with the trade liberalizing measures, they 
nonetheless occurred. Then in July 1984, stronger action was taken, bolstered by a 
more forceful rhetoric.
In July 1984, President de la Madrid presented the National Programme for 
Industrial Promotion and Foreign Trade for 1984-1988 (Pronafice) and was a 
substantial step closer to liberalizing trade. Pronafice presented an outline for the 
restructuring of Mexico’s industry necessary to make its growth compatible with 
the National Development Plan. It identified industrial sectors that have not 
contributed strongly to exports in the past or that had negative trade balances. In 
addition, it posited a design for an industrial structure that would be more 
efficient, better able to compete in international markets and less dependent on 
imported inputs and products. Selective promotion largely through fiscal 
incentives, was intended to re-orient many sectors toward greater export 
activity.25
This programme promoted an outward-oriented economy through export 
promotion rather than trade liberalization. It defended the system of a mixed- 
economy under the guidance of the state. It also promised to reject ‘statism’ along 
with ‘free-market liberalism’ and to strive for a parastatal industry that would be 
‘efficient’ and ‘competitive’. With regard to trade policy, a combination of both
23Diario Oficial, Organo del Gobiemo Constitutional de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos,
Director: Lie. Luis de la Hidalga (el 3 de mayo de 1983 and el 19 de mayo de 1983, Tomo 
CCCLXXXVH, Nos. 2 and 13), pp. 17 and 10; and Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, ‘Cronologia, 
3/2/83’, op. tit., in footnote 3, pp. 103-4.
^Francisco Gil Diaz, ‘Opportunities Presented by the Opening of the Mexican Economy 
Through Trade’, Banamex: Review o f the Economic Situation o f Mexico (Vol. LXII, No. 729, 
August 1986), p. 330.
^The Federal Executive Branch, The National Program for Promoting Industry and Foreign 
Trade 1984-88 (Mexico, DF: Secretariat of Commerce and Industrial Promotion, 1984).
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import substitution and export promotion, with neither dominant over the other, 
was proposed. In addition, international trade negotiations were discussed but only 
in general terms, with no mention of the GATT.26
At first glance, Pronafice resembles the previous development model. Yet, 
a closer look at Pronafice shows that the stage was being set for substantial 
changes. The programme explicitly stated that ‘... structural change in industry 
and foreign trade constitutes the catalyst for a new development strategy.’ It 
proclaimed the process of change to be ‘irreversible and necessary’. Although the 
programme acknowledged the state rectorship of the economy and the need for 
parastatals, it also asserted that those state enterprises must perform within the 
market system.27 The programme was innovative, as it called for a new 
development strategy that would rely on market forces and introduce a process of 
change that was irreversible. The process of change was leading to a new 
development model based on economic liberalization. Pronafice, therefore, was to 
make qualitative changes not only in rhetoric, but also to the substance of trade 
policy in Mexico. Though concrete reform was still a year away, Pronafice called 
for substantive reforms, advocating the gradual opening of trade, rationalization 
and harmonization of protective and regulatory policies, and adjustment of The 
General Import Tax tariff structure (i.e., abolition of permits and transition toward 
tariffs as the main instrument). The gradual approach was speeded up only six 
months after the Pronafice programme. In December 1984, SECOFI announced 
the export sub-programme envisioning an acceleration of the substitution of import 
permits by tariffs, an expansion of financial incentives for exporters and more 
flexible treatment for foreign firms investing in exports and technology.
These initial reforms were carefully carried out despite complaints by both 
the ‘right’ and the ‘left’, which recognized that the reforms indicated a 
fundamental change. The right argued that such change came too soon, insisting
™lbid.
21 Ibid, pp. 10, 23. My emphasis.
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that because of the extreme protectionism practised by past administrations, 
Mexican industry was quite uncompetitive. The left opposed any form of economic 
liberalization. Nevertheless, the Mexican government continued with its long-term 
changes to the country’s trade regime.
Further evidence that the Mexican government as well as some sectors of 
the business community accepted that long-term structural change and the 
modification of the economic doctrine underlying it was needed showed in 
documents and various ministers’ actions. Only eight months into office, the de la 
Madrid administration decided to commission a study on the state of small- and 
medium-size businesses. These businesses would be the firms most hurt by the 
liberalization of the economy. The United Nations Organization for Industrial 
Development (UNOID) would conduct a study to gather information and examine 
the experiences of other countries in a similar situation as Mexico - shifting from a 
protected to an open economy. In addition, the study would make 
recommendations for the development of small- and medium-size businesses in an 
increasingly competitive Mexican market.28
At a private sector meeting in Mexico City, one of the government’s 
leading economic strategists and a deputy Trade and Industry Minister, Rene 
Villareal, spoke of the need for change. Villareal, known for his insistence that 
Mexico must develop a dynamic export sector, suggested that without profound 
structural changes the Mexican economy may never realize its international trade 
potential.29 In addition, a deputy industrial development minister, Mauricio de 
Maria y Campos, said in November 1984 at an assembly of Mexican electronics 
manufactures - a group almost totally shielded from direct foreign competition - 
that they must soon begin investing the ‘effort, investment and technological 
development that will give us international competitiveness’. Electronics
^JosS Alvarez, The International Diffusion and Institutionalization o f the New Entrepreneurship 
Movement, PhD thesis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1990), p. 189.
29William A. Orme, Jr., ‘Mexico needs structural changes to realize its export potential and 
growth’, International Herald Tribune, 20 November 1984.
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companies unable to survive without continued aid of subsidies and tough import 
barriers ‘will have to get out of the market’.30
The use of language by the government such as ‘market forces’, ‘reduced 
protectionism’, ‘promoting efficiency to compete with external competition’ and 
‘the need to promote exports’ probably shows that the political will31 as well as 
economic necessity existed in the government from early on in the sexenio. 
Additional evidence exists in the form of trade liberalizing measures, albeit quite 
limited, which were carried out in 1983. The introduction of Pronafice in July 
1984 further demonstrates the will of the policymakers to liberalize the trade 
regime. To argue that Mexico was forced to restructure because of external 
pressure underestimates the Mexican government’s realization of the need to 
change economic policy and the political will of these policymakers to carry out 
the necessary reforms. It falsely assumes that the incremental application of 
liberating principles arose from less than full commitment to such principles rather 
than from astute politics. If the political will had not existed, there would have 
been far more resistance to economic liberalization as in the other major Latin 
American debtors.32 The Mexican government chose to move gradually toward 
liberalizing the economy in order to allow those most likely to be hurt by such 
measures to adjust and also because the government had to deal with the short­
term macro-management of the economy.
That the Mexican policymakers chose to start liberalizing the economy 
rather than being forced to make that decision is further evident in the lack of 
external pressure at this time. From 1983 to the beginning of 1985, Mexico 
pursued trade liberalization in a slow and gradual manner. Neither foreign 
governments nor international organizations were forcing Mexico to liberalize at 
this time. The United States was more interested in Mexico’s Central American
*>lbid.
31Political will is defined here as the commitment or belief in a particular policy.
32Argentina, Brazil and Peru are discussed in the conclusion on this chapter.
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policy than the liberalization of its economy. Although the first liberalizing 
measures were carried out only two months after Mexico signed its first IMF 
Letter of Intent in November 1982, the IMF did not, at this time, force 
liberalization.33 The first explicit mention of the need for Mexico to liberalize 
trade came in April 1985 after Mexico proposed substantial liberalization 
programmes.
In addition to international pressures, systemic variables likewise were not 
determining factors. Mexico’s economic stabilization record was upheld as the 
model for other debtor countries to emulate. The country did not run into renewed 
macroeconomic difficulties until well into 1985. The price of oil and the 
debilitating earthquakes were not a factor until the end of the year. If the IMF did 
not explicitly impose these changes and internally, liberalization met stiff 
resistance, then the reason for the shift lies within the governing ruling elite.34
Integral to President de la Madrid’s first objective of stabilizing the 
economy was export diversification and trade liberalization. If the trade regime 
was changed to encourage exports, then foreign exchange - so desperately needed 
to service the foreign debt - would more readily be available. Instead of oil- and 
debt-led growth as followed by the previous administration, a diversified export 
system would play the critical role as the driving force in Mexican economic 
resuscitation. By the end of 1985, however, oil still accounted for over 70 per cent 
of Mexico’s foreign currency earnings.35 Because of the performance of non-oil 
exports, the de la Madrid administration was convinced of the need for substantial 
trade liberalization as a means of removing constraints and biases against exports.
33These issues are discussed in Chapter 4.
34The governing elite and their ability to change policy so radically is discussed in Chapter 6.
35William P. Glade, ‘How Will Economic Recovery Be Managed?’, in R. Camp (ed.),
Mexico’s Political Stability: The Next Five Years (London: Westview Press, 1986), p. 58.
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In addition, the argument for trade liberalization was put forth by Jesus 
Silva Herzog (the Finance Minister), Miguel Mancera (the head of the central 
bank) and Hector Hernandez Cervantez (the Trade Minister), who saw a link 
between trade liberalization and inflation. In order to control inflation and make 
the economy more efficient, protectionism had to be reduced and the borders 
opened.36
The testimony of Mexico’s own key economic managers provide further 
evidence that they had a particular set of reforms in mind, irrespective of external 
pressures. What the policymakers reject, however, is that such measures were 
embedded in, or drawn from a particular ideology that they commonly subscribed 
to. The Finance Minister maintains that the liberalizing measures were a response 
to the above described ‘reality’ of the economic situation rather than to ‘ideology’. 
Rather than acting as ideologues, the de la Madrid economic team put forward an 
economic policy that had to face both internal and external constraints.
If there were no basis for the argument that the decision to liberalize 
Mexico’s trade regime was formulated because of the policymakers’ belief in the 
underlying doctrine, then it could be argued that the pace of reform taking place in 
Mexico in the latter half of the de la Madrid sexenio would not have been so 
frantic. In addition, when the Mexican economy improved toward the end of the 
decade, instead of slowing down the liberalization process, it was actually speeded 
up. Rather than responding to the ‘economic reality’ of the day, there was a 
fundamental shared belief in the doctrine of economic liberalization as the path to 
take to modernize Mexico. Although Mexican policymakers did not see themselves 
as ideologues, they were very much influenced by neoliberal ideas.37
3<sInterview, Silva Herzog, op. cit., in footnote 5.
37See Chapter 5 for a discussion of the role of ideas and the neoliberal resurgence.
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3.3 The 1985 Watershed
The de la Madrid administration was not implementing radical policy reforms in a 
vacuum. It is important to emphasize that such policy changes did not come 
without its political and socio-economic costs. Politically, society’s discontent with 
the economic situation led to the strengthening of opposition parties. For example, 
the 1985 mid-sexenio elections saw the first governorship from the PAN elected 
and allowed to take office - a first for any opposition party in twentieth century 
Mexico.38 There were also important social interests, especially from the small- 
and medium-sized businesses, that were opposed to trade opening. The 
liberalization of the trade regime threatened to force many entrepreneurs into 
bankruptcy as they did not have the financial resources for industrial reconversion. 
Because of the divisive factors related to sector, size and geographic location,39 
private sector cohesion and influence over policymaking has been greatly
38More importantly, the 1988 Presidential election witnessed a left-wing faction of the PRI split 
from the party and form the National Democratic Front (FDN). This coalition party posed the most 
significant challenge to the PRI. The FDN campaigned against the economic liberalizing measures 
carried out during the previous six years and, instead, called for a return to the ‘populist’, 
nationalistic policies of the past. Even if one were to go by the official results, (the PRI with 50.3 
per cent; the PAN, 17 per cent; and the FDN with 31.12 per cent) the outcome indicated that 
society was not happy with the economic policies pursued by President de la Madrid. This is 
explored in more detail in Chapter 7.
39The ‘radical’ faction of the private sector is concentrated primarily in the northeastern city of 
Monterrey. The group includes industrialists, merchants, agriculturalists, mining interests and 
bankers. The faction find their origins in the 19th century and were active beneficiaries of the 
Porfiriato regime in which an export-oriented model was pursued. The radicals were the strongest 
proponents of resistance to the state-led economic programme which emerged from the Mexican 
revolution. They disagreed with the govemment/PRI on fundamental issues including state 
intervention in the economy. Various business groups were formed by this group and such groups 
were instrumental in fostering the formation of political groups and organizations such as the PAN. 
The ‘moderates’, on the other hand, are concentrated in the Valley of Mexico, particularly Mexico 
City. Unlike the radicals, this group developed slowly in the 1920s and 1930s. They are 
overwhelmingly industrialists and are aware of their vulnerability to foreign competition. Hence, 
they are vehemently against the post-1982 economic direction and call for protection against foreign 
competition in exchange for their recognition of the hegemony of the political bureaucracy.
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diminished. The PRI exploits and perpetuates these differences through policies 
that aim to ‘divide and conquer’ the business community.40
The socio-economic costs borne by the Mexican people were considerable. 
This sexenio saw the highest levels of inflation, public deficit and monetary 
speculation with the lowest economic growth, employment and productive 
investment. Just in the years, 1982 to 1985, the living standard in Mexico dropped 
by 25 per cent.41 No new jobs were created, the population increased a couple 
million and open unemployment rose from 2.7 million in 1981 to 4.6 million in 
1984.42 Wages saw a dramatic decline throughout the entire sexenio. If we take 
the base year of 1980 as equal to 100, then we can see the dramatic decline in real 
average wages - 1982 stood at 104.4 and by 1985 had dropped to 76.6.43 Despite 
the immense political and social costs of the crisis, the de la Madrid administration 
did not follow the path of his predecessors. When the crisis intensified in 1985, 
rather than retreating into populism, the de la Madrid government rapidly speeded 
up the process. The liberalizing measures taken in 1985 are examined below.
3.3.1 The Dim ex and Profiex Programmes
Sweeping Mexican trade reforms began in 1985 with the Dimex (Import Rights for 
Exporters) programme. This programme, originally proposed in February, was 
introduced with the purpose of expediting the purchase of imported materials for 
the production of exports. It would benefit all exports having a minimum domestic
"“Sylvia Maxfield, ‘International Economic Opening and Govemment-Business Relations’, in 
W. Cornelius, J. Gentleman, and P. Smith (eds), Mexico’s Alternative Political Futures,
Monograph Series 30 (San Diego, CA: Centre for US-Mexican Studies, University of California, 
San Diego, 1989), p. 226.
41Mike Faber, ‘Dissent on Debt: The Implications of Mexico’s 1986 Rescheduling’, 
Development Policy Review (Vol. 5, No. 3, September 1987), p. 232.
42H. Dieguez, Social Consequences o f the Economic Crisis: Mexico (Washington, DC: IBRD, 
1985), p. 8.
43By 1988, it had dropped to 46.9. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC), UN Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean (Santiago, Chile: ECLA, 1991), p. 488.
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value-added of 40 per cent and allowed exporters to import without a license an 
amount equivalent to 40 per cent of their foreign sales. Merchandise imports under 
this framework would be subject to an ad valorem tax of a minimum of 10 per 
cent depending on the import tariff.44
The reduction in the protectionism advocated by this programme met with 
strong opposition. Some argue that, with the controversy surrounding the 1980 
GATT debate, the strength of those who would oppose the opening of the 
economy had been well established.45 It was no surprise that nationalist 
politicians, local private businessmen who feared they could not withstand sharper 
foreign competition, the managers of a number of state-owned enterprises and 
even foreign enterprises that reaped extra profits from their protected Mexican 
markets were against any attempts by the de la Madrid government to liberalize 
trade. It would even seem that these groups played an influential role in 
policymaking in Mexico when Dimex was put on hold. Only four months later (in 
June 1985), however, the programme was reintroduced with the 40 per cent figure 
reduced to 30 per cent.
In April 1985, the government introduced the export side to its new trade 
liberalization measures. Profiex (Integral Program for Export Development) aimed 
to make Mexican export activities more profitable within internationally accepted 
norms. The programme defined a strategy to foster non-petroleum exports through 
the promotion and diversification of markets and products, adjustments in export 
credit lines, the organization of exportable supplies, incentives to import 
substitution and a better use of government financing and consulting services to 
support export sales.46
^Banco de Mexico, The Mexican Economy 1986 (Mexico, DF: Banco de Mexico, June 1986),
p. 111.
45W. Glade, op. cit., in footnote 35, p. 65.
^Banco de Mexico, op. cit. , in footnote 44.
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It is important to point out here that these programmes were not the 
beginning of the liberalization of imports and the rationalization of protection, but 
merely accelerated these processes. This new trade policy, oriented to promote 
exports instead of the traditional process of import substitution, demonstrated the 
substantial structural change occurring in the Mexican trade regime. It represented 
the break with the gradualist approach. By June 1985, import permits had been 
abolished on 3,555 items of the General Import Tariff, covering 24.5 per cent of 
total imports.47
3.3.2 The July 1985 reform
The July 1985 reforms accelerated the process of import liberalization. President 
de la Madrid declared the elimination of import permit mechanism for most goods, 
controlling them through a revised tariff structure.48 This new import tariff 
structure introduced nine rates ranging from 0 to 50 per cent, with most subject to 
duties in the range of 25 to 40 per cent.
The July reforms removed most licensing requirements and rationalized 
tariffs on a wide-array of products. The Commission of Tariffs and Controls to 
Foreign Trade under the chairmanship of SECOFI introduced a new policy 
package that eliminated an additional 3,604 items of the General Import Tariff, 
accounting for 36.9 per cent of total imports. The total number of items exempted 
from import permits equalled 7,159 or the equivalent to 61.4 per cent of 1984 
total imports. Licensing requirements were still used. Until June 1985, more than 
half (4,513) of the items of the Import Tariff Schedule were subject to import 
licenses, but with the July reforms only 909 items out of a total of 8,077 were 
subject to such licenses, accounting for 38.6 per cent of total imports.49
47Banco de Mexico, The Mexican Economy 1985 - Supplement (Mexico, DF: Banco de Mexico, 
October, 1985), p. 23.
48‘The New Economic Policy’, Banamex: Review o f the Economic Situation in Mexico (Vol. 
LXI, No. 717, August 1985), pp. 297-8.
49Banco de Mexico, op. cit., in footnote 44, p. 23.
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Thus, in only 6 months, substantial and fundamental reforms were made to 
the trade regime. Only one obstacle remained for the de la Madrid government to 
overcome in order to demonstrate to domestic and foreign actors that Mexico was 
serious about trade liberalization and the transformation of the development 
strategy in the long-term. That obstacle was joining the GATT.
3.3.3 The GATT decision
The most significant outcome of the administration’s push to liberalize the 
economy was its decision to seek and ultimately gain membership to the GATT in 
late November 1985. The GATT accession (August 1986) was a turning point in 
post-Second World War Mexican history because it marked the definitive shift 
toward trade liberalization, and the commitment to restructure not only the entire 
economy, but also to commit itself to a long-term shift in development strategy. 
With the ongoing economic crisis of the 1980s and the earthquakes of September 
1985, President de la Madrid believed that entry into the GATT was necessary to 
help convince foreign investors and creditors that Mexico remained committed to 
its policies of economic austerity of the previous three years and to liberalizing 
and ‘mainstreaming’ its economy. This attitude was in direct contrast to other 
leaders in the region and only further demonstrates the political will on the part of 
the Mexican policymakers to follow a dramatically different development option.
Although it may seem, in hindsight, that joining the GATT was the next 
logical step to take, the decision, nevertheless, caught many observers by surprise 
for two reasons. First, this was not the first time the country had considered 
membership. As was discussed in the previous chapter, during the administration 
of Lopez Portillo (1976 to 1982), Mexico’s entry into the organization had been 
acrimoniously debated by both the ‘left’ and the ‘right’. Second, the decision 
marked the definitive shift away from the post-Second World War development 
strategy. As its many critics pointed out, the government’s decision was further 
evidence of its intention to internationalize the Mexican economy, abandon the
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nationalist policies forged during the 1930s and developed further in the 1970s, 
and more importantly, sacrifice Mexico’s political autonomy.
As the debate of 1980 revealed, the decision to enter the GATT was 
economically significant and politically delicate. It was economically significant in 
that the decision was the turning point in trade policy toward long-term 
liberalization. Yet, import substitution policies of the past could not easily be 
abandoned. They had played a crucial role in promoting rapid growth for over 
thirty years. The growth of many firms in the private sector had been based on 
these policies. Hence, for them, entering into competition with foreign companies 
was seen as a threatening prospect, and one that had to be opposed vehemently. 
Politically, the Mexican government was interested in avoiding a repetition of the 
conflictive and debilitating exchange that ensued when the same issue was 
discussed in 1980.
The de la Madrid administration’s task was twofold. First, it had to manage 
the political backlash and second, it had to cushion society to the extent possible. 
The government disguised its desire to liberalize trade early in the administration. 
The official policy was that Mexico would not enter the GATT. At the annual 
meeting of the ANIERM (Mexican Importers and Exporters Association) in 1983, 
the Secretary of Trade, Hector Hem&ndez Cervantes stated unequivocally that 
Mexico would not join the GATT. He denied that he was ever in favour of such a 
decision.50 According to L<5pez Portillo’s diary at the time, however, Hector 
Hernandez strongly defended GATT entry.51 In Excelsior, a Mexico City daily, 
President de la Madrid stated definitely that Mexico would not enter the 
organization.52 So while the public was lulled into believing that Mexico would
^ a l e  Story, Industry, The State, And Public Policy in Mexico (Austin, TX: University of 
Texas Press, Austin, 1986), p. 145.
51Jose Lopez Portillo, Mis Ttempos, Parte Segundo, (Mexico, DF: Fernandez editores, 1988), 
p. 892.
52Excelsior (Mexico City), 21 May 1983, cited in Dale Story, Industry, The State, And Public 
Policy in Mexico (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, Austin, 1986), p. 145.
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stay out of the GATT, the government in a swift and effective manner had already 
decided to join without national debate.
As GATT entry threatened a system that had been in place for close to four 
decades, opposition to the 1985 decision was expected.53 Those who were against 
accession were the majority of small- and medium-sized businesses who had 
enjoyed a high degree of protectionism under the old system. As was the case five 
years earlier, such businesses were represented by the organization Canacintra.
The crucial issue was to avoid leaving small- and medium-sized industries 
unprotected from foreign competition, as well as to protect some large industries 
which could not compete efficiently in the international market. In addition to 
Canacintra, the labor union (the CTM) Foreign Relations Secretariat, as well as 
the intelligentsia were against GATT entry. Yet, eventually Canacintra and others 
in the anti-GATT group gradually changed their posture as Mexico’s accession 
seemed inevitable. Whereas many business groups were either mildly supportive 
or non-committal in 1980, many were actively in favour in 1985. The business 
organizations insisted that, although opening Mexico to foreign commerce should 
be gradual so as not to cripple existing operations, the age of protectionism had 
come to its definitive end. In addition to the business organizations, the 
departments of the Presidency, the Treasury, the Budget and Programming and the 
central bank were in favour of GATT accession. It was this strong cohesion of 
those responsible for economic policymaking that is the key not only to Mexico’s 
entry to the GATT, but also to the whole liberalization process.
From the economic reasoning of 1980, the de la Madrid government 
argued that the situation changed substantially in five years. First, whereas in 1980 
Mexico was concerned that the overvaluation of its peso would be a disadvantage
53For more information on the 1985 GATT decision, see Saul Escobar Toledo, ‘Rifts in the 
Mexican Power Elite, 1976 - 1986’ and Matilde Luna, Ricardo Tirado and Francisco Valdes, 
‘Businessmen and Politics in Mexico, 1982 -1986’, in S. Maxfield and R. Anzaldua Montoya (eds), 
Government and Private Sector in Contemporary Mexico (San Diego, CA: Monograph Series 20, 
Center for US - Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1987). A comprehensive 
look at what the GATT means for Mexico, see Blanca Torres y Pamela S. Falk (coordinadoras),
La Adhesion de Mexico al GATT (Mexico, DF: El Colegio de Mexico, 1989).
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if it were a GATT member, in 1985 the peso had been devalued significantly. 
Second, with the credit crunch, high interest rates and declining petroleum prices, 
Mexico’s payments position had been weakened. In such situations, GATT allows 
countries to reimpose temporary restrictions or delay liberalization. Mexico would 
have some flexibility within the GATT in dealing with short-term problems if it 
should need to resort to temporary protection. And finally, in 1980, the question 
of establishing rules for ensuring equitable access to supplies of commodities was 
an important issue in the GATT. Mexico was concerned that such rules would 
reduce its flexibility in the management of its petroleum resources. By the mid- 
1980s, this issue was no longer a preoccupation of the GATT.
As was pointed out in the section above, the GATT decision was not 
entirely unexpected by many since Mexico had already made considerable progress 
with trade liberalization. Mexico had a long history of protectionism and domestic 
critics would need some convincing. Reinforcing the government’s view, Banamex 
implied that in 1985, Mexico had no alternative if it wanted to restructure 
fundamentally its economy, resume growth and thus increase the standard of 
living. This could be achieved by promoting exports through GATT membership. 
The advantages of Mexico’s entry into GATT were stated to be:
1) The country cannot continue to protect inefficient commercial and 
industrial activities. Therefore entry into the GATT will force the 
nation’s industrial sector to improve product quality, thus benefitting 
both the domestic and foreign consumer. The proposed opening will 
not affect small and medium-sized businesses, since the concessions 
granted represent only 10 per cent of the country’s imports, Mexico 
will make concessions on 300 national products, receiving like 
treatment for 256 foreign ones.
2) The most-favored-nation clause will help maintain other 
countries’ tariffs fixed.
3) Mexico will be designated a developing nation, permitting it to 
keep certain protectionist measures for periods from three to fifteen 
years.
4) Mexico already has exportable products available.
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5) There will be an opportunity to penetrate the US market more 
efficiently and regularly, avoiding protectionism to a good degree.
6) Mexico could attract new foreign investments, which could prove 
both economically and socially beneficial.
7) There would be no problems of national sovereignty, as no 
country has veto powers. The agreement is not legally binding.
8) The country could strengthen its international bargaining power 
and thus expand its markets.
9) It might be easier for Mexico to defend its present and future 
markets and products from within the GATT.54
Mexico’s accession, it was argued, would not hinder its position as a 
developing country nor its eligibility for tariff advantages. Mexico agreed to 
eliminate trade barriers over a period of eight years, with the possibility of being 
permitted an emergency assessment of 50 per cent over and above previously 
negotiated tariff levels. After this time, the maximum tariff rate would be set at 50 
per cent. In view of their strategic importance, three sectors would be subject to 
special protection: agriculture, energy and certain industrial subsectors and some 
lines of capital goods.55
The 1986 GATT entry signalled the definitive shift toward trade 
liberalization. The dramatic shift in policy in only four years is evident in the 
statistics from Tables 3.1 and 3.2. Table 3.1 shows the process of trade 
liberalization from the beginning of the de la Madrid adminstration to the 1986 
GATT entry. At the beginning of 1983, 100 per cent of imports were under 
import license requirements. By mid-1986, over 73 percent of license requirements 
had been liberalized. The percentage share of imports subjected to import licensing
54‘Mexico and the GATT: Towards a New Horizon for Our Economy’, Banamex: Review of 
the Economic Situation of Mexico (Vol. LXII, No. 722, January 1986), p. 22.
55‘The State of the Economy’, Banamex: Review of the Economic Situation of Mexico (Vol. 
LXII, No. 729, August 1986), p. 289.
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Table 3.1
Import Trade Liberalization in Mexico, 1983 to 1986
Financial Crisis: 
Import restrictions
Gradual opening July 1985 reform Deepening reform and 
entrance to GATT
Concept Situation in 
December 1982
1 January 1983 to 
24 July 1985
25 July 1985 to 
31 December 1985
1 January 1986 to 
August 1986
Import
license
require­
ments
100% of imports 
brought under license 
requirements
Gradual liberalization 
begins, extended to 
16.4% of imports by 
December 19841
July 25, 1985 decree: 
liberalization extended 
to 64.1% of imports
Liberalization 
extended to 73.2% 
of imports
Imports
Tariffs
Simplification of 
tariff schedule
July 25, 1985 decree: 
tariff increases to
GATT tariff 
reductions
compensate reduction of 
license requirements
 ^This gradual liberalization process continued throughout the first half of 1985 (711 more items liberalized). The aim 
was to extend freedom from license requirements to 35-45 per cent of total.
Source: US International Trade Commission, Review of Trade and Investment Liberalization Measures by Mexico and 
prospects for Future United States-Mexican Relations: Phase I: Recent Trade and Investment Reforms Undertaken by 
Mexico and Implications for the United States Investigation No. 332-282 (Washington, DC: United States International 
Trade Commission, April 1990), p. 4-2.
Table 3.2
Import Licensing in Mexico, 1956 to 1988
Years Total Import Value Controlled Import Value Percentage Share
1956 1,071.6 189.7 17.7
1960 1,186.4 448.4 37.8
1965 1,559.6 935.7 60.0
1970 2,328.3 1,590.2 68.3
1975 6,699.4 4,582.3 68.4
1978 7,917.5 6,041.1 90.0
1980 18,896.6 11,337.9 60.0
1982 14,437.0 14,437.0 100.0
1983 9,005.9 9,005.9 100.0
1984 11,245.3 9,397.3 83.5
1985 13,212.2 4,954.6 37.5
1986 11,432.4 3,532.6 30.9
1987 12,222.9 3,361.3 27.0
1988 18,777.0 3,699.1 19.7
Source: US International Trade Commission, Review of Trade and Investment Liberalization Measures by Mexico and 
prospects for Future United States-Mexican Relations: Phase I: Recent Trade and Investment Reforms Undertaken by 
Mexico and Implications for the United States Investigation No. 332-282 (Washington, DC: United States International 
Trade Commission, April 1990), p. 4-5.
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is illustrated in Table 3.2. In 1956 the figure stood at 17.7 percentage share. This 
figure rose during the ISI years reaching 90 per cent in 1978 and 100 per cent in 
1982. The liberalizing measures implemented by de la Madrid are especially 
evident from the change from 1984 to 1985. The share dropped from 83.5 per 
cent in 1984 to 37.5 percent in 1985.
GATT membership transformed the Mexican political economy and shifted 
it away from the post-Second World War development model based on 
protectionism. The policymakers of the de la Madrid economic team knew the 
significance of such a decision. They committed Mexico in the long-term not only 
to a new development model, but more importantly, to a new development 
doctrine based on economic liberalization. There seems to be no doubt about 
President Miguel de la Madrid’s goal of opening up Mexico’s economy to the 
outside world and thus forcing it to become more competitive. Right after the 
GATT entry, he emphasized,
We cannot isolate ourselves in an increasingly interdependent world.
To insert the Mexican economy in world trade on efficient and 
competitive terms has been one of the structural changes that I have 
been proposing to the nation since my inaugural message on 
December 1, 1982.56
Many of the same policymakers had pushed for GATT entry in 1980, but 
had been unsuccessful because of the lack of cohesion in the Lopez Portillo 
cabinet. In addition, these policymakers had been unsuccessful because of the 
historical timing of the decision. The economic crisis of 1982 acted as the catalyst 
for change in policy and political leadership. It enabled a group of like-minded 
policymakers with a common vision for Mexico’s future economic development to 
gain the political power and the policy space to implement radical reforms. If the 
crisis had not occurred, then the radically different development model pursued in 
post-1982 would most likely not have happened. The economic crisis was a
56Cited in Robert J. McCartney, ‘Mexico to Lower Trade Barriers, Join GATT’, The 
Washington Post, 26 November 1985, pp. El, E3.
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necessary international variable for Mexico’s decision to shift toward trade 
liberalization in the early 1980s.
Conclusions
This chapter discussed the 1982 economic crisis and the trade liberalizing 
measures by the de la Madrid administration. The first section discussed the first 
international variable outlined in the introduction to the thesis: the economic crisis. 
It argued that the crisis situation was very much a reality to the newly elected de 
la Madrid team. The team believed that if they did not take radical action to try to 
solve the acute economic problems facing the country, then the alternative would 
be even worse. The proposed policy action was to change fundamentally the post- 
Second World War development model from an inward- to an outward-oriented 
strategy. This policy began with the liberalization of the trade regime.
The second part examined the trade liberalizing measures pursued from the 
beginning of the de la Madrid sexenio to the 1985 watershed year. Change in 
Mexican trade policy proceeded with caution as the newly implemented measures 
slowly chipped away at the substantially protected economy. The third section 
tracked the rapid liberalization process culminating in the 1985 decision to join the 
GATT. It was not until 1985, however, that the first substantial and long-lasting 
changes were implemented. The chapter argued that the Mexican policymakers 
were not forced to liberalize trade in 1985, but in fact made the choice to open up 
the economy gradually before the debt crisis hit in the summer of 1982 and before 
the renewed crisis in mid-1985. The external pressures from international actors 
and the internal economic difficulties accelerated the momentum and deepened the 
commitment, but did not force liberalization.
It could be argued that President de la Madrid was only instituting policies 
that were long overdue. The financial crisis of 1982 gave the international 
financial community additional leverage over Mexico to force it to follow the 
orthodox programme. This argument is flawed for two reasons. First, the leverage 
exerted by international actors only reinforced a policy direction already
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considered as the only option by the de la Madrid administration.57 And second, 
Mexico was not the only country facing the inability to service its foreign debt. 
Many Latin American countries had defaulted on their loans. Yet Mexico, unlike 
other major debtors in the region, did not resist the IMF-backed policies. If the de 
la Madrid policymakers were not behind the orthodox policy changes, then there 
would have been far greater resistance to their implementation as was the case in 
other Latin American countries. In Argentina, Brazil and Peru there was a 
vacillation between compliance with the IMF in their respective stabilization 
policies and an aggressive stance against the international financial community 
regarding the debt issue.
In Argentina’s newborn democracy, the Alfonsm government (elected in 
late 1983), lacked political muscle to carry out economic reform. As a result, 
there was no clear cut economic policy. The fight against inflation did not include 
any major effort at fiscal consolidation. It left untouched one of the main sources 
of macro-economic instability: the government used gradualist income policies and 
passive monetary management. Alfonsm thought he should be more assertive vis- 
a-vis foreign creditors and believed that Argentina, as a fledging democracy, 
qualified for special and more flexible treatment. After almost a year of tense 
negotiations with international financial institutions, the Alfonsm government 
moved reluctantly toward accepting an IMF-styled package. Argentina failed to 
comply with the terms and in mid-1985, a heterodox stabilization policy, called the 
Austral Plan, was introduced.
Like Argentina, Brazil’s newborn democracy had to contend with 
bureaucratic politics and a weak political structure. President Sarney inherited a 
‘developmentalist’ economic cabinet which followed expansionist and nationalist 
policies. Such actions brought Brazil into increasingly acrimonious confrontations 
with the IMF and other international creditors. For the first six months of Sarney’s 
administration, the cabinet was divided between the developmentalists and the
57The use of leverage by the international financial community is discussed in Chapter 4.
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neoclassical economists advocating an IMF-backed stabilization package. With the 
economy in recession and high rates of inflation, Brazil introduced its own 
heterodox policy in 1986 called the Cruzado Plan. The plan failed to control high 
inflation and the deteriorating economic conditions. Relations with the international 
financial community continued to decline and in February 1987, Brazil called a 
moratorium on its debt service.
Although Peru is not in the same league as Argentina, Brazil or Mexico, 
President Garcia’s stand on the debt issue provides another example of a 
reluctance to comply with orthodox IMF-styled policies. When elected to office in 
1985, the Garcia administration diagnosed the economy as being in a ‘debt trap’. 
The country claimed that servicing the foreign debt was accelerating exchange rate 
devaluation and inflation, and that investment was being curtailed as net transfers 
of capital abroad eroded domestic savings. In an attempt to curtail capital flight 
and develop domestic industry, the economy was closed off from the rest of the 
world through a combination of import quotas and controlled exchange rates. 
Payments on the foreign debt were unilaterally restricted in an unsuccessful 
attempt to limit them to 10 per cent of export revenue.
In all three countries there was a lack of political strength and/or will to 
institute classical IMF-backed stabilization policies. Furthermore, their respective 
relations with the international financial community were acrimonious at the worst 
of times and strained at the best. The compliance with the IMF stabilization 
policies and the positive negotiations with the international financial community 
thus set Mexico apart from the rest of the region. The key to Mexico adhering to 
orthodox policies are the policymakers in the de la Madrid administration and the 
belief that economic liberalization was the only viable development doctrine. As 
stated by de la Madrid, ‘I believe that the political economy is more political than 
economic. Above all in times of crisis.’58 This is more a political decision; it is
58Interview by the representatives of the Texas Daily Newspapers Association, February 1984, 
Mexico City, Mexico in Javier Lopez Moreno, Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado un Presidente Ante 
La Prensa: Entrevistas 1982-87, Tomo I (Mexico, DF: Miguel Angel Purrua, 1987), p. 92.
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not forced by economics. The next chapter addresses the second international 
factor - leverage by international actors - and argues that international actors 
reinforced Mexico’s decision to liberalize trade, but did not force the country to 
implement such policies.
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Chapter Four: International Leverage: Mexico - United States Trade
Relations
Introduction
This chapter examines the leverage exerted by international actors on Mexican 
policymakers. The focus is primarily on the bilateral commercial relationship 
between Mexico and the United States; it also examines the link between Mexico 
and international financial institutions. It is argued that the policy prescriptions 
advocated by the United States and international institutions coincided with a 
preferred policy path of the de la Madrid economic team. As the previous chapter 
has shown, the decision by the de la Madrid government to liberalize trade 
gradually was made in the presidential campaign of 1981 to 1982. This chapter 
asserts that although international actors reinforced Mexico’s neoliberal economic 
policies, they did not force domestic policymakers to implement trade liberalizing 
reforms. The overt pressure exerted by these actors actually came after important 
long-term structural changes had been initiated. However, the international 
leverage did affect the pace and intensity of the reforms.
This chapter is organized into three parts. The first section examines the 
asymmetrical interdependent relationship between Mexico and the United States 
and the changing dynamics of the 1980s. The second part of the chapter focuses 
on the bilateral trade relationship. In the post-Second World War era, Mexico and 
the United States relied on ad hoc measures to resolve trade disputes in the 
absence of any agreed upon commercial framework. It was not until the mid-1980s 
that the two countries finally signed a trade agreement. The final section of the 
chapter examines the international pressure on Mexico. It explores the leverage 
exerted on Mexico to liberalize its trade regime by the United States and the 
international financial institutions. Although US pressure was strong, policy 
toward Mexico was often inconsistent and lacked a coherent strategy because of 
the executive-legislative divergent policy objectives. Institutional pressure to 
liberalize trade existed, but the explicit demands came after important policy 
changes had been implemented.
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4.1 Asymmetrical Interdependence
Historically, sensitivity to political and economic domination by foreign powers, 
especially the United States, has been strong in Mexico. Indeed, the Mexican- 
United States relationship has long been characterized by mutual distrust and 
misunderstanding, especially for the Mexicans.1 Yet, Mexico and the United 
States are inextricably linked through geographical proximity and strong economic, 
political and cultural ties. In the economic sphere, Mexico is the United States’s 
third largest trading partner and one of its most important oil suppliers. Mexicans 
comprise the largest national group of tourists and almost half of its foreign debt is 
with US banks. The United States is Mexico’s principal source of foreign 
investment and number one trading partner as well as the primary source of 
tourism earnings. These strong links make Mexico more interdependent with the 
United States than any other country in the international system.2
Interdependence is not necessarily mutually beneficial nor evenly balanced 
and does not necessarily lead to co-operation. Interdependent relationships involve 
costs and restrict autonomy to a certain degree. The relationship between Mexico 
and the United States can best be described as asymmetrical interdependence. The 
United States is larger, stronger and richer than Mexico: it has three times the 
population, an overwhelming military superiority, close to twenty times the GNP
‘For example, during the first half of the nineteenth century disputes over Texas led to the US 
invasion and subsequent war in which Mexico lost half of its land. The country continued to 
struggle against many predatory US ventures, such as the presence of US Marines in Veracruz in 
1914 which resulted in hundreds of Mexican deaths. During the Mexican revolution, the US 
Ambassador to Mexico, Henry Lane Wilson, helped to instigate a rebellion against Madero. From 
the United States perspective, the country feared an exposed, 3,000 kilometre long southern border. 
An unstable Mexico could have considerable consequences for the United States. For example, 
during the Second World War, there was concern for Mexico’s attempted alliance with Nazi 
Germany. See Michael C. Meyer and William L. Sherman, The Course o f Mexican History, 4th 
ed. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1991).
2Interdependence is defined here as mutual dependence characterized by reciprocal effects 
resulting from international transactions. These transactions can be money, goods, people or 
cultures across interstate borders. The international transactions increase the sensitivity and 
vulnerability of one country to developments in a second. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power 
and Interdependence, 2nd edition (London: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1989).
105
International Leverage Chapter Four
and eight times the GNP per capita.3 The asymmetry is even more pronounced in 
trade relations where over two-thirds of Mexico’s foreign trade is carried out with 
its northern neighbour.4 In contrast, even as the United States’s third largest 
trading partner,5 the Mexican market accounts for only 9 per cent of the value of 
all US exports.6 Mexico is over seven times more reliant on the US market for its 
foreign trade (see Table 4.1, page 115).
The asymmetry in power has been reflected in the disproportionate amount 
of attention paid by policymakers of each country to the other. No matter how 
much Mexico has broadened its formal relations in Latin America and elsewhere, 
the United States has been the centre of Mexico’s international relations. In 
contrast, US policymakers have dealt with Mexico sporadically, mostly in times of 
crisis. Mexican officials have placed great stock in relations with the United 
States, while the United States has typically practised, to the great annoyance of 
Mexico, a form of ‘benign neglect’ toward its neighbour.
In the 1970s, two sets of developments altered the perceptions of US 
officials concerning the importance of the bilateral relationship, thereby changing 
the relationship itself. First, in the broader context of international relations, the 
East-West conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union took 
precedence over other relationships. But with the emergence of the period of 
detente in United States-Soviet relations, the East-West conflict was replaced by an 
emphasis on North-South issues.7 Second, the period of detente coincided with the
3World Atlas & Review (New York, NY: Rand McNally, 1993), pp. 312 and 345.
4IMF, Direction o f Trade Statistics Yearbook (Washington, DC: IMF, 1992).
5Mexico has vacillated between the fifth and third largest trading partner to the United States in 
the 1980s. It is interesting to note, however, that by summer 1993, Mexico was the number two 
market for the United States, displacing Japan. Latin American Weekly Report (WR-93-21, 3 June 
1993).
6In the 1980s, US exports averaged 6 per cent. By 1992, this figure had risen to 9.1 per cent. 
US Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, statistics, various years.
7Susan Kaufman Purcell (ed.), Mexico in Transition, Implications for US Policy: Essays from 
Both Sides of the Border (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988), pp. 13-14.
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discovery of large oil reserves in Mexico at a time of crisis in international energy 
markets. With these emerging international events, the United States came to view 
Mexico in a new light. Mexico suddenly mattered more than at any other time in 
the post-Second World War era.
The twin phenomena of oil crisis and oil discovery, ironically, meant one 
thing to the United States, but another to Mexico. To the United States, it meant a 
greater reliance on Mexico because of its oil wealth. In response to the oil 
discoveries, the Carter administration (1976 to 1980) developed elaborate 
institutions to improve ties with its southern neighbour.8 Mexico viewed the 
sudden attention sceptically. This interest was too closely related to Mexico’s 
discovery of oil and thus, increased Mexico’s distrust of US motives.
To Mexico, the twin phenomena signified an opportunity to assert its 
independence. Mexico’s ‘role conception’ (its enduring self-image of the 
appropriate relationship of itself vis-a-vis the external environment)9 changed with 
the oil bonanza toward that of a regional leader. Oil was uniquely influential in 
Mexico’s conception of its position in international affairs. The independent stand 
took two forms: political discourse and an active foreign policy in Central 
America. With the oil findings and the high international petroleum prices, Mexico 
now had both the status and the resources to end its perceived economic 
dependency on the United States and pursue an active foreign policy.10 Beginning
8In 1977, Carter created the bilateral Consultative Mechanism equipped with subgroups to deal 
with political, social and financial issues. This institution, however, was chaired by only the State 
Department and lacked well defined goals and strong leadership. The following year Carter put out 
the Presidential Review Memorandum 41 (PRM-41) to promote the ‘special relationship’ with 
Mexico, but this was vague and noncommittal.
9George Grayson, Oil and Mexican Foreign Policy (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pitssburgh 
Press, 1988), Ch. 1.
10Mexico had departed from the US position on numerous occasions before the late 1970s.
Cuba and Chile are excellent examples. Mexico’s Cuba policy was perhaps the biggest thorn in the 
United States’ side. Since Fidel Castro’s revolution triumphed in 1959, Mexico has kept its 
diplomatic doors open to Cuba despite various anti-Castro embargoes and diplomatic pressures 
instituted by the United States. In the case of Chile, following the bloody coup there in 1973, 
Mexico again departed from the US lead by breaking ties and condemning the Pinochet regime and 
by welcoming Chilean exiles and former officials of the fallen Allende government.
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with the administration of Luis Echeverrfa (1970 to 1976) and continued 
sporadically with Jose Lopez Portillo (1976 to 1982), the Mexican government 
introduced strong anti-US rhetoric into its official political vocabulary and 
followed a different foreign policy agenda than that of the United States.11
The Central American region was the most important area in which Mexico 
increased its involvement in the late 1970s. President Lopez Portillo withdrew 
recognition from Antonio Somoza’s regime in Nicaragua and joined other Latin 
American countries in supporting the Sandinistas. In addition, the Mexican 
president shipped oil to revolutionary Nicaragua and joined French President 
Mitterand in recognizing the Salvadoran revolutionaries as a representative force. 
Moreover, L<5pez Portillo laid the groundwork for Mexico’s subsequent leadership 
role in the Contadora peace process.12 Mexico viewed Central America as a 
North-south issue, not an East-West concern. The reason the region was in crisis 
had more to do with poverty, unemployment and social injustice than from 
communist intervention.
In the early 1980s, three related developments narrowed the divergence 
between the United States and Mexico, in thinking and policy. First, ddtente had 
collapsed with the outbreak of the second Cold War.13 Reagan’s election to the 
US presidency restored East-West concerns to prominence on the US foreign 
policy agenda and the application of the ‘Reagan Doctrine’ to Central America. 
Second, there was a change of administration in Mexico that brought to power 
individuals with divergent policy goals than previous administrations. With the 
government of de la Madrid (1982 to 1988), Mexico’s international activism had
nFor more information on this time period, see G. Grayson, op. cit., in footnote 9, Chapters 2 
and 3.
12Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and Panama formed the Contadora Group to promote peace in 
Central America. Contadora’s peacemaking efforts were frustrated largely by US opposition. 
Nevertheless, the independent stand of the Latin American nations would have been inconceivable 
twenty years before.
13For more information on this time period, see for example, Fred Halliday, The Making of the 
Second Cold War, 2nd edition (London: Verso, 1986).
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begun to change. Mexico stopped oil shipments to Nicaragua and recognized the 
government of President Duarte in El Salvador. This change in Mexican 
international relations continued throughout the decade. More importantly, the 
Mexican view of the United States began to change in the latter 1980s. The 
country abstained from criticizing the United States on its bombing of Libya in 
1986 and it broke with precedent and voted in favour of the resolution condemning 
Panama’s Manuel Noriega for electoral fraud in 1989. This change in foreign 
policy stance by the Mexicans had a lot to do with the United States’ change in 
position toward the country. Because of the troubled history between the two, 
Mexico had long complained that it was not treated with enough respect. When the 
United States began to view its neighbour as an important actor in light of oil, the 
debt and immigration issues, Mexico became more amenable to dealing with the 
United States.
Finally, with the debt crisis, the expectations of an oil-driven independence 
and the move to a more modem country was greatly reduced. This decrease in oil 
led to a change in Mexico’s role conception from a regional leader to a responsible 
debtor. Mexico needed to foster foreign policy co-operation to nurture economic 
collaboration. Although Mexico would continue its independent foreign policy, the 
debt crisis would inevitably change the economic relationship between Mexico and 
the United States. President de la Madrid was unwilling to risk alienating the 
United States as it sought US co-operation in opening markets and rescheduling 
debt payments.
It seems like stating the obvious to argue that because of the asymmetrical 
interdependence between the United States and Mexico, the former had more 
power in influencing economic policy in the latter. When Mexico was 
economically strong (in the 1970s with the oil boom), the country made 
independent foreign policy decisions, many times contradicting US policies. When 
Mexico was economically vulnerable (most of the 1980s) however, the country’s 
political stand against the United States was weakened substantially and hence, 
Mexico was more susceptible to external pressures for policy change. It follows
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that the United States was able to wield undue power, forcing Mexico to 
implement economic policies it would not have otherwise chosen during its 
financial crisis. This implies that Mexico was not in favour of liberalizing trade 
and did so only because of US pressure. This view is prominent among many 
Mexican academics. For example, political scientist Adolfo Aguilar Zinzer wrote:
Since 1982, economic negotiations between Mexico and the United 
States have gradually moved toward a new framework unilaterally 
imposed by Washington. [In order] to normalize its economic 
relations with the United States and to get support of the US 
government in crucial debt negotiations, Mexico has to slash 
protectionism and subsidies, reverse the role of the state in the 
economy...[US officials] do not want the Mexican authorities to 
choose their economic strategies on their own...an autonomous 
solution by Mexico to its economic problems is unanimously 
considered unreliable and undesirable.. .Mexico is trapped™
Gonzalez Casanova also argued that Mexico had lost control of its fate. Due to the 
economic crisis, Mexico’s autonomy vis-a-vis the United States had been 
undermined, not only subjecting Mexico to the IMF-imposed conditions on policy 
options, but depriving the country of the possibility of pursuing a nationalistic 
development policy.15
These arguments assert that Mexico had no choice but to liberalize trade 
and follow an economic model in which it did not agree. It could be argued that 
rather than implementing an economic policy foisted upon it because of the debt 
crisis, the Mexican policymakers, in fact, used the debt crisis as an opportunity to 
implement economic policies which they had already favoured but were otherwise
14Adolfo Aguilar Zinser,‘Mexico and the United States: The Lost Path’, in Susan Kaufman 
Purcell (ed.), Mexico in Transition, Implications for US Policy: Essays from Both Sides o f the 
Border (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988), pp. 123-5. My emphasis.
,5Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, ‘Prologo a la crisis futura’, in Pablo Gonzalez Casanova and 
Hector Aguilar Camin, Mexico Ante la Crisis, Vols. 1 & 2 (Mexico City, DF: Siglo Ventiuno 
Editores, 1985).
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reluctant to pursue.16 Writing in a recent article, ex-President Miguel de la 
Madrid stated, ‘Mexicans realize that their country is relatively weak in 
comparison to the United States, mainly in economic ... matters’, but this does not 
mean Mexico always does what the United States wants.17
It could be argued that in asymmetrical power relations, the less dependent 
state uses the interdependent relationship as a source of power in bargaining over 
an issue - such as Mexico’s Central American policy - and perhaps affecting other 
issues - such as trade liberalization.18 The power to influence policy is not always 
as obvious as the relative strengths would make it appear. As Keohane and Nye 
point out, political bargaining is usually the ‘means of translating potential into 
effects, and a lot is often lost in the translation’.19 There is considerable 
difference between power potential and power application. The United States 
might well have the capability to defeat Mexico militarily or cripple it 
economically, but it has not executed such policies in the last hundred years and is 
unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future. In the absence of such possible dangers 
Mexico acquires substantial room for manoeuvre.
The dynamics of this bilateral relationship have altered significantly in the 
1980s. Not only have the two countries become increasingly interdependent, but 
the changes are more important for the United States than Mexico. The fate of 
Mexico has long been tied to that of its neighbour. What has changed in the last
16 This move toward economic liberalism was not only economically significant, but 
politically delicate. By opening the economy to the outside world and increasing its vulnerability to 
external economic and political influences (especially from the United States), the de la Madrid 
administration went against the very core of the post-Second World War model. The nationalist 
model was ingrained in the Mexican psyche and appealed to post-revolutionary ideals of nationalism 
and social welfare. It was not easy for the government to challenge the very foundations of the 
modem Mexican state and implement these radical reforms; such policies involved considerable 
political risks.
17Miguel de la Madrid, ‘Cultural Relations between Mexico and the United States’, Voices of 
Mexico (July-September, 1992), p. 23.
18Power here is defined as the ability of one state (the United States) to get another state 
(Mexico) to do something it otherwise would not do or to control outcomes.
19R. Keohane and J. Nye, op. cit., in footnote 2, p. 11.
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decade is the extent to which the United States now depends on Mexico. Because 
of its international debts, petroleum reserves and large immigration flows, Mexico 
has become increasingly important to the United States.
Asymmetrical interdependence cuts both ways. Bargaining power in 
asymmetrical relationships is not always as unbalanced as the capacities of the 
players might suggest. Mexico’s weaknesses in the 1980s have ironically been 
turned into strengths to a certain degree. Although Mexico is militarily, politically 
and economically weaker than the United States, the country derived a certain 
amount of bargaining leverage in its relationship with the United States in the mid- 
1980s from several sources: trade, migration, drugs and the debt. Debt has 
provided the greatest source of leverage. Mexico, along with most of Latin 
America, had borrowed large sums of money in the late 1970s. The country found 
that it could not meet its foreign debt obligations in August 1982 and the rest of 
Latin America soon followed suit. The United States and its top financial 
institutions were faced with a growing economic crisis.
US policymakers recognized that the debt problem was not just a 
commercial crisis, but it was also a ‘national security’ issue. The US banking 
system was heavily exposed to Latin American debt. In Mexico, for example, the 
12 largest US banks, including the Bank America Corporation, had more than 50 
per cent of their capital invested in the country.20 If Mexico decided to default, it 
was perceived in the United States that such action would have crippled the US 
banking community and would have jeopardized the entire international financial 
system. One Mexican debt negotiator was quick to point out, ‘Mexico can make 
Bank of America disappear; Bank of America can’t make Mexico disappear.’21
Because of the bilateral economic relations, there existed a delicate balance 
of financial interdependence. US Secretary of State, George Shultz stated:
^US Congress, Twenty-Third Mexico-United States Interparliamentary Conference, Puebla, 
Mexico, 8-10 July 1983 (Washington, DC: May 1984), p. 25.
21Quoted in Peter Truell, ‘Nation in Jeopardy’, The Wall Street Journal (1 October 1985), pp. 1 
and 20.
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This intimate link between the developing countries and our own 
prosperity is financial as well as commercial. The lingering crisis of 
some heavily indebted developing countries can hurt our own 
financial institutions if not handled prudently.22
The most prominent financial institutions in the United States were in a vulnerable 
position.23 Mexico had a certain amount of leverage when negotiating about 
economic policy in general, and trade policy in particular. The United States was 
not only concerned about more radical action from Mexico, but feared the 
possibility of several Latin American nations forming a debtors’s cartel. The 
United States realized that it had to be subtle about promoting change in Mexico 
and also to be aware of the country’s deep sensitivity to any hint of interference.
The asymmetrical interdependent relationship between Mexico and the 
United States took on new dimensions in the 1980s. As the following section on 
Mexican-US trade shows, Mexico’s policy alignment with the United States in the 
1980s came after more than a decade of US pressure. This pressure did not force 
Mexico to liberalize, but it did ensure their continuance. The reasons for trade 
policy reform are more subtle than pure power relations might suggest.
George Shultz, ‘Our Joint Stake in the World Economy’, Department o f State Bulletin (July
1983), p. 59.
^ o ta l external debt for Latin America and the Caribbean in 1982 was US$328.5 billion. Of 
this amount, Mexico accounted for US$87.6 billion. See Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean, Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 1986, (Santiago, Chile: 
ECLAC, 1989), pp. 12 and 460.
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4.2 Mexico-United States Trade Relations
This section examines the bilateral trade relationship between Mexico and the 
United States. The two countries relied on ad hoc measures for most of the post- 
Second World War era. In the 1970s, the commercial relationship changed with 
the maquilas and the GSP programme. Yet, Mexico maintained its independent 
stand with regards to bilateral and multilateral commercial agreements. With the 
economic crisis and the election of Miguel de la Madrid to the presidency in 1982, 
however, Mexico’s stand on trade issues changed dramatically. By 1985, Mexico 
had agreed to a bilateral agreement with the United States and negotiated entry 
into the GATT.
Mexico has always been highly dependent on the US market. During the 
Second World War, almost 90 per cent of Mexico’s exports were directed to the 
United States. This figure dipped to 65 per cent in the 1960s with the increase in 
exports to Latin American, Europe and Japan.24 The figure rose steadily in the 
1970s and 1980s and is currently over 70 per cent. (See Table 4.1.) With two- 
thirds of its foreign trade linked to the United States, Mexico has realized that it 
does not have a substitute for the US market and the connection is crucial to its 
economic development and modernization process.25
When examining the trade links between Mexico and the United States, one 
may wonder why the two nations did not have a trade agreement before the
^IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook (Washington, DC: IMF, 1950, 1970, 1992).
^Mexico has been trying to increase trade relations with the Pacific Rim countries, the 
European Union and other countries in Latin America. For more information, see, for example, 
articles in Riordan Roett (ed.), Mexico’s External Relations in the 1990s (London: Lynne Rienner, 
1991) and Roberto Galvan, ‘Mexico Looks East: The Hard Facts on the Rim’, Business Mexico 
(March 1990).
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Table 4.1
US-Mexican Bilateral Trade, 1977 to 1992 
(percentage of total)
Year US Exports US Imports Mexican Exports Mexican Imports
1977 4.0 3.2 66 64
1978 4.6 3.5 68 60
1979 5.4 4.3 70 63
1980 6.7 5.1 65 62
1981 7.5 5.3 55 64
1982 5.5 6.4 53 60
1983 4.4 6.5 58 60
1984 5.4 5.4 58 62
1985 6.2 5.7 60 67
1986 5.5 4.7 65 66
1987 5.7 5.0 65 65
1988 6.4 5.3 65 65
1992 9.1 6.6 75 71
Source: US Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration and IMF, Direction of Trade 
Statistics Yearbook, 1993.
Table 4.2 
US Trade with Mexico, 1977 to 1992 
(US$ millions)
Year US Exports US Imports Trade Balance
1977 4,822 4,694 128
1978 6,680 6,094 586
1979 9,847 8,813 1,034
1980 15,145 12,573 2,572
1981 17,789 13,799 3,990
1982 11,817 15,566 -3,749
1983 9,082 16,776 -7,694
1984 11,992 18,020 -6,028
1985 13,635 19,132 -5,497
1986 12,392 17,302 -4,910
1987 14,582 20,271 -5,689
1988 20,628 23,260 -2,632
1989 24,982 27,162 -2,180
1990 28,279 30,157 -1,878
1991 33,277 31,130 2,147
1992 40,598 35,189 5,409
Source: US Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, 1993.
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Table 4.3
Mexican Trade with the United States, 1977 to 1991 
(US$ millions)
Year Mexican Exports Mexican Imports Trade Balance
1977 2,738 3,493 -755
1978 4,057 4,564 -507
1979 6,252 7,563 -1,311
1980 10.072 11,979 -1,907
1981 10,716 15,398 -4,682
1982 11,129 8,188 2,941
1983 13,034 4,958 8,076
1984 14,130 6,440 7,690
1985 13,341 8,954 4,387
1986 10,424 7,574 2,850
1987 13,265 8,252 5,013
1988 13,419 12,102 1,317
1989 16,163 15,553 610
1990 18,837 18,160 677
1991 28,969 33,276 -4,307
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, various years.
1980s.26 The two countries did sign a bilateral trade agreement in 1942, but it 
was renounced by Mexico in 1956. Throughout the import substitution 
industrialization (ISI) years Mexico did not actively promote exports and thus did 
not feel the need for a trade agreement with the United States. When in the 1970s 
the ISI strategy was exhausted and Mexico came to realize that export promotion 
was necessary, another attempt was made. Nonetheless, the much-heralded 
agreement announced in the winter of 1976 was abandoned. In late 1977, Mexico 
and the United States signed their first trade agreement in 35 years. After the 
country decided not to join GATT in 1980, however, the United States cancelled 
the agreement.
The two countries had to rely on ad hoc measures to resolve trade disputes. 
With other trading partners, the United States could refer to the GATT as a
^Interestingly, by 1980 Mexico had bilateral agreements - to obtain scarce technology - with 
Japan, Spain, Switzerland, Canada and Brazil. See Laura R. Randall, ‘Mexican Development and 
It’s Effects Upon US Trade’, in Robert McBride, Mexico and the United States (Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1981), p. 50.
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standard for trade policy and a guide to dispute settlement. In Mexico’s case, the 
absence of such an agreed framework for trade caused uncertainty in both nations 
about the other’s intentions and policies and their possible impact on business 
decisions. The lack of a trade agreement between the two countries could be 
attributed to two factors: the divergent philosophies regarding trade and the low 
absolute level of trade flows.
First, in the United States, at least in theory if not in practice, there is a 
commitment to a liberal world trading system with the emphasis on the 
international market-place and a multilateral trade regime. In Mexico, from 1940 
to the mid-1970s, there had been a commitment to autonomous trade and 
investment decisions within the ISI framework. Mexico was not a member of the 
GATT because it believed (like most developing nations) that the multilateral trade 
regime did not serve Third World interests.27 It was generally believed that the 
GATT was beneficial for industrialized countries, but opinions varied about its 
appropriateness for developing countries. For example, the bulk of developing 
countries’ exports were and often are products (i.e., agricultural exports) that are 
still subject to protectionist policies in the industrialized nations. The developing 
countries asserted that one of the major impediments to accelerated economic 
growth and development was their inability to compete on an equal basis with 
developed countries in the international trading system. Through tariff preferences, 
the developing countries claimed, they could increase exports and foreign 
exchange earnings needed to diversify their economies and reduce dependence on 
foreign aid. The many trade and investment disputes that confronted the two 
countries stemmed from these different foundations for trade policy.
27The Haberler Report (Trends in International Trade, Report by a Panel o f Experts), the first 
comprehensive study of the operation of the GATT with respect to the exports of developing 
countries, appeared in 1958. The report stated that the dilemma of the developing countries was 
due in no small measure to the trade policies of the industrialized nations. It was generally believed 
that the GATT benefitted the developed nations, but disregarded the developing countries. This idea 
was supported by the corresponding share in the value of world exports for developing countries 
declined from 35 per cent in 1950 to 20 per cent in 1973. Diana Tussie, The Less Developed 
Countries and the World Trading System: A Challenge to the GATT (London: Frances Pinter,
1987), pp. 2 and 26.
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In spite of their different trade philosophies, there was little friction 
between the two countries. This was in large part due to the relatively low 
absolute level of trade flows. From the late 1970s, however, trade between the 
two countries increased substantially, primarily because of the discovery of large 
oil reserves in Mexico. Between 1977 and 1982, foreign trade rose from US$9.5 
billion to US$27.4 billion.28 Even throughout the economic crisis of the 1980s, 
exports to the United States rose steadily with imports only increasing substantially 
later in the decade. By 1992 total trade surpassed US$75 billion. (See Table 4.3.)
The substantial increase in bilateral trade in the late 1970s highlighted the 
lack of a commercial agreement between Mexico and the United States and 
underlined the differences in their trade philosophies. The introduction of the 
maquiladora and the General System of Preferences (GSP) programmes in the 
mid-1960s and the late 1970s would further integrate Mexico with its most 
important trading partner as well as undermine the foundations of its post-Second 
World War commercial policy. The following sections examine these programmes 
and its consequences on the bilateral commercial relationship and the principles of 
Mexican trade policy.
4.2.1 The Maquiladoras29
The post-Second World War Mexican development model was based on the 
inward-looking industrialization policy of ISI. Although exports generally were de­
emphasized during this period, there was an important exception. The 
maquiladoras or In-bond programme was introduced by Mexico in 1965 to
^US Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, official statistics, 1993.
29For more information on the maquila industry, see Leslie Sklair, Assembling for  
Development: The Maquila Industry in Mexico and the United States (London: Unwin Hyman, 
1989); Haynes C. Goddard, ‘Evaluating the Benefits and Costs of Mexico’s Border Industrialization 
Program’, in Lay James Gibson and Alfonso Corona Renteria, The U.S. and Mexico: Borderland 
Development and the National Economies (London: Westview Press, 1985); and Philip Mirowski 
and Susan Helper, ‘Maquiladoras: Mexico’s Tiger by the Tail?’, Challenge (May-June, 1989).
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encourage foreign firms to build factories along the Mexican-US border.30 The 
Maquiladoras (primarily US firms operating on the Mexican side of the border), 
are export processing plants assembling products for the US market. They import 
duty-free the components for assembling and return the finished product to the 
United States, paying import duties only on the value added in Mexico.
The maquiladora programme, however, was not initiated in order to 
promote exports or change the trade policy from an inward- to an outward- 
oriented direction. Rather, the programme was started to create employment 
opportunities that were lost when the United States discontinued the bracero 
programme.31 Maquiladoras were intended to alleviate the problem of workers’ 
migrating to the US in search of jobs not found in Mexico by providing 
employment opportunities on the Mexican side of the border. In 1968 there were 
112 plants employing 11,000 people. These figures rose in 1970 to 120 plants with 
a labour force of over 20,000 and in 1972, there were 339 plants and over 48,000 
workers.32
The programme was broadened dramatically in 1972 when the Mexican 
government (ironically under the leadership of the nationalist president, Luis 
Echeverrfa) approved the establishment of these plants in other parts of the 
country. President Echeverrfa believed that the expansion of the programme was a 
‘temporary expedient to help Mexico through a difficult economic phase’. Instead 
of being temporary, the programme has grown considerably and occupies a small,
3(yThe 1962 US tariff items 806.30 and 807.00 allowed US produced materials and components 
assembled abroad to reenter the country by paying duty only on non-US components and the overall 
value added abroad.
31In 1942, the United States instituted a labour programme as a means of bringing Mexican 
workers into agriculture during the wartime period of labour shortages. The ‘bracero programme’ 
was formalized by US legislation. Mexico was hesitant at first but then agreed to the programme 
after declaring war against the Axis powers. The programme legalized labour migration from 
Mexico and involved over 4 million workers 1964 when US labour unions pressures the US 
congress to unilaterally terminate the agreement. See Ernesto Galarza, Merchants o f Labour: The 
Mexican Bracero Story (Charlotte, NC: McNally & Lofting, 1964).
32Leslie Sklair, ‘Mexico’s Maquiladora Programme: A Critical Evaluation’, in George Philip 
(ed.), The Mexican Economy (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 292, Table 11.1.
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though, significant place in Mexico’s development strategy.33 During the 
administration of Miguel de la Madrid, the number of plants rose from 585 in 
1982 to 1058 in 1987. This period saw direct employment rise by more than 120 
per cent, from 127,000 to over 290,000.34
The maquiladoras increased employment opportunities, but more 
importantly the In-bond programme oriented parts of the economy - with 
successful results - toward export-oriented industrialization. Even when Mexico 
was experiencing a renewed overall inward-looking development strategy in the 
early 1970s, the export-oriented programme was expanded to other parts of the 
country. This programme, along with the GSP, facilitated the integration of 
Mexico with the international economy and more specifically, with its northern 
neighbour.
4.2.2 The Generalized System o f Preferences
In the mid-1960s, the industrialized nations started to acknowledge some of the 
developing countries’ claims that they were unable to compete on an equal basis 
with developed nations. In the multilateral trade negotiations of the Kennedy 
Round (1963 to 1967), the first formal recognition of a preferential mechanism in 
favour of developing countries was introduced. It was embodied in Part IV of the 
General Agreement in which non-reciprocity on the part of the developing
33L. Sklair, op. cit., in footnote 29, p. 195.
34L. Sklair, op. cit. , in footnote 32.
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countries as well as the GATT-waiver of the most favoured nation (MFN)35 
principle was accepted.36
One of the most important results for the developing countries was a 1968 
provision which provided for the GSP. Under the GSP, industrialized nations were 
subject to three provisions. First, they could not require reciprocal tariff benefits 
from developing nations in return for GSPs. Second, they could not offer the same 
benefits to other developed countries. Finally, the GSP programmes would 
continue at least 10 years and could be renewed after that period. The United 
States authorized a GSP programme under the Trade Act of 1974, effective on 1 
January 1976.37 This trade act authorized the President to grant duty-free 
treatment to over two thousand eligible articles imported from designated 
developing countries.38
The industrialized nations agreed to reduce tariffs to give infant industries 
in developing countries a competitive edge in the world market. Its purpose was to 
boost the economies of developing countries by encouraging exporters to find new 
markets for their products. The philosophy behind the programme was that if the 
developing countries could diversify their production and exports, they would be 
able to support themselves, rather than depend on foreign aid.39 The most 
important point of the GSP programme was that it was designed to integrate the
35The most favoured nation principle is one of the central provisions of the GATT. This 
principle requires that trade policy measures be applied without discrimination to all contracting 
parties. ‘Any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any 
product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other 
contracting parties’, (GATT, Article I, Paragraph I).
36K.A. Koekkoek, ‘The Integration of Developing Countries in the GATT System’, World 
Development (Vol. 16, No. 8, 1988), pp. 947-8.
37The Trade Act was originally to last 10 years, but it was amended through the Trade and 
Tariff Act of 1984 and the US GSP programme was extended to 4 July 1993.
38Congressman Kika de la Garza, ‘GSP An Underused Tool’, Business Mexico (June 1989), p.
55 .
39Mark Fazlollah, ‘Mexico and GSP’, Mexican-American Review (August 1978), p. 4.
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developing countries into the international trading system. This integration would 
seek to reverse years of autonomous, inward-oriented development in many 
developing countries. In the United States, the Assistant Secretary for Inter- 
American Affairs, quite blatantly stated that the programme aimed to use the GSP 
as powerful indirect incentives for economic policy reforms’.40
The US GSP got off to a slow start in Mexico because of political 
resistance and the lack of understanding of its economic benefits. This was largely 
due to President Echeverrfa’s rejection of the programme. The qualifications for 
receiving US GSP benefits, such as not belonging to a cartel or to OPEC, seemed 
to run contrary to Echeverrfa’s United Nations proposal of the Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of Nations.41 The GSP was perceived by some key 
people in the Mexican government as a US attempt to divide Latin American 
countries. Yet, for a country like Mexico - interested in increasing its volume and 
diversity of exports - the US GSP programme was very important. The next 
administration of Lopez Portillo saw an increased use of the GSP by Mexican 
businessmen. The dollar value of Mexican exports receiving US GSP benefits was 
45 per cent higher in 1977 than 1976. Mexico was initially sceptical of its purpose 
and exported only US$245 million under GSP in 1976. Later, as benefits of GSP 
were better understood, exports rose to US$368 million in 1977, US$458 million 
in 1978, US$545 million in 1979. (See Table 4.4.) In 1980, Mexico ranked the 
fourth largest user of American GSP (out of 140 countries), trailing Taiwan, South 
Korea and Hong Kong.42
40Langhome A. Motley, ‘Future Opportunities for U.S.-Latin American Trade: the U.S. 
Perspective’, Department of State Bulletin (August 1984), p. 75. Ambassador Motley was the 
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.
41 This would serve as an alternative to war between industrialized and developing countries by 
bolstering each state’s sovereignty, while overhauling an ‘unjust system of world exploitation based 
on both a colonial view of the world and the stealing of natural resources and human effort of 
Third World countries’. G. Grayson, op. cit., in footnote 9, p. 21.
42US Department of State, U.S.-Mexican Relations (Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office), p. 2. By 1992, $US4.8 billion or 13.7 per cent of overall US imports from Mexico entered 
duty-free under the GSP. In January 1989, the four Asian countries were eliminated from the US
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Table 4.4
US Imports under the Generalized System of Preferences, 1976 to 1992
Year GSP imports 
from Mexico 
(US$ millions)
Share of total 
Mexican 
imports 
(percentage)
GSP imports from 
all countries 
(US$ millions)
GSP imports 
from Mexico 
(percentage of total)
1976 253 7.0 3,160 8.0
1977 368 7.8 3,878 9.5
1978 458 7.5 5,204 8.8
1979 546 6.2 6,280 8.8
1980 509 4.0 7,328 6.9
1981 633 4.5
1982 599 3.8
1983 725 4.3
1984 1,092 6.1 13,000 8.4
1985 1,239 6.5 13,323 9.3
1986 1,301 7.5 13,840 9.4
1987 1,677 8.3
1988 2,188 9.4
1989 2,470 9.1
1990 2,685 8.9
1991 3,834 12.3
1992 4,832 13.7
Source: Office of the US Trade Representative, official statistics, various years.
The increased use of the US GSP programme intertwined the Mexican 
economy further with its northern neighbour. It enabled Mexico to substantially 
increase the volume and diversity of its exports with its most important trading 
partner. Most importantly, the programme undermined the post-Second World 
War Mexican commercial policy that sought to distance itself with the international 
economy. Instead, Mexico began the process of furthering its integration with the 
international trading system. The GSP programme also further skewed the bilateral 
connection, thus contributing to the growing asymmetrical power relationship 
between Mexico and the United States. Mexico felt that with the increased trade 
interdependence with the United States, it could become more vulnerable to its 
northern neighbour and therefore, more susceptible to its pressures. Encouraged
GSP programme. The termination of duty-free benefits profited Mexico greatly. By 1990, Mexico 
was the leading beneficiary country under the programme.
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by its new found oil wealth possibilities, Mexico asserted its independence from its 
neighbour through not joining the GAIT. The following section briefly discusses 
the issue.
4.2.3 The 1980 GATT Decision
The United States believed that Mexico was deriving enormous benefits from its 
commercial relationship, especially after it began to benefit from the GSP 
programme in the late 1970s. In May 1979, US Ambassador Patrick J. Lucey 
spoke before the American Chamber of Commerce of Mexico:
I feel there is a disturbing lack of understanding within many sectors 
of the Mexican public on the extent to which the US has created and 
is maintaining access to its markets for the products of developing 
nations in general, and for Mexico in particular...the United States 
has always unilaterally and voluntarily extended MFN status to 
developing nations, even those that have not participated in the 
negotiations. These concessions have been an important boost to 
development...Mexico has shared in the benefits of this opening up 
of the world’s markets, and particularly of the US market as a result 
of our unilateral extension of MFN treatment.43
Ambassador Lacey acknowledged Mexico’s fear of US interference. At the same 
time, he asserted that, if Mexico wanted to continue to have unhindered access to 
its most significant trading partners, it must start playing by international trade 
rules:
We have been gratified by the very serious participation of Mexico 
in the current round of trade negotiations in Geneva, and are, of 
course, aware of the significance of Mexico’s decision to explore 
the possibility of accession to the GATT...The ability of the US to 
absorb an ever increasing flow of goods from Mexico will depend, 
in part, on Mexico’s attitude towards imports from us.44
43Patrick J. Lucey, ‘US Ambassador Patrick J. Lucey before the American Chamber of 
Commerce of Mexico, May 1979’, Mexican-American Review (June 1979), pp. 24-6.
"Ibid, pp. 26-7.
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In the midst of the economic troubles facing Mexico in the mid-1970s, the 
United States first proposed that its neighbour should join the GATT. In the hope 
of influencing Mexico to enter the organization, the United States signed a 
bilateral agreement with Mexico in 1977 and awarded the country MFN status in 
January 1978 for a three-year period. The United States, along with several 
European countries and the EEC itself, had strongly urged Mexico to join the 
multilateral trading organization.45
Nevertheless, this prodding combined with other subtle pressures, did not 
convince Mexico. In March 1980, the country decided to ‘postpone’ GATT entry. 
This decision had a significant affect on Mexican-US trade relations. In response, 
the United States cancelled the bilateral agreement negotiated with Mexico in the 
Tokyo Round (1973 to 1979) depriving the country of many trade benefits - 
Mexico was to lose approximately US$536 million in tariff concessions.46
The reason Mexico decided not to enter the GATT in 1980 was due to 
political resistance within the government and oil.47 The Mexican government 
saw its relative international strength as a product of its oil revenues. Control over 
the country’s internal economic and political decision making processes was vital 
to Mexico and some prominent government officials believed GATT accession 
would jeopardize these goals.48 As a declaration of its independence from its 
dominant neighbour, Mexico decided in November 1980 not to sell more than 50 
per cent of its petroleum exports to any one country.49 As Mexico had been
45In meetings with both the US President Carter and French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing 
of France, Lopez Portillo was encouraged to join the GATT. See Saul Escobar Toledo,‘Rifts in the 
Mexican Power Elite, 1976 - 1986’, in S. Maxfield and R. Anzaldiia Montoya, Government and 
Private Sector in Contemporary Mexico, Monograph Series 20, Center for US-Mexican Studies 
(San Diego, CA: University of California, San Diego, 1987), p. 68.
46‘The Economy in Review’, Mexican-American Review (April 1980), p. 3.
47The 1980 GATT debate is discussed in detail in Chapter 2, section 2.1.3.
^Interview, Sr. Jesus Silva Herzog, Minister of Finance (1982 to 1986), Madrid, Spain, 21 
May 1992.
49Interview, Sr. Gustavo Mohar, Pemex London, London, 11 May 1992.
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selling 80 per cent of its exports to the United States, this move was a way in 
which to send the message to the United States that Mexico would not bow to US 
influence.
With the economic crisis of the early 1980s, the trade relationship between 
Mexico and the United States underwent radical changes. Mexico’s historical trade 
deficit with the United States was reversed so that the foreign exchange could help 
service the debt. Mexico’s trade balance went from a deficit of US$4.6 billion in 
1981 to a surplus of US$2.9 billion in 1982. (See Table 4.3.) In addition, Mexico 
diversified its export system to free itself from a reliance on a single product and 
promote its non-oil export capacity. With Mexico’s drive to increase such exports 
in the mid-1980s, the country came to understand how highly interdependent it is 
with its neighbour.
With the de la Madrid administration, a new dimension was introduced to 
bilateral commercial relations. The differences in the underlying philosophies that 
characterized past relations were changed. Rather than the anti-US rhetoric and the 
desire to distance itself from its northern neighbour, Mexico, under President 
Miguel de la Madrid, embraced the international economy and emphasized the 
interdependent relationship with the international system. The use of the term 
‘interdependent’ was first used by President de la Madrid when referring to the 
Mexican-United States relationship. Previously, Mexican rhetoric always referred 
to the ‘dependent’ relationship and the need for ‘independence’ from its northern 
neighbour.50 Most importantly for the de la Madrid administration, the oil glut in 
early 1981 and the ensuing economic crisis caused Mexico to change its ‘role 
conception’. Rather than acting as a regional leader, Mexico was now turning to 
the role of responsible debtor. Grayson argues that Mexico’s ‘ideologically 
inspired’ assertiveness in the international arena gave way to pragmatism with
“For example, Carlos Rico F. stressed that Mexican acceptance of interdependence with the 
US would result in US domination. See Carlos Rico F. ‘Las relaciones mexicano-norteamericanas y 
los significados de la "interdependencia"’, Foro Internacional (Vol. 19, oct-dic, 1978), pp. 256-91.
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President de la Madrid.51 As the next chapter will argue, the role of ideas along 
with pragmatism did play into President de la Madrid’s decision to work with the 
United States. This was not just a pragmatic response, but a change in the 
underlying philosophy. With the change in the philosophy of the de la Madrid 
administration, Mexico sought better commercial relations with the United States. 
Mexico realized that it was time to negotiate a trade agreement.
Despite its traditional advocacy of multilateralism, the United States took 
steps in the 1980s that revealed a willingness to negotiate regional or bilateral 
trade agreements.52 The United States had made it quite clear in the 
interparliamentary meetings that it wanted some kind of trade agreement with its 
neighbour.53 The de la Madrid government’s first attempt to negotiate a bilateral 
agreement came only months after coming to power in 1983. The negotiations 
were done in private and concerned Mexico suspending its main export subsidy 
programme - the CEDI - and the promise not to introduce any new export subsidy 
programmes. In return the United States would not impose any countervailing 
duties on Mexican imports.54 The bilateral agreement, however, was disclosed 
and greatly embarrassed the new government.55 It would be another two years 
before a bilateral agreement was reached.
51G. Grayson, op. cit., in footnote9, pp. 8-9.
52In the 1980s the United States concluded bilateral free trade agreements with Israel, Canada 
and the Caribbean. The Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) sought to promote growth and stability in 
the Central American-Caribbean region. It gave preferential access to US markets for Caribbean 
products, to provide technical assistance for the development of export industries and to encourage 
private investment. New York Times (25 February 1982), p. 8.
53US Congress, Twenty-First Mexico-United States Interparliamentary Conference, Manzanillo, 
Colima, Mexico, 12-13 June 1981 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 1982), p. 
17.
54The countervailing duty issue is discussed in section 4.3.1 of this chapter.
55As this was only three years since the 1980 GATT debate, many believed that the bilateral 
agreement with the United States would bring Mexico into the GATT through ‘the back door’. The 
elimination of the CEDI programme in 1983 was too soon for the small and medium businesses 
that depended on these subsidies to survive. The new de la Madrid economic team had to proceed 
with more caution.
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4.2.4 The 1985 Framework Agreement
The break-through came in April 1985 when the Mexican Secretary of Commerce, 
Hector Hernandez Cervantez, and U.S. Trade Representative, William E. Brock 
III, signed an intergovernmental agreement on subsidies and countervailing duties. 
The agreement was quite straight-forward: in exchange for a Mexican commitment 
to bring its general subsidy policies into line with those allowed to signatories of 
the international code, the United States government agreed that US interests 
which complained about Mexican subsidies must show that the allegedly subsidized 
imports caused or threatened to cause material injury to a US industry. In short, 
Mexico foreswore export subsidies and the United States provided the injury test.
This framework agreement was important for both countries. Ever since the 
United States pushed hard for Mexican accession to the GATT in 1980, it had 
been trying to get Mexico to open up its economy. In Washington, the fact that 
there existed no trade agreement with its third largest trading partner had been an 
anomaly. For Mexico, gaining the injury test for its exporters was an objective 
which would strengthen the country’s existing capacity to export non-traditional 
products, encourage new entrants to international trade and put the country on a 
path leading away from the inefficiencies of its old development model.
The bilateral trade agreement between Mexico and the United States 
demonstrated the former’s interest not only in improving trade relations with its 
most important partner, but also signalled to the United States the Mexican desire 
to further the liberalization process. With the substantial measures implemented in 
July 1985 in the Presidential Decree, President de la Madrid was paving the way 
for GATT entry. On 25 November 1985, the president approved negotiations 
leading toward Mexico’s entry into the GATT - a watershed in post-Second World 
War Mexican development policy. The Mexican commitment for closer trade 
relations is evidenced by the flurry of trade negotiations that followed the 1985 
bilateral agreement. The most significant move was President Carlos Salinas de
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Gortari’s (1988 to 1994) request for a free trade agreement with the United 
States.56
The asymmetry in Mexico-US relations is most important when analyzing 
the degree to which the United States pressured Mexico to liberalize its trade 
regime. Fundamental changes in bilateral commercial exchanges took place in the 
1980s, especially after the debt crisis hit in 1982. The final section of the chapter 
examines the pressure exerted by the Reagan administration and the IMF. It argues 
that although Mexico was greatly influenced by these international actors, they did 
not coerce Mexico to initiate trade liberalizing measures. Rather, international 
leverage reinforced the Mexican decision and helped to quicken the pace and 
intensity of the liberalizing reforms.
56For a discussion of the bilateral trade negotiations and the Nafta, see Postscript.
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4.3 US Pressure for Policy Change in Mexico 
US Policy toward Mexico in the 1980s was often inconsistent and lacked a 
coherent strategy. One of the primary reasons for this was due to the decision 
making process that exists in the United States. Unlike Mexico, where 
policymaking is dominated by the presidency,57 the situation in the United States 
is much more fragmented. This is due to the great number of government 
agencies,58 each with its own perspective and constituency, taking part in the 
policy process. Each agency pursues its own particular interests with regard to 
Mexico, which may at times serve certain domestic constituent interests rather 
than an overall US strategy. When studying oil and US-Mexican relations,
Grayson found that because of the US domestic pressures and broader multilateral 
objectives, especially in trade and financial matters, the State department is not 
central to US policy toward Mexico. Energy decisions, for example, involve the 
departments of State, Energy, Defense, Treasury, Commerce and Health and 
Human Resources as well as the Office of Management and Budget, the Central 
Intelligence Agency, the Export-Import Bank and the Office of the Special Trade 
Representative.59
There are roughly two perspectives that emerge from the United States on 
Mexico’s trade policy.60 The first is represented by those who seek an equitable 
or reciprocal relationship with Mexico. The second is put forth by those who place 
a greater importance on the overall bilateral relationship and emphasize the 
interdependence of economic and political issues. Although supporters of each
57Because of the political co-optation of the various sectors in Mexican society, the president is 
relatively free to make policy choices. The strength of the Mexican presidency is discussed in 
Chapter 6, section 6.1.1. See George Philip, The Presidency in Mexican Politics (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1992).
58They included almost all departments of the executive branch plus both houses of Congress.
59George W. Grayson, The Politics o f Mexican Oil (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 1980), p. 162.
“See Guy F. Erb, ‘U.S.-Mexico Trade Relations’, in Pamela S. Falk, Petroleum and Mexico’s 
Future (London: Westview Press, 1987).
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viewpoint are found in all constituencies that influence trade policy - the executive 
branch, the Congress and the business community - the legislative branch roughly 
represents the reciprocity position, the executive, better bilateral relations.
The recession in the United States, coupled with the escalation of trade 
flows between the two countries in the late 1970s and early 1980s, resulted in an 
increasing divergence between the two views. The public and congressional 
reaction to Mexican protectionism, especially after the 1980 decision not to join 
the GATT, illustrated the tension between those who sought a reciprocal 
relationship with Mexico and others who wanted to promote strong, stable and 
friendly bilateral relations. Despite the incoming Reagan administration’s 
intentions toward Mexico, the US Congress asserted its own trade policy 
objectives, regardless of the consequences for bilateral relations. Hence, there 
occurred a rash of US legislation that affected Mexican trade.
4.3.1 The Legislative Branch
In the early 1980s, members of the US Senate and House of Representatives 
frequently came under domestic political pressure from their constituents for 
tougher trade legislation and reciprocal bargaining from the newly industrialized 
countries (NICs). There was specific concern about Mexican barriers to trade 
between the two countries and a common perception that Mexican protectionism 
was prolonged and increasing. (Mexico was particularly annoyed at such reactions 
in the United States. It seemed that the US institutional memory was far shorter 
than Mexico’s - its northern neighbour did not seem to recall the impact on 
Mexico of the United States’ 10 per cent import surcharge of 1971.) The United 
States (both the legislative and executive branches) was unhappy with Mexico’s 
decision not to join GATT, particularly as the terms of entry negotiated were the 
most liberal ever granted. There followed a move in the country to get tougher 
with the highly protected Mexican economy. The US response took two forms: the 
application of countervailing duties (CVDs) and the exclusion and graduation of 
products from the GSP.
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As Mexico was not a member of the GAIT and there existed no bilateral 
trade agreement with the United States, the United States was in a position to 
retaliate against several Mexican subsidies by means of a countervailing duty.61 
Both the Subsidies Code62 and United States law permit the imposition of a duty 
equal to the net amount of such bounty or grant only if investigation reveals that 
the subsidy has caused material injury to a domestic industry.63 But as Mexico 
was not a member of GATT, any CVDs charges against the country would not 
have to demonstrate major injury to the US party making the charges.
In the 1980s as trade grew, complaints proliferated. Although Mexico 
benefitted under the US GSP programme, the absence of a framework for trade 
itself became a source of conflict. A flurry of complaints about Mexican subsidies 
resulted in a significant increase in the application of CVDs against the country’s 
imports, particularly after 1982. In effect, once a Mexican subsidy was found to 
exist, the imposition of a duty was automatic, since no injury test was necessary. 
The imposition of CVDs - or even the threat of such action - had an immediate, 
negative impact on Mexican exports. Potential US buyers generally refused to 
place firm orders as soon as they learned that a request for such duties had been 
submitted on a Mexican product. Eighteen investigations were initiated in the early 
1980s. In over half of these cases, a determination was reached that subsidies 
existed. In four cases, the Mexican exporters signed an agreement of suspensions; 
and in another four, the resolution was favourable to Mexico.64 In 1982, the
6IThese subsidies would include government intervention in such matters as the granting of 
capital, or loans, inconsistent with commercial considerations; the provision of goods and services 
at preferential rates; and the redemption of loans or assumption of costs or expenses of production.
62The Subsidies Code is one of the agreements in the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations in 1979.
63In order to implement US obligations under the Subsidies Code, the Trade Agreements Act of 
1979 amended US trade law, imposing the requirement of an injury investigation on countervailing 
duty proceedings against a specific country.
MUS Congress, Twenty-Fourth Mexico-United States Interparliamentary Conference, 
Washington, DC, 18-19 May 1984 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, December
1984), p. 27.
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value of Mexican imports under investigation in the United States was US$181 
million and rose to US$310 million in 1983.65 US pressure on Mexican trade 
rose in 1984; the US Department of Commerce carried out 25 investigations on 
Mexican exports. In this year, Mexican merchandise worth more than US$500 
million was submitted to investigation.66
The application of countervailing duties fuelled the common Mexican 
perception that the United States was a protectionist country determined to 
frustrate its efforts to overcome the economic crisis. In a survey conducted in 
Mexico City in 1983, six out of 10 people believed it was easier for the United 
States to export to Mexico than vice versa.67 The US government, however, 
claimed that their actions were not protectionist.
[TJhey are directed against the protectionist or unfair trade practices 
of other countries and thus are designed to correct rather than 
increase distortions in free trade. Countervailing duties are meant to 
balance the export subsidies of other governments...Our actions are 
consistent with international rules.68
Numerous countervailing duty cases hampered the efforts of Mexico’s private 
sector exporters and those of the Mexican government to move the country toward 
greater non-traditional exports and away from the import substitution policies 
which had led to highly protected and generally inefficient Mexican industries. 
Ironically, as Mexico was attempting to shift to export promotion as the United 
States had always wanted, its efforts were thwarted by the US move toward 
protectionism.
“Ibid.
“Luis Bravo Aguilera, ‘Mexico’s Foreign Trade Policies and Commercial Relations with the 
United States’, in William Glade and Cassio Luiselli (eds), The Economics o f Interdependence: 
Mexico and the United States, Volume 2, Center for US - Mexican Studies (San Diego, CA: 
University of California, San Diego, 1989), p. 95.
67US Congress, op. cit., in footnote 64, p. 81.
“Cited in Stephen Lande, ‘Opportunities for Improving U.S.-Mexico Trade Relations’,
Business Mexico (June 1989), p. 54.
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The United States began to exert pressure on all trading partners from the 
late 1970s as a result of the interplay of three factors: unfavourable changes in the 
economic position of the United States in the world economy; intensification of 
public/lobby pressures on congress; and on the shift in the executive-legislative 
relationship generally, and on trade policy in particular. Pressure was a legislative- 
led assault on ‘unfair traders’. Mexico was a target but by no means the main one. 
This assault was not a concerted effort to coerce Mexican liberalization per se. 
Mexican officials, in any case, were determined to resist such pressure.
From 1981, there was a strong call for reciprocity in the United States. 
Mexico had been singled out as a prime example of a country from which US 
negotiators should seek a more reciprocal relationship. With the recession of 1981 
to 1982 and the strong dollar until 1986, many industrial sectors in the United 
States were under competitive pressure in both domestic and foreign markets. The 
CVDs that resulted, therefore, were more in response to the domestic economic 
climate than a coherent effort on the part of the US government to force Mexico to 
change its international trade policy.
The second concern of Mexican exporters was the US exclusion and 
graduation of products from the GSP. The United States started to impose 
stipulations on eligibility for its GSP programme only a few years after its 
inception. The GSP had always included a ‘competitive need’ disqualifier which 
was intended to prevent a GSP beneficiary from becoming a significant supplier, 
in percentage of dollar terms and of the US market. The Trade Agreement Act of 
1979 allowed a presidential waiver if imports exceeded 50 per cent, but with a 
total value less than US$1 million.69 The concept of ‘graduation’ referred to the 
phasing out and eventual elimination of special and differential trade treatment for 
advanced developing countries. The discretionary graduation was based on the 
country’s general level of development, competitiveness in the particular product
69U.S. Congress, op. cit., in footnote 64.
134
International Leverage Chapter Four
and overall US economic interests, including domestic import sensitivity.70 
According to the United States, Mexico belonged to this category of advanced 
developing nation. But despite its economic growth in 1980 and 1981, Mexico was 
still underdeveloped and could not be expected to conduct its trade policies on an 
equal footing with developed countries.71 However, Mexican members to the 
Interparliamentary Conference expressed their concern about the US policy of 
graduating more advanced developing countries. The Mexican delegation 
emphasized that Mexico was still an underdeveloped country and could not be 
expected to conduct its trade policies on an equal footing with developed 
countries.72
These changes in the US GSP programme adversely affected Mexican trade 
initially, but to a limited extent. Beginning in 1980, Mexican products were 
removed from the US GSP. The graduation, however, eliminated GSP only on two 
Mexican items worth a mere US$14 million (out of US$509 million under the GSP 
programme).73 According to a US government document, Mexico was 
compensated because it regained eligibility on more than US$14 million of 
previously ineligible products and received eligibility on 47 new items added to the 
list.74 With the deepening of the world recession and the increase in protectionist 
sentiments in the United States, the pressure on Mexico became more extensive.
By 1983, 55 Mexican products had been excluded from preferential treatment. The 
measure affected the Mexican government’s economic policy and many
70James Smith, ‘GATT Disputes and U.S. Trade Law’, Business Mexico (March 1987), p. 37.
71These sentiments were strongly expressed by Mexican delegates to the Mexican-United States 
Interparliamentary meeting in 1982. See US Congress, Twenty-Second Mexico-United States 
Interparliamentary Conference, Santa Barbara, California, 28-29 May 1982 (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, June 1983), p. 21.
nIbid.
^United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S.-Mexican Relations 
(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 10 June 1981), p. 2.
uIbid.
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government officials feared that the countries annual revenues would be greatly 
reduced.75
The United States employed these measures in order to demonstrate to 
Mexico its displeasure with the country’s protectionist policies. A recurring theme 
in US complaints about trade policy was that Mexico was a free rider and sought 
to remain so. This complaint was a familiar theme used by US policymakers at the 
time and by no means confined to Mexico. The United States had not only 
awarded Mexico GSP benefits on over US$1 billion of imports (see Table 4.4), 
but had also extended MFN status (though Mexico was the only main trading 
country that was not a member of the GATT). William Brock IE, the US Trade 
Representative, wrote:
If [high debt countries] refuse to open their market and fail to adopt 
more outward-looking economic policies, they will be stuck with 
lower growth rates and less efficient export production. At the same 
time, failure to institute reforms and to liberalize their trade regimes 
could undermine the industrialized nations’ efforts to dampen 
protectionist pressures, ultimately leading to decreased access for 
the high-debt countries’ exports.76
From the US perspective, it was faced with a recession in the early 1980s 
and its businesses were calling for protectionist measures. As trade had grown by 
spectacular rates - 260 per cent between 1976 and 198077 - the US firms were 
feeling the nonreciprocal trade effects. As there were no established rules of trade 
conduct between the United States and Mexico, it is no small wonder that there 
was a rise in countervailing duties.78 For the Mexicans, however, many believed
75Foreign Broadcast Information Service, US Restrictions on Imports Draws Reaction (5 April
1983), p. Ml and Officials Critical of US Import Taxes (6 April 1983), p. Ml.
76William E. Brock, III, ‘Trade and Debt: The Vital Linkage’, Foreign Affairs (Vol. 62, No. 5, 
Summer 1984), p. 1038.
77US Congress, op. cit., in footnote 53, p. 14.
^Interview with Mr. Walter Bastian, Director of Latin America, The US Department of 
Commerce, Washington, DC, 15 April 1993.
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that the use of countervailing duties and the elimination of products from the GSP 
programme was in retaliation for not entering the GATT in 1980.
Throughout the early 1980s, there were pressures for Mexico to liberalize - 
it was no secret that the United States would have preferred its third largest 
trading partner to be a member of the multilateral trading organization. In 1984, 
there were repeated calls from the US Senate for Mexico to end its protectionist 
policies and join the GATT. Oliver Farrez, director of economic relations of the 
Mexican Foreign Secretariat, noted that US calls for Mexico to join the GATT 
happened every four years during periods of electoral activity. He emphasized that 
Mexico has never accepted and never will accept pressures on its international 
trade policy. Farrez inferred that the calls from the Senate were more for domestic 
consumption and Mexican policymakers believed that when the elections were 
over, the United States would reduce its pressure.79
The rise in countervailing duties and the elimination of GSP products were 
significant pressures on Mexico in the early 1980s. They were not, however, the 
determining factor in the decision to liberalize trade. Had its policymakers 
genuinely opposed liberalization, Mexico could have resisted it as had other Latin 
American countries (e.g., Argentina or Brazil). Rather, these pressures were used 
by the Mexican government to convince a highly protected Mexican business 
community that there was no option but to compete in the international economy. 
Interestingly, it was domestic business pressures that fed the US government’s 
push for liberalization. The converse was true in Mexico. Although some large 
businesses in Mexico were in favour of liberalization (but only in a gradual 
manner), the small- and medium-sized firms were against opening the economy. 
The US legislature acceded to domestic pressures while the Mexican government 
was able to co-opt and control their domestic influences.
Although there were periodic bursts of pressure from the legislative branch 
of the US government, the executive was sending out very different signals. In
79See Rogelio Hernandez, ‘Officials Reacts to U.S. Senate Statements on GATT’, Excelsior 
(Mexico City), 29 August 1984, pp. 1-9.
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contrast to this view presented by the Congress for reciprocity in trade matters, the 
Reagan administration was far more interested in the overall bilateral relations. 
Rather than concentrating on specific trade cases, the executive branch was 
focused on ‘high policy’ issues such as Central America and its relation to the 
overall East-West balance. The following section examines the executive branch 
and its pursuit of broad policy objectives with Mexico in the 1980s.
4.3.2 The Executive Branch
Unlike the US Congress, the Reagan administration was far more concerned with 
overall bilateral relations. Two areas in particular preoccupied the executive 
branch in the early 1980s - the financial crisis and the strategic Cold War agenda. 
The Reagan administration was more concerned with alienating Mexico, prompting 
a debt moratorium and encouraging further ties with leftist governments in Central 
America than it was with reducing Mexican protectionism. Because of the lack of 
a legislative-executive consensus, the efficacy of US pressure was far less than 
might be assumed. This section of the chapter examines the executive branch’s 
relationship with Mexico and highlights the two countries’s different policy 
agendas in the 1980s.
Bilateral relations with Mexico had not been good under the Carter 
administration. Relations between the two countries grew to be acrimonious in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s.80 With the arrival of the Reagan administration, there 
was a concerted effort to state consistently and publicly that the United States 
wanted a strong, stable and friendly relationship with Mexico.81 As president­
80In addition to the bad personal relations between Presidents Carter and Lopez Portillo, the 
1979 natural gas deal, the Mexican refusal to accept the Shah of Iran after his operation in the 
United States, the decision not to join the GATT, the Ixtoc oil spill and the imposition of a US tuna 
embargo all served to further deteriorate Mexican-United States relations.
81President Reagan appointed John Gavin as ambassador to Mexico. At the time, Gavin seemed 
to be an ideal choice as he had a long experience in Mexico, extensive contacts there and fluency in 
Spanish. However, Ambassador Gavin’s out-spoken, negative comments on Mexican policy in the 
1980s meant that he was not well received by his host country and eventually resigned from his 
position.
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elect, Reagan had highlighted the need for a special relationship with both Canada 
and Mexico and the desire to create some form of North American economic 
entity. The idea of an economic entity was not welcomed by President Ltipez 
Portillo and his administration. The announcement led immediately to 
denunciations in the Mexican press of this as ‘another Yankee plot to keep Mexico 
subjugated’. The reasoning was that the economic disparity of the United States 
and the other two members would lead to US dominance. Not only that, but it was 
also put forth that this was somehow a means of guaranteeing Mexican oil exports 
to the United States. President Lopez Portillo declared to the Canadian Parliament 
in May 1980 that ‘proposals [along this line] are incompatible with the objectives 
of Mexico’s social and economic developments in view of the great difference 
between the development levels of the three countries’.82 Interestingly, only a 
decade later, it would be the Mexican president who would initiate similar plans.
In his attempt to improve bilateral relations, President Reagan invited the 
entire Mexican cabinet to Camp David to meet their US counterparts in June 1981. 
Two institutions were created to facilitate the ‘special relationship’. The first was 
the Binational Commission (BNC) which would deal with broad issues and be 
chaired by the State Department. The second was the Joint Commission on 
Commerce and Trade (JCCT), to be chaired by the Commerce Department.83
With the change in the US administration came an even greater emphasis 
on laissez faire economic policy.84 President Reagan’s support for the free market 
can best be represented by the following:
82See Robert H. McBride, Mexico and the United States (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall 
Inc., 1981), pp. 18-19.
83These institutions had no more success than President Carter’s Consultative Mechanism. The 
JCCT was formed at the height of battle between the Commerce Department and the United States 
Trade Representative (USTR) for control over trade policy. The institution did not effectively co­
ordinate US economic policy - almost all of the negotiations for the 1985 trade agreement and 
Mexico’s 1986 entrance into the GATT took place outside the JCCT. By 1986, it had withered 
away.
84Chapter 5 discusses the change in economic ideology.
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Our trade policy rests firmly on the foundation of free and open 
markets - free trade ... the freer the flow of world trade, the 
stronger the tides for human progress and peace among nations ...
Our commitment to free trade is undiminished. We will vigorously 
pursue our policy of promoting free and open markets in this 
country and around the world. We will insist that all nations face up 
to their responsibilities of preserving and enhancing free trade 
everywhere.85
The Reagan administration was especially enthusiastic about promoting a 
more open trading relationship with Mexico. Yet after 1982, it was also sensitive 
to Mexico’s difficulties during its economic crisis. The United States realized from 
the 1980 GATT debate in Mexico, that it could not pressure the country to 
liberalize trade. In addition, the United States understood that there would be 
intense resistance to a US-enforced trade policy which could precipitate a 
unilateral Mexican decision to default on the international debt. To the new 
administration an improved overall relationship with its neighbour and the handling 
of the financial crisis was a more immediate concern than trade liberalization.86 
Even after the debt crisis, Central America was the number one concern to the 
Reagan administration. President Reagan viewed complaints by the Congress about 
reciprocity as a diversion from high policy issues.
4.3.3 Different Agendas
When determining whether the United States pressured Mexico to liberalize trade, 
it is vital to stress that the two countries had very different policy agendas. The de 
la Madrid administration experienced an ‘economization’ of foreign policy with 
trade policy at the heart of Mexican politics. For Mexico, trade policy was linked 
to its economic recovery and therefore, US protectionism was of primary concern. 
The reverse cannot be said to be true, however. Although Mexican protectionism
85Ronald Reagan, ‘The President’s Trade Policy Action Plan’, Department o f State Bulletin 
(November 1985), pp. 1 and 3.
86Interview, Mr. Walter Bastian, op. cit., in footnote 78.
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was an issue to the United States, it was of only minor importance compared to 
the issue of Central America. At every bilateral meeting, Mexico tried to resolve 
economic issues and the United States attempted to change Mexico’s policy on 
Central America.
These differences in focus are clearly demonstrated by the meetings 
between Presidents Reagan and de la Madrid from 1983 to 1986. For example, at 
the Washington meeting in 1984, both Presidents presented different agendas. 
Although President Reagan acknowledged the economic difficulties that Mexico 
was facing and the significant trade matters that needed to be discussed, his focus 
was first and foremost Central America. Mexican trade liberalization was 
deliberately subordinated to fighting the Cold War (the Reagan Doctrine). 
President Reagan’s opening speech was almost entirely on Central America:
The conflagration in Central America appears too close to ignore.
Like a fire in one’s neighborhood, this threat should be of concern 
to every nation in the hemisphere... Complicating the situation and 
making it even more dangerous has been the intervention of a 
totalitarian coalition which has undermined what we had hoped 
would be a democratic revolution... this issue is of utmost 
importance.87
At the same meeting, President de la Madrid acknowledged the ‘serious 
difficulties’ in Central America, but concentrated on the economic crisis:
Latin America is suffering the most severe economic crisis of 
modem times. Its peoples and governments have been obliged to 
implement harsh economic programs to cope with the situation ...
The Mexican people are giving ample proof of their vigor and 
responsibility. Nonetheless, our determined efforts require 
international understanding and cooperation in the field of trade and 
finance ... We have already shown that we are both willing and able 
[to make the effort]. Now we ask the international community and 
essentially the industrialized countries to accept that. Since
87<Visit of Mexican President’, Department o f State Bulletin (July 1984), pp. 85-6.
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interdependence is an irreversible fact, the imperative of solidarity 
is a duty based not only on ethics but also on expedience.88
A pattern was set for the bilateral meetings. Every US policymaker would 
emphasize Central America and every Mexican would try to stress the importance 
of economic issues. When George Shultz met President de la Madrid at the end of 
1984, he announced at the news conference that, ‘a good proportion of the total 
amount of time was spent in discussing the Contadora process’.89 And this was at 
the height of the financial crisis.
Even when Mexico announced on 22 July 1985 that it was to liberalize 
trade substantially, the United States although acknowledging the importance of the 
decision, still placed greater importance on the Central American issue. The 
presence of Clayton Yeutter and Bruce Smart (the US Trade Representative and 
Under Secretary of Commerce, respectively) demonstrated the importance the US 
attached to trade and investment issues between the two countries. Nevertheless, in 
Secretary Shultz’s opening remarks, he devoted one paragraph to the trade 
relationship and waxed lyrical about Central America, drug trafficking and illegal 
migration.90
Although the executive branch was primarily focused on the Central 
American issue, there was concern about the solvency of the highly indebted 
countries and the effect the debt crisis was having on the international financial 
community. Those who would argue that Mexico was forced to liberalize its trade 
because of the asymmetry in power relationship with the United States would point 
to the conditionality of the funds the debtors sought. An examination of the IMF 
letters of intent, the Baker Plan and the 1986 Omnibus trade bill in the United
*Ibid, p. 86.
89‘News Conference, Mexico City, Oct. 11, 1984’, Department o f State Bulletin (December
1984), p. 89.
^ ‘U.S.-Mexico Bilateral Commission Meets’, Department o f State Bulletin (October 1985), pp. 
56-7.
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States shows that Mexico had already made the fundamental steps toward trade 
liberalization when such pressures were exerted.
4.3.4 The United States and the IMF
As in most Third World governments in the late 1970s, there was strong anti-US 
and anti-IMF rhetoric in Mexico. When the debt crisis hit, the Lopez Portillo 
government feared that, through an IMF agreement, the country would be 
pressured into selling more oil to its northern neighbour and so be used by 
Washington to undermine OPEC. Equally, the government was afraid that the IMF 
would push the country into joining the GATT by insisting that the highly 
protected economy be liberalized.91 Some have argued that because of Latin 
America’s financial difficulties in the early 1980s, many countries in the region 
were forced to follow the dictates of the United States and the international 
community. Closer examination of the conditions of the loans, however, shows 
that this was not the case.
The first two IMF letters of intent mentioned trade liberalization, but it was 
outlined in general terms with no specific targets agreed upon. When Mexico 
negotiated with the IMF in the autumn of 1982, the November letter of intent 
contained none of the elements that the government expected. There was no 
stipulation about free trade or GATT accession.92 As the financial crisis 
continued, the 1984 letter still did not mention liberalization.93 Only 1 in 11 
policy proposals addressed the issue of structural reforms to the system of 
protectionism. This proposal called for the process of substituting import permits 
by tariffs but did not stipulate when or how this would be accomplished. At this 
early stage of the economic crisis, the international community was concerned with 
Mexico generating enough foreign exchange to service its debt. Rather than
91William Chislett, The Financial Times (London), 24 September 1982.
92Alan Robinson, The Guardian (London), 15 November 1982.
^Coral Young, El Nacional (Mexico City), 4 January 1984, p. 1.
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forcing Mexico to liberalize trade, the IMF was implicity encouraging import 
protection to create income.
It was only in the spring of 1985 that new elements were introduced, 
recognizing the vital necessity of fundamentally improving Mexico’s trade 
situation. Rather than just dealing with financial and fiscal policy targets, the 1985 
letter of intent specified that the protection of the Mexican economy was to be 
reduced (but not eliminated), the ‘anti-export’ bias to be diminished and a clear 
timetable was set for trade liberalization. The 1985 letter was the third and final 
part of the 1982 negotiated agreement between the IMF and Mexico.
After substantial trade liberalizing measures were implemented and the 
Mexican economic situation deteriorated further, Mexico signed another agreement 
with the IMF. The 1986 agreement took eighteen months of negotiation before 
Mexico, rather than the international financial community, proposed conditions. — 
As Duran found, such an agreement was the first time that new money was linked 
to economic performance, as opposed to economic perspectives and the adoption 
of agreed measures.94 The Mexican deal included two conditions: 1) a petroleum- 
linked fund which would enter into force in the event that oil prices fell below 
US$9 per barrel and which would amount to an extra US$1.2 billion from the 
banks and be topped up by some US$600 million by the IMF. Equally, if the price 
of oil rose above US$14 per barrel, the country’s repayment terms would be 
speeded up; 2) an additional US$500 million if Mexico failed to reach the 
economic growth target of 3 to 4 per cent agreed with the IMF. As part of this 
agreement, signed in the summer of 1986, the World Bank agreed to contribute 
US$1.9 billion towards the restructuring of the Mexican economy, with particular 
emphasis on opening up the economy through foreign trade.95
94Esperanza Duran, ‘Mexico’s 1986 Financial Rescue: Palliative or Cure?’, in George Philip 
(ed.), The Mexican Economy (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 102-3.
95‘The State of the Economy’, Banamex: Review of the Economic Situation o f Mexico (Vol. 
LXII, No. 729, August 1986), p. 289.
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Economic policymakers in Mexico had consistently stated that they would 
never agree to conditions that contradicted their own preferred policy paths.96 
Miguel Mancera, the director of the Mexican central bank, emphasized that the 
IMF had not imposed economic models nor pressured the country to follow a 
predetermined course:
We are perfectly capable of choosing our destiny and of 
implementing measures which, although drastic, are proving to be 
correct and conducive to a better future.97
Silva Herzog, the Finance Minister, claims that Mexico already had plans to 
liberalize trade. Although there were external pressures from the US Treasury, the 
World Bank and the IMF, he maintains that he would have refused to sign the 
letter of intent if Mexico had not wanted to implement such policies.98 Mexico 
implemented the IMF-backed programmes because it agreed that these were the 
necessary policies to follow. This commitment on the part of Mexico is consistent 
with Kahler’s study of cross-national IMF programmes. He found that those 
countries most committed to policy reform would most likely undertake them and 
those that were opposed would resist their implementation.99
The United States worked with the IMF and the World Bank to urge 
reforms on Mexico. The changes the three favoured were generally congruent with 
the policies of the de la Madrid administration and therefore did not generated 
much conflict. The de la Madrid government not only believed that opening the 
Mexican economy was the appropriate policy path, but the country had already
^Interview, Silva Herzog, op. cit., in footnote 48.
97‘Bank Director Discusses Economy’, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (21 September 
1983), p. Ml.
"Interview, Silva Herzog, op. cit., in footnote 48.
"Miles Kahler, ‘External Influence, Conditionality and the Politics of Adjustment’, in Stephen 
Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman (eds), The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1992).
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made substantial moves to dismantle barriers to trade. The 1986 GATT accession 
added momentum to trade reforms already underway in Mexico. The latter part of 
the de la Madrid administration was characterized by a significant liberalization of 
the Mexican economy. Much of this was required by Mexico’s GATT accession, 
but the country liberalized its import restrictions far sooner than required and by a 
much larger margin.100 The international financial community still feared Mexico 
could return to its protectionist ways and therefore encouraged the liberalization 
process. After the July 1985 Presidential Decree101 and the decision to enter the 
GATT, the international community was more willing to reward Mexico for its 
efforts. For example, the World Bank provided Mexico with a Trade Policy Loan 
for US$500 million in July 1986.102 Although funding was scarce for highly 
indebted countries in the international system, Mexico was to benefit when the 
resources were there. This was the case with the Baker Plan.
4.3.5 The Baker Plan
The resolution of the debt crisis eluded both the international financial community 
and the indebted countries themselves. Three years after Mexico stated that it 
could not service its foreign debt, the problem seemed to be growing. Mexico’s 
total external debt had risen from US$87.6 billion in 1982 to US$97.8 billion in 
1985.103 In other parts of Latin America, several countries either called a
100For example, in the 1986 GATT accession agreement, Mexico agreed to eliminate trade 
barriers over a period of eight years, with the possibility of being permitted an emergency 
assessment of 50 per cent over and above previously negotiated tariff levels. After this time, the 
maximum tariff rate would be set at 50 per cent. Mexico has unilaterally brought those tariff levels 
down to 20 per cent and within a few years rather than eight. ‘The State of the Economy’,
Banamex: Review o f the Economic Situation of Mexico (Vol. LXII, No. 729, August 1986), p. 289.
10ISee Chapter 3, section 3.2.3.
102Banco de Mexico, The Mexican Economy 1987 (Mexico, DF: Banco de Mexico, 1987), p. 
129.
103Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Economic Survey o f Latin 
America and the Caribbean, 1986 (Santiago, Chile: ECLAC, 1989), p. 460.
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moratorium on their debt repayments or else stated they would repay only a 
certain percentage of their export earning.
Although Mexico did not participate in such independent moves, the 
initiative taken on board by the debtors to solve the debt crisis prompted the 
industrialized nations to act. As the perceptions of Third World debt were 
changing, the industrialized countries attempted to retain the initiative and forestall 
unilateral actions by the debtors. In the United States, a policy programme was 
devised to take on the crisis management role of the debt problem. This policy 
was proposed by the US Treasury Secretary, Mr. James Baker, at the annual IMF- 
World Bank meeting in October 1985. The Baker Plan was a new international 
debt initiative directed at the most troubled middle-income debtor countries in 
order to refloat their stagnant economies.
The three proposals of the Baker Plan were as follows:
1) comprehensive macroeconomic and structural policies, supported 
by the international financial institutions, to promote growth and 
balance of payments adjustment, and to reduce inflation. In addition, 
the adoption by principal debtors of market-oriented policies for 
growth;
2) a continued central role for the IMF, in conjunction with 
increased and more effective structural adjustment lending by the 
development banks, equivalent to US$9 billion of additional 
resources between 1984 and 1986;
3) new lending by commercial bank of US$20 billion during the 
same period.104
104The Baker Plan did not meet with much success. It was inherently flawed in that it still 
assumed that the debt crisis was a liquidity rather than a solvency problem which an inflow of 
funds from the international financial community could resolve. There was resistance from banks to 
provide new lending as evident by the 9 months it took for them to provide money just for Mexico 
in their part of the agreement. Mexico finally reached an agreement with the IMF almost one year 
later. Although the Mexican government initially had sought some form of debt relief, and while 
public opinion in Mexico began to coalesce around the need for a debt moratorium, the long 
negotiations yielded additional loans totalling US$12.5 billion - half from the international 
development banks and half from the private banks. There were some new facets to this agreement, 
including an additional US$1.7 billion in loans, to be activated in the event of an unanticipated 
deterioration of the Mexican economy. See Robert A. Pastor (ed.), Latin America’s Debt Crisis:
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The Baker Plan called for structural changes in the debtor countries, that included 
market-opening measures to encourage foreign direct investment and capital 
inflows, as well as to liberalize trade, including the reduction of export subsidies.
Mexico had already begun the process of liberalizing trade and reducing 
export subsidies by the time of the Baker Plan in October 1985. The April 1985 
bilateral agreement and the July 1985 Presidential Decree were in place months 
before the Baker Plan was proposed. In addition, Mexico had planned to announce 
its intention to join the GATT in late summer 1985, an announcement delayed by 
the major earthquakes that hit Mexico City in September.105
The Baker Plan as a pressure to force Mexico to liberalize was not 
effective, but it did reinforce Mexico’s decision. Even when the Baker Plan was 
unveiled, it did not ‘cause’ liberalization to occur. Mexico was willing, not 
cajoled, to accede to elements of the Plan. Although Mexico was to be one of the 
few that ‘benefitted’ from such a programme, the international financial system 
was not a stable source of finance. Even though Mexico in its rescheduling of 
1986 attempted to incorporate the Baker Plan, the reluctance of the banks to 
provide new lending was evident as it took 9 months for them to come up with the 
money in their part of the agreement.
4.3.6 The 1986 Omnibus Trade Bill
Those who argue that Mexico was forced to liberalize its trade regime because of 
US pressures would point to the 1986 Omnibus trade bill. In 1986 - the year 
Mexico acceded to the GATT - there occurred a powerful push from those seeking 
reciprocal concessions from Mexico. In the United States, there were concerns 
about the US trade deficit, overseas competition and persistent doubts about 
Mexico’s trade and investment regime as well as intellectual property rights. These
Adjusting to the Past or Planning for the Future? (London: Lynne Rienner, 1987), pp. 13-14.
105At the July 1985 Binational meeting, Mexican delegates told the United States that Mexico 
would soon announce its decision to join the GATT. Interview, Mr. Paul Dacher, US Department 
of Commerce, Office of Mexico, Washington, DC, 15 April 1993.
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concerns overshadowed those representing the second view - improving overall 
bilateral relations. Neither Mexico’s financial difficulties (the drop in oil prices, 
the consequent worsening of Mexico’s external accounts and debt service 
capacity), nor its trade liberalizing measures - most notably, GATT 
membership106 - offset the negative feelings about Mexico’s trade and investment 
regimes. The argument was that it was difficult to credit Mexico for its 
liberalization, since much of it was mandated by Mexico’s GATT accession 
agreement or represented unilateral tariff and nontariff measure concessions which 
could be withdrawn without notice.107 The United States feared that Mexico 
could still return to its protectionist ways.108
Protectionist legislation before Congress (H.R. 4800 - A Bill to Enhance 
the Competitiveness of American Industry) called for liberalization of imports and 
investment policies. Moreover, it called for financial assistance to developing 
countries linked with liberalization.109 Such a bill contradicted the Reagan 
administration’s commercial philosophy of free trade. The administration labelled 
the bill defensive, protectionist and self-defeating.110 Officials stated they would, 
without hesitation, recommend a presidential veto. If the Congress was attempting 
to force Mexico to liberalize its trade through such legislation, the Reagan 
administration not only disagreed with its basic premise, but seemed to be more 
sensitive to Mexico’s economic situation.
106The US response to Mexican trade liberalization during the de la Madrid period was 
disappointing. The US imposed barriers to Mexican exports of steel, maintained (although in a 
slightly liberalized form) textile quotas and removed selected products from GSP.
107S. Lande, op. cit., in footnote 68, p. 53.
108US International Trade Commission, Review of Trade and Investment Liberalization 
Measures by Mexico and prospects for Future United States-Mexican Relations: Phase I: Recent 
Trade and Investment Reforms Undertaken by Mexico and Implications for the United States, 
Investigation No. 332-282 (Washington, DC: US International Trade Commission, April 1990), pp. 
4-1, 4-3.
109S. Lande, op. cit, in footnote 68, p. 52.
U0Ibid.
149
International Leverage Chapter Four
As Mexico had already made major inroads toward trade liberalization and 
decided to join GATT, the protectionist bill before Congress and its application to 
Mexico was perhaps more a result of the overall bad relations between the two 
countries. Instead of trade as the focus in 1986, other issues were more important 
and took precedence over the commercial considerations of the United States. 
These issues included debt, drugs, immigration and Mexican policies toward 
Central America.
In the mid-1980s, various factions in the United States - from both views - 
expressed concern over the specific economic troubles and the overall management 
of the Mexican economy and political system. In the area of debt, negotiations 
remained stalled with the failure of the Baker Plan and Washington expressed its 
desire for major changes in Mexico’s foreign and domestic policies. These 
included restructuring of the Mexican economy along free-market lines and 
changing its policies on Central America. The issue of drug trafficking was a 
particular sore point. In 1985, a US Drug Enforcement Agency officer, Enrique 
Camarena, was murdered on Mexican soil and information was emerging about 
possible government involvement. In addition, the United States was becoming 
more aware of and concerned about the major drug problem in its society - the 
increased drug consumption of cocaine and ‘crack’. There was increasing US 
public concern, especially as the drugs were entering the United States via 
Mexico. Also legislation was enacted by Congress and approved by the Reagan 
administration in late 1986 for sweeping changes in US immigration law and 
policy.111
Perhaps the most damaging event for Mexican-United States relations at 
this time were the Senate hearings chaired by Senator Jesse Helms in May and 
June of 1986. In the hearings, it was perceived by Mexico that the United States 
was attacking Mexico unjustly - for example, criticism of Mexico’s foreign policy
11'For more information, see, for example, Wayne A. Cornelius, The Political Economy of 
Mexico Under de la Madrid: The Crisis Deepens, 1985 - 1986 (San Diego, CA: University of
California, San Diego, Center for US - Mexican Studies, 1986), pp. 42-5.
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regarding Nicaragua and its lack of effort to curb illegal drug production and 
trafficking.112 The Mexicans were angered by the Helms hearings. They felt that 
they violated Mexico’s sovereignty and was yet another example in a long 
historical line of US interference in their internal affairs. The Mexican 
Ambassador to the United States, Jorge Espinosa de los Reyes, presented an 
official protest to the US Department of State. The government run daily 
newspaper, El National, called the hearings intolerable. The Mexican people also 
were outraged by the accusations. A molatov cocktail exploded outside the US 
consulate in Guadalajara and tens of thousands of demonstrators marched on the 
main square in Mexico City.113 The overall bilateral relations between Mexico 
and the United States had reached a low point.
Mexicans had worried about linkages in US policy since the beginning of 
the debt crisis. After the spring 1983 visit by Secretary of State, George Shultz, 
the Mexico City dailies were accusing the United States of linking the Mexican 
foreign policy on Central America to the country’s request for new loans.114 The 
United States may have indeed wanted to link various policy issues, but as the US 
Ambassador to Mexico, Mr. John Gavin, said, ‘... linkages and cohesive policy 
were hard to develop.’115 There are many difficulties in linking issues in 
Mexican-US relations: 1) the difficulty of assigning ‘weights’ to various issues to 
help calculate the feasibility trade-offs, such as with trade and Central America; 2) 
the problem of determining the individual or group in the United States responsible 
for bargaining once weights have been determined - i.e., State or Commerce 
Department; 3) the difficulty of delivering what it promises after weights have 
been determined and trade-offs concluded; and 4) the problem with US negotiating
112Committee on Foreign Relations, Economic Development in Mexico (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1986).
113G. Grayson, op. cit., in footnote9, pp. 75-6.
114Angel Aguilar Perez, El Di'a (Mexico City), 7 April 1983.
115Quoted in Donald Lyman, ‘US-Mexican Relations: Time for Change’, in S. Purcell, op. cit., 
in footnote 7, p. 142.
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a bilateral agreement - such as trade - when it is a member of a multilateral 
organization - such as the GATT.116
US officials have noted that bilateral issues pertaining to Mexico were often 
‘piecemealed’ or compartmentalized. With the many issues - debt, drugs, 
migration, trade and Central America - each with domestic as well as bilateral 
implications, and the myriad of US agencies involved in the policymaking process, 
Washington found it difficult to develop a cohesive and lucid policy toward 
Mexico. This lack of US policy cohesion does not lend itself to the argument that 
international actors forced Mexico to liberalize trade. Rather, Mexico’s alignment 
with the United States on trade policy was more choice than compliance and 
Mexico’s role in bargaining on specific issues more autonomous than dependent.
Conclusions
This chapter examined the leverage exerted by international actors on Mexican 
policymakers. The first section explored the asymmetrical interdependent 
relationship between Mexico and the United States and the changing dynamics of 
the 1980s. This section challenged the view that the United States, helped by the 
economic crisis, was able to force Mexico to implement trade liberalizing policies. 
Rather, Mexico’s weaknesses in the 1980s were ironically turned into strengths, 
especially on the issue of debt. Debt provided Mexico with its greatest source of 
leverage when dealing with its northern neighbour. Mexico’s possible default on 
debt repayments was perceived by the United States to have the ability to harm its 
financial interests and thus, become an issue of national security importance.
The second part of the chapter focused on the bilateral trade relationship. It 
showed that Mexico and the United States relied on ad hoc measures to resolve 
trade disputes in the absence of any agreed upon commercial framework. The lack 
of a bilateral trade agreement was due to the historic low levels of trade between 
the two countries and the differences in their underlying trade philosophies. With
116G. Grayson, op. cit., in footnote59, pp. 162-3.
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the introduction of maquiladora and the GSP programmes, trade increased 
substantially between the United States and Mexico and integrated Mexico into the 
international trading system. Mexico was not ready to commit to bilateral or 
multilateral agreements. In 1980, it refused to join the GATT. With the economic 
crisis and the election of Miguel de la Madrid to the presidency in 1982, Mexico’s 
stand on trade issues changed dramatically. By 1985, Mexico had agreed to a 
bilateral agreement with the United States and negotiated entry into the GATT.
The final section of the chapter addressed the heart of the argument. It 
examined the leverage exerted by the United States and the international financial 
institutions on Mexico to liberalize its trade regime. It found that the executive- 
legislative and bureaucratic struggle ensured that policy toward Mexico in general 
was somewhat incoherent and inconsistent. A myriad of government agencies and 
interests were involved in the policymaking process in the United States. Although 
the legislative branch pushed for trade liberalization, the executive branch was far 
more interested in the overall bilateral relationship and the East-West balance. In 
addition, other pressures from the IMF, the Baker Plan and US legislation came 
after Mexico had committed itself to trade liberalization.
The chapter concludes therefore that, although US and institutional support 
for liberal economic regimes acted as a reinforcing factor in Mexico’s decision to 
open its economy, the decision to liberalize trade and accede to the GATT were 
initiatives taken by Mexican policymakers. Power relations are insufficient to 
explain international influence. Such influence was far more subtle than pure 
power relations would suggest. The next chapter explores this subtlety by looking 
at the transmission of ideas.
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Introduction
This chapter examines the factors contributing to the neoliberal revival and its 
influence on Mexico’s decision to liberalize its trade regime. The 1980s witnessed 
the sudden and fundamental shift in the dominant development paradigm not only 
in Mexico, but throughout the developing world. The new model called for the 
restructuring of state intervention in the domestic economy, liberalizing trade and 
investment regimes and privatizing state-owned enterprises. What was so 
remarkable about this shift was the pace and intensity in which the neoliberal 
policies were implemented. Today, Latin American, Asian, African and, most 
recently, eastern European countries have been affected by this global resurgence 
of neoliberalism and have instituted free-market reforms.
The link between the global and domestic policymaking arena is vital for 
this analysis. The chapter, therefore, concentrates on why these economic policies 
have been extensively and concurrently pursued by developing countries; how 
neoliberal ideas were transferred from the global to the domestic level; and how 
Mexico, in particular, was influenced by these emerging global impulses. In order 
to address these questions, the chapter is divided into three parts. The first section 
examines the explanations for the global resurgence of neoliberalism and the role 
ideas play in domestic policymaking. The second part analyzes international 
regimes and transnational policy co-ordination. The third section identifies the 
transmission mechanisms through which these new ideas are carried (hegemonic 
states, the academic community and international organizations) and the carriers of 
the ideas (the epistemic community). The core argument of the chapter is that the 
resurgence of neoliberalism set the outer margins for domestic policy choice and 
proved to be a legitimizing factor in Mexico’s decision to open up its economy.
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5.1 The Influence of Ideas
The reasons for the global shift in the dominant development paradigm in the 
1980s could be explained by: systemic, institutional, interest based and ideational 
explanations.1 In theory, systemic factors - such as the deep global recession of 
the early 1980s and the debt crisis of 1982 - can act as catalysts for policy change. 
These shocks can break policy inertia and provide the opening for the diffusion of 
knowledge and new ideas. Systemic factors do provide insights into the external 
stimuli facing developing countries as a whole in the 1980s and why there was a 
need for some kind of policy response, but they do not adequately explain the 
precise content and direction of domestic economic policy. Previous chapters have 
demonstrated that the 1982 debt crisis was a determining factor for Mexican 
economic policy change.2 Although this crisis signalled the need for policy 
reform, it did not stipulate what the changes would entail.
A second explanation for the global shift in paradigm points to international 
institutions and their effectiveness in propelling developing countries to adopt 
neoliberal economic policies. This argument implies a power relationship: the 
developing countries changed policy because of pressure from international 
institutions. Even though it has been shown in the previous chapter that 
international financial institutions merely reinforced a policy path already chosen 
by the Mexican government, this is not the case in many developing countries.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), for example, has had considerable 
influence in significant aspects of developing countries’ economic policymaking 
after 1982.3 Yet the ability of the Fund to force particular policy directions has
’For a discussion of these explanations, see Thomas J. Biersteker, ‘The "Triumph" of 
Neoclassical Economics in the Developing World: Policy Convergence and Bases of Governance in 
the International Economic Order’, in James Rosenau and Emst-Otto Czempiel (eds), Governance 
Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992), pp. 102-31.
2See Chapters 2 and 3.
3Margaret Garritsen de Vries, Balance o f Payments Adjustment, 1945 to 1986: The IMF 
Experience (Washington, DC: IMF, 1987), pp. 207-42.
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been limited. Haggard cites thirty adjustment programmes established under the 
Extended Fund Facility. Of these thirty, twenty-four were renegotiated, with 
sixteen of them eventually cancelled for noncompliance.4 Remmer’s study of IMF 
programmes in Latin American found that
unsuccessful implementation of IMF recipes has been the norm in 
Latin America, not the exception... The power of the IMF remains 
a useful myth for governments seeking a scapegoat to explain 
difficult economic conditions associated with severe balance-of- 
payments disequilibria, but the ability of the IMF to impose 
programs from the outside is distinctly limited.5
In addition, this power relationship between the international institutions 
and the developing world does not explain the broad shift toward economic 
liberalization. Although the institutions had supported the application of neoliberal 
policies in the mid-1970s,6 it was not until the next decade that they succeeded in 
winning adherents. When, in the 1980s - possibly as the result of the economic 
crisis - developing countries altered their policies, many of them implemented 
heterodox strategies rather than wholeheartedly embracing neoliberalism.7 The 
influence from these international financial institutions was far more subtle than 
pure power relations would suggest. The ‘conversion’ to neoliberalism was not 
immediate, not universal and not unqualified. Notwithstanding the reluctance and 
resistance of the ‘neoliberal formula’, one should not underestimate the
4See Stephan Haggard, ‘The Politics of Adjustment: Lessons from the IMF’s Extended Fund 
Facility’, International Organization (Vol. 39, No. 3, Summer 1985), pp. 505-06.
5Karen Remmer, ‘The Politics of Economic Stabilization: IMF Standby Programs in Latin 
America’, Comparative Politics (October 1986), p. 21.
6During the 1970s, international financial institutions and the development field began to shift to 
policies based on neoliberalism. The new approach called for not only corrective macroeconomic 
policies, but also for longer-term structural reforms, including the shift towards outward-oriented 
trade policies, reductions in the role of the state and public sector reforms. See International 
Monetary Fund, Theoretical Aspects of the Design o f Fund-Supported Adjustment Programs, 
Research Department Occasional Paper 55 (Washington, DC: IMF, September 1987).
7For example, in Argentina, Brazil and Peru.
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institutional influence. For influence can consist not merely in the crude sense of 
‘power over’, but in the sense of carrying ideas.
Another possible explanation for the shift toward neoliberalism could be the 
influence of interest groups. This argument contends that interests are more 
important than ideas. For example, Mancur Olson, in The Rise and Decline o f  
Nations, argues that ideas are primarily tools that serve particular interests.8 The 
growth of state intervention and the impairment of the market in this century can 
be traced not to the influence of general doctrines, but to vying interests as part of 
the political process in democratic states. The ‘interests’ argument is not sufficient 
to discount the role of ideas for several reasons. To begin with, the principal result 
of an idea is to give rise to others, most of which were not envisioned by the 
original formulators.9 The ‘second-generation’ ideas will, in turn, develop in other 
ways, as has Keynesianism. Just because Keynes did not write about the policies 
which bear his name does not necessarily mean that his original ideas did not give 
root to the eventual outcome. In addition, ideas can be seen as animating interest 
groups, either by providing suggestions as to how groups’ interests can best be 
promoted, or by providing suggestions as to how their interests might be 
threatened.
In a different vein, ‘interests’ cannot explain the concurrent move globally 
toward economic liberalization throughout the developed and developing world.
The resurgence of neoliberalism did not arise in only a handful of countries 
responding to particular societal interest groups; it occurred on a global level. 
Further, although there may have been a demand for some kind of change in 
economic policy, the specific policy direction that emerged - economic 
liberalization - is not what well-established, entrenched interests would have 
wanted in most developing countries. Such groups benefitted tremendously from
8Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations (London: Yale University Press, 1982).
9 Albert O. Hirschman, ‘How Keynesian Revolution Was Exported from The United States, and 
Other Comments’, in Peter Hall (ed.), The Political Power of Economic Ideas (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 358.
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the nationalist policies of state subsidies, overvalued exchange rates and high 
tariffs. Rather than supporting the move for economic reform, there was strong 
opposition to it; the stabilization and structural adjustment policies were routinely 
thwarted by domestic political forces.10
In the case of Mexico, the private sector was deeply divided over the 
government’s moves to open the economy. The ‘moderates’, who were opposed to 
any form of liberalization whatsoever, vied with the ‘radicals’, who favoured 
opening the economy, but only in a selective and gradual manner.11 Neither camp 
was sufficiently organized to push forward their interests effectively. Thus, the 
Mexican government rapidly liberalized the economy in the early 1980s in spite 
of ’ rather than because of, interest group pressures.
Instead of focusing on interests, an examination of the role of ideas on 
economic policymaking may prove more fruitful. Keynes argued in his General 
Theory that
the ideas of economists and political philosophers ... are more 
powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by 
little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt 
from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some 
defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the 
air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a 
few years back.12
This oft-quoted statement points to ideas rather than interests as influencing 
policymakers. Although the importance of ideas is vital to understanding the global 
shift toward neoliberalism, there are problems with trying to prove how economic
10See S. Haggard, op. cit., in footnote 4, p. 506.
nM. Luna, R. Tirado and F. Valdes, ‘Businessmen and Politics in Mexico, 1982 - 1986’, 
in S. Maxfield and R. Anzaldua Montoya (eds), Government and Private Sector in Contemporary 
Mexico, Monograph Series 20 (San Diego, CA: Center for US - Mexican Studies, University of 
California, San Diego, 1987), p. 23.
12J. M. Keynes, The General Theory o f Employment, Interest and Money (London: Macmillan, 
1936), p. 383.
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ideas have been translated into economic policy. An economic idea is defined here 
as ‘a conception or notion of something to be done or carried out; a plan of 
action’.13 Hall writes,
Any attempt to specify the conditions under which ideas acquire 
political influence inevitably teeters on the brink of reductionism, a 
large lacuna at the center of our understanding of public policy.14
Colander and Coats maintain that, ‘studying the spread of ideas is like studying 
subatomic particles with half-lives of nanoseconds’.15
However difficult it is to prove ideas translate into policy, there exist 
strong links between the dissemination, influence and carriers of certain economic 
ideas and policy outcome. There have been cases where ideas have been translated 
into actual policy. The role of ideas and their influence on policymaking is evident 
in the case of Karl Marx. The 19th-century economist had considerable influence 
on the pattern of institutions and the policies of the Soviet Union and other 
communist states.16 Marx’s ideas were developed and disseminated by Lenin and 
Stalin to the domestic policymaking arena. A second example concerns the work 
of John M. Keynes. The ideas from the General Theory greatly influenced 
policymaking in the United States and Britain.17 In these countries, Ikenberry 
argues, Keynesian-inspired policy ideas were embraced by influential policymakers 
and drawn upon to set up the post-Second World War international economic
13David C. Colander and A. W. Coats (eds), The Spread o f Economic Ideas (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 2.
14Peter Hall (ed.), The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism Across Nations 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 4.
15D. Colander and A. W. Coats, op. cit., in footnote 13, p. 1.
16Mancur Olson, ‘How ideas Affect Societies: Is Britain the Wave of the Future?’, in Andrew 
Gamble (ed.), Ideas, Interests & Consequences (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1989), p. 
23.
l7See Walter S. Salant, ‘The Spread of Keynesian Doctrines and Practices in the United States’, 
in P. Hall, op. cit., in footnote 14, pp. 27-52.
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order.18 In addition, the post-Second World War development policies put forth 
by Raul Prebisch, et al.t at the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin 
America (ECLA) could be interpreted as ideas influencing policy. The ECLA, 
criticizing the international trade regime, advocated import substitution 
industrialization (1ST) as a means of breaking economic and political dependence 
on the industrialized countries. This philosophy prompted the entire Latin 
American region to pursue import substitution policies for over thirty years.
The recent and concurrent move toward economic liberalization at the 
global level demonstrates further the importance of ideas. In the Latin American 
region, there occurred a rush to implement neoliberal policies in the late 1980s. 
This move is especially important, as it occurred in countries where there was a 
strong tradition of considerable state intervention in the economy. In the late 
1980s, politicians, who had stood against neoliberal economic measures, actually 
implemented privatization and liberalization policies when in power. In Argentina, 
the Peronist president, Carlos Menem, rather than implementing the populist 
policies promised, introduced privatization and trade liberalization policies that 
radically departed from the tradition of the Peronist party. President Menem 
declared that his government would sell off the major parastatals, including the oil 
industry, and lower tariffs and other trade barriers.19 In Venezuela, President 
Carlos Andres Perez had been responsible for the expansion of the public sector in 
his first administration from 1974 to 1978. When he was re-elected in 1988, 
President Perez announced policies to privatize and liberalize the Venezuelan 
economy.20 Like his Argentine and Venezuelan counterparts, the new Peruvian 
president Alberto Fujimori campaigned and was elected for his stand against
18G. John Ikenberry, ‘A World Economy Restored: Expert Consensus and the Anglo-American 
Postwar Settlement’, International Organization (Vol. 46, No. 1, Winter 1992), p. 291.
19See ‘Menem produces his super-shock’, Latin American Weekly Report (20 July 1989), p. 2.
“ See ‘Talks under way on rescheduling’, Latin American Weekly Report (19 January 1989), p.
2 and ‘Union announce fight with Perez’, Latin American Weekly Report (19 January 1989), p. 11.
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liberalizing the economy. Yet once in power, he too made promises to lower 
protection and rationalize the public sector.21
This globalization of neoliberalism was not confined to the Latin American 
region. The rush to privatize and liberalize the economy also occurred in eastern 
Europe in the late 1980s. Poland, like Mexico, instituted a shock treatment, 
rapidly implementing policies to move quickly to a market-based system. On 1 
January 1990, Poland implemented a stabilization programme that included full 
price liberalization and tight monetary and fiscal policies.22 Unlike Poland, 
Hungary employed a more gradualist approach, but since 1987, imposed greater 
fiscal and monetary discipline (though with mixed results). In addition, 
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia have implemented liberalization policies. Even the 
Soviet Union felt that long-term structural changes were needed as far back as 
1985. In this year, Gorbachev called for reform which included perestroika 
(restructuring); uskoreniye (acceleration of growth) and glasnost (openness).23
To regard as coincidental the adoption of neoliberal policies by so many 
countries of such disparate characteristics ignores the obvious influence of ideas. 
Although domestic political and economic variables cannot be discounted, there 
can be no doubt that ideas have had a powerful impact on domestic policy. This 
leads the analysis to ask why certain ideas are more successful than others. Three 
explanations are offered: 1) the inherent logic of economic liberalization; 2) 
timing; and 3) epistemic communities. First, it could be argued that some ideas, 
such as neoliberalism, were successful and dispersed because of some inherent 
logic. This argument assumes that there exists a kind of ‘perfect market-place’ for 
ideas and the most ‘valuable’ of them will be bought by the consumers.
21 See ‘Fujimori victory marks critical point in region’s privatising, free-market drive’, Latin 
American Weekly Report (21 June 1990), p. 1.
“ Ishac Diwan and Fernando Saldanho, Long Term Prospects in Eastern Europe (Washington, 
DC: World bank, June 1991), pp. 7-8 and David Lipton and Jeffrey Sachs, ‘Creating a Market 
Economy: The Case of Poland’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (Vol. 1, 1990), pp. 75- 
147.
23World Bank, World Development Report 1991 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1991), p. 20.
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Accordingly, the resurgence of neoliberal economic policies occurred because the 
developing countries realized that they were the ‘right’ or ‘best’ policies to pursue, 
especially after the alternatives had failed in the 1960s and 1970s. This position 
argues that even short-sighted political elites could not fail to see that only 
neoliberal policies would produce successful economic policies.
The second position asserts that the triumph of certain ideas could be 
explained by timing. Victor Hugo claimed that ‘no army can withstand the strength 
of an idea whose time has come.’24 The success of neoliberalism in the 1980s 
could be due to a particular juncture in the course of history: the resurgence of 
neoliberalism occurred because of the ideological vacuum of the 1970s and the 
search for alternative development models. Or, the resurgence could be explained 
by: the idea was at the right place at the right time. Albert O. Hirschman argues 
that the rise of certain ideas go through cycles.25 The relative acceptance of 
neoliberal or economic nationalist ideas is subject to cycles that reflect the 
historical swings between the public oriented and private life. Both market and 
state solutions provoke expectations which they cannot satisfy as the goods and 
services which they deliver inevitably disappoint. As the failures accumulate, so 
the attractions of an alternative policy increases. In time, a major shift in policy is 
implemented.
A third argument, which is not mutually exclusive to either the first or 
second positions, asserts that the success of economic liberalization depended upon 
the acceptance of an ideology, a belief or a set of ideas by important domestic 
actors with political clout, such as an ‘epistemic community’. An epistemic 
community is a network of knowledge-based experts with recognized specialization 
and ability in a particular field and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant 
knowledge within this sphere or issue-area. The epistemic community would
^Quoted in Cento Veljanovski, ‘Foreword’, in Andrew Gamble (ed.), Ideas, Interests & 
Consequences (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1989), p. ix.
25Albert O. Hirschman, Shifting Involvements: Private Interest and Public Action (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1982), p. 4.
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legitimate and spread the ideas through their links or positions within the domestic 
policymaking structure. In the case of Mexico during the de la Madrid 
administration, the epistemic community did not have to press its policy advice on 
the political leadership - the community was the political leadership.26
This chapter maintains that ideas matter and policymakers make a 
difference. It is also acknowledged that ideas and policymakers function within 
certain constraints. In the case of Mexico, there was a synergy between timing 
(the crisis of the nationalist model and the 1982 debt crisis) and the epistemic 
community (the carriers and disseminators of new ideas). The next section 
discusses international regimes and transnational policy co-ordination in order to 
understand further the ideological crisis in the international economic system 
during the late 1970s and early 1980s.
26This is examined in later in this chapter and in Chapter 6.
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5.2 International Regimes and Transnational Policy Co-ordination
The international economic order could be conceptualized as a cohesive system of 
ideas, norms, rules and decision making procedures that influence political and 
economic systems. These ideas and rules form international regimes and provide 
global institutional orders that promote regular operating patterns in foreign and 
domestic policy. The acceptance of a particular international regime facilitates the 
transnational convergence of foreign and domestic policy.
This section of the chapter briefly traces the ideas on which the post- 
Second World War international economic order was based. The dominant 
paradigm in the developed world was influenced by Keynesian economic doctrine. 
In Latin America, the paradigm drew from Keynesianism and put forth its own 
version, called structuralism. Yet, by the mid- to late 1970s, an ideological 
vacuum caused by international economic troubles led to the search for new ideas 
to solve domestic economic problems. This search provided the opportunity for the 
resurgence of neoliberalism, first in the developed, and then the developing world.
5.2.1 The Keynesian Revolution
Arising from the experience of ‘market failure’ in the 1930s and the necessity of 
reconstruction policies after the Second World War, state involvement in the 
economy drew widespread approval. The origins of this fundamental change in 
economic thinking can be found in the ideas of John M. Keynes, particularly in his 
work, The General Theory o f Employment, Interest and Money (1936). The new 
discourse challenged the assumptions about a self-equilibrating market system and 
instead put forth the idea that the state had a positive role to play in correcting 
market failures. The changes in the climate of ideas was soon followed by a 
fundamental shift in policy. The post-Second World War international economic 
order went beyond Keynes’s work in both its economic and political implications.
This economic doctrine challenged the classical or orthodox thinking in 
economic policymaking in several ways. First, Keynesianism challenged the 
assumption that full employment of labour and capital was the norm. Rather, the
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new doctrine asserted that there existed no natural tendency in capitalist market 
economies for the system to move towards equilibrium. Second, rather than 
viewing unemployment as a voluntary act on the part of the workforce, the new 
doctrine saw it as involuntary. Capitalist economies commonly experience general 
unemployment, and there exists no proclivity for natural forces to eliminate it. 
Third, the failure to maintain the workforce in full employment is mainly due to 
the lack of total spending. Fourth, these intermittent total spending failures were 
primarily due to the shortfall in private domestic capital formation.
Following from these four points, the Keynesians put forth a strong 
argument for government economic intervention. In addition, the doctrine 
introduced a series of variables such as income distribution, the interests of 
individuals, groups and nations, and market imperfections not previously 
considered part of conventional economic analysis. Furthermore, government 
budgetary policy was no longer to be confined to balancing the budget; instead, it 
would now be at the centre of national economic policy.
The Latin American structuralists were greatly influenced by the ideas from 
the developed world. They applied the Keynesian analysis to the Latin American 
situation and to the theory of economic development. The following section 
discusses briefly the structuralist position and how these ideas were translated into 
economic policy.
5.2.2 The Structuralists and the State-led Development Model 
Confronted with the collapse of world trade and primary commodity markets in 
the 1930s, Latin American policymakers were forced into ad hoc policies to deal 
with the consequent shortages of foreign exchange and manufactured imports.27 
These external shocks generated heterodox policy experiments that prompted 
fundamental structural changes in the Latin American economies. Because it takes 
time for ideas to be produced and disseminated, the lessons of the 1930s were not
27For more information on this time period, see Rosemary Thorp (ed.), Latin America in the 
1930’s: The Role o f the Periphery in World Crisis (London: Macmillan Press, 1984).
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incorporated into a general doctrine for economic development until almost twenty 
years later.
Structuralism first came into use in Latin America in the 1950s in the form 
of a structuralist explanation of inflation. The structuralist school, originating in 
Chile and the ECLA, held that the basic cause of inflation lay in structural rigidity 
of one sort or another. Accordingly, structuralists viewed deflationary policies as 
attacking the symptoms rather than the causes. The structuralist school was not 
confined to the Latin American region, however.28 The dominant view in 
development economics in the 1950s and 1960s was that markets frequently failed 
to work efficiently in the developing world. Furthermore, the structures of 
developing countries were significantly different from those of the industrialized 
countries.29 According to this perspective, the problems of development and 
underdevelopment were caused by the historic integration of developing countries 
into the world economy, their continued dependence, the structural and 
institutional rigidities that were endemic to the domestic development process and 
other factors that perpetuate unbalanced growth and disequilibrium. Essentially, 
structuralists considered orthodox policies to be unrealistic, inadequate and 
politically biased in its orientation and conclusions. The state needed to intervene 
in order to help correct, but not replace, the market. This led to the expansion of 
the public enterprise sector and widespread adoption of economic planning.
The nucleus of the ECLA analysis was the critique of the neoclassical 
theory of international trade. Its aim was to show that the international division of 
labour which orthodox theory claimed was naturally produced by world trade was 
of much greater benefit to the advanced industrialized nations than to the 
developing countries. To illustrate this point, the world was divided into the centre
^For a review of the structuralist position, see H. W. Arndt, ‘The Origins of Structuralism’, 
World Development (Vol. 13, No. 2, February 1985).
29Christopher Colclough, ‘Structuralism versus Neo-liberalism: An Introduction’, in C. 
Colclough and J. Manor (eds), States or Markets?: Neo-liberalism and the Development Policy 
Debate (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 2.
166
The Transmission of Ideas Chapter Five
and the periphery. The international economy was composed of a centre of highly 
industrialized countries and a large periphery comprised of underdeveloped 
countries which specialize in agricultural and other primary production.30 
Structuralists argued that the period from the late 19th-century until the middle of 
the 20th-century had been a period of outward-oriented development. An 
international division of labour had emerged in which Latin America specialized in 
the export of primary products (foodstuffs, industrial raw materials or minerals) 
while importing manufactured goods, especially capital goods required for 
development, from Europe and the United States. Whereas to the neoclassicalists, 
this situation would benefit both partners, to the structuralists such an assumption 
relied more or less on perfect markets. The latter stressed that developing 
countries possessed various institutional features and weaknesses (structures) that 
prevented the markets from operating efficiently. ECLA theorists argued that, as 
the factor markets were far from perfect, the system of international trade operated 
against the interests of the Latin American nations.31
ECLA argued that there was a spurt of industrial development every time 
the region’s outward-oriented development was interrupted by war or world 
economic depression. But such spurts came to an end when economic ties between 
the centre and periphery were re-established and outward-oriented development 
was resumed.32 The ECLA remedy proposed to solve the problem of 
underdevelopment by recommending rapid industrialization through the strategy of 
ISI. The ISI strategy would have a two-fold benefit: economically, it would be a 
prerequisite for halting the transfer of surplus from the periphery to the centre,
^ a u l  Prebisch, ‘Commercial Policy in the Underdeveloped Countries’, American Economic 
Review (Vol. 49, No. 2, 1959).
31Ian Roxborough, Theories of Underdevelopment (London: Macmillan, 1979), p. 28.
22Ibid, p. 29.
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and politically, ISI would provide greater self-sufficiency and independence from 
outside influences.33
The ECLA philosophy, based on the ISI model, fostered the transnational 
policy co-ordination of the Latin American economies. It was a development 
model designed by and for the southern countries, but with full support from 
international financial institutions and northern states as well as most 
multinationals that benefitted greatly from the protected domestic economies. Yet 
by the 1960s, the ISI model was exhausted and was associated with wide-spread 
inefficiencies and resource misallocation.34 In the developed world, Keynesian 
economics was unable to explain or cure the seemingly contradictory problems of 
rising unemployment and inflation of the 1970s. With the intellectual 
disillusionment with Keynesian approaches to economic management, there was a 
shift toward the rehabilitation of the use of prices and markets as a mechanism for 
the allocation of resources.
The disillusionment with Keynesian approaches by the latter 1970s 
converged with the onset of adverse international and domestic conditions in the 
early 1980s. There was the deep economic shock of the recession, increasing 
protectionism in the industrialized nations and a reduction in international funds. 
The adverse developments in the trading system and the drying up of private 
sources of external finance reduced the resources available to domestic 
governments to pursue state-led development strategies.
For Mexico, the 1982 debt crisis exposed the political, economic and 
ideological crises of the Mexican regime. As a result of the abandonment of the 
revolutionary promises and of the withdrawal of social support for the regime,35
33When the ISI strategy failed both economically and politically, many countries in the 
developing world moved toward a more assertive stance toward the ‘North’. The 1970s witnessed 
the rise of ‘North-South’ issues and the increase in dialogue as southern states gained economic and 
political strength. For more information on this important period, see Charles A. Jones, The North- 
South Dialogue: A Brief History (London: Pinter Publishers, 1983).
34See Chapter 2, for more information on the problems of the ISI model.
35The socio-economic troubles of the late 1960s and early 1970s were discussed in Chapter 2.
168
The Transmission of Ideas Chapter Five
the government became more dependent upon the legitimation derived from the 
continuation of economic development. Yet the failure of the oil boom made 
economic progress even more difficult to deliver. The 1982 economic crisis 
delivered a decisive blow to the foundations of the Mexican regime. The first 
casualty was the ideology of populism and nationalism - the underpinnings of the 
regime and to a considerable degree, the identity of the Mexican state. The shift 
towards economic liberalization was one of the reactions to the economic, political 
and ideological crisis in 1982.
International and domestic conditions coincided with the perceived failure 
of past ISI policies which led to an historic opening or policy vacuum. The need 
for an alternative development model was apparent not only in Mexico, but 
throughout the Latin American region. There were persistent calls for economic 
policy reform in all of the major debtor countries, clearing the way for neoliberal 
economic measures. Such policies sought to reduce budget deficits and tighten 
monetary policy, liberalize trade and exchange rate regimes and expand the role of 
market forces and the private sector. These new policy ideas contrasted sharply 
with over thirty years of the expansion of the public sector and the state’s 
extensive regulation of the economy. The final section of the chapter discusses the 
reasons for the neoliberal resurgence in the 1980s. It identifies the transmission 
mechanisms and the carriers of ideas.
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5.3 The Transmission Mechanisms
The 1980s ushered in a fundamental shift toward neoliberalism. The reasons for 
the shift are twofold. First, there was the ascendance of conservative governments 
in Britain and the United States in 1979 to 1980,36 which greatly affected policy 
discourse. With the ascendance of neoliberalism in industrialized nations, there 
occurred a corresponding shift toward orthodoxy in most developing nations. In 
addition to the rise of such ideas in government circles, there was a long-term 
intellectual change within the economics profession and the development field. 
These factors greatly affected domestic policymaking in the developing world.
This section explores the transmission of ideas from the international 
system to the domestic arena by identifying the channels through which new ideas 
are carried. The channels identified in this chapter are hegemonic states, the 
academic community and international organizations. One of the most important 
carriers are the epistemic communities. It is argued that ideas influence domestic 
policy by transnational political and economic networks that link domestic and 
international actors.
5.3.1 The Election of Conservative Governments
The resurgence of conservative economic policy occurred in the 1970s. Toye 
considers the Nixon and Heath administrations (with their attempts to enforce 
wage and price ‘guidelines’ in 1971 to 1972 as a fundamental part of their 
macroeconomic strategies) to be the single most important factor that organized the 
right into an anti-Keynesian counter-revolution.37 The opposition to ‘big 
government’ and the renewed interest in free-market forces and monetarism were 
assimilated into conservative parties in both the United States and Europe. The 
conservative return to government in the United Kingdom and the United States in 
1979 to 1980 signalled new economic strategies to resolve tensions which followed
36This also occurred in the Federal Republic of Germany with the election of Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl.
37John Toye, Dilemmas of Development (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), p. 23.
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the eclipse of Keynesianism and the welfare state. Under the leadership of 
Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, the United Kingdom and the United States 
departed from the norm of mainstream non-ideological governments and centrist 
policies.38 They reversed decades of economic policies based on strong state 
involvement in their economies.39
The ideological changes in the industrialized nations, and most particularly 
the United States, influenced the rest of the countries in the international system. 
President Reagan addressed development issues at the last major global conference 
on development at Cancun, Mexico in 1981. President Reagan put forth the 
following principles for economic policy: 1) stimulating international trade by 
opening markets ...; 4) improving the climate in many developing countries for 
private investment and technology transfer; and 5) creating a political climate in 
which practical solutions can move forward rather than ‘founder on the reef of 
government policies that interfere unnecessarily with the market place’ .40 
President Reagan called for the developing world to get its ‘house in order and 
allow the magic of the market to do its work’. In March 1983, President Reagan 
said in San Francisco:
The United States will carry the banner for free trade and a 
responsible financial system... In trade with developing countries ... 
tariffs and quotas still play a significant role. Here, the task is to 
find a way to integrate the developing countries into the liberal 
trading order of lower tariffs and dismantled quotas. They must 
come to experience the full benefits and responsibilities of the
38Joel Krieger, Reagan, Ihatcher and the Politics of Decline (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986), 
p. 15.
39For a more detailed examination of these policies, see, for example, David Boaz, Assessing 
the Reagan Years (Washington, DC: The Cato Institute, 1988); Stephen Haseler, The Battle for 
Britain: Thatcher and the New Liberals (London: I.B. Tauris, 1989); Christopher Johnson, The 
Economy Under Thatcher, 1979-1990 (London: Penguin Books, 1991); T.S. Langston, Ideologues 
and Presidents (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992); and G. Smith, Reagan and 
Thatcher (London: Bodley Head, 1990).
401982 Economic Report of the President (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 
1982).
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system that has produced unprecedented prosperity among the 
industrial countries.41
The Reagan administration was, at least in rhetoric, firmly committed to free and 
open markets, the freer the flow of world trade, the stronger the tides for 
human progress and peace among nations’.42 The US attitude towards the desired 
policy direction of developing countries is most candidly spelled out in a telegram 
by US Secretary of State, George Schultz, to the US Agency for International 
Development. The 1985 document states:
Policy dialogue should be used to encourage LDCs to follow free 
market principles and to move away from government intervention 
in the economy. This allows the market to determine how economic 
resources are most productively allocated and how benefits should 
be distributed...To the maximum extent practical governments 
should rely on the market mechanism - on private enterprise and 
market forces - as the principal determinants of economic 
decisions.43
The rise of conservative governments in the United States and Europe 
greatly affected policy discourse. Policy changes included the reversed of 
Keynesian practices and the shift toward neoliberalism. The United States, in 
particular, played a crucial role in championing the new policy shift. In its 
capacity as a hegemonic power, the United States influenced policy dialogue with 
the developing countries. This dialogue emphasized the importance of a certain 
ideological position and a particular policy path for developing countries to pursue.
41 Cited in George Schultz, ‘Our Joint Stake in the World Economy’, Department o f State 
Bulletin, July 1983, p. 59.
42‘The President’s Trade Policy Action Plan’, State Department Bulletin, November 1985, pp.
1-3.
43Cited in Simon Commander and Tony Killick, ‘Privatisation in Developing Countries: A 
Survey of the Issues’, in P. Cook and C. Kirkpatrick (eds), Privatisation in Less Developed 
Countries (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1988), p. 95.
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5.3.2 The Academic Community
By the 1970s, structuralism was subject to much criticism focused primarily on the 
school’s de-emphasis on the importance of relative prices as a means of affecting 
both distributive and productive outcomes and the role visualized for the state.44 
The retreat of structuralism was reinforced by the growing evidence (and 
misinterpretation)45 of the East Asian successes in the 1960s and 1970s. The 
lessons gleaned from the contrasting experiences of the export-oriented newly 
industrializing countries (NICs) of East Asia and their heavily indebted and 
economically-troubled Latin American counterparts were not lost. Economists and 
development specialists renewed their interest in neoclassical ideas. The failure of 
the ISI policies renewed interest in trade regimes and the significance of trade 
liberalization in spurring growth.
This counter-revolution was led by Bela Balassa, Peter Bauer, Anne O. 
Krueger, Deepak Lai and Ian Little, among others.46 Although there exists sharp 
differences in their respective economic philosophies, they are united in their 
opposition to Keynesianism and structuralist theories of development and the use 
of economic planning for development purposes.47 They subscribe to the view
^See C. Colclough, op. cit., in footnote 29, pp. 3-5.
45The East Asian NICs did not, in fact, pursue free-market policies. Although their individual 
experiences differed substantially, many relied on interventionist policies (e.g., Singapore, Japan 
and South Korea). Already in the early 1980s there was some question about the applicability of the 
East Asian experience to other developing countries, see W. Cline, ‘Can The East Asian Model of 
Development Be Generalised?’, World Development (Vol. 10, No. 2, 1982). A recent publication 
examines in detail the East Asian experience and concludes that there does not exist one Asian 
model that can be replicated as a general format for developing countries to follow. See World 
Bank, The East Asian Miracle (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1993).
^See Bela Balassa, and associates, The Structure of Protection in Developing Countries 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press for the IBRD and IDB, 1971); Peter Bauer, 
Equality, The Third World, and Economic Delusion (London: Weindenfeld and Nicolson, 1981); 
Anne O. Krueger, Liberalization Attempts and Consequences (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger for the 
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1978); Deepak Lai, The Poverty of Development 
Economics (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1983); and Ian Little, Economic Development:
Theory, Policy and International Relations (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1982).
47J. Toye, op. cit., in footnote 37, p. vii.
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that the dilemmas of economic development can only be unravelled by freely 
operating markets and a minimalist government involvement in the economic 
system.
In the 1970s and early 1980s, a series of publications appeared that were 
highly critical of the dominant development paradigm. The first publication to 
introduce the new liberalism as a solution to the economic problems was in 1970 
by Little, Scitovsky and Scott.48 This work was highly critical of the ISI policies 
and advocated instead, export-oriented industrialization. The National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER) in the United States did studies on the advantages of 
liberal exchange regimes in the late 1970s.49 The distorting effects of government 
policy intervention were addressed in the World Bank’s ‘Berg Report’.50 
Biersteker attributes the diffusion of these ideas to a ‘trickle-up’ process whereby 
ideas gain acceptance among academics who then press their policy preferences on 
political leadership.51 This intellectual change in the development field was 
circulated to academics in the developing world through numerous linkages.
Transnational linkages facilitated the dissemination of the intellectual 
community’s neoliberal ideas. Such links include: colleges and universities; 
publishing houses and the press; research institutes and foundations. The 
widespread dissemination of neoliberal ideas has been facilitated by the relatively 
standardized textbooks, especially in economics; the growth and homogenizing 
tendencies in advanced graduate training; the worldwide readership of leading
^I. M. D. Little, T. Scitovsky and M. Scott, Industry and Trade in Some Developing Countries 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970).
49A. Krueger, op. cit., in footnote 46 and Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Anatomy and Consequences of 
Exchange Control Regimes (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1978).
50World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action, Report
No. 3358, The Berg Report (Washington, DC: IBRD, 1981).
5lT. Biersteker, op. cit., in footnote 1, p. 120.
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professional journals; and most importantly, the vastly expanded global mobility of 
students and professors.52
The increase in foreign graduate training, especially in economics, among 
developing country policymakers has been a particularly successful transnational 
linkage.53 The foreign educational experience has acquainted the domestic 
policymaker not only with an international lifestyle and culture, but with specific 
knowledge provided within the paradigms acceptable in the industrial countries. 
This foreign-acquired knowledge, coupled with domestic socialization experiences, 
unites a group into an epistemic community. The community share not only a set 
of causal approaches and a consensual knowledge, but more importantly, they 
share normative commitments.54 Each sub-group of economists, such as 
Keynesians, structuralists and monetarists, constitutes an epistemic community. 
Each systematically contributes to a concrete set of projects informed by its 
preferred views, beliefs and ideas.
According to the epistemic communities approach, there are three major 
dynamics for epistemic co-ordination: uncertainty, interpretation and 
institutionalization. The complex and technical nature of the wide range of issues 
confronting domestic policymakers causes a certain amount of uncertainty with 
regards to policy formulation, especially in times of crisis. With the increasing 
economic interdependence of nation-states and the globalization of the economy,
52A. W. Coats, ‘Economic Ideas and Economists in Government: Accomplishments and 
Frustrations’, in D. Colander and A. W. Coats, op. cit., in footnote 13, p. 113.
53Influence of foreign ideas on domestic policymaking was apparent in Mexico in the 1930s. 
Eduardo Suarez, Cardenas’s (1934-1940) Secretary of the Treasury, was strongly influenced by the 
ideas of Keynes. J. M. Keynes, at the height of his renunciation against neoclassical trade theory, 
maintained that ‘national self-sufficiency’ was much preferable to the subjection of a nation to the 
arbitrary swings of an international economy. See John M. Cypher, State and Capital in Mexico: 
Development Policy Since 1940 (Oxford: Westview Press, 1990), p. 15. The most extreme case is 
the Chicago Boys and their influence in Chile. The Pinochet economists trained at the University of 
Chicago on an exchange programme with the Catholic University in Santiago. See Arturo Fontaine, 
Los economistas y el presidente Pinochet (Santiago: Zig-Zag, 1988).
54Peter M. Haas, ‘Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination’, 
International Organization (Vol. 46, No.l, Winter 1992).
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the domestic and international agendas have become increasingly linked. 
Understanding these complex linkages is vital for domestic policy formulation. In 
times of uncertainty, policy elites may not be sure what strategies will most likely 
keep them in power. Also, poorly understood conditions create enough disorder 
that standard operating procedures may break down, making institutions 
unworkable. Assuming that ‘specialist’ are better at uncertainty than politicians, 
the epistemic community approach asserts that when confronting conditions of 
uncertainty, policymakers have reasons to look to specialists for help. In the case 
of Mexico, the turbulent times favoured the ‘specialist policymaker’.
Because of the epistemic communities’ acknowledged expertise, they are 
accorded access to the political system by policy elites who legitimize their 
activities. Whether the ideas of these communities influence policy choice depends 
upon the group’s access to the decision making process. One way this is done is 
through the political infiltration of an epistemic community into governing 
institutions. This access enables the community to lay the groundwork for a 
broader acceptance of their ideas and beliefs. Once part of the bureaucracy, the 
community may vie for key positions, thus increasing their influence over policy 
decisions.
Although there have been foreign educated policymakers in positions of 
power in developing countries throughout the post-Second World War era, these 
technocrats increased dramatically in number with the financial crisis of the early 
1980s. The uncertainty of the times led to the ascendance of the epistemic 
community and their interpretation of the crisis. Drawing from their ideas on 
economic policy reform, the community recommended neoliberal policies. 
Throughout the Latin American region, foreign educated technocrats have assumed 
positions of power (some have even been elected president) and implemented 
policies based on the ideas of neoliberalism. The transnational epistemic 
community, advocating the shift toward free-market policies, has been effective in
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building a ‘winning coalition’ of support behind its preferred policy choice.55 
This choice has included selling off state enterprises, deregulating financial 
markets and liberalizing trade barriers. In addition, many of these policymakers 
maintain their connections with colleagues and professors from their foreign 
educational experiences.56
In the case of Mexico, these transnational linkages have been especially 
strong. Not only has the Mexican ruling elite become more technocratic in the 
post-Second World War era, but also there has been a homogenization of 
background and training of the policymaker since the 1980s. Table 5.1 outlines the 
Mexican economic cabinet members and the place of their foreign education.
These epistemic communities transmitted ideas from the international arena to their 
domestic policymaking agendas through their positions in government. The first 
epistemic community in this study, the Cambridge Group,57 influenced policy for 
a short time period. The second community, the Internationalists, were far more 
successful in implementing their policy preferences.
The Cambridge group gained influence in Mexican policymaking circles 
during the administration of President Echeverrfa (1970 to 1976) and reached their 
peak of influence towards the end of the Lopez Portillo administration (1976 to 
1982). Two individuals especially associated with this group were the Cambridge 
trained economists Jose Andres de Oteyza, Minister of Energy, Mines and 
Parastatal Industry (SEMIP), and Carlos Tello, first Minister of Programming and 
Budget (SPP) and then Director of the central bank. The two studied for Master’s 
degrees in Economics at Kings College, Cambridge under the ‘statist’ economists, 
Joan Robinson and Anjit Singh. When the economic crisis began to worsen in
55See James Sebenius, ‘Bargainers with Shared Beliefs’, International Organization (Vol. 46, 
No. 1, Winter 1992).
56In Mexico, there have been cases during the administration of Carlos Salinas (1988 to 1994) 
where the Finance Minister, Pedro Aspe (a PhD from MIT) has called in the help of former 
professors (e.g., Rudiger Dombusch) for advice on policy questions.
57They argued that growth and income redistribution were compatible. These policies might be 
defined as ‘hyper-Keynesianism’.
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Table 5.1
Epistemic Communities: The Economic Cabinets of the 
Lopez Portillo and de la Madrid Administrations
Epistemic Community Name/Position Postgraduate Degree
The Ldoez Portillo Administration
Cambridge Group Carlos Tello
Secretary of SPP (1977) & 
Director General of 
the Bank of Mexico (1982)
MA Econ., Kings College, 
Cambridge, 1961-63
Cambridge Group Josd Andrds de Oteyza 
Secretary of Patrimony 
& SEMIP (1976-82)
MA Econ., Kings College, 
Cambridge, 1966-68
The de la Madrid Administration
Internationalist Miguel de la Madrid 
President of Mexico 
(1982-88)
MA Public Administration, 
Harvard, 1964-65
Internationalist Jesus Silva Herzog 
Secretary of SHCP 
(1982-86)
MS Econ., Yale, 
1960-62
Internationalist Carlos Salinas 
Secretary of SPP 
(1982-88)
MA Public Administration, 
1973; MS Political Economy, 
1976; PhD Political Economy 
& Government, 1978, all at 
Harvard
Internationalist Miguel Mancera 
Director General of 
the Bank of Mexico 
(1982-88)
MS Econ., Yale, 1959-60
Sources: Roderic A. Camp, Who’s Who In Mexico Today Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988 and 
Presidencia de la Republica, Diccionario Biografico del Gobierno Mexicano Mexico, D.F.: Unidad de 
la Cronica Presidential, 1989.
SEMIP - Secretariat of Energy, Mines and Parastatal Industry
SHCP - Secretariat of the Treasury
SPP - Secretariat of Programming and Budget
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Mexico in the early 1980s, the two policymakers called on their transnational links 
and invited the Cambridge group to Mexico. Led by Dr. Ajit Singh, a group from 
Cambridge moved to Mexico by mid-1982 to advise Carlos Tello.58 This 
Cambridge linkage served to reinforce the already existent statist position 
originating from the structuralist school dominant in the region.
The influence of the Cambridge Group did not last very long. Although 
both de Oteyza and Tello were influential policymakers, they did not represent the 
unified views of the Ldpez Portillo administration. Within the economic cabinet, a 
very different epistemic community - the Internationalists - struggled to put forth 
their policy preferences.59 In addition, the policy choices of the Cambridge group 
went against international currents that pressed for a shift towards neoliberalism. 
When the administration changed in 1982, a new epistemic community came to 
power.
As Table 5.1 shows, the Internationalists were a far more numerous and 
homogenous group. The linkage with foreign educational establishments was more 
diverse and the direct influence far more subtle. Not only were many of the 
cabinet officials members of this epistemic community, but also the president 
himself was very much a supporter of the Internationalist position. De la Madrid 
virtually eliminated structuralists and neo-Keynesian economists from top levels of 
the government. The president, who received a Master’s in Public Administration 
at Harvard, chose technocrats like himself who subscribed to the same ideas and 
values. He filled the three main command centres of the economic bureaucracy 
with powerful figures with strong commitments to liberal economic policies. The 
Treasury went to Jesus Silva Herzog, a Yale Master’s graduate in economics, who 
had initially been appointed in the last months of the Lopez Portillo administration. 
Miguel Mancera, another prominent orthodox economist educated at Yale, was
58Alan Robinson, ‘Portillo Pockets the Banks’, Euromoney (October 1982), p. 41.
59This is examined in more detail in Chapter 6.
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Table 5.2
The Internationalist Epistemic Community:
Linkage between Government, Academics and Foreign Education
Name/Position Postgraduate Degree Academic Position
Miguel de la Madrid 
President of Mexico 
(1982-88)
MA Public Administration, 
Harvard, 1964-65
Professor of Constitutional 
Law, UNAM, 1965 - 1968
Jesiis Silva Herzog 
Secretary of SHCP 
(1982-86)
MS Econ., Yale, 
1960-62
Professor of Theory and 
Monetary Fiscal Policy at 
Coldgio de Mdxico; 
Professor of International 
Economic Cooperation at 
UNAM
Carlos Salinas 
Secretary of SPP 
(1982-88)
MA Public Administration, 
1973; MS Political Economy, 
1976; PhD Political Economy 
& Government, 1978, all at 
Harvard
Professor Public Finance, 
ITAM, 1976
Miguel Mancera 
Director General of 
the Bank of Mexico 
(1982-88)
MS Econ., Yale, 1959-60 Professor Political Economy, 
Free Law School, 1957; 
Professor of International 
Trade, ITAM, 1958-64
Pedro Aspe Armella 
Undersecretary of SPP 
(1985-1987)
Secretary of SHCP 
(1988-94)
Ph.D. in Economics at 
MIT, 1978
Director of the Msc 
Economics, ITAM, 
1978-82
Jaime Serra Puche 
Adviser and Under­
secretary of SHCP 
(1979-1986) 
Secretary of SECOFI 
(1988-1994)
Doctorate in Economics 
at Yale (1975-79)
Professor El Colegio
Sources: Roderic A. Camp, Who's Who In Mexico Today Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988 and 
Presidencia de la Republica, Diccionario Biografico del Gobiemo Mexicano Mexico, D.F.: Unidad de 
la Cronica Presidential, 1989.
IT AM - Autonomous Technological Institute of Mexico
SECOFI - Secretariat of Trade
SHCP - Secretariat of the Treasury
SPP - Secretariat of Programming and Budget
UNAM - National Autonomous University of Mexico
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reappointed as head of the Central Bank. Finally, Carlos Salinas, who received a 
Master’s and PhD from Harvard, was appointed head of the SPP. De la Madrid’s 
original cabinet included seventeen members with graduate degrees, 12 of them in 
foreign institutions.60
The internationalist-oriented epistemic community in Mexico has sought to 
strengthen its future influence over the policymaking process in Mexico. Table 5.2 
shows the top Mexican policymakers and their links with the academic community 
in Mexico. All of the top economic cabinet members, including President de la 
Madrid, have held professorships at the leading universities. This has meant that 
the policymakers have had access to the best and brightest students whom they 
have then recruited into government service. For example, Pedro Aspe 
(undersecretary at SPP during the de la Madrid administration and Minister of 
Fiance from 1988-1994) in his capacity as Professor at the private university, the 
Autonomous Technological Institute of Mexico (ITAM), brings his best students to 
work at the various government ministries.61 He then obtains government 
scholarships to send some of them to Master’s and PhD programmes in the United 
States. Upon completion of their degrees, these new members of the transnational 
internationalist epistemic community then return to Mexico to take up mid-level 
positions in the government bureaucracy. In 1992, 42 government scholarship 
students returned from the United States with PhDs from leading universities, such 
as Chicago, MIT, Harvard and Stanford to take up government posts.62
In addition to hegemonic states and the academic community, international 
organizations have acted as transmission mechanisms through which ideas are 
carried. The following examines the role of the international development 
institutions and policy-based lending.
“C.H. Oppenheim, ‘Six Years of Change’, Mexico Journal (5 December 1988), p. 13.
61 Confidential Interview 1, The Ministry of Trade, Mexico City, July 1992. The interviewee and 
fellow ITAM economics students worked at the Ministries of Trade and Finance.
62See ‘Latin America: The Big Move to Free Markets’, Business Week (15 June 1992), pp. 50-5.
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5.3.3 International Organizations
International organizations act as mechanisms through which international norms, 
rules and behaviour are expressed. The post-Second World War international 
economic order was set forth in the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1944. The 
Bretton Woods system established the rules for commercial and financial relations 
and provided for a system of fixed exchange rates. This new economic order was 
to be administered by two international organizations, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. These institutions are involved in the channelling 
of neoliberal ideas from the international to the domestic arena.63
The economic crisis of the early 1980s increased the influence of these 
organizations in the economically vulnerable developing countries. With the 
market-oriented perspective gaining the hegemonic position in the industrialized 
world and within the major international institutions, the developing nations 
became more susceptible to the resurgence of neoliberalism. An examination of the 
international organizations’ policies in the post-Second World War era, and 
especially in the 1980s, better explains their influence as neoliberal transmission 
mechanisms.
The International Monetary Fund
Since its creation, the IMF has played the role of Tender of last resort’, 
providing short-term finance to countries with balance of payments problems. 
Central to the Fund’s perception on how to establish balance of payments 
equilibrium and stabilize price levels was the reduction in fiscal deficit, controls 
on domestic credit expansion and credit extended to the public sector and 
establishment of realistic exchange rates. Contrary to many of the criticisms of the 
Fund, the institution’s analysis was not based on theories derived from the 
industrialized world and applied indiscriminately to developing countries. Much of 
the key research at the IMF was based on detailed studies of developing country
63The Inter-American Development Bank, established in 1958, is also an international institution 
that is influential in Latin America.
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experience after 1945, especially the stabilization programmes in Latin 
America.64 Particularly important was the Fund’s work with Latin American 
central banks. A major building block of the Fund’s theory was based on Mexico’s 
devaluations of the late 1940s and early 1950s.65
The IMF assistance comes primarily in the form of Stand-by Arrangements 
with the developing world as the main user of these funds. From 1976 to 1981,
108 of 114 Stand-bys were with developing countries.66 In exchange for short­
term loans, specific terms of agreement are attached to the funds. Performance 
criteria are written into letters of intent and finance could be discontinued if agreed 
upon targets are not met. IMF conditionality calls for policy changes in exchange 
for external financing. The orthodox policies supported by the IMF stress the 
imposition of a short-term strategy of demand management. Domestic 
mismanagement is seen as the primary cause of payments difficulties. Serious 
payments problems are believed to be caused by an excess of aggregate domestic 
demand resulting from overly large increases in the supply of money and credit.
From the 1970s, the IMF was subject to increased criticism from the 
dependency and structuralist schools. They accused the Fund of sponsoring 
recessionary programmes that punished developing countries for trade problems 
that were endemic to the development process and the result of external and 
uncontrollable factors.67 The influence of the IMF on economic policies in Latin 
America was increasingly limited. The percentage of countries in the region
^See M. Garritsen de Vries, op. cit., in footnote 3, pp. 9-30; and M. Khan, P. Montiel and N. 
Haque, Adjustment with Growth: Relating the Analytical Approaches o f the World Bank and the IMF 
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 1986), pp. 7-21.
'“Miles Kahler, ‘Orthodoxy and Its Alternatives: Explaining Approaches to Stabilization and 
Adjustment’, in Joan M. Nelson (ed.), Economic Crisis and Policy Change: The Politics of Adjustment 
in the Third World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 37.
'“Mary Sutton, ‘Introduction and Summary’, in T. Killick (ed.), The IMF and Stabilisation: 
Developing Country Experiences (London: Overseas Development Institute, 1984), p. 3.
67For example, see Cheryl Payer, The Debt Trap: The IMF and the Third World (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1974).
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functioning under the Fund’s programmes fell from approximately two-thirds 
between 1966-1970 to one-third by 1979-1981.68 IMF officials were actually 
complaining that Fund resources were ‘underutilized’.69 The IMF was responsive, 
to a certain degree, to these criticisms; in 1974, it created the Extended Fund 
Facility (EFF). It was the first time the Fund mentioned developing countries 
specifically. The EFF was regarded as a concession to developing countries, 
offering longer terms of adjustment (three years instead of one) for programmes 
which attacked structural defects.70 With the concessions, however, came an 
infusion of the neoliberal orthodoxy, greatly influenced by the change in the 
intellectual community.71 These policies emphasized trade liberalization and 
public sector prices and subsidies. By 1980, over half the Fund-supported 
programmes included public enterprise rationalization and 38 per cent included 
trade liberalization.72
With the debt crisis in 1982, the decline in Fund influence was reversed. 
The Latin American countries were actively seeking short-term help and the IMF’s 
assistance in renegotiating long-term loans. By 1983, three-fourths of the Latin 
American countries were functioning under either a Stand-by Arrangement or the 
EFF.73 As the 1980s progressed, the remaining quarter also fell under IMF 
policy supervision. IMF conditionality was relatively low until the economic crisis 
of the 1980s, at which time the programmes acquired a high degree of 
conditionality. In Mexico, for example, the first few years of the debt crisis were
“Manuel Pastor, Jr., ‘Latin America, the Debt Crisis, and the IMF’, Latin American Perspectives 
(Vol. 16, No.l, 1989), p. 88.
69Ibid, p. 86.
^M. Garritsen de Vries, op. cit. , in footnote 3, p. 135.
71M. Kahler, op. cit., in footnote65, p. 42.
^Morris Goldstein, The Global Effects of Fund-Supported Adjustment Programs (Washington, DC:
IMF, 1986), Table 5, p. 9.
73M. Pastor, Jr. op. cit., in footnote 68, p. 90.
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spent trying to deal with the more immediate crisis management through demand 
restraint measures. In the IMF’s third letter of intent in March 1985, the 
institution’s policy proposals took on a new dimension. The IMF disbursed funds 
in exchange for long-term structural adjustments, including export promotion and 
trade liberalization.74 The significance of the explicit change in IMF policy 
prescriptions was to have a considerable effect on the developing world. As early 
as March 1984, the IMF advised that the inward-looking policy had to be 
abandoned; the institution stressed the developing countries’ need to export their 
way out of debt.75 The World Bank, like the IMF, was influenced by the 
resurgence of neoliberalism in the 1970s. The following outlines the evolution of 
the Bank’s lending policies and the significant changes from the late 1970s 
onwards.
The World Bank
The World Bank was set up at the Bretton Woods conference to make long­
term loans at commerical rates to finance infrastructure development projects in 
economically disadvantaged countries. From the end of the Second World War to 
the 1980s, the Bank endorsed long-term, project-based loans. The 1970s was a 
time of expansion for the Bank. In addition to its traditional infrastructure projects, 
the Bank began to focus on the issues of poverty and made loans for basic human 
needs projects.76 From the late 1970s, however, the Bank began to move its 
focus away from project-specific policies to the entire macroeconomic, trade and 
industrial policies of developing countries. The Bank launched structural 
adjustment lending which was a form of medium-term balance of payments
74It was demonstrated in the previous two chapters that Mexico had already committed itself to 
trade liberalization and export promotion by March 1985. The influence of the IMF in the case of 
Mexico was to reinforce, but not cause the shift in policy.
75IMF, ‘Stability and Sustainable Growth Need Coordinated Worldwide Effort and a Liberal 
Trading Environment’, IMF Survey (26 March 1984), p. 82.
76See Paul Streeten, ‘From Growth to Basic Needs’, Finance and Development (Vol. 16, No. 3, 
September 1979), pp. 28-31.
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support. These policy-based, structural adjustment loans attacked the state’s role in 
the economy and generally advocated an open international trade regime. Policy- 
based lending rose from around 6 per cent to 20 per cent of the Bank’s 
disbursements between 1979 and 1986.77 In the 1980s there occurred a merging 
of policies between the World Bank and the IMF. The Bank and the Fund both 
introduced ‘cross-conditionality’ to its lending practices. These institutions would 
only continue lending if the conditions under which the others’ funds were lent 
were fulfilled.
The fundamental economic principals on which the Bank’s policies were 
based began to change in the 1980s. One reason could be the change in the Bank’s 
presidency in 1981. A. W. Clausen, who succeeded Robert McNamara as the 
President of the international financial institution, was President-elect Reagan’s 
choice. Clausen focused on the private sector and conditionality of loans. He 
reiterated the importance of the private sector in development and the ways in 
which the developing world could better utilize this sector and emphasized 
‘macroconditionality’ - packages of projects that would be tied to the developing 
countries’ policies.78 In the annual World Bank Development Report the shift in 
policy orientation became more apparent. Whereas in 1983 the Bank was calling 
for a balance between the state and private sector, in 1987 there were declarations 
for an outward-oriented trade policy with substantial liberalization for developing 
countries.79 By 1991, the Bank was blatantly saying, ‘Let markets work’, adopt a 
‘market-friendly approach’ to development and privatize state-owned 
enterprises.80
Even though the World Bank did not pressure the Mexican state to the 
same extent as the IMF, its academic studies of the East Asian development
77S. Commander and T. Killick, op. cit., in footnote 43, p. 129.
^See Robert Ayres, Banking on the Poor (London: MIT Press, 1983), p. 237.
79World Bank, World Development Report (Washington, DC: 1983 and 1987).
80World Bank, op. cit., in footnote 23, pp. 5-6 and 9.
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experience were nevertheless widely used by policymakers to justify the 
acceleration of economic liberalization. The Mexican policymakers in the 1980s 
were greatly influenced by the Bank’s greater emphasis on laissez-faire economic 
policies.81 In addition to the Bank’s ‘Berg Report’ criticising the strong state role 
in the economy, a World Bank study on the East Asian NICs highlighted the 
advantages of a free trade regime.82
Policy-based lending has been the main vehicle by which both the IMF and 
the World Bank have attempted to put forth their ideas for policy reform. Whether 
or not the IMF stabilization programmes or World Bank structural adjustment 
loans in the developing countries met their respective targets or even out-right 
failed, the fact that they were applied is important. The introduction of neoliberal 
policies by the international organizations brought about a different approach to 
policymaking in the developing world: a shift from an interventionist to a reliance 
on the free-market approach.
5.3.4 The Hegemony o f Ideas
According to Cox’s interpretation of Gramscian hegemony, the reasons for the 
dissemination of ideas is due to four features of international organizations: 1) they 
embody the rules which facilitate the expansion of hegemonic world orders; 2) 
they are themselves the product of the hegemonic world order; 3) they 
ideologically legitimate the norms of the world order; and 4) they co-opt the elites 
from peripheral countries.83 The rules are first initiated by the dominant or
81Hobbs found that at the BANCOMEXT/CEMAI conference both officials from the foreign Trade 
Institute and BANCOMEXT (Foreign Trade bank) were greatly influenced by the Bank-sponsored 
study by Yung Whee Rhee, A Framework for Export Policy and Administration: Lessons from the East 
Asian Experiences. Jeremy Hobbs, The Role of Business Organisations in the Transition from an Import 
Substituting to an Export-oriented Model o f Growth in Mexico After 1982, PhD thesis (Colchester: 
University of Essex, 1991), p. 345.
82Yung Whee Rhee, A Framework for Export Policy and Administration: Lessons from the East 
Asian Experiences (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1984).
“Robert W. Cox, ‘Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method’, 
Millennium: Journal o f International Studies (Vol. 12, No. 2, Summer 1983), p. 172.
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‘hegemonic’ state(s) that maintain the power to secure the compliance of other 
states according to a hierarchy of powers within the international economy. In the 
case of the spread of neoliberalism in the 1980s, the conservative governments in 
Europe and the United States are the dominant, hegemonic states. These countries 
implemented particular neoliberal policies in their respective countries and by 
endorsing their policy preferences and prescriptions at the international level, 
greatly influenced the policy programmes of the international organizations. The 
policy goals are assigned to these organizations by their most powerful members.
These institutions in turn, perform the ideological role of defining policy 
guidelines and legitimate institutions and practices at the national level. This is 
most apparent with conditionality of the loans from the IMF and World Bank - the 
conditionality is an exchange of policy changes for external financing.84 In 
addition to ideas being diffused through policy-based lending, another feature 
concerns elite actors from the developing countries and their co-optation in the 
international organizations through a process of transformiso.85 The IMF in the 
early 1960s, for example, established an IMF institute to help train officials from 
the developing countries in order to help these members ‘develop better techniques 
for managing their domestic economies...’.86
In her research on economic crisis and policy change, Nelson found that
By the 1980s, in almost all developing countries some senior 
economic officials (and/or influential private economists) had spent 
some time as staff members of the IMF, the World Bank, or 
regional international development banks... Often, alumni of the 
international financial institutions played key roles in the dual 
political game of adjustment. They interpreted external pressures 
and attempted to persuade their colleagues in domestic decision-
MFor more information on conditionality, see Andrew Crockett, ‘Issues in the Use of Fund 
Resources’, Finance and Development (June 1982), pp. 10-15 and Manuel Guiti£n, Fund 
Conditionality: Evolution of Principles and Practices, Pamphlet No. 38 (Washington, DC: IMF, 1981).
85R. Cox, op. cit., in footnote 83, p. 173.
86M. Garritsen de Vries, op. cit., in footnote 3, p. 102.
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making circles, and they interpreted internal constraints and 
attempted to persuade their former associates in dialogue with 
external agencies.87
The individuals who come to the international organization with the intention of 
working within the system to change it are ‘condemned to work within the 
structures of passive revolution’.88 The result is that these elite actors return to 
their countries and help transfer elements of ‘modernization’.
In Mexico, a growing number of the elite actors have served as staff 
members of the IMF, the World bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. 
It could be argued that these elite actors have a broader understanding of, if not 
sympathy for, orthodox policy prescriptions, as well as some comparative 
knowledge of the adjustment experiences of other countries. These officials were 
frequently thrust into positions of substantial authority in Mexico, often acting as 
the go-between in negotiations with the international financial institutions.
Linkages between the international institutions and Mexican policymakers 
was evident throughout the post-Second World War era. From 1958 to 1970, two 
men dominated the policymaking process: Rodrigo Gomez and Antonio Ortiz 
Mena.89 The first, Rodrigo Gomez, held the position of Executive Director of the 
IMF for Mexico and Central America, from 1946 to 1948. He was also prominent 
in the Mexican movement to join the Latin American Free Trade Area in 1960. In 
Mexico, Gomez held the position of Director General of Bank of Mexico for 
eighteen years, from 1952 to 1970. The second man, Antonio Ortiz Mena, held 
the post of Governor of the IMF from 1959 to 1970 while concurrently holding 
the Secretary of the Treasury from 1958 to 1970. In 1971, Ortiz Mena became 
President of the IDB and held the post until 1988.
87Joan Nelson, ‘Conclusions’, in J. Nelson (ed.), Economic Crisis and Policy Change: The Politics 
of Adjustment in the Third World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 330-1.
88R. Cox, op. cit., in footnote 83, p. 173.
89The background of these men is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.
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More recent linkages include Silva Herzog, the Finance Minister at the end 
of the L<5pez Portillo Administration and for the first 4 years of the de la Madrid 
administration, was the crucial link between Mexico and the IMF in the 1982 debt 
negotiations. Silva Herzog had worked as an economist for the Inter-American 
Development Bank from 1962 to 1963. In addition, Francisco Sudrez Ddvila, 
subsecretary at the Treasury from 1982 to 1988, was executive director for 
Mexico at the IMF from 1974 to 1976. Francisco Alejo L6pez, a director general 
at the Treasury from 1982 to 1984, was vice president of Promotion and 
Development at the International Finance Corporation at the World Bank from 
1985 to 1987. Julio Genel Garcia,90 also a director general at the Treasury from 
1982 to 1986, was a finance and economics advisor to the Organization of 
American States in Washington, DC from 1972 to 1976. Alfredo Phillips Olmedo, 
director general off the Foreign Trade Bank from 1982 to 1988, was executive 
director of the IMF from 1968 to 1970 and a member of various comittees of the 
IMF and the World Bank from 1968 to 1982.91
In negotiating and implementing adjustment programmes, the key to 
success lies with these transnational epistemic communities. Because of these 
academic and institutional links, there is an international network of officials 
sharing a common body of economic knowledge and broadly similar economic 
policy prescriptions. These links are helping to shape future intergovernmental and 
transnational co-operation on world trade, monetary, investment and economic 
development affairs.
90Mr. Genel Garcia received his master’s and doctorate in Economics from the University of 
Chicago.
91Presidencia de la Republica, Diccionario Biogrdfico del Gobierno Mexicano, Unidad de la 
Cronica Presidencial (Mexico, DF: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1989).
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Conclusions
This chapter examined four explanations for the global resurgence of 
neoliberalism. It argued that although systemic crises provided insights into the 
external stimuli facing developing countries as a whole and why there was a need 
for some kind of policy response, they did not adequately explain the precise 
content and direction of domestic economic policy. In addition, the influence of 
international institutions was not as obvious as many believe. Rather, the leverage 
exerted on developing countries was far more subtle than pure power relations 
would suggest. The interests argument also cannot explain the concurrent move 
globally toward economic liberalization. Rather than responding to powerful 
interest groups in domestic society, it was in spite o f such interests that neoliberal 
policies were applied. It was asserted that there exists strong links between the 
dissemination, influence and carriers of certain economic ideas and policy 
outcome.
The second part analyzed international regimes and transnational policy co­
ordination. This section tracked the ideas on which the post-Second World War 
international economic order was based. It concentrated on the dominant paradigm 
in the developed world - Keynesianism - and the philosophy in Latin America 
derived from Keynesianism - structuralism. It was argued that by the mid- to late 
1970s, international economic troubles exposed an ideological vacuum. This led to 
the search for new ideas to solve domestic economic problems. This search 
provided the opportunity for the resurgence of neoliberalism first in the developed, 
and then in the developing world. The reasons for the shift were the ascendance of 
conservative governments in the United States and Europe and the long-term 
intellectual change within the economics profession and the development field.
The third section identified the transmission mechanisms through which 
these new ideas were carried - hegemonic states, the academic community and 
international organizations. It also discussed the carriers of the ideas - the 
epistemic community. It was argued that the United States, in particular, played a 
crucial role in championing the new policy shift. In its capacity as a hegemonic
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power, the United States influenced policy dialogue with the developing countries. 
A second transmission mechanism was the academic community. This community 
gleaned lessons from the contrasting experiences of the export-oriented NICs of 
East Asia and their heavily indebted and economically-troubled Latin American 
counterparts. This led to the renewal of interest in neoclassical ideas, especially 
about trade. The final transmission mechanism, international organizations, was 
shown to channel neoliberal ideas from the international to the domestic arena 
through policy-based lending. Although these organizations did not force the 
countries to implement policies, they nevertheless introduced market-oriented 
ideas. The ideas conveyed through these international transmission mechanisms 
were carried from the international to the domestic via the epistemic community. 
Examples of such communities were given in the case of Mexico.
The chapter has highlighted an important synergy of events that greatly 
helps to explain the reasons for trade liberalization in Mexico in the early 1980s. 
First, the timing of Mexico’s decision to liberalize was very important. It was 
made when the country and the international community was experiencing an 
ideological vacuum. The Keynesian policies in the north and the nationalist 
development strategy in Mexico had failed and an alternative path was sought. 
Second, the policies chosen, based on the doctrine of economic liberalization, were 
similar to those that had been replaced in the 1930s by the Keynesian policies. 
Hence, there was an element of a shift from one policy extreme to another in 
times of crisis. Finally, there was a synergy of man and hour in Mexico. At this 
critical junction in post-Second World War Mexican history, a group of 
policymakers predisposed toward neoliberalism came to power in Mexico. The 
coinciding of the three factors above is important for this analysis.
The chapter has argued that the resurgence of neoliberalism set the outer 
margins for domestic policy choice and proved to be a legitimizing factor in 
Mexico’s decision to open up its economy. But the globalization of economic 
liberalization only partly explains Mexican economic policymaking. It shows 
external influences, but does not explain the domestic political process. In order to
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be disseminated, ideas must have domestic viability. Hall found three necessary 
variables in his study of the spread of Keynesian ideas.92 They are economic, 
administrative and political viability. First ideas must have economic viability. 
They must be able to solve the current economic problems facing policymakers. 
The neoliberal economic ideas seem to provide the solutions to the economic 
problems facing Mexico in the 1980s. As Chapters 2 and 3 have clearly pointed 
out, the exhausted ISI strategy and the expanding public sector deficit in the 1970s 
were dealt with by a dosage of neoliberal austerity measures. The domestic 
economic decisions taken by the de la Madrid government were reinforced by the 
acceptance of the new economic doctrine within the international community.
Second, ideas must have administrative viability. Ideas must be able to 
correspond with existing administrative institutions and must be feasible to 
implement. Administrative viability is more likely if the new ideas accord with 
long-standing administrative biases of the officials responsible for approving the 
new policies and if they seem feasible in light of the existing implementational 
capacities of the state. As the following chapter argues, there had been changes in 
the ideas and perceptions of individuals within the Mexican administrative 
structure. In addition to the change in personnel, the key to viability is the 
economic crisis. As institutions are prone to inertia, change is most likely to occur 
in periods of crisis as state structures become malleable. In the crisis situation, 
opportunities arise for new political coalitions to influence the direction of policy. 
In order for the existing structures to change, however, the people within them 
must have some alternative plan to overcome the problem at hand.
Finally, ideas must have political viability. Ideas are more likely to become 
policy if they also have some appeal in the broader political arena to which the 
politicians who ultimately make policy are oriented. Hall maintains that a new set 
of economic ideas must be seen to have a minimum level of viability on all three 
dimensions in order to be incorporated into policy. In periods of crisis, it seems
^Peter Hall, ‘Conclusion: The Politics of Keynesian Ideas’, in P. Hall, op. tit., in footnote 14, 
pp. 370-5.
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that political considerations may have become more important. Particularly in the 
case of the authoritarian Mexican state, the political viability of economic ideas is 
the most important variable. As Hall argues, ‘if the Keynesian case demonstrates 
that ideas have real power in the political world ... it also confirms that they do 
not acquire force independently of the constellation of institutions and interests 
already present there.,93 The key to the viability of neoliberal ideas and policies 
is the Mexican individual policymakers. As the following chapter argues, it is the 
emergence of the Internationalist epistemic community in the de la Madrid 
government that explains the domestic reasons for Mexican trade policy reform in 
the 1980s.
™Ibid, p. 390.
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Introduction
As the previous three chapters have demonstrated, the international variables - the 
1982 debt crisis, leverage by international actors and the transmission of ideas - 
were catalytic, reinforcing and setting the outer margins for Mexican economic 
policy reforms in the 1980s. These external factors are vital and necessary 
explanations, but they do not give specific insight into the important internal 
political process in Mexico. Hence, this chapter turns the analysis to the two 
domestic determinants for Mexican economic policy change in the 1980s: the 
institutional arrangements of the state - primarily the institution of the presidency - 
and the individual policymakers.
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first part briefly discusses 
the institutional arrangements of the state. It is vital to comprehend these 
arrangements and the capacities of the individual policymakers who occupy 
positions within the state. Economic policy decisions are functions of the domestic 
institutional relationships that have persisted over time and the ability of 
policymakers to realize their objectives in light of domestic constraints. Attention 
to the Mexican institutional arrangements reveal the enormous power and influence 
the executive branch wields, thereby enabling a small group to make relatively 
independent policy decisions.
The second part of the chapter focuses on individual policymakers within 
the powerful executive branch. The section discusses the emergence of the 
Mexican policymaker from the general politico1 to the specialized tecnico2 and 
the reasons for this change - the tecnicos ’ background and education. Beginning 
with the de la Madrid administration and consolidated with President Salinas
1Politico is used to describe the old-style Mexican politician, who emerged after the 1917 
Revolution.
2Tecnico is used here to mean ‘political technocrat’ rather than just technocrat. The political 
technocrat possess both specialized knowledge and political skill.
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(1988 to 1994), there emerges a technocratic administration very different from 
previous Mexican governments. The reason for the emergence of the tecnico is 
important because it answers why Mexican policymakers in the 1980s were able 
and willing to change so fundamentally the post-Second World War development 
strategy. The third section discusses the two factors that contribute to the change 
in the perception, beliefs and values of the domestic decision maker in Mexico: 
domestic socialization and foreign educational experiences.
The final part of the chapter looks at the formation of two epistemic 
communities: the Cambridge and the Internationalist groups. The emphasis is on 
the goal oriented behaviour of these individuals as they respond to internal and 
external constraints in an effort to manipulate policy outcomes in accordance with 
their preferences. The section discusses the struggle between the ‘nationalist- 
populists’ and the ‘liberal-rationalists’ in the Lopez Portillo administration. When 
the debt crisis hit in 1982, two policy positions emerged. First, the Cambridge or 
statist epistemic community advocated a renewed nationalist programme. The 
second group, however, came into office in December of that year and introduced 
their own neoliberal policies. It is argued that neoliberal economic policies had 
political viability with the de la Madrid administration because of the 
transformation the domestic socialization process of the individuals and their links 
to an epistemic community through foreign postgraduate education. The debt crisis 
serves as the catalyst for change while the transnational, neoliberal epistemic 
community provides the external support for the Internationalists to implement 
radical reforms.
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6.1 The Institutional Arrangements of the State
The first domestic factor is the institutional arrangements of the Mexican state. As 
the first chapter outlined, these arrangements are important to explain who makes 
policy and what factors influence decision makers in their choices. It is not the 
purpose of this study to delve into the institutional arrangements of the state as 
there have been many indepth studies of this subject.3 Rather, the purpose here is 
to identify these arrangements as important and vital factors contributing to 
Mexican economic policy change in the 1980s. The particular institutions of 
relevance for this thesis are statism and presidentialism. Statism as an institutional 
feature of the Mexican regime endows the state with considerable powers vis-a-vis 
social classes and interest groups and places the executive branch at the forefront 
of making policy choices.
As the rector of the economy, the Mexican state greatly influences the 
national unity and cohesion of society by the perceived pursuit and achievement of 
economic growth and development. In turn, the Mexican regime derives a large 
degree of legitimacy from this economic advancement. Prior to the mid-1980s, the 
Mexican state owned or controlled the most important industries - including the 
railroad, telegraph, telephone, electric power, steel, aviation, petroleum, natural 
gas and petrochemical industries. By 1982, there were an estimated 1,155 state 
owned entities.4 In addition, the state played a significant role in credit and 
finance through its involvement in over thirty public credit institutions; it set tariff 
rates, granted tariff exemptions and allocated rights to import foreign-made light 
and heavy goods; and the state decided how and where to invest. All these actions 
had a considerable effect on empowering the state and reducing the influence of 
the strongest interest group - the private sector.
3See, for example, John Bailey, Governing Mexico: The Statecraft o f Crisis Management 
(London: Macmillan Press, 1988).
4IMF, ‘Structural Reforms Lay Foundation For Medium-Term Growth in Mexico’, IMF Survey 
(10 July 1989), p. 212.
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The Mexican state has been successful in its pursuit of economic 
development in the post-Second World War era by insulating itself from group 
pressure. Through pacts and coalitions, the state has performed the critical 
function of regulating sociopolitical and economic interactions among the various 
social forces. The state creation of the peasant organization, CNC (National 
Peasant Confederation), the labour organization, CTM (Confederation of Mexican 
Workers) and the business organizations, Concamin (Confederation of Industrial 
Chambers) and Concanaco (Confederation of Chambers of Commerce of Mexico), 
enabled the regime to shape much of the interest-group life in the country. The 
symbolic integration of these organizations into various governmental structures 
and the apparatus of the dominant party, the PRI, secured their co-optation.5
When determining the domestic reasons for Mexican economic policy 
reform in the 1980s, it is important to focus on the institution and/or the 
individuals most responsible for making policy choices. In the Mexican political 
system, policy emanates from the executive branch. The institution of the 
presidency has evolved so that it is key to economic policy formulation and 
implementation.
6.1.1 Presidentialism
Philip describes the Mexican political system as
indeed highly presidential...its dynamic involves an interaction - 
sometimes co-operative, sometimes creatively diverse, sometimes 
destructively confrontational - between state power and various 
forms of societal power... state power is more than anything else, 
the presidential institution.6
Theoretically, the 1917 Constitution provided for legislative and judicial branches 
to provide checks-and-balances powers, but in practice, power has rested with the
5Rose J. Spalding, ‘State Power and its Limits: Corporatism in Mexico’, Comparative Political 
Studies (Vol. 14, No. 2, July 1981), p. 141.
6George Philip, The Presidency in Mexican Politics (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 3-4.
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presidency.7 In the post-Cold War international society, it would be difficult to 
find a political leader with greater personal power than a Mexican president. 
During his one, six-year term, the Mexican president is virtually omnipotent; he 
rules with near total authority. Both Mexican foreign policy and influencing 
economic policy direction are almost totally under the president’s control. With no 
national or institutional check that control decisions, the president has been 
virtually free in the use of government resources. In addition, the Mexican 
president can choose whomever he likes for his cabinet - without meeting 
resistance from other governmental branches. Most significantly, the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party, the PRI, has won every presidential election since the 
revolution.8 The PRI candidate is not selected by the party, but is hand picked by 
the outgoing president. The Mexican president has been generally immune from 
media criticism and opposition within the ruling party. Until recently, the congress 
and the bureaucracy all obeyed him unconditionally. The president makes all laws 
while the congress and the court function as rubber stamps.9
Importantly, it is the institution, however, rather than the man, that 
possesses the power. While in office, the president is all powerful, but when his 
six-year term ends, he relinquishes his personal power to his successor. The 
institution of the presidency is above the political system and its function is to 
incorporate and interpret political forces. As Meyer argues, the presidency is 
viewed as the very incarnate of the national interest and possesses all the best
7See ibid; John Bailey, Governing Mexico: The Statecraft of Crisis Management (London: 
Macmillan Press, 1988); and Jose Reyna and Richard S. Weinert (eds), Authoritarianism in Mexico 
(Philadelphia, PA: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1977).
8The Mexican political system has been undergoing considerable changes in the last twenty 
years. Since 1985 there has been electoral opposition to the long-ruling PRI. Not only has the party 
experienced more forceful opposition parties, but there has been discontent from within the party in 
the late 1980s. A particular faction within the ruling elite broke away and formed a rival force in 
the 1988 presidential elections, led by Cuauhtemoc Cardenas.
9This almost total possession of power by the president is changing in today’s Mexico. When 
examining the de la Madrid administration and the policymaking constraints of the early 1980s, 
however, the traditional view is still appropriate for this analysis.
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qualities of leadership: wisdom, intelligence, honesty, patriotism and magnanimity. 
For these reasons, the president is perceived to be almost infallible.10
The Mexican public sector is part of a clientelist, political system. If the 
institution of the presidency can be envisioned as the tip of a political-power 
pyramid, the block below the president is the cabinet and other senior officers - all 
loyal to their chief. This group in turn appoints loyal subordinates, who in turn 
appoint their juniors. This process continues down to the base. With each new 
sexenio, the process starts again, causing a high turn over of government positions 
that goes far enough down to mid- and low-level positions. Thus, Mexican 
bureaucrats are loyal to their boss as opposed to loyal to a specific department. As 
Philip maintains, this system can generate inertia and inter-bureaucratic rivalries, 
but does not fit the classic bureaucratic politics paradigm as powerful ‘bureaucratic 
interests’ are not created.11 In order to understand economic policymaking and 
particular policy choices, it is necessary then to examine these influential 
individuals.
6.1.2 The Policymakers
The institutional arrangements of the Mexican state have endowed a small group of 
policymakers with a considerable degree of autonomy in the policymaking process. 
These individuals are linked with external actors and play a vital role in mediating 
between international and domestic pressures. They seek to manoeuvre within 
these constraints and to design solutions that will be politically acceptable and 
seriously address public problems. This unique position in the policymaking 
process grants decision makers substantial power over the policy agenda to 
identify, articulate and propose policy reforms that coincide with the aims of the 
state and society.
10Lorenzo Meyer, ‘Historical Roots of the Authoritarian State in Mexico’, in J. Reyna and R.
Weinert, op, cit. , in footnote 7, p. 12.
nG. Philip, op. dr., in footnote6, p. 7.
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Why a specific policy decision is taken can best be understood by 
examining the origins of the perceptions, values and experiences of the individual 
decision makers. When determining the reasons for policy choices it makes a 
difference what values, experiences, training and commitments policymakers have 
when they are involved in discussions and debates about particular policy and 
organizational reform initiatives. The perceptions of policy problems and the 
perceived viable solutions are important determinants in policy reform. These 
perceptions are undoubtably influenced by ideological biases.
The perceptions and ideological beliefs of the individual policymakers are 
greatly influenced by professional expertise and training. Increasingly, individuals 
with technical training and experience in specific subjects are found among 
Mexican decision makers. Their specialization - in economics and public 
administration, for example - influences how they perceive problems and what 
solutions they believe ought to be applied. These domestic policymakers form 
epistemic communities with transnational, like-minded groups and influence the 
direction of policy reforms. The next section examines the evolution of the 
policymaker from the old-style politician to the new tecnico.
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6.2 The Governing Elite
The stability of the Mexican regime is largely due to the cohesion of the governing 
elite.12 The governing elite is defined as those leaders who directly or indirectly 
play a part in ruling society.13 These leaders include the Mexican executive 
branch, primarily the president, his cabinet and bureaucracy. It does not include 
the military or commercial elite. This elite group, in spite of considerable factional 
rivalry within the national political leadership, has governed the modem Mexican 
state for over sixty years. Both stability and elite cohesion have fed on each other: 
the relative long-term stability in Mexico has ensured continuity in patterns of 
political recruitment that has increased elite cohesion. This stability was derived 
from the governing elite’s ability to mediate intra-elite conflicts, to keep peasant 
and labour groups from potential mobilization and to sustain economic growth 
(from 1940 to 1981).
This elite consensus was due to the homogenous political socialization and 
recruitment process. In order to enter the top elite, an individual had to work his 
way up slowly through the ranks. During this long and rigorous recruitment 
process, there was ample opportunity to weed out individuals who were not 
properly deferential to authority. Those who succeeded were the ones willing to 
resolve conflicts privately and refrain from expanding the arena of conflict. Most 
importantly, they were able to master the intricacies of patron-client relationships. 
Only those who were both willing and able to play by the political rules reached 
the top of the power structure - a phenomenon that surely worked to limit the 
possibilities of serious elite disagreement.
12It is not the aim of this chapter to trace the historical evolution of the governing elite. For 
more detailed information on the Mexican political elite, see, Merilee Grindle, ‘Patrons and Clients 
in the Bureaucracy: Career Networks in Mexico’, Latin American Research Review (Vol. 12, No.
1, 1977, pp. 37-66); Peter H. Smith, ‘Does Mexico Have A Power Elite?’, in J. Reyna and R. 
Weinert op. cit., in footnote 7; Peter H. Smith, Labyrinths o f Power (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1979); and Roderic A. Camp, Mexico’s Leaders, Their Education and 
Recruitment (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 1980).
13V. Pareto, The Mind and Society, Vol. 3 (London: Cape, 1935), p. 1422-4, cited in P. 
Dunleavy and B. O’Leary, Theories of the State: The Politics o f Liberal Democracy (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1987), p. 136.
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Over the past twenty years the type of person being recruited has changed 
as well as the recruitment process itself. A new faction of tecnicos have entered 
the policymaking arena, initially at lower levels, but with a few in prominent 
positions in the late 1970s.14 The de la Madrid administration signalled the break 
with the old-style Mexican politician. This change in the governing elite has had 
repercussions not only for elite consensus and the stability of the regime, but also 
for the direction of economic policy. In order to understand the economic policy 
choices of the Mexican government over the last decade, it is necessary to study 
this new governing elite. They are the ones responsible for the shift in 
development policy in recent years. It is, therefore, important to know who they 
are and their background and education.
6.2.1 The Shift to the Tecnico
In order to understand why policy changed in the 1980s, it is important to outline 
the differences between the individual policymakers who came to power with the 
de la Madrid administration - the tecnicos - and the policymakers they displaced - 
the politicos. The classic politico differs from the tecnico in education, class 
background and career experience. In quite general terms, the classic politician 
would have come from a lower-middle-class background in a provincial city, 
attended local schools and was university educated, primarily in law at the 
Universidad National Autonoma de Mexico (UNAM) and had rarely studied 
abroad.15 The political socialization of the elites and masses through public 
education enabled the Mexican government to put forth its economic and social 
policies and to help form the views of several generations of Mexicans. As
'technocrats have long held prominent positions within the political leadership - some 47 per
cent of all cabinet positions were held by political technocrats as early as the 1940 to 1946 period 
and this proportion has not dropped below two-thirds since then. Kevin J. Middlebrook, ‘Dilemmas 
of Change in Mexican Politics’, World Politics (Vol. 41, No. 1, 1988), p. 128. As the following 
sections highlight, the domestic socialization and foreign postgraduate education fundamentally 
alters the Mexican technocrats’ values, beliefs and policy preferences.
15P. Smith, Labyrinths o f Power, op. cit., in footnote 12, pp. 66-87.
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UNAM dominated higher education throughout most of this century, it contributed 
to a shared set of values and ideas that have been crucial for the elite in ruling the 
political system.16
After being socialized in a specific way through a distinctive educational 
experience, the typical Mexican politico would have then begun a long 
apprenticeship in the PRI and in ‘elective’ offices. Although spending a career at 
the national political level, he would have often held some positions outside the 
federal bureaucracy, including elective posts as federal deputy or senator or an 
appointive post in the PRI. As this ascendance to political prominence would have 
taken some time, politicos in national office tended to be older.17 Politicos would 
make their claim that based on their social skills and accumulated contacts (their 
ability in negotiations and face-to-face bargaining and the structure of personal 
alliances), they were the most effective to run the country.18
The Mexican tecnico differs from the old-style politico in preparation, 
educationally and professionally, and in orientation. A likely tecnico would have 
grown up in an upper-middle-class family in Mexico City, attended the Instituto 
Politecnico Nacional and gone to UNAM in a field other than law (e.g., 
engineering or economics). The tecnico derives recognition and employment from 
the prestige and authority of this technical knowledge which is exemplified by a 
certificate of expertise, usually a university degree. Most significantly, the tecnico
16Daniel C. Levy, ‘The Political Consequences of Changing Socialization Patterns’, in R.
Camp, Mexico's Political Stability: The Next Five Years (London: Westview Press, 1986), p. 21.
17Peter Smith, Labyrinths of Power, op. cit., in footnote 12, p. 97.
18There has been some criticism that the tecnico does not possess the necessary political skills 
to run the country. However, with the relatively homogenous socioeconomic and educational 
background of Mexico’s governing elite and the intensity of competition for high-level posts, 
tecnicos who rise to key decision making positions indicate considerable political skill. The 
Mexican regime offers aspiring leaders a number of structured opportunities through which to learn 
the established political ‘rules of the game’.
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would probably have completed (at the Master’s or PhD level) postgraduate studies 
at a prestigious university abroad, most likely in the United States or England.19
After the educational experience, the tecnico would not have worked his 
way up through the party system, but would have immediately moved into a 
medium-to-high level position in the national bureaucracy, either in a ministry or 
in the semipublic sector. Hence, the tecnico would usually be much younger than 
the old-style politician. Unlike the politico building broad networks of political 
contacts outside the bureaucracy, his counterpart would have spent his entire 
career in the federal bureaucracy. The tecnico's claim to prominence in leading the 
country derives from his ‘scientific’ knowledge and significantly from the 
membership to a specific transnational epistemic community. The former gives 
him the necessary skills and knowledge to settle particular policy problems and the 
latter the international legitimacy to implement such policies.
This change in the recruitment and socialization process over the past 
twenty years is evident with the de la Madrid administration. Potential Mexican 
presidents serve their most important apprenticeships in the cabinet, which has 
substantial policymaking responsibilities in addition to its role in the presidential 
succession process. In the time of the dominant politico, one cabinet ministry had 
been especially salient in producing the presidential candidate: the Secretary of the 
Interior - Aleman (1946 to 1952), Ruiz Cortines (1952 to 1958), Dfaz Ordaz (1964 
to 1970) and Echeverrfa (1970 to 1976). Although he was not a tecnico, the Lopez 
Portillo presidency broke with a long-standing tradition which had stabilized the 
presidential succession process. Rather than coming from the Interior department, 
Lopez Portillo (1976 to 1982) came from the Ministry of Treasury.20 This shift 
from the political to the technocratic ministries began an alternative succession 
pattern. Beginning with the de la Madrid administration, the presidents have spent
19Presidencia de la Republica, Diccionario Biografico del Gobierno Mexicano, Unidad de la 
Cronica Presidencial (Mexico, DF: Fondo de Cultura Econdmica, 1987, 1989).
20Ldpez Portillo is not a tecnico. Although he was the Finance Minister for a few years before 
becoming president, his understanding of economics was extremely limited.
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almost all of their careers in economic or technocratic ministries - de la Madrid 
(1982 to 1988) and Salinas (1988 to 1994) both spent time at the Ministry of 
Treasury and came to the presidency from Budget and Planning.
6.2.2 The Reasons fo r  the Ascendance o f the Tecnico 
As Chapter One argued, because of the epistemic communities’ acknowledged 
expertise,21 they are accorded access to the political system by policy elites who 
legitimize their activities. Whether the ideas of these communities influence policy 
choice depends upon the group’s access to the decision making process. One way 
this is done is through the political infiltration of an epistemic community into 
governing institutions. This access enables the community to lay the groundwork 
for a broader acceptance of their ideas and beliefs. Once part of the bureaucracy, 
the community may vie for key positions, thus increasing their influence over 
policy decisions.
The change in the type of individual governing Mexico since the 1980s as 
well as the shift in their values and attitudes can be attributed to three factors: the 
recent growth of the bureaucracy, the generational distance from the Mexican 
Revolution and the increase in private and foreign education. The first two, it can 
be argued* allows the individual to enter the political elite and alter established 
post-revolutionary policy patterns, while the third influences values and attitudes 
through changes in the important socialization process.
Enlarged Bureaucracy
The federal bureaucracy is instrumental to national policymaking in 
Mexico. The bureaucracy has considerable potential to alter Mexico’s development 
pattern in two ways. First, as Mexico’s political system is dominated by the 
executive branch, the president and his advisors control the decision making
21 An epistemic community is a network of knowledge-based experts with recognized 
specialization and ability in a particular field and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant 
knowledge within this sphere or issue-area.
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process. As a result, the bureaucracy, which is structurally subordinate to the 
executive, accrues an important position in the policymaking process. Second, the 
Mexican state plays an important economic role through its direct activities in vital 
sectors, such as ownership and control of petroleum. In addition, the government 
makes an important contribution to capital formation and has provided the basic 
investment for industry, agriculture and manufacturing. Jurisdiction over these 
activities further enhances the bureaucracy’s role in the policymaking process.
Two mutually reinforcing developments during President Echeverrfa’s 
sexenio (1970 to 1976) expanded the intake of the tecnico's at lower levels: new 
recruitment practices and augmenting public sector expenditure. With the 
Echeverrfa administration, the number of tecnicos in powerful positions increased 
in the political bureaucracy. Believing that young political technocrats (with their 
formal credentials) were more useful for bureaucratic decision making, President 
Echeverrfa bypassed an entire generation of Mexican politicos, by giving positions 
of responsibility to young, well-educated specialists who had almost no political 
experience.22 Because of the enormous power wielded by the Mexican president, 
the control of the political opposition by the ruling party and the state, and the 
tradition of politicians ‘playing by the rules’ dictated by their superiors, the ‘lost 
generation’ had no recourse but to step aside for the newly emerging technocrats.
As part of his ‘shared development’ programme, President Echeverrfa 
enlarged the bureaucracy through the increase in public sector spending, ownership 
and employment. Total government spending increased from 13.1 per cent of GNP 
in 1970 to 39.6 per cent in 1976.23 The national government expanded from 
approximately 782 agencies to over 1,000 with the federal work force doubling to
“Roderic A. Camp, ‘The Political Technocrat in Mexico and the Survival of the Political 
System’, Latin American Research Review (Vol. 20, No. 1, 1985), pp. 111-12.
“Roberto G. Newell and Luis Rubio F., Mexico’s Dilemma: The Political Origins o f Economic 
Crisis (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 125-126, 199.
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more than 1 million.24 The growth of the public sector bureaucracy reinforced the 
expansion of the tecnico1 s political influence at lower levels and correspondingly 
began to lessen the influence of the politicos.
Generational Distance from the Mexican Revolution
The enlarged bureaucracy and the presidential recruitment practices explain 
the increased opportunity for tecnicos to enter political power, while the distance 
from the Mexican Revolution (1917) demonstrates the reason for the acceptability 
of the shift in established ways of thinking. For close to sixty years after the 
revolution, a specific doctrine of ‘revolutionary nationalism’ guided policy in 
Mexico and served as a potent symbol for many generations of Mexicans.25 This 
doctrine followed the mainstream of modem social democratic ideology, positing a 
mixed-economy under state tutelage, central planning of the representative sort, 
increased social welfare and a fiercely independent stand against its northern 
neighbour - the United States.
The reason for the rise of the tecnico and the preference for a divergent 
policy direction is the decrease in the use of traditional nationalism and 
revolutionary rhetoric as the historical distance from 1917 increases. Camp argues 
that, as political recruitment shifts to an urban, middle class background, ties to 
rural, working class values based on the doctrine of revolutionary nationalism 
becomes more tenuous.26
The individuals rising to high political positions in the 1980s on the basis 
of their educational background and technical expertise are members of
MMaria Guadalupe Acevedo de Silva, ‘Crisis del desarrollismo y transformacidn del aparato 
estatal: Mexico 1970-75’, Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Politicos y Sociales (Vol. 21, Num. 82, 
octubre - diciembre 1975), p. 154 and Daniel Levy and Gabriel Szekely, Mexico: Paradoxes o f 
Stability and Change (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1983), p. 148.
^This doctrine waxed and waned over the years. Under President Echeverrfa, it was renewed 
with vigor.
“Roderic A. Camp, ‘Overview’, Mexico’s Political Stability: The Next Five Years (London: 
Westview Press, 1986), p. 9.
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generations far removed from the violent transformation that produced the 
politicos. The first generation that fought the revolution steered the process of 
rapid political, social and economic change and held major national positions from 
the 1930s through the 1950s. The ideas and concepts of the revolution continued to 
underpin the thinking of those individuals of the following generation as they 
began their careers at a time when recollections of the revolution, fears of 
instability and an appreciation of the role played by major post-revolutionary 
institutions were still fresh.
With the increasing distance from the revolution, however, new generations 
of political leaders, represented by the tecnico, have begun to question the 
usefulness of organizations and practices that have long served as major supports 
of the established regime. Traditional nationalism has been slipping away.
President Salinas, for example, in his third state-of-the-union address (November 
1991), prepared the way for radical reform of the agricultural and educational 
sectors. He challenged the post-revolutionary ejido27 and restored ties with the 
Catholic Church.28 Although President Salinas has called this a ‘new 
nationalism’, it would have been considered reactionary and a betrayal of 
Mexico’s revolutionary past only a generation before. It is this generational 
distance from the revolutionary nationalism o f the past that plays one o f the key 
roles in the tecnico’s ability to deviate from established ways o f thinking.
Private and Foreign Education
The tecnicos in the de la Madrid administration have followed either of two 
educational paths, both of which diverge from that typically travelled by the 
politicos. The first is private higher education and the second is foreign 
postgraduate training. There has been a shift away from the dominance of public
21Ejidos are a co-operative form of agricultural organization designed to combine economies of 
scale with traditional communal practices.
^Damian Fraser, 'Salinas shares "new nationalism" dream’, The Financial Times, (London) 4 
November 1991.
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educational institutions, such as UNAM, toward the private universities, such as 
the Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico (ITAM) and the Monterrey 
Technological Institute. According to Levy, since the late 1960s, leftist political 
disorder - increasingly involving university workers rather than just students - 
helps to explain the elite exodus to private universities.29 As most of the post- 
revolutionary political socialization took place at UNAM, the exit of the elite from 
public to private universities has had considerable political implications. At the 
private universities, students are isolated from the participation, dissent, political 
bargaining and conflict of the public universities which have helped to shape the 
political values and ideas of the post-revolutionary governing elite. A key 
ingredient of Mexico’s post-revolutionary political stability has been the 
homogenizing influence of this public educational experience. This universal 
process among present and future political leaders, however, is quickly 
disappearing.30
Nineteen-sixty-eight is a watershed in elite socialization. The most 
important aspect of the shift from the public to the private universities has been 
the change in academic subjects studied and the philosophical leanings of the 
courses. Instead of law, economics is the most commonly studied field for the 
rising tecnico. As the government is increasingly recruiting its better trained 
tecnicos from the private universities, it has eroded the virtual monopoly of the 
UNAM economics faculty. Rather than the Marxist-leaning economics courses at 
UNAM, the private universities, such as the prestigious ITAM, teach economic
29D. Levy, op. cit., in footnote 16, p. 23.
30The conflict between the politicos and the new-style Mexican politicians reached a climax in 
the latter 1980s. A faction of the politicos broke away from the ruling party in 1987 and in the 
1988 presidential election, challenged the PRI and the tecnicos. Although this faction was initially 
successful in drumming up societal support, the Mexican institutions of statism and presidentialism 
proved too strong. The issue is explored in more detail in the Postscript.
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courses that are more US-oriented.31 In fact, 93 per cent of ITAM students are 
enroled in business administration and economics.32
The increase in private higher education is linked with foreign postgraduate 
studies. Private university students, account for a greater proportional share of 
those Mexicans now gaining entrance to postgraduate study abroad.33 As in the 
private universities, the foreign postgraduate study is undertaken in the fields of 
economics and public administration. Over the past couple of decades, there are 
more postgraduates in the government policymaking elite with a large proportion 
of these degrees obtained abroad. Two-thirds of de la Madrid’s cabinet officers 
received postgraduate educations - compared to 11 per cent in the 1930s and 21 
per cent in the 1950s.34 According to the Secretariat of the Presidency’s sample,
44 per cent of the top officials under President de la Madrid have a postgraduate 
education. UNAM accounts for only 18 per cent of postgraduate degrees as 
opposed to 56 per cent share of first degrees. In comparison, foreign universities 
account for 62 per cent of the postgraduate degrees compared with only 5 per cent 
of first degrees.35
Most significantly, a new set of political values, based on the infusion of 
liberal economic ideas, has begun to form. The core values and ideas of the 
students emerging from the private and foreign universities are expressed as a set 
of preferences: growth over distribution, technical efficiency over populism, 
economic leadership by business rather than by the state and, quite remarkably,
31Gardner has gone so far as to assert that ITAM is ‘a bastion of Chicago-trained economists’. 
See David Gardner, ‘Contrast of styles in the Cabinet’, The Financial Times (London), 4 June 
1985.
32D. Levy, op. cit., in footnote 16, p. 23.
33In postrevolutionary Mexico, the public and private sector has had divergent educational 
socialization patterns. With the governing elites’ move toward private and foreign education, the 
two sectors have recently experienced a merging of values and policy prescriptions.
34Peter H. Smith, ‘Leadership and Change, Intellectuals and Technocrats in Mexico’, in R.
Camp, op. cit. , in footnote 26.
35Cited in D. Levy, op. cit., in footnote 16, p. 24.
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support for US methods rather than the post-revolutionary nationalist policies.36 
The ingraining of the public sector with ideas and values usually associated with 
the private sector not only has enormous political impact, but helps to explain the 
shift in economic policy direction in the 1980s.
Now that the reasons for the ascendance of the tecnico in the Mexican 
policymaking elite has been discussed, the analysis now turns to the origins of 
their policy preferences. The following section examines the root of the 
perceptions and values of the individual policymaker through their domestic 
socialization and foreign educational experiences.
36Ibid, p. 23.
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6.3 The Socialization of the Tecnico
The reason why Mexican policymakers chose to liberalize trade in the 1980s can 
best be understood by examining the origins of the perceptions and values of the 
individual decision makers. The perceptions of policy problems and the perceived 
viable solutions are important determinants in reform initiatives. These perceptions 
are undoubtably influenced by ideological biases. These biases are greatly 
influenced by professional expertise and training. The domestic socialization and 
foreign educational experiences are examined below.
6.3.1 The Domestic Socialization Process
In Mexico’s political system where the institutional arrangements of the state 
invests the executive branch with a virtual monopoly of power, the president and 
his cabinet are the individuals most responsible for policy direction. Each 
president brings to power and influence his allies and friends. It can be argued that 
he ideally tries to bring individuals whose values and attitudes regarding policy 
direction are compatible with his own.37 Accordingly, the following analysis 
concentrates on the president and the technocratic cabinet.
In order to determine how tecnicos formulate their ideas on economic 
policy, it is important to look at where these individuals received their domestic 
political socialization and training. As the de la Madrid administration is seen as 
the benchmark for the rise of the tecnico to prominent positions, a comparison 
between this government and the Lopez Portillo administration is useful for the 
analysis. From Tables 6.1 and 6.2, it is possible to chart the domestic socialization 
process of the cabinet members responsible for economic policymaking in the 
Lopez Portillo and de la Madrid administrations. In the Lopez Portillo 
administration, both the president and his Trade Minister are not tecnicos.
37Mexican presidents have not historically chosen people who would challenge and compete 
with their own values and beliefs. There is no attempt to avoid the hazards of ‘group think’.
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Table 6.1
Domestic Socialization: The Ldpez Portillo Administration
Name Cabinet Post Institution Technocratic Positions Held
Ldpez Portillo, Jdse President of Mexico, 
1976-82
SHCP: Secretary of Treasury, 1973-75
Ibarra, David Secretary of Finance 
(SHCP), 1976-82
Bank of Mexico: 
ECLA:
Auditor, 1951-53 
Economist, 1958-59
Chief, Development, Mexico City, 1961-63 
Coordinator Research, 1964-66 
Asst. Director, 1966 
Director, 1970-73
de la Vega, Jorge Secretary of Trade 
(SECOFIN) 1976-82
SECOFIN: Economist, 1951-55
Director, Mexican Institute of Foreign
Trade, 1970-76
Madrid, Miguel de la Secretary of Budget and 
Programming (SPP), 
1979-82
Bank of Mexico: 
SHCP:
Adviser to the Administration, 1960-65 
Subdirector General of Credit, 1965-70 
Director General of Credit, 1972-75 
Subsecretary of Credit, 1975-76 & 1976-79
Oteyza, Josd Andrds de Secretary of Energy, 
Mines and Parastatals 
(SEMIP), 1976-82
Bank of Mexico: Analyst, Dept, of Economic Studies, 1968-70
Tello, Carlos Secretary of SPP, 
1977 & Director of 
the Bank of Mexico, 
1982
SHCP: Subdirector General of Credit, 1970-75 
Subsecretary of Revenues, 1975-76
Sources: Roderic A. Camp, Who’s Who In Mexico Today (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988) and Presidencia de la 
Republica, Dicdonario Biografico del Gobiemo Mexicano (Mexico, D.F.: Unidad de la Cronica Presidential, 1989).
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Table 6.2
Domestic Socialization: The de la Madrid Administration
Name Cabinet Post Institution Technocratic Positions Held
Madrid, Miguel de la President of Mexico, 
1982-88
See Table 6.1
Silva Herzog, Jesus Secretary of Finance 
SHCP, 1982 & 
1982-86
Bank of Mexico: 
SHCP:
Economist, Dept, of Economic Studies, 1956-60 
Director of the Technical Office, 1964-68 
Co-ordinator, 1969-70
Director General of Credit, 1970-72 & 1978-79
Petricioli, Gustavo Secretary of Finance 
SHCP, 1986-88
Bank of Mexico: 
SHCP:
Assistant economist, 1948-51 
Economist, National Price Commission, 1951-52 
Economist, Bank of Commerce, 1952-55 
Economist to Director, 1958 
Director of Technical Office,
Director General Treasury Studies, 1967-70 
Subsecretary of Treasury, 1970-76
Herndndez C., Hdctor Secretary of Trade 
SECOFI, 1982-88
Bank of Mexico: 
SECOFI:
SHCP:
Economist, 1946-47
Asst.to the Director, National Committee 
to Control Imports, 1947-48 
Sec., Committee on Export Prices, 1951-52 
Director General of Trade, 1961 
Subsecretary of Trade, 1976 
Subsecretary of Foreign Trade, 1976-82 
Secretary of SECOFI, 1982-88 
Subdirector of Economic Studies, 1958 
Director General, International Studies, 1970-76
Salinas, Carlos Secretary of Programming SHCP: 
and Budget (SPP),
1982-88
Subdirector of Public Finance, 1971-74 
Director, Department of Financial Studies and 
International Affairs, 1974-77 
Director General of Treasury Planning, 1978-79 
Technical Secretary, Economic Cabinet, 1979-81
Mancera, Miguel Director of the 
Bank of Mexico, 
1982 & 1982-88
Bank of Mexico: Economist 1958-62 
Administrator, Fund for the Export of 
Manufactured Goods (FOMEX) 1962-67 
Director, 1964-70
Manager of International Affairs, 1967-71 
Subdirector General of International Affairs, 
1971-73 
Subdirector General, 1973-82
Sources: Roderic A. Camp, Who’s Who In Mexico Today (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988) and Presidencia de la 
Republica, Diccionario Biografico del Gobiemo Mexicano (Mexico, D.F.: Unidad de la Cronica Presidential, 1989).
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The president did serve as Finance Minister for a few years in the Echeverrfa 
administration, but his domestic socialization took place outside of the Treasury or 
the central bank and most importantly, his knowledge of economics was very 
limited. De la Vega, an economist, did work at a lower level position in the Trade 
Ministry in his formative years, but it must be emphasized that the early 1950s 
was the time of the import substitution industrialization (ISI) strategy in 
SECOFIN. Although David Ibarra is a tecnico, he spent 15 years at the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. This international organization 
was a bastion of the structuralist-nationalist economic development model.38 Both 
de Oteyza and Tello are tecnicos of a sort, but as will be discussed in a following 
section, their foreign educational experience influenced them in a very different 
way than those tecnicos of the de la Madrid administration. Only de la Madrid as 
the Budget and Programming Minister was a tecnico, who spent his formative 
career years in the Treasury (SHCP) and the central bank.
When de la Madrid became president, he picked like-minded and similarly 
socialized tecnicos. Every one of them spent some portion of their careers in either 
the SHCP or the central bank. (See Table 6.2.) For example, de la Madrid spent 
five years at the central bank and 12 years at the Treasury. Silva Herzog worked 
at the central bank for 10 years and the SHCP for six. And Mancera spent his 
entire career, since 1958, at the central bank. This Treasury/central bank 
socialization went deeper than just the economic cabinet. This socialization 
accounted for thirteen of President de la Madrid’s eighteen initial cabinet 
appointees and a large number of subsecretarial and gubernatorial appointees.39 
As these institutions played such a prominent role in the professional socialization 
experience of the de la Madrid team, it is therefore important to examine these 
two institutions and the individuals who headed them in order to determine the 
possible values and attitudes learned during training.
38See Chapter 5, section 5.2.2.
39G. Hinojosa, ‘Banco de Mexico y hacienda, manantiales de los hombres del presidente’, 
Proceso (No. 507, 21 July 1986), pp. 6-11.
216
The Individual Policymakers Chapter Six
Historically, the Treasury and the central bank have been bastions of 
financial orthodoxy in the Mexican bureaucracy since the 1917 Revolution. 
Opinions within the Treasury and the central bank began to shift away from 
laissez-faire doctrines after 1929 toward the emerging post-Second World War 
consensus of ISI. However, both institutions remained strongholds of monetary 
conservatism.40 In spite of the post-Second World War heterodox development 
policies of the Mexican state, the conservative economists in these two institutions 
have occupied distinctive positions in the Mexican decision making process. (This 
probably explains the coherence of the post-Second World War development 
strategy informed by structuralism and import substitution with macroeconomic 
policies that combined an orthodox fiscal and monetary stance with fixed exchange 
rates.) The change in presidential administration in 1952 opened the way not only 
for a policy shift in the direction of stabilization, but also for the consolidation of 
the position of the Treasury and central bank economists. Their power began to 
wane in the 1970s, but with the advent of President de la Madrid, their influence 
was renewed.
The formal powers of the SHCP were reinforced by institutional factors. 
With the legislative and judicial branches subordinate to the executive branch, 
Treasury administered monetary policy, income (both taxation and borrowing), 
allocation and audit in relation to the central secretariats. After 1964, formal and 
increasingly real budget control was extended to the principal parastatal 
agencies.41 To simplify some policy implications of Treasury control, it 
advocated the orthodox goals of development with price stability, balance-of- 
payments equilibrium and manageable levels of foreign debt. The bulk of 
investment was to come from the private sector and government tailored policies
40Robert R. Kaufman, The Politics o f Debt in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico: Economic 
Stabilization in the 1980s (Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, University of California 
Press, 1988), p. 63.
41John Bailey, ‘Presidency, Bureaucracy, and Administrative Reform in Mexico: The 
Secretariat of Programming and Budget’, Inter-American Economic Affairs (Vol. 34, No. 1, 
Summer 1980), p. 35.
217
The Individual Policymakers Chapter Six
to promote investor confidence: currency convertibility, light tax effort with 
generous investment incentives, subsidized energy and transportation and credit 
preferences for priority activities. Given the comparatively low levels of 
expenditure prior to the latter 1960s, the principal instruments in promoting 
development were monetary policy (whereby the central bank adjusted investment 
along preferred lines) and a protectionist trade policy.42 Between 1958 to 1970, 
the Treasury formula worked; industry expanded rapidly and aggregate growth 
rates were among the highest in the world.43
The SHCP and the central bank recruited the best talent available from the 
universities and nurtured an elite career service marked by the highest rates of 
personnel continuity in the central government. Such continuity of tenure of such 
men was a measure of their power, and contrasted sharply with the high rates of 
turnover in most other government agencies. This longevity in the technocratic 
sectors of government provided a fertile ground for the domestic socialization and 
training of the emerging governing elite.
In a political system like Mexico’s, many rising technocrats will look up to 
and try to emulate their superiors in order to advance through the system. The 
men who head the institutions, where these elites received their training, are an 
important key to formulating economic ideas. From 1958 to 1970, two men 
dominated the policymaking process: Antonio Ortiz Mena, head of the Treasury 
and Rodrigo Gdmez, the head of the central bank. It is important, therefore, to 
outline briefly the educational backgrounds and professional experiences of these 
two men.
Antonio Ortiz Mena received a law degree in 1928 from UNAM where he 
had also studied philosophy and economics. During his tenure as the Secretary of 
Treasury from 1958 to 1970, Ortiz Mena was influential in masterminding the 
economic model of stabilizing development. At the same time as his tenure as
42Ibid, p. 38.
43See Chapter 2, section 2.1.1.
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Secretary of SHCP, Ortiz Mena was Governor of the IMF. With the election of 
President Echeverrfa, who sought to reduce the power of the Treasury and the 
man heading the ministry, Ortiz Mena resigned from the SHCP and became the 
President of the Inter-American Development Bank. He held this position from 
1971 to 1988.44
For 17 years Rodrigo Gdmez was the Director of the Bank of Mexico. He 
only had high school accounting but his government career was at the Mexican 
central bank from 1947 to 1970. He was also executive director of the IMF for 
Mexico and Central America from 1946 to 1948, as well as prominent in the 
Mexican movement to join the Latin America Free Trade Association in I960.45
Both Ortiz Mena and Rodrigo Gdmez trained a whole cadre of 
policymakers who came to power during the late 1970s and 1980s. Both were 
economic and political mentors to the rising new technocrats which included 
Miguel de la Madrid and Jesus Silva Herzog.46 In addition to the two above- 
mentioned men, another important mentor to the future president, de la Madrid, 
was his cousin, Ernesto Fernandez Hurtado. This relationship was key to the 
young de la Madrid’s intellectual, economic and political formation. In Mexico, 
the relationship between father and son is extremely close and with de la Madrid’s 
own father having died when he was very young, Ernesto Fernandez took on the 
role. Fernandez received an economics degree from UNAM and then went on to 
Harvard in 1948 for an Master’s in Public Administration - the degree that the 
future president would also read for almost twenty years later. Fernandez spent 
most of his career at the central bank before assuming the Director General 
position during the Echeverria administration. Fernandez was known to be a
^Roderic A. Camp, Who’s Who In Mexico Today (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988).
45Ibid.
^Interview, Sr. Gustavo Mohar, London, 11 May 1992. Sr. Mohar is the head of PEMEX 
London and was the personal assistant at the Treasury Ministry to Silva Herzog (1982 to 1986) and 
ibid.
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liberal-internationalist who advocated the restructuring of the economy along free- 
market guidelines.47
As previously discussed in Chapter 5, the link between individual 
policymakers and international institutions has proved to be an important conduit 
through which foreign economic ideologies and values are transferred. Both Ortiz 
Mena and Gdmez had strong links with international organizations and their 
domestic socialization was in economically liberal institutions. These men had 
great policymaking influence in two financial institutions where the current 
tecnicos received their training. It is argued here that at an important time when 
politicians formulate their political/economic ideas, the tecnicos in the de la 
Madrid administration were greatly influenced by the economic ideologies of these 
men and the institutions in which they served.
From 1970 to 1982, the Treasury/central bank technocrats remained 
extremely powerful players in the policy process, but under Presidents Echeverrfa 
and Lopez Portillo they lost the hegemony they had previously enjoyed. It is not 
until the administration of de la Madrid that we see the reemergence of the 
Treasury and a return to more orthodox policies. As is discussed in later sections, 
the individuals and agencies associated with the state financial sector were major 
proponents of the Internationalist model of development. Their reemergence, 
combined with the crisis situation, led to a radical shift in policy in the 1980s.
6.3.2. The Foreign Educational Experience
In addition to the domestic socialization process, the experienced gained through 
foreign study and living abroad can greatly influence values and attitudes. Miguel 
de la Madrid acknowledges as much in a recent article on US cultural influence in 
Mexico,
47Emest Fernandez Hurtado (ed.), Cincuenta Anos de Banca Central: Ensayos Conmemorativos 
(Mexico, DF: Fondo de Cultura Econdmica, 1976).
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Intercultural relations offer all manner of risks and opportunities for all 
participants [and have] their positive and negative influences[. There are] 
events perceived as favorable and those felt as threats.48
The ideas and methodologies learned abroad and/or experiences through numerous 
transmission mechanisms, such as books, the media or trends can be difficult to 
determine. Is it possible to argue that there is a high tendency among those 
educated privately and abroad, when in office, to introduce the methodologies 
learned through these experiences, especially in times of crises? With such a large 
number of Mexican political elites obtaining postgraduate degrees from abroad and 
especially in the United States, are foreign educational methodologies playing a 
more significant role in Mexican policymaking?
Camp writes that in contemporary Mexico, the ‘man of ideas’ and ‘the man 
of action’ are no longer separate. With the growing demand for specialized 
knowledge, intellectuals have been increasingly called upon to serve in government 
positions in Mexico. Because of their training and breadth of perception, 
intellectuals - especially those who studied economics, public policy or business 
administration - are perceived to be the best equipped to provide solutions to 
Mexico’s economic problems.49 An empirical study by Camp has found that the 
‘Mexicans who have studied abroad have been affected ideologically.’50 In a 
study of Mexican intellectuals from 1920 to 1980, Camp found that 79 per cent of 
those with neoliberal ideas were more likely to have lived in the United States 
(where a corresponding philosophy was held by most politicians) than were their 
contemporaries - 36 per cent - who professed Marxist views.51 Derived from the
^Miguel de la Madrid, ‘Cultural Relations between Mexico and the United States’, Voices of 
Mexico (July-September, 1992), pp. 22-3.
49Roderic A. Camp, ‘Intellectuals: Agents of Change in Mexico?’, Journal o f Interamerican
Studies (Vol. 23, No. 3, August 1981), p. 301.
50R. Camp, op. cit, in footnote 22, p. 104.
5lIbid.
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foreign educational experience in specialized subjects, the tecnicos ’ policy 
prescriptions tend to suggest that northern ideas can resolve most human and social 
problems in Mexico. This view is supported by the belief among this elite group 
that what Mexico needs is good administration and a more efficiently run state.52
The link between foreign study and entrance to bureaucratic positions is 
evident. Many of those reading for postgraduate degrees abroad are directly 
recruited into middle-level or higher positions by politicians with similar 
backgrounds, thus merging the intellectual and the political elite. Many of the top 
students from IT AM, for example, are recruited to work in the technocratic 
ministries by their lecturers who are also government officials (e.g., such as Pedro 
Aspe, the current Treasury Minister). After time spent in a specific ministry, the 
student will be sponsored to study economics, business administration or public 
policy primarily in the United States. Often the student will be given the topic of 
his/her research. During the summers, the student will return to Mexico to work 
at the ministry and will continue to work there after completion of his/her 
studies.53 In 1992, at least 42 government scholarship students returned with PhDs 
from top US universities, such as Harvard, Chicago and Stanford. They went 
straight into top businesses and government ministries, spreading a ‘new market 
mind-set’.54
Carlos Salinas, the present president of Mexico, had a similar socialization 
experience. Although he went to UNAM where he read economics, he studied 
under David Ibarra (Lopez Portillo’s Finance Minister), who brought Salinas into
52It is important to note that the application of foreign ideas may not be appropriate in a 
developing country. There are many within the country and outside of it, who believe that Mexican 
problems cannot be solved with universally applicable remedies, but can only be worked out with 
Mexican solutions.
53Interviews with Confidential Interview 1, The Ministry of Trade, Mexico City, 14 July 1992 - 
(BS in Economics at ITAM and studied under Pedro Aspe; Msc in Economics at Warwick 
University, U.K.) and Confidential Interview 6, NAFTA negotiator for the Mexican Ministry of 
Trade, Mexico City, 18 July 1992 - (Ph.D. in Economics, Stanford University, USA).
54‘Latin America: The Big Move to Free Markets’, Business Week (15 June 1992), p. 51.
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the Ministry of Treasury to work while he was writing his BA thesis.55 Salinas 
stayed on at SHCP until 1981 when he left to run the de la Madrid election 
campaign. Interestingly, Salinas served as subdirector of Public Finance, Director 
of the Department of Financial Studies and International Affairs and Director 
General of Treasury Planning all while completing three degrees at Harvard. (See 
Tables 6.2 and 6.4.)
Intellectuals are supplying real alternatives both in terms of leadership and 
ideas. In examining the shift in economic policy of the de la Madrid government, 
it is useful to look at the change in the individual policymaker in the previous 
administration. By looking at the individuals in the economic cabinet, we can see 
not only a shift towards private and foreign educational experiences, but the link 
with US educational institutions.
In the late 1970s, a few prominent tecnicos entered the top policymaking 
circles, but for the most part, the old-style politician still dominated. In the Lopez 
Portillo administration, all the top economic cabinet members and the president 
followed the politicos common path and received their first degrees from UNAM, 
save Carlos Tello. At the postgraduate level, the president and de la Vega do not 
have a foreign or national postgraduate degree. David Ibarra earned a PhD in 
Economics from Stanford; de la Madrid received a Master’s in Public 
Administration at Harvard; and both de Oteyza and Tello read for a Master’s in 
Economics at Cambridge University. (See Table 6.3.)
The dominance of the tecnico is most evident in the de la Madrid 
administration. (See Table 6.4.) Although de la Madrid received his first degree in 
law at UNAM, he was Mexico’s first president to earn a foreign postgraduate 
degree. All of President de la Madrid’s economic cabinet members studied 
economics; two at the private university, IT AM. Silva Herzog, Mancera and 
Petriciolli read for a Master’s in Economics at Yale; Hernandez Cervantez
55See the acknowledgement page in Carlos Salinas de Gortari, Agricultura, Industrializacidn y 
Empleo: El caso de Mexico, thesis for the BA in economics at UNAM, 1971.
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Table 6.3
Educational Socialization: The Lopez Portillo Administration
Name/Position Date of Birth First Degree Postgraduate Degree
Jdse Ldpez Portillo 
President of Mexico 
(1976-82)
16 June 1920 Law, University of 
Santiago, Chile, 1942-45
LLD, UNAM, 1950
David Ibarra 
Secretary of SHCP 
(1977-82)
14 January 1930 Public Accounting, 
UNAM, 1947-51; 
Econ., UNAM, 
1953-57
PhD Econ., Stanford, 
1959-61
Carlos Tello
Secretary of SPP (1977) & 
Director General of 
the Bank of Mexico (1982)
4 November 1938 BS Georgetown, 
1955-58
MS Columbia University,
1958-59; MA Econ., Kings College, 
Cambridge, 1961-63
Miguel de la Madrid 
Secretary of SPP 
(1979-82)
12 December 1934 Law, UNAM, 1952-57 MA Public Administration, 
Harvard, 1964-65
Jorge de la Vega 
Secretary of SECOHN 
(1976-82)
14 March 1931 Econ., UNAM, 
1955-58
Josd Andrds de Oteyza 
Secretary of SEMIP 
(1976-82)
21 November 1942 Econ., UNAM, 
1961-65
MA Econ., Kings College, 
Cambridge, 1966-68
Sources: Roderic A. Camp, Who’s Who In Mexico Today (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988) and Presidencia de la 
Republica, Diccionario Biogrqfico del Gobierno Mexicano (Mexico, D.F.: Unidad de la Cronica Presidential, 1989).
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Table 6.4
Educational Socialization: The de la Madrid Administration
Name/Position Date of Birth First Degree Postgraduate Degree
Miguel de la Madrid 
President of Mexico 
(1982-88)
12 December 1934 Law, UNAM, 1952-57 MA Public Administration, 
Harvard, 1964-65
Jesiis Silva Herzog 
Secretary of SHCP 
(1982-86)
8 May 1935 Econ., UNAM, 
1953-57
MS Econ., Yale, 
1960-62
Gustavo Petricioli 
Secretary of SHCP 
(1986-88)
19 August 1928 Econ., IT AM, 
1952
MS Econ., Yale, 
1955-58
Carlos Salinas 
Secretary of SPP 
(1982-88)
3 April 1948 Econ., UNAM, 
1966-69
MA Public Administration, 
1973; MS Political Economy, 
1976; PhD Political Economy 
& Government, 1978, all at 
Harvard
Hector Herndndez C. 
Secretary of SECOFI 
(1982-88)
31 December 1931 Econ., UNAM, 
1941-45
MS Econ., University of 
Melbourne, 1949-50
Miguel Mancera 
Director General of 
the Bank of Mexico 
(1982-88)
18 December 1932 Econ., IT AM, 
1951-56
MS Econ., Yale, 1959-60
Sources: Roderic A. Camp, Who’s Who In Mexico Today (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988) and Presidencia de la 
Republica, Diccionario Biografico del Gobiemo Mexicano (Mexico, D.F.: Unidad de la Cronica Presidential, 1989).
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received a Master’s in Economics from Melbourne University; and Salinas 
received two Master’s and a PhD in Public Administration, Political Economy and 
Government from Harvard. This transition to the tecnico goes deeper than just the 
economic cabinet. Eight of the cabinet heads had taken advanced degrees in 
universities outside of Mexico with ten of the sixteen ministers with technocratic 
degrees.56 Two-thirds of all cabinet secretaries and over one-half of all cabinet 
undersecretaries in the de la Madrid administration had completed some 
postgraduate study before assuming office.57
Foreign postgraduate education is especially important to the change in the 
economic ideology of the elite. The Mexican governing elite, themselves, view 
free-market skills as vital to the modernization of Mexico. Accordingly, many of 
the up and coming policymakers are sent to the US specifically to be trained in 
economics or public administration. So convinced are the Mexicans that 
modernization of the state lies with market solutions that Pedro Aspe, Salinas’ 
Treasury Secretary, said, ‘thank god we didn’t cut scholarships to the U.S. during 
the lean years.’58 Today’s policymakers themselves quite freely admit that they 
have been influenced by the free-market ideas taught in the United States. The 
foreign educated tecnicos are not afraid of having closer ties to the US; they 
welcome it. ‘To cope with the new world situation, it’s better to get together’, said 
President Carlos Salinas.59 This tie has not only taken place in Mexico, but is 
occurring all over Latin America.
Both the domestic socialization and the foreign educational experiences 
have greatly influenced the perceptions and policy preferences of the tecnico in 
Mexico. As Mexican political institutions are dynamic and constantly redefined by
56John Bailey and Leopoldo G6mez, ‘The PRI and Political Liberalization’, Journal o f International 
Affairs (Vol. 43, No. 2, Winter 1990), p. 129.
57Presidencia de la Republica, op. cit., in footnote 19.
%%Op. cit., in footnote54, p. 51.
59Ibid, pp. 51-2.
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those in power, the changing socialization patterns of the tecnicos are important. 
The numerous incremental changes introduced in the political institutions 
ultimately have reinforced and institutionalized the polices learned elsewhere. 
These practices have become ingrained in the institutional fabric of the Mexican 
state and have now become part of the standard operating procedure.
The final part of the chapter examines two competing epistemic 
communities: the Cambridge and the Internationalists. Armed with the support of 
like-minded, transnational networks, the Mexican policymakers find the legitimacy 
of their policies and the political strength to carry them out.
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6.4 The Economic Crisis and Transnational Epistemic Communities
The final part of the chapter looks at the economic crisis and its effect on the two 
rival factions within the governing elite in the Lopez Portillo administration. Not 
only is it a struggle between the old-style politico and the new tecnico, but it is a 
struggle of ideologies between two transnational epistemic communities. The two 
factions were first, the more dominant nationalist-populists and their tie to a group 
of Cambridge, statist economists; and second, the liberal-rationalists and their link 
to a wider, transnational movement advocating economic liberalization. The next 
section discusses the struggle between the two groups in the late 1970s and early 
1980s.
6.4.1 The Nationalist-Populists versus the Liberal-Rationalists 
The Lopez Portillo cabinet lacked cohesion on economic policy from the very 
beginning of the sexenio due to the infighting of two distinct, ideological groups: 
the nationalist-populists and the liberal-rationalists. The nationalist-populists, 
represented by Carlos Tello (Planning and Budget - SPP) and Josd Andres de 
Oteyza (Patrimony), advocated state intervention in a relatively closed economy. 
The liberal-rationalists, represented by Julio Moctezuma Cid (Treasury), endorsed 
market forces in an open economy with a strong private sector.60 Almost from 
the beginning, there was conflict between the two factions: in 1977, over the depth 
of the cuts in spending required by the IMF programme; in 1978, over the 
advisability of oil and gas sales to the US; in 1979 to 1980, over the accession to 
the GATT discussed in Chapter 2; and over the contents of the 1980 Global 
Development Plan.
The conflict over the budget is a good example of this rivalry.
Moctezuma Cid was the uncompromising supporter of the austerity programme, 
whereas Tello opposed the IMF programme and pursued reinflation of the
“See R. Newell and L. Rubio F., op. cit., in footnote 23, pp. 207-8.
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economy through Cambridge-type economics.61 This policy struggle occurred not 
only because of the inherent conflict between SPP and the Treasury - the former 
was responsible for expenditure and the latter for revenue - but also because it 
highlighted the conflict between two individuals with divergent economic policy 
prescriptions. In formulating the budget, Moctezuma Cid called for a fiscal deficit 
in lines with the IMF guidelines. Carlos Tello supported a larger deficit to 
reactivate a lagging economy. Moctezuma Cid was a supporter of the 
Treasury/central bank network which abhorred inflation.62 In addition, he drew 
upon the effective political symbol of associating the more statist position with the 
Echeverria administration, which had fallen into public disfavour since the 
devaluation.63 Carlos Tello had been an advocate of a stronger public sector and 
more aggressive public spending. Tello’s overall thrust implied a more active, 
statist orientation, with a greater role for public and mixed enterprise.
Compromise between the two positions proved impossible. In addition, the 
conflict became too public. The open struggle went against the first rule of the 
governing elite - keep infighting behind the scenes. Lopez Portillo vacillated 
between the positions, but after a year of infighting he dismissed them both.64
As the nationalist-populists were to influence greatly President L<5pez 
Portillo, it is useful to outline their background and educational. Jose Andres de 
Oteyza was the youngest member of the Lopez Portillo cabinet. He worked briefly 
as an economists for the Secretariat of National Patrimony and then as an 
economic analyst at the central bank. De Oteyza had completed his first degree in 
economics at UNAM where he was a student of Horacio Flores de la Pena - a
61 This programme is explained in a later section.
“Moctezuma Cid was not a tecnico nor a member of the liberal-internationalist epistemic
community. He followed the politicos domestic socialization experience receiving a law degree from
UNAM with no foreign postgraduate training. In addition, he spent most of his public sector career 
in the Secretariat of the Presidency not at the Treasury or central bank. Yet, he took the monetarist 
line in the inflation debate.
63J. Bailey, op. cit., in footnote 41, p. 48.
“Ibid.
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self-described socialist who believed in a strong state role in the economy. De la 
Pena was the political and economic mentor for a generation of young economists 
in Ldpez Portillo’s government. De Oteyza had continued his education for an 
Master’s in Economics at Kings College Cambridge under the ‘statist’ economists, 
Joan Robinson and Anjit Singh. He held the powerful post of Minister of Energy, 
Mines and Parastatal Industry (SEMIP), which had gained a new place of 
prominence as the country discovered huge oil reserves. From this powerful post, 
de Oteyza steadily gained influence within the administration, especially in the 
final months of the crisis.
Carlos Tello had a close working relationship with President Ldpez 
Portillo, first as an advisor, when the president had been subsecretary of the 
Presidency from 1965 to 1970, and later at the Secretariat of the Treasury. Even 
after his resignation from the Secretariat of SPP, Tello remained close to the 
president. The 1978 budget conflict with Moctezuma Cid radicalized Tello. He 
moved on to one of Mexico’s top economic research institutions at El Colegio de 
Mexico. From there he criticized the government’s economic policies. As a joint 
author with Rolando Cordera from the Unified Socialist Party, Tello put forth a 
model for the future of Mexico’s economy. The book called for government 
stimulus of industry through protectionism, nationalization of key industries, 
greater control of the private sector, especially the banks, low interest rates; strong 
exchange controls and heavy direct investment.65 Tello received all of his 
university-level education outside Mexico. Most significantly, he earned an 
Master’s in Economics at Kings College, Cambridge in 1963.
Throughout the Lopez Portillo administration, the president wavered 
between relatively orthodox policies and the nationalist-populist approach, but the 
more radical position was to win the important policy debates on the 1980 GATT 
entry and renewing the inward-looking development strategy with the 1980 Global 
Development Plan. This triumph of the nationalist platform was largely due to the
“Rolando Cordera and Carlos Tello, Mexico, la disputa por la nacidn: perspectivas y opciones del 
desarrollo (Mexico, DF: Siglo Ventiuno Editores, 1981).
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president’s lack of a solid understanding of economics and his distrust of the 
Treasury/central bank network.66 Because of this apprehension of technocratic 
ministries, the nationalist-populists had the ear of the president.
For four years, the Ldpez Portillo government experienced an economic 
boom because of oil. As was discussed in Chapter Two, the government was 
trying to cope with their new ‘role conception’ and the economic abundance of this 
newly discovered answer to their future growth and development. As long as 
Mexico could sustain its development model based on the continuing high price of 
oil and large amounts of foreign borrowing, the country did not have to think 
about the much needed economic reordering and structural change. But the oil 
boom was not to last. The drop in oil prices had caused a rippling effect in the 
economy in 1981. The Mexican political system was to experience economic, 
political and ideological stress.67
In the midst of the deteriorating economic situation, Mexico was going 
through the selection process for a new president. Traditionally, the succession has 
depend on what kind of person the Mexican governing elite and the president 
consider is necessary to preserve the system and what type of problems are 
envisaged in the next presidency.68 If the selection process works, someone suited 
to the needs of the following sexenio is selected.
Miguel de la Madrid’s background in the central bank, the public sector, as 
Treasury undersecretary and then Planning Minister was clearly important in his 
being chosen. De la Madrid had succeeded in assembling a planning apparatus in 
SPP (the 1980 Global Development Plan), a priority in President Lopez Portillo’s 
eyes. De la Madrid was seen as an orthodox economist projecting an image of
66When Lopez Portillo had been appointed Finance Minister under Echeverrfa, the ex-director of 
the Treasury - Antonio Ortiz Mena, the ex-director of the central bank - Rodrigo G6mez and his 
predecessor as Minister of Treasury, Hugo Margain, let it be known that they had no confidence in 
his ability.
67See Chapter 2 for a discussion of the causes of the economic crisis.
“J. Bailey, op. cit. , in footnote 7, p. 57.
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competence and moderation, who could buoy up international respect for an oil- 
based economy now flagging under depressed world oil prices.69 Although it was 
apparent that de la Madrid was an economic liberal, he had been responsible for 
devising Lopez Portillo’s Global Development Plan which had advocated the 
deepening of the inward-looking development strategy (ISI) and reinforced the 
public sector’s involvement in the economy. De la Madrid had kept his head low 
and did not get into the thick of the rivalry between the nationalist-populists and 
the liberal-rationalists, playing his cards right and not alienating either side. What 
Mexico needed at that particular juncture, thought President Lopez Portillo, was a 
person who could unite the two factions and put forth a responsible economic 
development plan. He believed that de la Madrid was that person.70 In addition, 
de la Madrid was most likely chosen because he had the support of President 
Lopez Portillo’s closest advisors - including Rosa Luz Alegria, his son, Ramon 
Lopez Portillo and Jose Andres de Oteyza.
De la Madrid’s selection as the PRI candidate (and subsequently the next 
Mexican president) did not put an end to the rivalry between the two groups. As 
the economic crisis intensified, there was an important victory for the nationalist- 
populists with the nationalization of the banks.71 In his last state-of-the-union 
address, President Jose Lopez Portillo announced the state takeover of all Mexican 
commercial banks as well as the imposition of exchange controls. It was de Oteyza 
who, with the support of the economic arguments of Tello, convinced President 
Lopez Portillo that the commercial banks had to assume responsibility for the 
crisis.72 After all, the banks were highly concentrated in ownership and in turn
69Dial Togerson, The Guardian (London), 28 September 1981.
^Josd Ldpez Portillo, Mis Tiempos, Segundo parte (Mexico, DF: Fernandez Editores, 1988), p. 
1109.
71 See Chapter 2, section 2.1.3.
72The close relationship between these two men and Ldpez Portillo cannot be understated. In L<5pez 
Portillo’s memoirs published in 1988, the ex-president defends the nationalization of the banks and says 
he owes gratitude to first his son and then de Oteyza and Tello without mentioning any of the liberal- 
intemationalists. See J. Lopez Portillo, op. cit., in footnote 70, p. 1249.
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owned or controlled a large proportion of Mexican industry and services. The two 
men advocated exchange controls and above all called for the elimination of the 
root of the problem: the enormous economic power of the banks.
Just to illustrate the enormous power of the presidency, the decision was 
made without consultation with his cabinet or the president-elect. Both the new 
Treasury Minister, Jesus Silva Herzog,73 and the president-elect, Miguel de la 
Madrid, were informed just prior to the announcement of the measures. The night 
before, President Lopez Portillo had told his cabinet that he was going to order the 
seizure of the banks and he invited resignations from those not in agreement.
Those who resigned were: The Director of the Bank of Mexico, Miguel Mancera 
and the head of the state owned Foreign Trade Bank, Adrian Lajous. Only a few 
months earlier, Miguel Mancera had written a well-publicized pamphlet, On the 
Inconvenience o f Exchange Control. As a result of the September measures, he 
had no choice but to leave. President Lopez Portillo replaced Mancera with Carlos 
Tello. Under Tello, the central bank was to become a decentralized government 
agency overseeing the nationalized banking system. Tello would command the 
biggest state agency and the heart of the private sector. When President Lopez 
Portillo named Tello as Director General to the Bank of Mexico, he did not totally 
eliminate the liberal-internationalist view in his cabinet. The Finance Minister,
Silva Herzog offered his resignation but President Lopez Portillo refused.
Because of the delicate debt negotiations going on with the international 
financial community, the president refused to allow Jesus Silva Herzog resign 
from the Ministry of the Treasury. Silva was involved in delicate negotiations to 
roll over US$80 billion debt and about to leave for the IMF meeting in Toronto, 
Canada. Silva became indispensable to the international debt renegotiations: he 
was the conduit by which information passed to Washington and Mexico City; and
73When de la Madrid was selected as the next president of Mexico, Ldpez Portillo allowed him to 
put his own economic team into cabinet positions in 1982 to deal with the economic turmoil. Jesus 
Silva Herzog was appointed Minister of Treasury and Miguel Mancera, the Director General of the 
Bank of Mexico.
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he enjoyed the trust of the uncertain international community. To have lost Silva at 
this time would have been disastrous for Mexico.
Two separate and opposed financial centers emerged: 1) the populist 
conception of Tello and other nationalist-populists; and 2) the orthodox financial 
philosophy of Silva Herzog and the liberal-rationalists. For three months, Silva 
Herzog had to balance pressures from President Lopez Portillo, Tello at the 
central bank and de la Madrid, the President-elect. When the banks were 
nationalized, little or no notice were given to the inner most circles of government 
including de la Madrid. Silva had to appoint over 55 heads of the nationalized 
banks in less than 24 hours.
Silva fought to exclude the names of left-wing economists from the list of 
the new heads of the nationalized banks. He refused to leave for Toronto until a 
suitable list of names had been agreed. He was ready to resign on this issue.74 
Silva got rid of Munoz Ledo (former Minister of Labour) and prevented Horacio 
Flores de la Pena taking over one of the big four private banks. Instead he was to 
head the Foreign Trade Bank. Silva included two former Finance Ministers: David 
Ibarra (to Banamex) and Antonio Carrillo Flores (to Bancomer). Most of the other 
57 were men trained in the central bank or in NAFINSA - the State Development 
bank.75
Tello and de Oteyza were in the position to greatly influence the president. 
Soon after assuming the office, President Lopez Portillo was riding a great wave 
of optimism and popularity, as the oil boom seemed to have answered Mexico’s 
long-sought after development problems. The rapidly declining economy and the 
ensuing acute crisis had brought the country from an all time high to the depths of 
despair. President Lopez Portillo, at the end of his sexenio, was looking for some 
answers to Mexico’s economic ills. As a means of regaining some of the 
confidence lost in his government, the president listened to the nationalist-populists
74Interviews Sr. Silva Herzog, Madrid, Spain, 21 May 1992 and Sr. Mohar, London, 11 May 
1992.
75Interview, Sr. Gustavo Mohar, ibid.
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and made a radical shift toward populism with the nationalization of the banks. He 
seemed to achieve his goal; the move was perceived by many at home as a victory 
for the people of Mexico.
With the continuing drop in oil prices, the August 1982 debt crisis 
announcement and the nationalization of the banks, the opportunity arose for a 
more radical version of the nationalist-populists’ policy agenda. With the help of a 
group of foreign economists, a more radicalized nationalist agenda was put 
forward. The next section discusses the arrival of the Cambridge economists to 
help guide the Mexican economy.
6.4.2 The Nationalist-Populists and the Cambridge Group 
The nationalization of the banks was not an isolated move, but part of a larger 
economic development plan. The Lopez Portillo government (between September 
and December 1982), influenced by Tello and de Oteyza, put forth a nationalist 
agenda. In addition to the nationalization of the banks, there were to be strict 
controls on imports, foreign exchange curbs and bigger budget deficits. These 
policies, although tried before in Mexican history, were being put forth in a more 
radical and comprehensive form because of the time constraint. Perhaps in the 
belief that the incoming administration of de la Madrid would be more orthodox, 
the measures were applied quickly so they could not be easily undone.76
The nationalist policies originated from and were implemented by 
Mexicans, but they also reflected the ideas of a group of economists at Cambridge 
University. After his resignation from SPP in 1978, Tello renewed his links with a 
group of Cambridge University economists who had been fellow students of the 
noted economist Joan Robinson, soliciting their views about Mexico. Led by Dr. 
Ajit Singh, a group from Cambridge moved to Mexico by mid-1982 to advise 
Tello.77 Those linked to the foreign economists were Carlos Tello, a student of
76This was definitely a good point. It took the subsequent administrations 10 years to reprivatize 
the banks.
77Alan Robinson, ‘Portillo Pockets the Banks’, Euromoney (October 1982), p. 41.
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Nicholas Kaldor, and newly appointed as Director General of the Bank of Mexico; 
Jose Andres de Oteyza, the Minister of SEMIP; and Vladimiro Brilovsky, 
director-general of the Institute of Industrial Planning. The latter two studied under 
Joan Robinson and Anjit Singh.
The Cambridge economists had been advising Mexican officials for 
years.78 Dr. Singh was initially contacted by Dr. Brailovsky, a PhD student of 
his until 1976, because the Mexican economist had become concerned about the 
restraint that was introduced into economic policy in Mexico following a financial 
crisis in the mid-1970s. Dr. Singh was a fellow at Queens College and was the 
most active of the Cambridge group involved in Mexico.
The Cambridge position objected to the orthodox policies of the IMF, 
especially to the institution’s devotion to the free-market and to restrictive fiscal 
and monetary strategies. To the Cambridge group there was no substitute for 
heavy government intervention in economic matters. They advocated a form of 
nationalism that emphasized industrial growth, which for developing countries 
required protectionism and expansionary economic policies.
Regarding the trade regime in Mexico, the Cambridge economists believed 
that a country such as Mexico could not keep exports ahead of imports. Rather 
than open markets, they advised that Mexico should close them. ‘If you simply 
open your borders, you simply get wiped out,’ remarked Dr. Singh.79 In 
addition, the group also rejected the economic orthodoxy that trade always makes 
the world better off. The constraint on growth in many countries was the fear of a 
balance of payments crisis - a fear they would eliminate by protectionism while 
growth goes ahead. But growth was more constrained by inflation, which would be 
exacerbated by import controls. In order to attack this threat, the Cambridge 
economists believed in wage and price controls.
^Steven Rattner, ‘Cambridge to Mexico: A Radical Connection’, International Herald Tribune,
26 October 1982.
79Cited in Ibid.
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It is important to point out that these nationalist policies were not imposed 
by the foreign economists. It was the Mexicans who were primarily responsible 
for the policies. The Cambridge group was part of a community which believed in 
these policies. The Mexican policymakers belonged to this transnational, statist, 
epistemic community. Thus, the advice solicited was advise which they were 
already predisposed to accept. The link with this transnational network added to 
the legitimacy of the nationalists’ policies and gave the international backing to 
implement them.
The Mexican experiment, as long as it lasted, represented a broadly based 
test of the Cambridge group’s statist theories. Nonetheless, they did not have total 
success. Times had changed and with it had come a shift in the dominant 
development paradigm in the international arena from the more statist-oriented 
development policy - such as that advocated by the Cambridge group and the 
ECLA economists80 - toward one based on neoliberal economic policies, such as 
those advocated by the liberal-rationalists within the de la Madrid team. In times 
of economic crisis and with the uncertainty that ensues, policymakers most likely 
will look to specialists for help. Because of an epistemic community’s 
acknowledged expertise and its access to the decision making process, it greatly 
influences policy direction through their ideas and beliefs. Three interacting factors 
contribute to the triumph of the liberal-rationalists - those belonging to the 
Internationalists epistemic community. They are first, the economic crisis that 
acted as the catalyst for change; second, the empowerment of the domestic 
epistemic community through the global resurgence of neoliberalism; and third, as 
was discussed earlier in this chapter, the domestic socialization and foreign 
postgraduate educational experiences. The next section outlines the formation of 
the Internationalist epistemic community in the de la Madrid administration.
®°See Chapter 5.
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6.4.3 The Triumph of the Internationalists
The de la Madrid accession to the presidency marked the significant change in the 
balance of forces within the governmental elite. So profound was the discontent 
with President Lopez Portillo that de la Madrid entered office in December 1982 
in a virtual power vacuum. The new president was free to hand-pick like-minded 
tecnicos to his governing team, with no links to the traditional political elites. 
Technical experts had been introduced to politics since the times of President 
Miguel Aleman in the 1940s and 1950s, but never before had they politically 
relegated the old guard - the PRI, the labor movement, and the elimination of 
structuralists and neo-Keynesian economists - to such an extent as under President 
de la Madrid.
In stark contrast to the Lopez Portillo administration, President de la 
Madrid enjoyed a consensus on economic policy based on the ideological cohesion 
of the individuals appointed to his government. President de la Madrid sought 
competent personal confidants who were not discredited from the past disorder. 
The technocratic group might help reassure the business community, much 
battered by the wave of populism in 1981 to 1982.81 President de la Madrid 
chose not only personal friends with the same career socialization pattern (from 
the Treasury, Bank of Mexico and SPP), but also individuals with similar 
postgraduate training. The most important appointments to the de la Madrid team 
were the men who filled the three main command centres of the economic 
bureaucracy, all powerful figures with strong commitments to liberal economic 
policies. The Treasury went to Jesus Silva Herzog, who held a Master’s in 
Economics from Yale and had worked in the central bank from 1956 to 1970 and 
the Treasury during the Echevema and Lopez Portillo governments. Because of 
Silva’s close personal relationship with President de la Madrid - formed when they 
worked together at the Bank of Mexico and Treasury - Silva had been appointed in
81The private sector’s reaction to the nationalists policies is discussed in Chapter 2.
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the last months of the Ldpez Portillo administration to the position of Treasury 
Minister.
Miguel Mancera, another prominent orthodox economist, was reappointed 
as head of the central bank after resigning in protest over the nationalization 
decree. Mancera also did an Master’s in economics at Yale and was a classmate of 
Silva Herzog. His entire career (from 1958) had been spent at the central bank. 
And Carlos Salinas, who at 36 was the youngest cabinet member, was appointed 
head of SPP. Salinas received an MA in Public Administration, an MA in Political 
Economy and a PhD in Political Economy and Government all at Harvard from 
1973 to 1978. He spent his career in the Treasury where he started in 1971.
Salinas ran de la Madrid’s election campaign and, most importantly, Salinas was 
in large part responsible for the Global Development Plan under the Ldpez Portillo 
administration while de la Madrid was SPP Minister.82 Salinas is said to have 
been one of the most influential in convincing President de la Madrid for the need 
of radical policy changes.
By choosing men with similar domestic and educational socialization 
patterns, President de la Madrid assured the likelihood of economic policy 
cohesion. By ensuring that they belonged to the same epistemic community, 
President de la Madrid’s development model based on economic liberalization was 
more actively pursued. De la Madrid worked out his administration’s economic 
policy prescriptions while he was president-elect (4 July to 1 December 1982) with 
a select few who met twice a week.83 This inner circle included, among others, 
Carlos Salinas de Gortari, Jesus Silva Herzog and Miguel Mancera. This coalition 
of economic policymakers believed that in this time of acute crisis, brave choices 
had to be made. The times called for unity in the face of diversity and empowered 
this small elite to make radical policy choices. A common goal of crisis 
management and long-term structural change was needed at this important
82D. Gardner, op. cit., in footnote 31.
83Interview, Silva Herzog, op. cit. , in footnote 74.
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crossroad in Mexican history. Through these twice weekly meetings, the inner 
circle worked out a ‘recipe for economic recovery’ that called for short-term 
macro-management and long-term economic reordering and structural change.
Almost immediately upon taking office in December 1982, the new 
administration took a number of steps that plainly revealed that it was prepared to 
reverse the nationalist measures while substituting in their place market-oriented 
policies. First, President de la Madrid replaced Carlos Tello as head of the Bank 
of Mexico by the more conservative Miguel Mancera. Rather than implement 
Tello’s more nationalistic measures, the government proceeded to dismantle the 
exchange controls and reestablish the dual exchange rate system. The new 
administration of de la Madrid would overturn most of the nationalist-populist 
policies. The liberal-rationalists’ strength in conviction of policy paths and support 
of the implementation was far more successful. This was due to a transnational 
link that went beyond the tenuous bond to a specific group of individuals at one 
university. Rather the Internationalist policy platform was supported by a truly 
transnational networks that was both politically empowered through their claims to 
exercise authoritative knowledge and motivated by shared causal and principled 
beliefs.
Conclusions
To complement the international analysis, this chapter concentrated on the 
domestic political process in Mexico. The focus was on the two domestic 
determinants for Mexican economic policy change in the 1980s: the institutional 
arrangements of the state - primarily the institution of the presidency - and the 
individual policymakers. It was argued that because of the authoritarian-corporatist 
state, the governing elite have considerable autonomy from social actors when 
making policy. The governing elite has changed substantially over the last twenty 
years due to the enlarged bureaucracy, the generational distance from the 1910 
Revolution and a shift toward private and foreign postgraduate education.
240
The Individual Policymaker Chapter Six
The educational shift from public to private institutions and the increase in 
foreign postgraduate training in ‘technical’ fields constituted the shift in the 
educational socialization process among the ruling elite. In addition, the domestic 
socialization received at the Treasury and the central bank also greatly influenced 
the ideas and values of the newly emerging tecnicos. This has significant 
repercussions, as the individuals just now reaching the political elite are 
experiencing a fundamentally different socialization process. The process has 
resulted in a shift in values, ideas and policy prescriptions among the governing 
technocratic elite. The change in domestic socialization and foreign postgraduate 
education explains the reasons for the political viability of the economic 
liberalization policies of the de la Madrid government.
The domestic and educational socialization process is key to the shift in 
policy prescriptions, and the debt crisis proved to be the catalyst to bring about 
radical policy options. Some have argued that the nationalists economic measures 
implemented in the final months of the Ldpez Portillo administration were a 
pragmatic response brought on by the economic crisis. Interestingly, the same 
argument was used by some from the neoliberal view in the de la Madrid 
administration.84 But two radically different policies - statist and neoliberal - in 
response to a crisis situation were not mere pragmatism. The policy choices 
reflected the ideological stance - bom from career and educational socialization - 
of the respective individual policymakers. To argue that Tello and de Oteyza 
implemented a nationalist agenda because of pragmatism would ignore the 
important influence of their own well-documented, stated economic beliefs as well 
as the influence of prominent economic mentors such as Horacio de la Pena and 
contacts with the Cambridge economists.
Equally, the internationalists in the de la Madrid government were not just 
being pragmatic when they put forth a radically different development policy in 
Mexico. At least, the nationalist view was part of a strategy already attempted and
84Interview, Silva Herzog, op. cit. , in footnote 74.
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viewed as a more extreme position within the post-Second World War 
development model. The model advocated by the de la Madrid team broke with 
over thirty years of policy. The decision was based on the individuals’ belief that 
economic liberalization was the only viable policy prescription to solve not only 
the short-term economic crisis, but also the longer-term structural problems.
The economic prescriptions of the de la Madrid administration went against 
not only a development policy in place for over half a century, but also went 
against the very sense of nationalism which has been such a potent force in the 
Mexican psyche since the early part of this century. If the move to liberalize the 
economy was only a pragmatic response to an acute crisis, then there would have 
been a shift back towards the more populist economic policy when the crisis had 
subsided. It could be argued that a decision initially taken for pragmatic reasons 
might have generated successes and supporters, thereby creating a kind of 
momentum to perpetuate it. However, the extent that economic liberalization has 
been carried out in Mexico, especially in trade liberalization and the Mexican 
initiative to form a North American Free Trade Agreement, refutes this. Carlos 
Salinas has continued with fervour the economic liberalization policies begun by 
his predecessor.
This chapter has shown that the belief by the de la Madrid cabinet in 
economic liberalization policies for Mexico finds its origins from the specific 
career and educational socialization process: the Treasury/central bank network 
and the foreign postgraduate study, primarily in the United States. This tie to an 
epistemic community of transnational economists helped to empower the de la 
Madrid team, giving legitimacy to their actions and the international support to 
implement them.
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This thesis has examined the reasons why Mexico liberalized its trade regime 
during the administration of Miguel de la Madrid. In order to answer this 
question, the study emphasized five international and domestic variables: the 
impact of the 1982 economic crisis, the leverage by international actors, the 
transmission of ideas, the institutional arrangements of the Mexican state and the 
ideas, values and perceptions of the individual policymakers. The five 
determinants are reviewed in the first part of this chapter. Following this 
summary, the final section addresses the economic, political and ideological 
developments in post-1986 Mexico and the broader implications for the study of 
international relations.
7.1 International and Domestic Determinants
7.1.1 The Economic Crisis
The first international variable discussed in this thesis was the economic crisis of 
the early 1980s. The debt crisis as well as the deep global recession and Mexico’s 
inability to manage its considerable budget deficit, proved to be the catalysts for 
policy change. These economic shocks not only affected the Mexican economy, 
but they greatly shook the political and ideological foundations of the Mexican 
state.
Throughout this study, it has been argued that during such crises, there is 
not only strong pressure for reform, but decision makers are more likely to 
institute radical or innovative policies than when a crisis does not exist. This 
certainly is the case with Mexico. The new de la Madrid administration not only 
perceived that a crisis existed and that it was of a real and threatening nature, but 
the policymakers believed that failure to act would lead to an even more dire 
economic and political reality. Their belief that the Mexican political and 
economic system might possibly collapse, compelled decision makers to implement 
radical reforms that corresponded to their perception of the realities of the day.
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The crisis not only affected Mexican policymakers, but it influenced the 
government institutions responsible for economic policy. It was argued that 
although institutions can be prone to inertia, they become more flexible in the 
crisis situation and more receptive to new approaches to solve the economic 
problems at hand. Because crises demand immediate action in a short time period, 
standard operating procedures are pushed aside and new ideas and solutions are 
initiated. In the early 1980s, the Mexican policymaking environment became less 
of a constraint as new policies, such as trade liberalization, were introduced.
Ever since the ISI policy had failed in the late 1960s and more importantly, 
recognition that the oil-led growth strategy could not be sustained, Mexican 
policymakers recognized that an alternative strategy was needed. The nature of this 
alternative path depended to a large degree on the individuals who came to power 
in 1982. Even before the economic crisis intensified, the candidate de la Madrid 
and his economic team believed that Mexico had delayed the essential economic 
reordering and structural change of its economy. At the PRI national campaign 
meetings in early 1982 - before the onset of the crisis, the ‘Basic Plan and 
Electoral Programme’ called for the Mexican market to integrate into the world 
economy, support an outward-oriented growth strategy and pursue the gradual 
liberalization of the trade regime. What the crisis did was to serve as the catalyst 
for policy reform. If there had not been a crisis, Mexico still would have 
implemented some form of trade liberalization but in a slower and less 
fundamental form. The crisis enabled the decision makers to take the bold 
decision.
7.1.2 International Leverage
The second external factor explaining Mexican trade policy reform is the leverage 
of international actors - the United States and the international financial 
institutions. The analysis focused primarily on the bilateral commercial relations 
between Mexico and the United States. The leverage argument maintains that 
because of the asymmetrical interdependence between the United States and
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Mexico, the former had more power in influencing economic policy in the latter. 
This view posits that the United States was able to wield undue power, forcing 
Mexico to implement economic policies it would not have otherwise chosen during 
its financial crisis. This implies that Mexico was not in favour of liberalizing trade 
and did so largely because of US pressure. Yet, the power to influence policy is 
not as obvious as the relative strengths make it appear. The above position fails to 
recognize the leverage held by Mexico. It was argued in this thesis that Mexico 
derived a certain amount of bargaining leverage in its relationship with the United 
States from several sources: debt, trade, migration and drugs. The United States 
saw the debt problem, for example, not only as a financial crisis, but also a matter 
of national security. It feared that any overt pressure would compel Mexico to call 
a moratorium on debt repayments. This gave Mexico a certain amount of room for 
manoeuvre in its negotiations with the United States.
The thesis has maintained that the United States and the international 
financial institutions - primarily the IMF and the World Bank - did not force 
Mexico to liberalize its trade regime, but rather the policy prescriptions coincided 
with a preferred policy path of the de la Madrid government. In contrast to the 
other major debtors in the region at the time, Mexico had decided to liberalize 
trade, albeit only gradually, during the 1982 presidential campaign. Just 
announcing the commitment of opening the economy was important for Mexico, 
but it did not guarantee such policies would be implemented. Where the 
international actors played a role was in reinforcing Mexico’s commitment to the 
process of liberalization and facilitated the speeding up of policy implementation. 
The most influential pressure came from the US legislative branch that sought a 
reciprocal trade relationship with Mexico. Before the substantial liberalizing 
measures were implemented by Mexico in 1985, the United States increased the 
application of countervailing duties and began to eliminate products from its GSP 
programme. These pressures could have been greater if the US executive branch 
co-ordinated on policy objectives. However, the Reagan administration was far 
more preoccupied with the financial crisis and the strategic Cold War agenda. At
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every bilateral meeting Mexico tried to resolve economic issues while the United 
States attempted to change Mexico’s policy on Central America.
It cannot be denied that pressure from the United States and the 
international financial institutions reinforced and greatly influenced Mexico to stay 
the course, but it could equally be argued that Mexico could have chosen a more 
resistant path like the other Latin American countries. In the largest and third 
largest debtor countries in the region, Brazil and Argentina, domestic 
policymakers were resistant to neoliberal stabilization policies and these countries 
applied a variation of heterodox policies to deal with the economic crisis. In 
Mexico, on the other hand, orthodox stabilization policies were implemented and 
long-term structural reform, including trade liberalization, were policy objectives 
from the beginning of the de la Madrid administration. This difference in policy 
response in the face of similar external pressures demonstrates a different 
commitment on the part of Mexico.
7.1.3 The Transmission o f Ideas
The third international variable that explains trade policy reform in Mexico was 
the transmission of ideas from the international system to the domestic political 
arena. This variable highlighted two important points. First, ideas do play a role in 
domestic policymaking. It was demonstrated that there existed strong links 
between the dissemination, influence and carriers of certain economic ideas and 
policy outcome. And second, neoliberalism in Mexico was due to the synergy of 
‘the man and the hour’. The study argued that the triumph of certain ideas could 
best be explained by timing. In the early 1980s, three interrelated factors occurred: 
the debt crisis and the world recession; the ideological vacuum left from the 
failure of Keynesian policies in the north and import substituting policies in the 
south; and the election of officials in both the industrialized countries and in 
Mexico who were either enthusiastic toward economic liberalism or were 
predisposed to accept the doctrine’s policy prescriptions.
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With the resurgence of neoliberalism in the industrialized nations in the 
1970s and 1980s, came a corresponding change in policy in much of the 
developing world. A shift occurred in the global development paradigm ushered in 
by new ideas concerning the best way for states and markets to interact. The so- 
called ‘Keynesian Revolution’ that swept through the industrialized world from 
1940 to 1975, with its emphasis on the state correcting market failures, had a 
correlating shift in economic policy - import substitution - in the Latin American 
and other developing countries. Likewise, with the ascendance of neoclassical 
economics in Britain and the United States in the late 1970s and early 1980s, there 
occurred a shift toward orthodoxy in most developing nations. This shift in global 
paradigm explains why policy changed so dramatically in the developing world in 
the 1980s.
In order to show how ideas were transferred from the international to the 
domestic policymaking arena, the thesis identified three mechanisms through 
which new ideas were carried. The first was through the hegemonic states. In 
1979 to 1980 the ascendance of conservative governments in Britain and the 
United States greatly affected policy discourse. The United States played a crucial 
role in championing the new policy shift. The second mechanism was the 
academic community. The thesis argued that a ‘counter-revolution’ was led by a 
group of influential academics united in their opposition to Keynesianism, the 
structuralist theories of development and the use of economic planning for 
development purposes. These ideas carried through academic writing and foreign 
postgraduate training proved a particularly successful transnational linkage. The 
third mechanism was the international organizations such as the IMF and the 
World Bank. After the debt crisis in 1982, most Latin American countries actively 
sought help from the IMF (in renegotiating long-term loans) and the World Bank 
(through structural adjustment loans). Both institutions attacked the state’s role in 
the economy and generally advocated an open international trade regime. Policy- 
based lending had been the main vehicle by which the organizations transferred 
their ideas for policy reform. In addition, it was shown that some influential
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Mexican policymakers had spent time working for these international financial 
institutions. Through transnational links such as foreign study and work in the 
international organizations, new ideas were brought in by technical experts 
identified as an epistemic community. In Mexico, the epistemic community was 
the political leadership. President de la Madrid and his economic advisors were 
shown to belong to the neoliberal oriented, ‘Internationalist’ epistemic community.
Primarily because of the economic crisis, the new ideas and solutions were 
able to enter the policymaking process. This technical information was important 
in convincing decision makers in Mexico that a crisis existed, reform was needed 
and only certain options could solve the economic problems. Whereas the leverage 
of the international actors could explain why the Mexican government stayed the 
course in economic policy reform, it failed to account for the origins of the 
neoliberal policies. The transmission of ideas factor does reveal such origins.
7.1.4 The Institutional Arrangements o f the State 
The first domestic factor contributing to Mexico’s liberalization of its trade 
regime, is the institutional arrangements of the state. Although there has been 
much written about the Mexican state, it was important to highlight briefly this 
variable because it explains why Mexican policymakers were able to change so 
fundamentally the development strategy without more social opposition. Because 
the Mexico is characterized by statism, presidentialism and one party domination 
of the Mexican political system, the Mexican state has considerable powers vis-a- 
vis social classes and interest groups and places the executive branch at the 
forefront of making policy choices. Through pacts and coalitions, the state has 
performed the critical function of regulating sociopolitical and economic 
interactions among the various social forces. The symbolic integration of peasant, 
labour and the popular sector into various governmental structures and the 
apparatus of the dominant party, the PRI, secured their co-optation. In addition, as 
the Mexican political system is highly presidential, the president rules with near 
total authority. Both Mexican foreign policy and economic policy direction are
248
Conclusions Chapter Seven
almost entirely under the president’s control. With no national or institutional 
check that control decisions, the president has been virtually free in the use of 
government resources and in choosing whomever he likes for his cabinet. The 
implications of the combination of factors is that the individual policymakers 
themselves are important in determining policy choices.
7.1.5 The Individual Policymakers
Having established the key role of policymakers within the Mexican state, the final 
variable that explains Mexican economic policy choice is the individual 
policymaker. The thesis has argued that why specific policy decisions were taken 
can best be understood by examining the origins of the perceptions, values and 
experiences of the individual decision makers. Their beliefs are greatly influenced 
by professional expertise and training. Specialization in economics and public 
administration, for example, is likely to influence how they perceive problems and 
what solutions they believe ought to be applied. The study maintained that three 
reasons account for the change in type of policymaker in Mexico: the increase 
number of technocrats brought into the government bureaucracy from the early 
1970s, the generational distance from the Mexican Revolution and the increasing 
numbers of individuals obtaining their education through private and foreign 
means.
This thesis has found evidence to show that the domestic socialization and 
foreign educational experiences of the Mexican policymakers explain the change in 
values, beliefs and perceptions of policy problems and the necessary solutions. It 
was shown that with the de la Madrid administration came a different type of 
policymaker and therefore policy outcome was affected. The new tecnicos had 
conducted a majority of their professional training in the Treasury/central bank 
network and their foreign postgraduate education in the United States.
The thesis argued that in response to the economic crisis Mexican 
policymakers relied on transnational links with like-minded groups or epistemic 
communities. The August 1982 economic crisis prompted radical policy change.
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The national-populists in the Lopez Portillo cabinet, allied to a group of like- 
minded Cambridge economists, nationalized the banks and tried to implement a 
populist policy agenda. But de la Madrid came to power four months after the 
August crisis. As the crisis continued, his government allied with an 
internationalist epistemic community and put forth orthodox policy reforms. This 
thesis has argued that there occurred a synergy between the economic crisis, the 
individuals and the resurgence of neoliberalism globally that explains Mexico’s 
policy direction.
The international and domestic determinants outlined above were identified 
as the mutually reinforcing and necessary factors contributing to Mexico’s trade 
liberalization in the 1980s. The crisis highlighted Mexico’s desperate need for a 
new development strategy in light of the failed ISI development model and the 
unreliable oil-led growth strategy. Domestically, the crisis prompted the outgoing 
President L<5pez Portillo to choose a successor who had the technocratic 
credentials and the domestic and international legitimacy to deal with the economic 
problems facing the country. Without the crisis situation, a different man may 
have been selected as the PRI presidential candidate and it most likely would have 
been a populist. President de la Madrid brought to office a group of like-minded 
tecnicos with similar domestic socialization and foreign educational experience that 
served to reduce greatly policy discord. These individuals had formed transnational 
links with neoliberal epistemic communities that helped to legitimate and 
strengthen their resolve to implement trade liberalizing policies. Because of the 
institutional arrangements of the state and the crisis policymaking environment, de 
la Madrid and his economic cabinet had considerable autonomy in the 
policymaking process. The crisis coincided with an ideological vacuum in both the 
developed and developing world. With the move away from Keynesian policies 
and a strong interventionist role of the state, there occurred the resurgence of 
neoliberalism globally. These ideas were transferred to the domestic policymaking 
arena via international actors and institutions. In addition to the transmission of
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ideas, these actors - the United States, the IMF and the World Bank - reinforced 
the policy decisions already taken by the de la Madrid team.
The use of the five variables in a comparative analysis with other countries 
in Latin America, where historically a similar political and economic development 
has taken place, would be interesting for future research. Chile provides a similar 
case study to Mexico because of its failed attempts at economic liberalization in 
the 1970s and then the more successful implementation in the 1980s. Chile was 
also greatly affected by the economic crisis, international actors and the 
transmission of ideas. In addition, the military regime and later the authoritarian 
rule has ensured that social interests have been controlled. Further, the country has 
an abundance of US educated economists in top policymaking positions with close 
ties to a monetarist epistemic community.
Mexico and Chile could be contrasted with Argentina and Brazil. These 
countries resisted neoliberal policies for most of the 1980s and although they are 
implementing such policies now, are doing so in a slow and gradual manner. All 
three international factors were equally influential in Argentina and Brazil, but the 
difference is in their domestic political and economic situations. The economic 
crisis was not managed effectively and both suffered hyperinflation and 
experimented with heterodox stabilization policies. Brazil, for example, 
experienced in the 1980s the debilitating internal struggle between structuralists 
and neoliberals similar to that of Mexico in the late 1970s. Unlike Mexico and 
Chile, the governing elite lacks the cohesion and control over the government 
machinery and the commitment to neoliberalism. This internal political discord 
combined with strong social opposition made neoliberal policies difficult to 
implement. Social and political opposition to economic liberalization is still quite 
strong in the southern cone, yet trade liberalization and privatization is occurring. 
The answer to why this is happening could be found in the transmission of ideas 
and international pressure for policy change. Further research into the applicability 
of the five determinants in Latin America or other developing countries could
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advance the study of both of domestic policymaking and transnational policy co­
ordination.
These five international and domestic determinants explain why Mexico 
decided to liberalize its trade regime from 1982 to 1986. But what significance, if 
any, do these factors have for economic policymaking in Mexico today? Were they 
only relevant for this particular juncture in Mexico’s politico-economic history? 
Was the opening of its commercial relations only a momentary deviation in its 
post-Second World War development strategy? The following section addresses 
these questions and the significance of the economic, political and ideological 
developments in post-1986 Mexico for economic policymaking in the future.
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7.2 The Post-1986 Developments
7.2.1 The Economic Developments
The rapid process of trade liberalization took off in the post-1986 period and has 
transformed Mexico’s long-term development strategy. Since 1986, Mexico has 
undertaken a serious effort to open up and streamline its trade barriers.1 In fact, 
Mexico liberalized much faster and further than what was agreed to in the GATT 
negotiations. Under the GATT agreement, Mexico was to bring down its 
maximum import duty from 100 per cent to no more than 50 per cent over a 
period of eight years. Instead within 16 months, the maximum tariff rate dropped 
from 100 to 20 per cent and the number of tariff categories was reduced from 16
Table 7.1 
Trade Liberalization, 1982 to 1992
Year Average Tariffs 
(percentages)
Value of Import Permits 
(percentages)
1982 27.0 100.0
1987 22.6 26.8
1992 13.1 10.1
Source: Department of Economic Research, Banamex, 1993.
to five.2 Table 7.1 shows the decline of the average duty from 27.0 per cent in 
1982 to 22.6 per cent in 1987 to 13.1 per cent in 1992. In addition, the table 
highlights the percentage drop of imports requiring import permits. The figure fell 
from 100 per cent in 1982 to 26.8 per cent in 1987 to 10.1 per cent in 1992. This 
transformation of the trade regime is quite remarkable. Whereas Mexico was one
*In addition, the structure of trade altered substantially during the de la Madrid sexenio. Non-oil 
exports as a percentage of total exports, rose from 22 per cent in 1982 to 62 per cent in 1990. 
Non-oil exports grew from US$5.6 billion in 1982 to nearly US$17 billion in 1990. The Mexican 
Government, Mexican Agenda, 12th edition (Mexico, D.F.: Direccidn de Publicaciones, July
1991), p. 26.
Hbid.
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of the most protected countries in the world in 1982, today it is one of the most 
open.
Since the 1985 US-Mexican bilateral trade agreement, there has been a 
flurry of trade agreements between the two countries. The most important bilateral 
development occurred in June 1990 when the free trade area talks were initiated. 
These negotiations were later expanded to include Canada. The Nafta will create 
an enormous market, encompassing some 360 million consumers and total output 
of more than US$6 trillion. This trade agreement would bring together more than 
18 per cent of world trade.3 It will work towards the progressive elimination of 
barriers to the flow of goods, services and investment, and strengthen protection 
of intellectual property rights. Interdependence between Mexico and the United 
States has fostered co-operation leading to Mexico’s acceptance of the international 
regime of free and open markets. The Nafta and the idea of President George 
Bush’s ‘Enterprise for the Americas’4 ensures the perpetuation of the international 
trade regime and its influence on domestic policymaking.
The fundamental changes to the Mexican development strategy since 1982 
have been furthered and consolidated under the Salinas administration (1988 to 
1994). The pace and intensity of the trade liberalizing measures implemented in 
the 1980s were, therefore, not a momentary deviation in Mexico’s post-Second 
World War development strategy, but the beginning of the process of structurally 
transforming the Mexican economy. The underlying ideology of the Mexican 
development model has changed from that based on economic nationalism to the 
philosophy of economic liberalization. It could be argued that rather than 
demonstrating a commitment to the doctrine of economic liberalization, the much 
needed structural changes were implemented because the policymakers were 
responding to the realities of the day. But one could equally argue that other 
options existed for Mexican decision makers. Most importantly, the country did
3Stephen Fidler, ‘Problems to be resolved’, Financial Times (London), 12 May 1993, p. 31.
4A proposed free trade area encompassing the two continents of America.
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not have to increase its commerical ties with North America. The North American 
Free Trade Agreement was a Mexican-led initiative. President Salinas went 
courting European foreign investment in the Spring of 1990. He was told by 
Chancellor Kohl of (West) Germany that his country’s foreign investment, as well 
as most of the European Union, would be directed to eastern Europe. Apparently 
this is when President Salinas decided that he had no alternative but to seek a 
closer relationship with North America.5
The closer integration of the Mexican economy with North America 
accentuates the role of international actors and their influence on economic 
policymaking in post-1986 Mexico. As the trade interdependence between Mexico 
and the United States becomes stronger, other policy areas such as domestic 
political issues and foreign policy will most likely be affected. Most importantly 
for Mexico, the United States will continue to reinforce Mexico’s policy choices in 
the future. What affect this US role will have on Mexican policymakers 
themselves and the Mexican population’s attitude toward the United States has yet 
to be determined.
The concept of the Nafta is tremendously significant for a country that has 
historically defined its nationalism through anti-US rhetoric. Remarkably, the 
closer commercial relations with the United States has not produced what most 
Mexicanists would have predicted: large scale protest. A Los Angeles Times 
opinion poll found 79 per cent of Mexicans in favour of the Nafta in 1991. 
However, such overwhelming support has waned considerably in the intervening 
two years according to the Mexico City daily, Excelsior. The paper claims that
5Both Mexican and US officials concur that it was indeed Mexico that requested a Free Trade 
Agreement. President Salinas, in desperate need of foreign investment to continue his chosen 
economic development strategy, soon realized that his only option was to turn to the United States. 
Interviews, Walter Bastian, Director of Latin America, US Department of Commerce, Washington, 
DC, 15 April 1993; Paul Dacher, Office of Mexico, US Department of Commerce, Washington, 
DC, 15 April 1993; and Confidential Interview 2, Department of the President, Mexico City, 
Mexico, 22 July 1992.
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only 47 per cent of Mexicans supported Nafta in March 1993.6 Yet, the real 
question that could be addressed in future research is that in light of the historical 
relationship between the United States and Mexico, why is close to half the 
Mexican population in favour of such an agreement when, according to the 
opinion poll, only 14 per cent of Mexicans thought the Nafta would benefit 
Mexico.7
The economic reforms implemented over the past 12 years would be 
difficult to undo quickly. However, as the first international variable - the 
economic crisis - quite aptly demonstrates, systemic shocks can act as catalysts for 
fundamental policy changes. The Mexican economy today is struggling with a 
growing trade deficit8 and the economy is predicted to grow only a little over 1 
per cent in 1994.9 Perhaps more important than these emerging economic 
difficulties, the Mexican political regime has not dealt effectively with the 
mounting socio-political changes and pressures. The challenges for the 1994 to 
2000 administration will be how it addresses the socio-political changes that have 
been occurring along side the economic transformation of Mexico since 1982. 
These political developments and their relevance for future economic policymaking 
are discussed below.
7.2.2 The Political Developments
The institutional arrangements of the Mexican state have been undergoing 
considerable changes in the post-1986 period. One of the most important casualties 
of the changing political environment has been the cohesion of the governing elite.
6‘Poll\ Latin American Regional Report: Mexico & NAFTA Report (25 March 1993), p. 2.
1Ibid.
8Mexico’s non-maquiladora trade deficit grew from US$-0.6 billion in 1989 to US$-4.4 billion 
in 1990 to US$-11.3 billion in 1991 to US$-20.7 billion in 1992. ‘Foreign Trade’, Country Profile: 
Mexico 1993-94 (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1993), p. 6.
9‘Outlook\ Country Profile: Mexico 4th Quarter (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
1993), p. 5.
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As was discussed in Chapter Six, the rise of the tecnico in Mexico’s governing 
elite displaced a generation of politicos and cast aside others within the party who 
did not subscribe to the neoliberal economic vision for Mexico. In a move 
unprecedented in modem Mexico, a disaffected faction within the governing elite 
with more populist tendencies broke away from the PRI in 1987. Led by two 
influential men, the former PRI president, Porfirio Munoz Ledo, and the former 
governor of Michoacan, Cuauhtemoc Cardenas,10 they formed the Corriente 
Democrdtica (the Democratic Current) to force a more democratic method for 
selecting the PRI’s future leader. But the powers of tradition and patronage led to 
de la Madrid hand picking his successor (Carlos Salinas also a technocrat) and the 
newly formed group to be expelled from the party.
In the presidential election held on 6 July 1988, Cardenas ran for president 
in a coalition of left-wing parties, the National Democratic Front (FDN). Although 
the PRI candidate, Carlos Salinas, was officially declared the winner, an important 
watershed was reached in Mexican political history. The official results gave 
Salinas a victory with only 50.4 per cent of the vote - the lowest ever recorded for 
the PRI which had traditionally received over 90 per cent. The right-wing party, 
the National Action Party (PAN), (historically the opposition party) obtained 17.07 
per cent of the vote. And the FDN, which many believe actually won the 
election,11 garnered 31.12 per cent - a tremendous result, nevertheless, 
considering that no opposition party in modem Mexico had received over 20 per 
cent.12 Many analysts believed, at the time, that the 1988 presidential campaigned
10He is the son of the revered President Lazaro Cardenas (1934 to 1940). The elder Cardenas 
carried out extensive land reform, expropriated foreign oil companies in 1938 and had strong ties to 
labour. Lazaro Cardenas was responsible for strengthening the presidency; bringing the military 
firmly under presidential control as an essentially apolitical, professional body; and strengthening 
the role of the state.
11 An ‘electrical failure’ occurred and the computer system suspiciously went down during the 
tallying of the ballots. In addition, after the election there were calls for a recount, however, half 
of the ballots were mysteriously lost in a fire.
l2‘Reduced majority vote for Salinas’, Latin American Weekly Reports (WR-88-29, 28 July 
1988), p. 2.
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signalled the beginning of the end for the seven-decade domination of the PRI. 
With almost half of its population at or below the poverty line, it could be argued 
that the reason for the strength of the FDN was due to the enormous additional 
social costs borne by the Mexican people because of the economic crisis and 
structural adjustment policies. The de la Madrid government may have indeed 
transformed the Mexican economy, but his sexenio witnessed the lowest growth 
rates in Mexico’s history (0.1 per cent) and mounting socio-political tensions.
Traditionally Mexican presidents have been quite adept at crisis 
management and President Salinas was no exception. When Salinas took office on 
1 December 1988, he promised a new era of pluralism, consultation and a clearer 
political system. Although protests of corruption and election manipulations still 
occurred throughout his administration, the opposition (primarily the right) were 
allowed to make some political gains. For the first time, governorships went to 
non-PRI candidates and in a few cases corrupt PRI officials were forced from 
office and the rightly elected official was allowed to take office.
In addition to the political openness, albeit quite small, Salinas instituted 
social reforms fully aware of the social costs created from the crisis and 
adjustment to the policy reforms. The president’s call for ‘social liberalism’ has 
included the controversial reform of the agrarian laws, in particular the ejido 
system, redefining the relationship with the church, educational reforms and of 
course, the politically astute programme called Solidaridad (the National Solidarity 
Programme). It is through Solidaridad that Salinas has managed to recoup the loss 
suffered by the PRI in the 1988 elections. The programme was launched to deal 
with the urgent social needs of society. The programme deals mainly with job 
creation, productive projects, health care, education, nutrition, food distribution, 
public services and basic infrastructure. Priority attention is given to Indian 
communities, disadvantaged campesinos and low-income neighbourhoods. In a 
departure from previous Mexican administrations, the Solidarity programme was 
presented as neither a populist nor a paternalistic programme. The funds for the 
programme were in line with an orthodox economic policy. The programme has
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not been financed by printing more money or increasing the public expenditure, 
but rather by primarily making use of the funds unblocked following renegotiation 
of the foreign debt and those funds from the divestiture of public enterprises. 
Opinions differ as to whether or not the true intentions of this social programme 
was to alleviate the costs from the decade of negative socio-economic welfare 
factors, or whether it was an adept move by a regime well versed in the means of 
co-optation. Regardless, President Salinas envisions himself not merely as a 
tecnico, but as a man with the vision and courage to modernize Mexico - the 
Gorbachev or Thatcher of Mexico.13
The Solidarity programme seems to have recouped the PRI hold over the 
Mexican political system. The 1991 mid -sexenio elections were far more 
favourable toward the ruling party than had been the case in the 1988 Presidential 
elections. In addition, the PRI has successfully diminished the appeal of the parties 
on both the right and the left. The neoliberal economic programme of the PAN has 
been completely taken on board by the Salinas administration and all the PAN 
seems to call for now is further political liberalization.14 The left-wing coalition, 
still led by the uncharismatic Cdrdenas, is not only a varied and diverse group 
representing former PRI officials and ex-communists, but their appeal has 
considerably lessened in the last few years. Cdrdenas’ populist platform and, most 
remarkably, his anti-Nafta stand have been considerably watered down. ,
According to Mexican tradition, Salinas has hand picked his successor - 
Luis Donaldo Colosio, the Secretary for Social Policy (head of the Solidaridad 
programme). Just as Lopez Portillo in selecting de la Madrid, chose a person he 
felt could address Mexico’s future needs, Salinas has chosen a man who seems to 
bridge the gap between the tecnicos and politicos. Colosio is not only a tecnico, 
but he has held elective posts before (he was a Senator for the state of Sonora) and
^Confidential Interview 2, Ministry of the Presidency, Mexico City, August 1992.
HLecture given by Luis Alvarez, leader of the PAN, The London School of Economics, 
London, March 1992.
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is on good terms with the politicos in the party. Thus, the outgoing president 
chooses an individual he perceives is good for the Mexican system and more 
importantly maintains the cohesion of the ruling party and its hold on Mexican 
political life. In this way, the institutional arrangements of the state have not 
changed much since the late 1920s.
In addition to the economic and political developments in post-1986 
Mexico, ideological considerations are important. The cohesion of the neoliberal 
epistemic community and the global ideological trends present challenges to the 
future of Mexican economic policymaking. The ideological developments are 
discussed below.
7.2.3 The Ideological Developments
The thesis has argued that trade liberalization and the broader development 
strategy of economic liberalization depended to a large degree on ‘the man and the 
hour’. The ‘man’ governing in post-1986 Mexico was a member of the neoliberal 
epistemic community. The de la Madrid administration shows a definitive shift 
toward a technocratic elite educated abroad, primarily in the US, with a 
concentration in economics. Significantly, this trend has continued and has been 
consolidated with an even more homogenous cabinet under President Salinas.
Pedro Aspe, Secretary of Treasury, has a BA in Economics from IT AM (private) 
and a PhD in Economics from MIT; Jose Cordorba, Secretary of Presidency, has 
a first degree and Masters in engineering and philosophy from France and a PhD 
in Economics from Stanford; Jaime Serra Puche, Secretary of Trade, has a politics 
degree from UNAM, a Masters in Economics from El Colegio de Mexico 
(private) and a PhD in Economics from Yale; Ernesto Zedillo, Secretary of 
Programming and Budget (before its dissolution), has an economics degree from 
the National Politechnical Institute (private) and a Masters and PhD in Economics 
from Yale; and Luis Donaldo Colosio, the Secretary for Social Policy (head of the 
Solidarity Programme), has a first degree in Economics at the Monterrey 
Technological Institute (private) and a PhD in Regional Development at the
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University of Pennsylvania. With the Salinas administration, the transnational links 
have been strengthened. Two noted MIT economists, Rudiger Dombusch and Paul 
Krugman, have constant contact with Salinas and his economic cabinet and 
frequently are consulted for economic policy advice.15 The broader implications 
that these epistemic communities have for the study and practice of international 
relations are essential to understanding domestic policy reform and transnational 
policy co-ordination.
It is significant that the Internationalist epistemic community is still in 
power in Mexico. If all goes as tradition would dictate, Colosio will be elected 
president in the Summer 1994. But one can never predict what policies and who 
the new president will choose. Whether the next Mexican president continues the 
trend in choosing like-minded tecnicos will determine to a large degree the 
cohesion of the governing elite and the continuation of the neoliberal economic 
policies. Colosio will most likely continue with the same economic policy, but he 
will have to spend a great deal of time addressing the more urgent social issues.
If the ‘man’ is the same in Mexico, will the timing still be right? There has 
been increasing scepticism about neoliberalism. The neoliberal resurgence draws 
criticism on welfare costs, economic effectiveness and political implications. The 
triumph of neoliberalism is not so clear cut. Will the lacklustre economic results of 
many developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s, including Mexico, lead to a 
resurgence of alternative approaches? If as Hirschman16 argued that policy shifts 
are explained in terms of cycles, is the pendulum now starting to swing toward the 
more public oriented life? If the dominant economic paradigm changes in the 
industrialized world, how long will it be before the majority of developing nations 
follow suit? Is the shift to economic liberalization merely an intellectual trend? If 
the change in economic policy is dependent to a certain degree on the ‘man and
15Confidential Interview 6, NAFTA negotiator for the Mexican Ministry of Trade, Mexico
City, July 1992 and Latin American Regional Report: Mexico & Nafta Report.
1<5See Chapter 5, section 5.1.
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hour’, then what will happen to economic policy direction when the leaders change 
or the social groups are no longer co-opted to the same extent by the state? Will 
the next economic crisis act as a catalyst for an entirely new policy direction? All 
these questions could be addressed in future research.
This thesis has provided an investigation into the political economy of 
Mexican trade liberalization in the early 1980s by identifying five determinants for 
policy change. The international and domestic variables are essential and mutually 
reinforcing factors for Mexican trade policy reform. By analyzing international 
regimes, epistemic communities and the Mexican domestic political process, the 
study has contributed to both the practice and study of international political 
economy. In this way, this thesis has both sought to advance the knowledge of 
policymaking in Mexico and theoretical conceptualizing more generally.
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Beyond Trade Liberalization
Although trade liberalization was the most successful, progress was made 
in other areas of structural reform. The de la Madrid government started the 
programme of privatization which was far more politically sensitive than trade 
liberalization. Mexico’s commitment to a strong state role in the economy was the 
oldest in Latin America dating back to the 1917 constitution. Mexicans, since the 
time of the nationalization of the oil companies in 1938, came to equate parastatals 
with the nation’s patrimony and sovereignty. When Ldpez Portillo nationalized the 
banks in September 1982, the decision was met with overwhelming support from 
the public. Despite the popularity of the nationalization measure, almost 
immediately after resuming office, President de la Madrid went about reversing 
that decision. In late 1982, the government signed a bill that would eventually lead 
to the return of the nationalized banks into the private sector. By the end of his 
sexenio, President de la Madrid returned 34 per cent of the bank stocks to private 
hands.1 President Salinas continued the important changes when, in May 1990, he 
introduced the constitutional reform to reestablish the private sector ownership of 
the commercial banking system. Out of the 18 commerical banks retained by the 
Mexican government since the 1982 nationalization, eight were sold between June 
and October 1991. The banks privatized amounted to more than 56 per cent of the 
country’s entire banking system.2
Although the political and social pressure President de la Madrid 
encountered was immense, he followed through with his policies of divestiture. In 
a policy shift that would have been inconceivable under his two predecessors, 
President de la Madrid merged, liquidated or sold a considerable amount of state-
l4History on hold’, Mexico Journal, (5 December 1988), p. 11.
2<Privatisation already half-complete’, Latin America Special Report (SR-91-06, December 
1991), p. 2.
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owned entities. Of the 1,155 in existence in December 1982, 680 remained four 
years later and less than 500 remained at the end of de la Madrid’s administration 
in 1988.3 As part of his project of reforming the Mexican state, President Salinas 
has moved divestiture further and by April 1991, only 195 parastatals were still in 
government control. Most importantly, Salinas has targeted some of the biggest 
enterprises in the public sector. The most outstanding being iron and steel 
enterprises, Teldfonos de Mexico, the commerical banking system and some would 
argue, Pemex. In July 1992, the Mexican government announced that in order to 
improve its efficiency and productivity, Pemex would be split into four semi- 
autonomous divisions. One of the divisions would be allowed to establish 
subsidiaries and enter into joint ventures with foreign companies.4 Many 
observers have commented that this is the beginning of the privatization of Pemex.
Although very little progress on financial liberalization was achieved during 
the de la Madrid government, only months before transferring power, the 
authorities allowed commercial banks to receive resources through bankers* 
acceptances, which boosted the availability of bank credit to the private sector.
This led to a reflow of resources into the banking sector by the end of 1988.5 
Only months after taking office, President Salinas adopted several measures to 
encourage banks to compete more effectively among themselves and with other 
financial intermediaries. The authorities eliminated controls on interest rates and 
maturities for most traditional bank instruments in order to encourage financial 
savings and improve the allocation of credit. Additionally, the former system of 
mandatory lending from banks to the public sector through reserve requirements 
was replaced by a simplified system of liquidity requirements, and the role of
3IMF, ‘Structural Reforms Lay Foundation For Medium-Term Growth in Mexico’, IMF 
Survey, (10 July, 1989), p. 212.
4‘Pemex being split into four units', Latin America Regional Reports: Mexico & Central 
America (RM-92-06, 16 July 1992), p. 2.
3Eliot Kalter and Hoe Ee Khor, ‘The Process of Structural Reform’, Finance & Development 
(September 1990), p. 23.
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open-market operations for monetary control was enhanced. In addition, legislation 
was passed that strengthened supervisory powers of the Bank cf Mexico over the 
banking system.
Although President de la Madrid made allowances to The 1973 Law fo r the 
Promotion o f Mexican Investment and Regulation o f Foreign Investment,6 it was 
not until the Salinas administration that foreign direct investment was liberalized.
In May 1989, the government announced a substantial liberalization of foreign 
investment regulations: foreign investors could now own 100 percent of enterprises 
valued up to US$100 million, without prior approval from the National Foreign 
Investment Commission. The new regulations permitted foreigners to invest in the 
Mexican stock market through specially designed trust funds.7 Recently, President 
Salinas has moved to eliminate all restrictions on foreign investment. All these 
liberalizing measures served to further the process of fundamental, structural 
change to Mexico’s post-Second World War development strategy.
Mexico and Free Trade
Mexico has attempted to expand and improve bilateral trade relations with Latin 
America, the European Union, the Pacific Basin and the North American 
countries. Since 70 per cent of Mexico’s trade is with the United States, this 
relationship is by far the most important. As was documented in Chapter Four, no 
bilateral trade agreement existed between Mexico and the United States until 1985. 
Since then, there has been a flurry of trade agreements. Table P. 1 highlights the 
major developments in the bilateral relations. The 1985 Bilateral Agreement 
(Mexico foreswore export subsidies and the United States provided the injury test)
6According to the 1973 law, the majority interest - at least 51 per cent - in all firms had to be
Mexican. President de la Madrid did make exceptions to this rule. The most publicized case is that 
of IBM in the mid-1980s.
7 Op. cit. , in footnote 3.
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Table P .l
Major developments in Mexico-US Bilateral Relations
Date Agreement
April 1985 1985 Bilateral Agreement
November 1987 1987 Framework Understanding
Framework of Principles and Procedures for Consultation Regarding Trade 
and Investment Relations.
December 1987 Sectoral accord on steel and alcoholic beverages reaches under the 
Framework Understanding.
February 1988 Sectoral accord on textiles and apparel under the Framework Understanding
January 1988-July 1989 Consultations and Plenary Sessions
October 1989 Trade and Investment Facilitation Talks (TIFTs)
June 1990 Free Trade Agreement talks initiated
Source: US International Trade Commission, The Likely Impact on the United States o f a Free Trade 
Agreement With Mexico, USITC Publication 2353 (Washington, DC: United States International Trade 
Commission, February 1991), pp. 1-8 - 1-9.
was renewed for additional three-year periods in 1988 and 1991. Because of the 
agreement, the number of cases brought against Mexican exports declined 
considerably. Whereas 1980 to 1985 saw 27 cases filed, only two were filed 
between 1985 and 1990.8
In November 1987, the two counties concluded negotiations begun in 1985 
with the 1987 Framework Understanding. This bilateral understanding was 
considered a landmark in economic relations between the two nations. The accord 
focused on Mexico’s need for export earnings to repay its foreign debt and on the 
creation of a mechanism for trade consultation, dispute resolution and mutual 
reduction of trade and investment barriers. Prior to this understanding, Mexico 
and the United States had no formal bilateral mechanism in which to regulate trade 
relations. Under the terms of the understanding, consultations on trade-related
8Gobiemo de Mexico, Mexican Agendat 12th edition (Mexico, DF: Direccidn de Publicaciones, 
July 1991), p. 30.
266
Trade Liberalization in Mexico Postscript
Table P.2
Major developments in the North American Free Trade Agreement, 1990 to 1994
Date Development
10 June 1990 President Carlos Salinas from Mexico and President George Bush from the 
US sign declaration advocating the idea of free trade agreement.
21 August 1990 President Salinas writes to President Bush proposing that they negotiate a 
free trade agreement, as per US law.
5 February 1991 President Bush, President Salinas and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney from 
Canada announce the they advocate a free trade agreement.
1 March 1991 President Bush asks the US Congress for a two year ‘Fast Track’ agreement 
for NAFTA.
23 to 24 May 1991 Congress approves the fast track provision.
31 December 1991 The basic text of the agreement is agreed.
February to August 1992 Negotiations between Mexican and US Trade Ministries.
12 August 1992 President Bush and the three trade ministers announce the negotiations have 
been successfully concluded.
7 October 1992 The three countries’ trade ministers sign the agreement in the presence of 
their political leaders.
17 December 1992 President Bush, President Salinas and Prime Minister Mulroney sign the 
NAFTA in their respective countries.
13 August 1993 Parallel agreements agreed.
14 September 1993 President Bill Clinton, President Salinas and Prime Minister Kim Campbell 
sign the parallel agreements in their respective countries.
3 November 1993 President Clinton sends the final text of the NAFTA to Congress for 
approval.
17 November 1993 US House of Representatives vote 234 to 200 in favour of the NAFTA.
1 January 1994 The North American Free Trade Agreement comes into effect.
Source: Latin American Regional Report: Mexico & NAFTA Report (RM-93-12, 2 December 1993), p. 
4.
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disputes are to commence 30 days after an initial request. If these discussions fail 
to resolve the dispute within 30 days, either country may resort to other means of 
dispute settlement, including the GATT procedures.9
The Trade and Investment Facilitation Talks (TIPTs)10 represented a 
fundamental turning point in bilateral commercial relations. Negotiations under the 
earlier Framework Understanding were held only as part of a consultative and 
dispute settlement mechanism. The mandate of the TIFT'S went further by 
providing for comprehensive trade and investment negotiations. In addition, 
previous attempts by the Mexican government to engage the United States in 
discussions on a sectoral basis had not been successful.11
Chapter Seven discussed Mexico’s negotiations for a North American Free 
Trade Agreement (Nafta). Table P.2 chronicals the three and one-half years of 
negotiations for the Nafta. The agreement came into effect on 1 January 1994. It 
provides concrete tariffs and provisions for ensuring open borders within Canada, 
the United States and Mexico. What follows are the details of the agreement:12
1) Market Access fo r  Products - Nafta will eliminate duties on all products 
immediately, or during five-, ten- or 15-year periods.
2) Agriculture - Nafta provides for immediate implementation of tariffs 
from non-tariff import barriers. It does not address aspects of the
9US International Trade Commission, Review o f Trade and Investment Liberalization Measures 
by Mexico and prospects fo r Future United States-Mexican Relations: Phase I: Recent Trade and 
Investment Reforms Undertaken by Mexico and Implications for the United States, Investigation No. 
332-282 (Washington, DC: United States International Trade Commission, April 1990), p. 2-3.
1(yThe mandate of the HFTs goes beyond that of the 1987 Framework Understanding. HFTs 
provides for comprehensive trade and investment negotiations which force the parties to focus on 
specific economic sectors as well as cross-sectoral issues. Under the TTFTs, the fact-finding and 
analysis in preparation of negotiations are performed by binational teams rather than based on 
exchanges between separate study groups on both sides.
nOp. Cit., in footnote 9, pp. 2-6.
!>rhe information is derived from Stephen Lande and Nellis Crigler, ‘NAFTA & Uruguay 
Round Provisions', Business Mexico (Vol. 4, Nos. 1 and 2, Special Edition 1994), pp. 10-12.
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agricultural programme such as levels of export subsidies and internal 
supports.
3) Textiles and Clothing - Nafta eliminates quantitative controls 
immediately.
4) Safeguards - A safeguard clause is where a country can impose 
temporary restrictions against surges in low-priced imports. Nafta does not 
exempt its members from all global safeguard actions but provides that 
such actions not be taken against a Nafta partner unless it counts among the 
five largest suppliers of a product and is found to contribute to serious 
injury.
5) Antidumping - Nafta did not address antidumping laws in member 
countries other than requiring Mexico to establish procedures equivalent to 
international norms.
6) Subsidies and Countervailing Measures - Nafta did not modify specific 
subsidy and countervailing duty practices, but did establish panels and 
requirements to review the operation of the law among member countries.
7) Trade-Belated Investment Measures - Nafta bans local content 
requirements and trade balancing requirements after a transition period. 
Nafta requires the best of national or most-favoured-nation treatment for 
investors and private party-state arbitration for investment disputes.
8) Services - In trade negotiation, services include professions (accounting, 
architecture, engineering), other business services (computer services, 
rental and leasing, advertising, market research, consulting, 
telecommunications, courier services and audio visuals) construction, 
distribution (wholesale, retail, franchising) educational, environmental, 
financial (banking, securities, insurance), health and tourism. Nafta 
provides for comprehensive liberalization of services.
9) Intellectual Property Rights - Nafta established significantly improved 
standards for the protection of intellectual property rights: copyrights 
(including computer programmes, sound recordings, motion pictures) 
patents, trade secrets, integrated circuits and industrial designs. Nafta 
includes biological patents and, at least between Mexico and the United 
States, audio visual.
10) Environment - Nafta is the ‘greenest’ trade agreement yet negotiated. 
Nafta explicitly protects countries’ environmental standards from 
challenges, as long as they are administered in a non-discriminatory fashion 
and are based on scientific evidence. Nafta allows for trade-sanction 
provisions in certain environmental agreements to take precedence over
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Nafta provisions. Finally, Nafta side agreements establish for the first time 
an environmental commission.
11) Labour - The Nafta side accord on labour establishes for the first time 
a labour commission.
The de la Madrid administration proved to be the watershed for fundamental 
structural changes. Twelve years after Miguel de la Madrid came to power, 
Mexico had completely altered the course of its development strategy: it 
substantially opened its trade regime, cut by more than three-quarters the number 
of parastatals, liberalized the financial sector and removed most restrictions to 
foreign investment. Just as membership to the GATT had demonstrated a 
commitment to long-term structural change, the recent Nafta agreement indicates 
Mexico’s serious intent to embrace the notion of free trade.
270
Bibliography
Books and Articles
Acevedo de Silva, Maria Guadalupe, ‘Crisis del desarrollismo y transformation 
del aparato estatal: Mexico 1970-75,* Revista Mexicana de Ciencias 
Politicos y Sociales, Vol. 21, Num. 82, octubre - diciembre 1975.
Adler, Emmanuel, The Power o f Ideology, Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1987.
Allison, Graham, Essence o f Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co., 1971.
Arndt, H. W., ‘The Origins of Structuralism,* World Development, Vol. 13, No. 
2, February 1985.
Aspe, Pedro, ‘Stabilization and Structural Change: The Mexican Experience,’ The 
Lionel Robbins Memorial Lecture, The London School of Economics,
20-22 January 1992.
Aspra, L. Antonio, ‘Import Substitution in Mexico: Past and Present,’ World 
Development, Vol. 5, Nos. 1/2, 1977.
Ayres, Robert, Banking on the Poor, London: MIT Press, 1983.
Baer, Werner, ‘Import Substitution and Industrialization in Latin America:
Experiences and Interpretations,* Latin American Research Review, Vol. 8, 
No. 1, 1972.
Bailey, John, Governing Mexico: The Statecraft o f Crisis Management, London: 
Macmillan Press, 1988.
Bailey, John, ‘The Impact of Major Groups on Policy-Making Trends in 
Govemment-Business Relations in Mexico,* in Roderic Camp (ed.), 
Mexico’s Political Stability: The Next Five Years, London: Westview Press,
1986.
Bailey, John, ‘Presidency, Bureaucracy, and Administrative Reform in Mexico: 
The Secretetriat of Programming and Budget,’ Inter-American Economic 
Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 1, Summer 1980.
Bailey, John and GOmez, Leopoldo, ‘The PRI and Political Liberalization,’
Journal o f International Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 2, Winter 1990.
Baker HI, James A, ‘Statement before the Joint Annual Meeting of the IMF and 
World Bank, October 8, Seoul, Korea,’ Treasury News, Washington, DC,
1985.
Balassa, Bela, and Associates, The Structure o f Protection in Developing
Countries, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press for the IBRD 
and IDB, 1971.
Basanez, Miguel, 20 Years o f Crisis in Mexico, 1968-1988, PhD Thesis, London: 
The London School of Economics and Political Science, 1991.
Basanez, Miguel, ‘Elections and Political Culture in Mexico,’ in Judith
Gentleman, Mexican Politics in Transition, London: Westview Press, 1987.
Basave, Jorge, et al, ‘La Nationalization de la Banca,’ Teorfa y Politico, Nos.
7-8, deciembre 1982.
Bauer, Peter, Equality, The Third World, and Economic Delusion, London: 
Weindenfeld and Nicolson, 1981.
271
Trade Liberalization in Mexico Bibliography
Bhagwati, Jagdish N., Anatomy and Consequences o f Exchange Control Regimes 
Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1978.
Biersteker, Thomas J., ‘The "Triumph" of Neoclassical Economics in the
Developing World: Policy Convergence and Bases of Governance in the 
International Economic Order,’ in James Rosenau and Emst-Otto Czempiel 
(eds), Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World 
Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Boaz, David, Assessing the Reagan Years, Washington, DC: The Cato Institute,
1988.
Bravo Aguilera, Luis, ‘Mexico’s Foreign Trade Policies and Commercial
Relations with the United States,* in William Glade and Cassio Luiselli 
(eds), The Economics o f Interdependence: Mexico and the United States, 
Volume 2, San Diego, CA: University of California, San Diego, Center for 
US - Mexican Studies, 1989.
Brock, in , William E., ‘Trade and Debt: The Vital Linkage,* Foreign Affairs,
Vol. 62, No. 5, Summer 1984.
Bull, Hedley, The Anarchical Society: A Study o f Order in World Politics,
London: Macmillan Press, 1977.
Camp, Roderic A., Entrepreneurs And Politics in Twentieth-Century Mexico, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.
Camp, Roderic A., ‘Intellectuals: Agents of Change in Mexico?,’ Journal o f 
Interamerican Studies, Vol. 23, No.3, August 1981.
Camp, Roderic A., The Making o f a Government: Political Leaders in Modem 
Mexico, Tucson, AZ: The University of Arizona Press, 1984.
Camp, Roderic A., ‘Overview,* in R. Camp (ed.), Mexico*s Political Stability:
The Next Five Years, London: Westview Press, 1986.
Camp, Roderic A., ‘The Political Technocrat in Mexico and the Survival of the 
Political System,’ Latin American Research Review, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1985.
Camp, Roderic A., Who’s Who In Mexico Today, Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1988.
Cline, W. R., ‘Can The East Asian Model of Development Be Generalised?,’ 
World Development, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1982.
Cline, W. R., International Debt, Washington, DC: Institute for International 
Economics, 1986.
Coats, A. W., ‘Economic Ideas and Economists in Government: Accomplishments 
and Frustrations,’ in David C. Colander and A. W. Coats (eds), The 
Spread o f Economic Ideas, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Colander, David C. and Coats, A. W. (eds), The Spread o f Economic Ideas 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Colclough, Christopher, ‘Structuralism versus Neo-liberalism: An Introduction,’ 
in C. Colclough and J. Manor (eds), States or Markets?: Neo-liberalism 
and the Development Policy Debate, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991.
Collier, David (ed.), The New Authoritarianism in Latin America, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1979.
272
Trade Liberalization in Mexico Bibliography
Commander, Simon and Killick, Tony, ‘Privatisation in Developing Countries: A 
Survey of the Issues,* in P. Cook and C. Kirkpatrick (eds), Privatisation in 
Less Developed Countries, Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1988.
Cordera, Rolando and Tello, Carlos, Mixico, la disputa por la nacidn:
perspectivas y opciones del desarrollo, Mexico, DF: Siglo Ventiuno 
Editores, 1981.
Cornelius, Wayne A., The Political Economy o f Mexico Under de la Madrid: The 
Crisis Deepens, 1985 - 1986, San Diego, CA: University of California, San 
Diego, Center for US - Mexican Studies, 1986.
Cox, Robert W., ‘Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in 
Method,* Millennium: Journal o f International Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2, 
Summer 1983.
Crockett, Andrew, ‘Issues in the Use of Fund Resources,’ Finance and 
Development, June 1982.
Cypher, John M., State and Capital in Mexico: Development Policy Since 1940, 
Oxford: Westview Press, 1990.
Dahl, Robert, Polyarchy, Participation, and Opposition, London: Yale University 
Press, 1971.
Dahl, Robert, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City,
London: Yale University Press, 1961.
Dieguez, H., Social Consequences o f the Economic Crisis: Mexico, Washington, 
DC: IBRD, 1985.
Diwan, Ishac and Saldanho, Fernando, Long Term Prospects in Eastern Europe, 
Washington, DC: World Bank, June 1991.
Dos Santos, T., ‘The Crisis of Development Theory and the Problem of
Dependence in Latin America,* in H. Bernstein (ed.), Underdevelopment 
and Development: The Third World Today, Hammondsworth: Penguin 
Books, 1973.
Dunleavy, Patrick and O’Leary, Brendan, Theories o f the State: The Politics o f 
Liberal Democracy, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987.
Duran, Esperanza, ‘Mexico’s 1986 Financial Rescue: Palliative or Cure?,’ in G. 
Philip (ed.), The Mexican Economy, London: Routledge, 1988.
Enriquez, Rosario, ‘The Rise and Collapse of Stabilizing Development,’ in G. 
Philip (ed.), The Mexican Economy, London: Routledge, 1988.
Erb, Guy F., ‘U.S.-Mexico Trade Relations,’ in Pamela S. Falk, Petroleum and 
Mexico *s Future, London: Westview Press, 1987.
Escobar Toledo, Saul, ‘Rifts in the Mexican Power Elite, 1976 - 1986,’ in
S. Maxfield and R. Anzaldua Montoya, Government and Private Sector in 
Contemporary Mexico, San Diego, CA: Monograph Series 20, Center for 
US - Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1987.
Faber, Mike, ‘Dissent on Debt: The Implications of Mexico’s 1986 Rescheduling,’ 
Development Policy Review, Vol. 5, No. 3, September 1987.
Falk, Pamela S. (ed.), Petroleum and Mexico*s Future, London: Westview Press,
1987.
273
Trade Liberalization in Mexico Bibliography
Falk, Pamela S., ‘Prdlogo,’ in Blanca Torres y Pamela S. Falk (coordinadoras),
La Adhesidn de Mixico al GATT, Mexico, DF: El Colegio de Mexico,
1989.
Femdndez Hurtado, Ernest (ed.), Cincuenta Aflos de Banca Central: Ensayos 
Conmemorativos, Mexico, DF: Fondo de Cultura Econdmica, 1976.
Fitzgerald, E. V. K., ‘Stabilization Policy in Mexico: The Fiscal Deficit and 
Macroeconomic Equilibrium, 1960-1977,’ in Rosemary Thorpe and 
Laurence Whitehead (eds), Inflation and Stabilization in Latin America 
London: Macmillan, 1979.
Fontaine, Arturo, Los economistas y el presidente Pinochet, Santiago: Zig-Zag,
1988.
Frank, Andre Gunder, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America:
Historical Studies o f Chile and Brazil, New York, NY: Monthly Review 
Press, 1969.
Galarza, Ernesto, Merchants o f Labour: The Mexican Bracero Story, Charlotte, 
NC: McNally & Lofting, 1964.
Galvan, Roberto, ‘Mexico Looks East: The Hard Facts on the Rim,’ Business 
Mexico, March 1990.
Garritsen de Vries, Margaret, Balance o f Payments Adjustment, 1945 to 1986: The 
IMF Experience, Washington, DC: IMF, 1987.
Gentleman, Judith, Mexican Oil and Dependent Development, New York, NY: 
Peter Lang, 1984.
Gentleman, Judith (ed.), Mexican Politics in Transition, London: Westview Press, 
1987.
Gilpin, Robert, The Political Economy o f International Relations, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1987.
Glade, William P ., ‘Distributional and Sectoral Problems in the New Economic 
Policy,’ in R. Camp (ed.), Mexico’s Political Stability: The Next Five 
Years, London: Westview Press, 1986.
Glade, William P., ‘How Will Economic Recovery Be Managed?,* in R. Camp 
(ed.), Mexico's Political Stability: The Next Five Years, London: Westview 
Press, 1986.
Glade, William P. and Luiselli, Cassio (eds), The Economics o f Interdependence: 
Mexico and the United States, Volume 2, San Diego, CA: University of 
California, San Diego, Center for US - Mexican Studies, 1989.
Goddard, Haynes C., ‘Evaluating the Benefits and Costs of Mexico’s Border 
Industrialization Program,’ in Lay James Gibson and Alfonso Corona 
Renteria (eds), The U.S. and Mexico: Borderland Development and the 
National Economies, London: Westview Press, 1985.
Goldstein, J., ‘The Impact of Ideas on Trade Policy,’ International Organization, 
Vol. 43 , Winter 1989.
Goldstein, Morris, The Global Effects o f Fund-Supported Adjustment Programs 
Washington, DC: IMF, 1986.
274
Trade Liberalization in Mexico Bibliography
Gonzalez Casanova, Pablo and Aguilar Camin, Hector, Mexico Ante la Crisis, 
Vols. 1 and 2, Mexico City, DF: Siglo Ventiuno Editores, 1985.
Gonzdlez Casanova, Pablo and Florescano, Enrique (eds), Mexico Hoy, Mexico, 
DF: Siglo Ventiuno Editores, 1979.
Gourevitch, Peter, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International 
Economic Crises, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986.
Grayson, George W., Oil and Mexican Foreign Policy, Pittsburgh, PA: University 
of Pittsburgh Press, 1988.
Grayson, George W., The Politics o f Mexican Oil, Pittsburgh, PA: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1980.
Gribomont, C. and Rfmez, M., ‘La polftica econdmica del gobiemo de Luis
Echeverria (1971-1976): Un primer ensayo de interpretacion,* El trimestre 
economico, Vol. 44, No. 176, octubre-diciembre 1977.
Grindle, Merilee S., Bureaucrats, Politicians and Peasants in Mexico, Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 1977.
Grindle, Merilee S. and Thomas, John W., Public Choices and Policy Change:
The Political Economy o f Reform in Developing Countries, London: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1991.
Guitidn, Manuel, Fund Conditionality: Evolution o f Principles and Practices, 
Pamphlet No. 38, Washington, DC: IMF, 1981.
Haas, Peter M., ‘Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy 
Coordination,* International Organization, Vol. 46, N o.l, Winter 1992.
Haas, Peter M., ‘Obtaining International Environmental Protection through 
Epistemic Consensus,* in Ian H., Rowlands and Malory Greene (eds), 
Global Environmental Change and International Relations, London: 
Macmillan, 1992.
Haggard, Stephan, ‘The Politics of Adjustment: Lessons from the IMF’s Extended 
Fund Facility,* International Organization, Vol. 39, No. 3, Summer 1985.
Hall, Peter, ‘Conclusion: The Politics of Keynesian Ideas,’ in P. Hall (ed.), The 
Political Power o f Economic Ideas, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1989.
Hall, Peter (ed.), The Political Power o f Economic Ideas: Keynesianism Across 
Nations, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989.
Halliday, Fred, The Making o f the Second Cold War, 2nd edition, London: Verso,
1986.
Halperin, Morton, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institute, 1974.
Hamilton, Nora, The Limits o f State Autonomy: Post-revolutionary Mexico, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982.
Hampson, Fen, Fcm ing Economic Policy: The Case o f Energy in Canada and 
Mexico, London: Pinter Publishers, 1986.
Hansen, Roger D., The Politics o f Mexican Development, Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1971.
275
Trade Liberalization in Mexico Bibliography
Haseler, Stephen, The Battle fo r Britain: Thatcher and the New Liberals, London: 
I. B. Tauris, 1989.
Hemdndez Cervantez, Hdctor, ‘La Polftica de Comercio Exterior de Mdxico,* El 
Economista Mexicano, julio-agosto, 1981.
Hinds, M., Issues in the Introduction o f Market Forces in Eastern European 
Economies, Washington, DC: World Bank, 1990.
Hirschman, Albert O., ‘How Keynesian Revolution Was Exported from The 
United States, and Other Comments,* in Peter Hall (ed.), The Political 
Power o f Economic Ideas, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1989.
Hirschman, Albert O., Shifting Involvements: Private Interest and Public Action 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982.
Hobbs, Jeremy, The Role o f Business Organisations in the Transition from an
Import Substituting to an Export-oriented Model o f Growth in Mexico After 
1982, PhD thesis, Colchester: University of Essex, 1991.
Hollis, Martin and Smith, Steve, Explaining and Understanding International 
Relations j  Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991.
Ikenberry, G. J., ‘A World Economy Restored: Expert Consensus and the
Anglo-American Postwar Settlement,* International Organization, Vol. 46, 
No. 1, Winter 1992.
Ikenberry, G. J., Lake, D. and Mastanduno, M. (eds), The State and American 
Foreign Economic Policy, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988.
Janis, I., Groupthink, 2nd ed., Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co., 1982.
Jervis, R., Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1977.
Johnson, Christopher, The Economy Under Thatcher, 1979-1990, London: Penguin 
Books, 1991.
Johnson, Kenneth F., Mexican Democracy: A Critical View, 3rd ed., London: 
Praeger, 1984.
Jones, Charles A., The North-South Dialogue: A Brief History, London: Pinter 
Publishers, 1983.
Kahler, Miles, ‘External Influence, Conditionality and the Politics of Adjustment,’ 
in Stephen Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman (eds), The Politics o f 
Economic Adjustment, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992.
Kahler, Miles, ‘Orthodoxy and Its Alternatives: Explaining Approaches to
Stabilization and Adjustment,’ in Joan M. Nelson (ed.), Economic Crisis 
and Policy Change: The Politics o f Adjustment in the Third World 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990.
Kalter, Eliot and Khor, Hoe Ee, ‘The Process of Structural Reform’, Finance & 
Development, September 1990.
Katzenstein, Peter J. (ed.), Between Power and Plenty, London: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1978.
276
Trade Liberalization in Mexico Bibliography
Kaufman, Robert R., The Politics o f Debt in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico: 
Economic Stabilization in the 1980s, Berkeley, CA: Institute of 
International Studies, University of California Press, 1988.
Kay, Cristobal, Latin American Theories o f Development and Underdevelopment, 
London: Routledge, 1989.
Keohane, Robert O., After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World 
Political Economy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.
Keohane, Robert O., ‘The Demand for International Regimes,’ International 
Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2, Spring 1982.
Keohane, Robert O., Neorealism and its Critics, New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 1986.
Keohane, Robert O., ‘The World Political Economy and the Crisis of Embedded 
Liberalism,’ in John H. Goldthorpe (ed.), Order and Conflict in 
Contemporary Capitalism, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984.
Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph, Power and Interdependence, 2nd ed. 
London: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1989.
Keynes, J. M., The General Theory o f Employment, Interest and Money, London: 
Macmillan, 1936.
Khan, M., Montiel, P. and Haque, N., Adjustment with Growth: Relating the
Analytical Approaches o f the World Bank and the IMF, Washington, DC: 
World Bank, 1986.
Kindleberger, Charles, The World in Depression, 1929-39, Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1987.
Knopf, Jeffrey W., ‘Beyond Two-level Games: Domestic-International Interaction 
in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Negotiations’, International 
Organization, Vol. 47, Autumn, 1993.
Knutsen, Torbjom, A History o f International Relations Theory, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1992.
Koekkoek, K. A., ‘The Integration of Developing Countries in the GATT 
System’, World Development, Vol. 16, No. 8, 1988.
Kouyoumdjian, Armen, ‘The Miguel De La Madrid Sexenio: Major Reforms or 
Foundation for Disaster?,* in George Philip (ed.), The Mexican Economy, 
London: Routledge, 1988.
Krasner, Stephen, Defending the National Interest, Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1978.
Krasner, Stephen, ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences,’ International 
Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2, Spring 1982.
Krieger, Joel, Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics o f Decline, Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1986.
Krueger, Anne O., Liberalization Attempts and Consequences, Cambridge, MA: 
Ballinger for the National Bureau of Economic Research, 1977.
Kuczynski, Pedro-Pablo, Latin American Debt, A Twentieth Century Fund Book, 
London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988.
277
1Trade Liberalization in Mexico Bibliography
Lai, Deepak, The Poverty o f Development Economics, London: Institute of 
Economic Affairs, 1983.
Lande, Stephen and Crigler, Nellis, ‘NAFTA & Uruguay Round Provisions,* 
Business Mexico, Vol. 4, Nos. 1 and 2, Special Edition 1994.
Langston, T. S., Ideologues and Presidents, London: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1992.
Levy, Daniel, ‘The Political Consequences of Changing Socialization Patterns,* 
in R. Camp (ed.), Mexico's Political Stability: The Next Five Years, 
London: Westview Press, 1986.
Levy, Daniel and Szdkely, Gabriel, Mexico: Paradoxes o f Stability and Change, 
Boulder, CO: Westview, 1983.
Lipton, David and Sachs, Jeffrey, ‘Creating a Market Economy,* Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 1, 1990.
Little, Ian, Economic Development: Theoryf Policy and International Relations 
New York, NY: Basic Books, 1982.
Little, Ian, Scitovsky, T. and Scott, M., Industry and Trade in Some Developing 
Countries, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970.
Looney, Robert E., Economic Policymaking in Mexico: Factors Underlying the 
1982 Crisis, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1985.
L<5pez G., Julio, ‘The Mexican Economy: Present Situation, Perspectives and 
Alternatives,* World Development, Vol. 11, No. 5, 1983.
Ldpez Moreno, Javier, Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado un Presidente Ante La
Prensa: Entrevistas 1982-87, Tomo I, Mexico, DF: Miguel Angel Pumia, 
1987.
Ldpez Portillo, Jos6, Mis Tiempos: Biografla y  Testimonio Politico, Parte 
Segundo, Mdxico, DF: Femdndez editores, 1988.
Love, Joseph L., ‘Raul Prebisch and the Origins of the Doctrine of Unequal 
Exchange, ’ Latin American Research Review, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1980.
Lowi, Theodore, The End o f Liberalism: The Second Republic o f the United 
States, 2nd ed, New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 1979.
Luna, M., Tirado R. and Valdes, F., ‘Businessmen and Politics in Mexico, 1982 -
1986,’ in S. Maxfield and R. Anzaldua Montoya (eds), Government and 
Private Sector in Contemporary Mexico, Monograph Series 20, San Diego, 
CA: Center for US - Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego,
1987.
Lustig, Nora, ‘The Mexican Economy in the Eighties: An Overview,’ in F.
Desmond Me Carthy (ed.), Problems o f Developing Countries in the 1990s, 
Vol. n, Washington, DC: IBRD, World Bank Papers #98, 1990.
Lyman, Donald, ‘US-Mexican Relations: Time for Change,’ in S. Purcell (ed.), 
Mexico in Transition, Implications fo r US Policy: Essays from Both Sides 
o f the Border, New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988.
Madrid Hurtado, Miguel de la, Cien Dias Contra La Crisis, Mexico, DF: 
Direccidn General de Comunicacidn Social de la Presidencia de la 
Republica, marzo, 1983.
278
Trade Liberalization in Mexico Bibliography
Madrid Hurtado, Miguel de la, Cien Tesis Sobre M ixico, Mdxico, DF: Editorial 
Grijalbo, S.A., 1982.
Madrid Hurtado, Miguel de la, ‘El Compromiso,’ Consulta Popular, Mexico, DF: 
PRI/IEPES, marzo 1982.
Madrid Hurtado, Miguel de la, ‘Cultural Relations between Mexico and the United 
States,’ Voices o f Mexico, July-September, 1992.
Madrid Hurtado, Miguel de la, National Development Plan 1983-88: Federal
Executive Branch Summary, Mexico, DF: Ministry of Planning and Budget, 
May 1983.
Malloy, J. M. (ed.), Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America, 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977.
Marcel, M. and Palma, G., The Debt Crisis, London: Fabian Society, Fabian 
Research Series 350, October 1987.
March, James G. and Olsen, Johan P., ‘The New Institutionalism*, American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 78, No. 3, September 1984
Maxfield, Sylvia and Anzaldua Montoya, R. (eds), Government and Private Sector 
in Contemporary Mexico, Monograph Series 20, San Diego, CA: Center 
for US - Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1987.
Maxfield, Sylvia, ‘International Economic Opening and Govemment-Business 
Relations,* in W. Cornelius, J. Gentleman, and P. Smith (eds), Mexico*s 
Alternative Political Futures, Monograph Series 30, San Diego, CA: Centre 
for US-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1989.
McBride, Robert H., Mexico and the United States, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall Inc., 1981.
Meyer, Lorenzo, ‘Historical Roots of the Authoritarian State in Mexico,* in Jos6 
Reyna and Richard S. Weinert (eds), Authoritarianism in Mexico, 
Philadelphia, PA: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1977.
Meyer, Michael C. and Sherman, William L., The Course o f Mexican History, 4th 
ed., New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1991.
Middlebrook, Kevin J., ‘The CTM and the Future of State-Labor Relations,’ in 
W. Cornelius, J. Gentleman, and P. Smith (eds), Mexico*s Alternative 
Political Futures, Monograph Series 30, San Diego, CA: Centre for US- 
Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1989.
Middlebrook, Kevin J., ‘Dilemmas of Change in Mexican Politics,’ World 
Politics, Vol. 41, No. 1, 1988.
Migdal, Joel, ‘Strong States, Weak States: Power and Accommodation,’ in Myron 
Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington (eds), Understanding Political 
Development, Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co., 1987.
Miller, Robert Ryal, Mexico: A History, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1985.
Mirowski, Philip and Helper, Susan, ‘Maquiladoras: Mexico’s Tiger by the Tail?’, 
Challenge, May-June, 1989.
Morse, Edward, Modernization and the Transformation o f International Relations, 
New York, NY: Free Press, 1976.
279
Trade Liberalization in Mexico Bibliography
Mosca, G., The Ruling Class, New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1939.
Nelson, Joan, ‘Conclusions,’ in J. Nelson, Economic Crisis and Policy Change: 
The Politics o f Adjustment in the Third World, Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1990.
Newell, Roberto G. and Rubio F., Luis, Mexico’s Dilemma: The Political Origins 
o f Economic Crisis, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984.
Nordlinger, Eric A., On the Autonomy o f the Democratic State, Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1981.
O’Brien, P., ‘A Critique of Latin American Theories of Dependency,* in I. Oxaal, 
et al., (eds), Beyond The Sociology o f Development, London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1975.
O’Donnell, G., et al., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America, 
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.
Olson, Mancur, ‘How Ideas Affect Societies: Is Britain the Wave of the Future?,* 
in Andrew Gamble (ed.), Ideas, Interests & Consequences, London: 
Institute of Economic Affairs, 1989.
Olson, Mancur, The Rise and Decline o f Nations, London: Yale University Press,
1982.
Pareto, V., The Mind and Society, Vol. 3, London: Cape, 1935.
Parkes, Henry Bamford, A History o f Mexico, London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 
1960.
Pastor, Jr., Manuel, ‘Latin America, the Debt Crisis, and the IMF*, Latin 
American Perspectives, Vol. 16, N o.l, 1989.
Pastor, Robert A. (ed.), Latin America’s Debt Crisis: Adjusting to the Past or 
Planning fo r the Future?, London: Lynne Rienner, 1987.
Payer, Cheryl, The Debt Trap: The IMF and the Third World, Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1974.
Philip, George (ed.), The Mexican Economy, London: Routledge, 1988.
Philip, George (ed.), Politics in Mexico, London: Croom Helm, 1985.
Philip, George, The Presidency in Mexican Politics, Basingstoke: Macmillan,
1992.
Poulantzas, Nicos, Political Power and Social Classes, London: New Left Books, 
Sheed and Leard, 1973.
Prebisch, Raul, Change and Development - Latin America’s Great Task, New
York, NY: Praeger, in co-operation with the Inter-American Development 
Bank, 1971.
Prebisch, Raul, ‘Commercial Policies in the Underdeveloped Countries,*
American Economic Review. May 1959.
Purcell, John F. H., ‘Mexican Social Issues,’ in Susan Kaufman Purcell (ed.), 
Mexico-United States Relations, New York, NY: Academy of Political 
Science, Vol. 34, No. 1, 1981.
Purcell, John F. H. and Purcell, Susan K., ‘Mexican Business and Public Policy,* 
in James Malloy (ed.), Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America, 
Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977.
Trade Liberalization in Mexico Bibliography
Purcell, Susan Kaufman, ‘Decision-Making in an Authoritarian Regime:
Theoretical Implications from a Mexican Case Study,* World Politics 
Vol 26, October 1973.
Purcell, Susan Kaufman (ed.), Mexico in Transition, Implications fo r US Policy: 
Essays from Both Sides o f the Border, New York, NY: Council on Foreign 
Relations, 1988.
Putnam, Robert D., ‘Diplomacy Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, 
International Organization, Vol. 42, Summer 1988.
Ramirez, Miguel D., Mexico's Economic Crisis, New York, NY: Praeger, 1989.
Randall, Laura R., ‘Mexican Development and It’s Effects Upon US Trade,* in R. 
McBride, Mexico and the United States, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice- 
Hall Inc., 1981.
Remmer, Karen, ‘The Politics of Economic Stabilization: IMF Standby Programs 
in Latin America,’ Comparative Politics, October 1986.
Reyna, Jos6 and Weinert, Richard S. (eds), Authoritarianism in Mexico, 
Philadelphia, PA: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1977.
Ripley, Randall B. and Franklin, Grace A., Congress, The Bureaucracy and 
Public Policy, Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, 1980.
Roett, Riordan (ed.), Mexico's External Relations in the 1990s, London: Lynne 
Rienner, 1991.
Ros, J., ‘Mexico from the Oil Boom to the Debt Crisis,’ in R. Thorpe and L.
Whitehead (eds), Latin American Debt and the Adjustment Crisis, Oxford: 
Oxford Un'versity Press, 1987.
Rosenberg, Justin, ‘The International Imagination: C. Wright Mills and IR 
Theory,’ unpublished manuscript, 1993.
Rosenau, James, ‘Toward the Study of National-International Linkages’, Linkage 
Politics: Essays on the Convergence o f National and International Systems, 
New York, NY: Cornell University Press, 1969.
Roxborough, Ian, Theories o f Underdevelopment, London: Macmillan, 1979.
Rubio F., L., ‘The Changing Role of the Private Sector,’ in S. K. Purcell (ed.), 
Mexico in Transition, Implications fo r US Policy: Essays from Both Sides 
o f the Border, New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988.
Salant, Walter S., ‘The Spread of Keynesian Doctrines and Practices in the United 
States,* in Peter Hall (ed.), The Political Power o f Economic Ideas: 
Keynesianism across Nations, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1989.
Schmitz, Herbert, ‘Industrial Strategies in Less Developed Countries,’ Journal o f 
Development Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1, October 1984.
Sebenius, James, ‘Bargainers with Shared Beliefs’, International Organization,
Vol. 46, No. 1, Winter 1992.
Seers, Dudley, ‘Development Options: The Strengths and Weaknesses of
Dependency Theories in Explaining A Government’s Room to Manoeuvre,’ 
Dependency Theory, London: Francis Pinter, 1981.
Sklair, Leslie, Assembling fo r Development: The Maquila Industry in Mexico and 
the United States, London: Unwin Hyman, 1989.
281
Trade Liberalization in Mexico Bibliography
Sklair, Leslie, ‘Mexico’s Maquiladora Programme: A Critical Evaluation,* 
in G. Philip (ed.), The Mexican Economy, London: Routledge, 1988.
Skocpol, Theda, ‘Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current 
Research,* in P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol (eds), Bringing 
the State Back In, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Smith, G., Reagan and Thatcher, London: Bodley Head, 1990.
Smith, Peter H., ‘Does Mexico Have A Power Elite?,* in Josd Reyna and Richard 
S. Weinert (eds), Authoritarianism in Mexico, Philadelphia, PA: Institute 
for the Study of Human Issues, 1977.
Smith, Peter H., labyrinths o f Power, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1979.
Smith, Peter H., ‘Leadership and Change, Intellectuals and Technocrats in
Mexico,’ in R. Camp (ed.), Mexico*s Political Stability: The Next Five 
Years, London: Westview Press, 1986.
Snidal, Duncan, ‘The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,’ International 
Organization, Vol. 39, No. 4, Autumn 1985.
Solis, Leopoldo, Economic Policy Reform in Mexico, New York, NY: Pergamon, 
1981.
Spalding, Rose J., ‘State Power and its Limits: Corporatism in Mexico,’ 
Comparative Political Studies, Vol, 14, No. 2, July 1981.
Spanier, John and Uslander, Eric M., American Foreign Policy Malang and the 
Democratic Dilemmas, fourth ed., London: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 
1985.
Stallings, Barbara, ‘International Influence on Economic Policy: Debt,
Stabilization, and Structural Reform,* in Stephen Haggard and Robert R. 
Kaufman (eds), The Politics o f Economic Adjustment, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1992.
Story, Dale, Industry, The State, And Public Policy in Mexico, Austin, TX: 
University of Texas Press, Austin, 1986.
Story, Dale, The Mexican Ruling Party: Stability and Authority, Politics in Latin 
America, A Hoover Institution Series, London: Praeger, 1986.
Strange, Susan, 'Cave! hie dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis,* in Stephen 
Krasner (ed.), International Regimes, London: Cornell University Press,
1983.
Strange, Susan, ‘The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony,’ International 
Organization, Vol. 41, No. 4, Autumn 1987.
Streeten, Paul, ‘From Growth to Basic Needs’, Finance and Development, Vol.
16, September 1979.
Sutton, Mary, ‘Introduction and Summary,* in T. Killick (ed.), The IMF and 
Stabilisation: Developing Country Experiences, London: Overseas 
Development Institute, 1984.
Teichman, Judith A., ‘Mexico and Economic Change,’ Latin American 
Perspectives, Vol. 19, No. 2, Spring 1992.
282
Trade Liberalization in Mexico Bibliography
Teichman, Judith A., Policymaking in Mexico: From Boom to Crisis, London: 
Allen & Unwin, 1988.
Tello, Carlos, La Nacionalizacidn de la Banca en Mexico, Mexico, DF: Siglo 
Veintiuno Editores, 1984.
Tello, Carlos, La PoUtica Econdmica en Mexico, 4th edition, Mexico, DF: Siglo 
Ventiuno, 1980.
Ten Kate, Adriaan, ‘Trade Liberalization and Economic Stabilization in Mexico: 
Lessons of Experience,’ World Development, Vol. 20, No. 5, May 1992.
Thorp, Rosemary (ed.), Latin America in the 1930's: The Role o f the Periphery in 
World Crisis, London: Macmillan Press, 1984.
Torres, Blanca and Falk, Pamela S., (coordinadoras), La Adhesidn de Mixico al 
GATT, Mexico, DF: El Colegio de Mexico, 1989.
Toye, John, Dilemmas o f Development, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987.
Truman, David, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion 
New York, NY: Knopf, 1951.
Tussie, Diane, The Less Developed Countries and the World Trading System: A  
Challenge to the GATT, London: Frances Pinter, 1987.
Veljanovski, Cento, ‘Foreword,* in Andrew Gamble (ed.), Ideas, Interests & 
Consequences, London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1989.
Wallerstein, Immanuel, The Modem World-System, Vols. 1 and 2. New York,
NY: Academic Press, 1974 and 1978.
Wallerstein, Immanuel, ‘The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist 
System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis,* Comparative Studies in 
Society and History, Vol. 16, No. 3, September 1974.
Waltz, Kenneth, Man, State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press, 1954.
Waltz, Kenneth, ‘Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to 
My Critics,’ in Robert Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics, New 
York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1986.
Waltz, Kenneth, Theory o f International Politics, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 
1979.
Weber, Max, ‘Politics as a Vocation,* in H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds),
Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, 7th ed., Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1970.
Weintraub, Sidney, Free Trade between Mexico and the United States?, 
Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 1984.
Weintraub, Sidney, A Marriage o f Convenience: Relations Between Mexico and 
the United States, Twentieth Century Fund Report, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1990.
Weintraub, Sidney, Mexican Trade Policy and the North American Community,
Significant Issues Series, Vol. X, No. 14, Washington, DC: The Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, 1988.
Weintraub, Sidney, ‘The North American Free Trade Debate,’ The Washington 
Quarterly, Autumn 1990.
283
Trade Liberalization in Mexico Bibliography
Weiss, John, ‘Trade Liberalization in Mexico in the 1980s,’ Institute of Latin 
American Studies Lecture, Mexico Seminar, 8 December 1992.
Whee Rhee, Yung, A Framework fo r  Export Policy and Administration: Lessons 
from the East Asian Experiences, Washington, DC: World Bank, 1984.
White, Russell N., State, Class, and the Nationalization o f the Mexican Banks, 
New York, NY: Taylor and Francis, 1992.
Wichtrich, Al R., ‘Mexican-American Commercial Relations,* in Robert McBride 
(ed.), Mexico and the United States, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall 
Inc., 1981.
Wyman, Donald I,., Mexico's Economic Crisis: Challenges and Opportunities, 
Monograph Series 12, Center for US-Mexican Studies, San Diego, CA: 
University of California, San Diego, 1983.
284
Trade Liberalization in Mexico Bibliography
Newspapers and periodicals
Banamex: Review o f the Economic Situation o f Mexico
Bulletin o f Latin American Research
Business America
Business Mexico
CEPAL Review
Business Week International
Commercio Exterior (Mexico City)
El DIa (Mexico City)
Economia de America Latina
Economia Informa
The Economist (London)
ElU ’s Country Profile Mexico (London)
Estudios Politicos 
Euromoney
Examen (Mexico City)
Exc&lsior (Mexico City)
Expansidn (Mexico City)
Financial Times (Ixjndon)
Finance & Development 
Foreign Affairs
Foreign Broadcast Information Service 
Foreign Policy 
Foro Intemacional 
Government and Opposition 
The Guardian (London)
Inter-American Economic Affairs
International Herald Tribune
Journal o f Development Studies
Journal o f Interamerican Affairs
Journal o f Interamerican Studies and World Affairs
Journal o f Latin American Studies
Latin American Perspectives
Latin American Regional Report: Mexico and Central America
Latin American Regional Report: Mexico & NAFTA Report
Latin American Research Review
Latin American Special Report
Latin American Weekly Report
Mexican-American Review
Mexico Journal
Mexico Forum
El Nacional (Mexico City)
Newsweek 
New York Times
285
Trade Liberalization in Mexico Bibliography
Proceso
Revista Mexicana de Gencias PoUtica y Sociales 
Revista Mexicana de Sociologia 
Teoria y Polftica 
Time
El Trimestre Economico 
Wall Street Journal (New York)
Washington Post 
World Development 
World Policy Journal 
World Politics
Interviews
Bastian, Walter, Director of Latin America, US Department of Commerce, 
Washington, DC, 15 April 1993.
Dacher, Paul, Mexico Office, US Department of Commerce, Washington, DC,
15 April 1993.
Mohar, Gustavo, Pemex London and Former Assistant to the Minister of Finance, 
Jesus Silva Herzog, London, 11 May 1992.
Silva Herzog, Jesus, Minister of Finance (1982 to 1986), Madrid, Spain, 21 May 
1992.
Confidential Interview 1, Ministry of Trade, Mexico City, 14 July 1992.
Confidential Interview 2, Ministry of the Presidency, Mexico City, July and 
August 1992.
Confidential Interview 3, former advisor to President de la Madrid, Mexico City, 
13 August 1992.
Confidential Interview 4, US Embassy, Mexico City, 4 August 1992.
Confidential Interview 5, Mexican Embassy, London, 6 September 1991.
Confidential Interview 6, NAFTA negotiator for the Mexican Ministry of Trade, 
Mexico City, 18 July 1992.
286
Trade Liberalization in Mexico Bibliography
Government and Other Official Publications
Mexican Publications
Banco de Mexico, The Mexican Economy 1985, Mexico, DF: Banco de Mexico, 
May 1985.
Banco de Mexico, The Mexican Economy 1985 - Supplement, Mexico, DF: Banco 
de Mexico, October, 1985.
Banco de Mexico, The Mexican Economy 1986, Mexico, DF: Banco de Mexico, 
June 1986.
Banco de Mexico, The Mexican Economy 1987, Mexico, DF: Banco de Mexico,
1987.
Gobiemo de Mdxico, Diario Oficial, Organo del Gobiemo Constitutional de los 
Estados Unidos Mexicanos, various years.
Gobiemo de Mexico, Mexican Agenda, 12th edition, Mdxico, DF: Direction de 
Publicaciones, July 1991.
Gobiemo de Mdxico, El Programa Inmediato de Reordenacion Economica y La 
Accion Economica Intemacional de M ixico, Mexico, DF: Presidencia de la 
Republica, enero 1983.
Gobiemo de Mdxico, Las Razones y  Las Obras: Gobiemo de Miguel de la 
Madrid, Direccidn: Alejandra Lajous, Mexico, DF: Fondo de Cultura 
Econdmica, Primer ano, 1984; Segundo aho, 1985; Tercer ano, 1986; and 
Cuartro ano, 1987.
Presidencia de la Republica, Diccionario Biogrdfico del Gobiemo Mexicano, 
Unidad de la Crdnica Presidencial, Mexico, DF: Fondo de Cultura 
Econdmica, 1987, 1989.
Presidencia de la Republica, El Programa Inmediato de Reordenacion Economica 
y La Accion Economica Intemacional de Mexico, Hatelolco, DF: PR, 17 
de diciembre de 1982.
Presidencia de la Republica, La Politica de Comercio Exterior y Opciones de 
Negociacion International, Mexico, DF: PR, septiembre 1984.
PRI/IEPES, Instmmentos de la Political Commercial, Mexico, DF: PRI/IEPES, 
marzo 1982.
SECOFI, The National Program fo r Promoting Industry and Foreign Trade 1984- 
88, Mexico, DF: Secretariat of Commerce and Industrial Promotion, 1984.
SECOFI, Understanding Concerning Trade in Certain Steel products between the 
Government o f United Mexican States and the government o f the United 
States, Mexico, DF: SECOFI, October 1984.
SPP, National Development Plan 1983-88 Federal Executive Branch Summary 
Mexico, DF: Ministry of Planning and Budget, May 1983.
287
Trade Liberalization in Mexico Bibliography
United States Publications
US Comptroller General, Prospects fo r a Stronger US-Mexico Energy
Relationship, Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, 1 May 1980.
US Congress, Twentieth Mexico - United States Interparliamentary Conference, 
Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1980.
US Congress, Twenty-Eighth Mexico - United States Interparliamentary
Conference, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1988.
US Congress, Twenty-First Mexico-United States Interparliamentary Conference, 
Manzanillo, Colima, Mexico, 12-13 June 1981 Washington, DC:
GPO, May, 1982.
US Congress, Twenty-Fourth Mexico-United States Interparliamentary Conference, 
18-19 May 1984, Washington, DC: GPO, December 1984.
US Congress, Twenty-Second Mexico-United States Interparliamentary Conference, 
Santa Barbara, California, 28-29 May 1982, Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, June 1983.
US Congress, Twenty-Six Mexico - United States Interparliamentary Conference, 
Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1986.
US Congress, Twenty-Third Mexico-United States Interparliamentary Conference, 
Puebla, Mexico, 8-10 July 1983, Washington, DC: May 1984.
US Department of Commerce, North American Free Trade Negotiations: Most 
Frequently Asked Questions and Their Answers, Washington, DC: US 
Department of Commerce, Office of Mexico, 14 February 1991.
US Department of State, Department o f State Bulletin, Washington, DC: Bureau 
of Public Affairs, Department of State, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986.
US Department of State, U.S.-Mexican Relations, Washington, DC: US 
Government Printing Office, 10 June 1981.
US International Trade Commission, The Likely Impact on the United States o f a 
Free Trade Agreement With Mexico, USITC Publication 2353, Washington, 
DC: United States International Trade Commission, February 1991.
US International Trade Commission, Review o f Trade and Investment
Liberalization Measures by Mexico and Prospects fo r  Future United States
- Mexican Relations: Phase I: Recent Trade and Investment Reforms 
Undertaken by Mexico and Implications fo r the United States, Washington, 
DC: US International Trade Commission, April 1990.
US International Trade Commission, Review o f Trade and Investment
Liberalization Measures by Mexico and Prospects fo r  Future United States
- Mexican Relations: Phase II: Summary o f Views on Prospects fo r  Future 
United States-Mexico Relations, Investigation No. 332-282. Washington, 
DC: US International Trade Commission, October, 1990.
US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Economic Development in Mexico, 
Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986.
US Trade Representative, NAFTA Review, Vol. 1, Issue 1, January 1992.
US Trade Representative, Review o f US-Mexico Environmental Issues,
Washington, DC: US Trade Representative, February 1992.
288
i
